Essays in Bayānī Political Ontology

Wahid Azal

Essays in Bayānī Political Ontology


محمد
علی
فاطمة
اللہ
حسن
حسین
بسم اللہ الرحمن الرحیم الحمد للہ رب العالمین الرحمن الرحیم مالک یوم الدین ایاک نعبد وایاک نستعین اہدنا الصراط المستقیم صراط الذین انعمت علیہم غیر المغضوب علیہم ولا الضالین
اللہ نور السماوات والارض
قسم والتین والزیتون
قسم والشمس وضحٰہا
قسم والفجر
قسم والضحیٰ
قسم والعصر

Essays in Bayānī

Political Ontology

Library of the Greatest Name (*ism al-aʿẓam*), Vol. 13 © 2026.

Eastern Coast, Australia.

Illustrations: *Haykal* by Wahid Azal © 2014; *Haykal* by the Bāb; the NUR Calligram © 2008; the *Eye Of God* by Wahid Azal © 2017; the *Square of Hana'il* by Wahid Azal © 2017; the *Hand of Fatimiya* by Wahid Azal and Habibollah Shahbazi © 2016.

Azal, Wahid, 1971-.

Essays in Bayānī Political Ontology.

Wahid Azal. – 1st edition.

ISBN: 978-1-7644547-1-1 (e-book)

1. Azalī Bābism 2. Bāb, Siyyid ʿAlī Muḥammad Shīrāzī (d. 1850).
3. Bayān. 4. Fanon, Frantz (d. 1961). 5. Metaphysics.
6. Political Theory. 7. Ontology. 8. Religion.

Copyright © 2025 Wahid Azal and Library of the Greatest Name (*ism al-aʿẓam*), Eastern Coast (Brisbane), Australia.

libraryofthegreatestname8@protonmail.com

All Rights Reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted without permission of the author and publisher.

At one word from You, night forgot the sun;
Dawn lost its road when Your appearing shone!

You sought no throne, no army, crown, or sword—
Yet time itself before Your step was undone!

The pen lay broken; law fell mute and bare;
Silence turned mirror where your glance had won!

They thought the rope would finish what You were—
The gallows bloomed a lamp where You had shone!

All speech collapsed where seeing first began;
Tongues failed the Truth the eye alone had known!

No witness this, no modest claim of sight:
Face answering Face, two yet wholly One!

Not source nor copy—Light knows only Light:
I am Thee and thou art Me—the Bāb made this One!

به یک کلام تو شب راه خاک را گم کرد
سپیده ماند کجا چون ظهور تو رقم کرد

نه تخت خواستی و نه سپاه و نه تیغ
جهان زگام تو بی اختیار مسلم کرد

قلم شکست شریعت به لرزه افتاد
سکوت آینه شد چون نگاه تو دم کرد

به دار خواستند آن نور را فرو بندند
ولی همان طنابش چراغ محکم کرد

سخن فرو ریخت آن جا که دیدن آغازید
نظر بساط جدل های وهم را گم کرد

نه دعوی و نه گواهی رخ اندر رخ
که چهره چهره را در خویش پیدا کرد

نه اصل و نه مثال نور با نور است
منم تو و تو منی باب این را مجسم کرد

Siyyid ʿAlī Muḥammad Shīrāzī, the Primal Point, the Bāb (d. 1850)





Frantz Fanon (d. 1961)

Fanon said: name the wound—let worlds collapse in flame,
The Bāb said: when names dissolve, God comes without a name!

One said: empire nests itself inside the skin,
The other: burn the self till Truth breaks in!

Fanon saw the body as the battlefield of lies,
The Bāb saw letters blaze where every limit dies!

One said: freedom starts where suffering is known,
The other: faith begins when time itself is overthrown!

No patient peace, no masters' ordered plan,
No law that teaches how to live inside the ban!

The Bāb and Fanon—one cry, one sword, one breath:
Either justice ends the world,
or the world earns death!


نبأ

Contents

Transliterations xv

Prologomenon xvii
• Political Ontology xxi
• The *Islamaic* Counterpoint xxix
• The Myth of the "Failed Messiah": xxxviii
A Civilizational Double Standard

Notes xlv

1: The Primal Point: 1
From the Bābī Revolution to
the Bahā'ī Counter-Revolution
• On the function of the Baha'i misrendering
of amnaʿ (أمنع) 22
• Red Bābism vs. Black Bābism: 30
Revelation, Martyrdom, and the Betrayal of the Bayān

Notes 38

2: Being Prior to Language: 66
Heidegger and Postmodernism;
the Bāb and Existential Linguistic
Sublation
• The Linguistic Abyss and the Death 69
Of Judgement
• The Bāb's Revelation against Linguistic 81
Idolatry

Notes 91

3: A Bayānī Commentary on Malcolm X's "*I Have a Nightmare*" 95
• Liberal Pluralism, Capital, and the Fiction of Tolerance 99
• "I Have a Nightmare": Malcolm X As Political Economist 101
• Attempted Liberal Capture of the Bayān: Epistemic Domestication, White {Mis}Innocence, and the Denial of Power 101
• A Fanonian Indictment of White Settler Epistemology in recent framings 105
• Nightmare, Judgement, and the Refusal of Innocence 109
Notes 112

4: A Note on Rousseau and the Bayān: A Dialogue on Property, Law, and the Origin of Inequality 114
• Bahāʾuʾllāh's About Face 116
• Conclusion 118
Notes 120

5: The Four Elements and the End of Political Economy: The Bayān versus Marxism 122
• The Ontological Contrast 127
• Bahā'ism's Counter-Revolution 129
•Bayānī Political Economy as Critique of Marxian LTV (The Labor Theory of Value) 132
•A Bayānī Critique of the LTV (The Labor Theory of Value) 135
• Contra Eco-Marxism *As It Is*: Why the Bayān Exceeds Mere Ecological Critique 137
• Toward a Bayānī Theory of Use Without Value and Beyond Marx, Beneath Capital 138
• The Wretched of the Corporate State: 140

Bayānī Prohibition and the Racialised Subject
• How the Bayān Abolishes the Marxian Category of "Class" 142

Notes 145

6: The Collapse of Natural Justice 147
A Bayānī Perspective
• Conclusion: From Post-Juridical Noise to Bayānī Decision 158

Notes 162

7: A Fanonian Reading of the 164
19 Commandments and Epilogue
• Epilogue 200

Notes 210

Select Bibliography 214



Transliterations

Unless noted otherwise, here we will be using a slightly amended version to the standard **Library of Congress** system in the romanization of Arabic and Persian,[1] which is now prevalent throughout all related disciplines. In transliteration, where relevant, note that the definite article in Arabic will not be elided. Thus, for instance, '*the remembrance*' will be romanized as *al-dhikr* (الذّكر) rather than *adh-dhikr* and similar. We have generally preferred not to capitalize Arabic and Persian transliterations. However, capitalization will also occur whenever warranted. As in the past, in English translation we refer to the Divinity with the capitalized 'It' and only use the gendered pronouns 'She' or 'He' when we are referring to the level of a divine theophany's human *locus*.

[1] Readers unfamiliar with this system, should consult the online resources, here https://www.loc.gov/catdir/cpso/romanization/arabic.pdf and here, https://www.loc.gov/catdir/cpso/romanization/persian.pdf (retrieved 1 September 2025).

Prologomenon

لَا إِلٰهَ إِلَّا اللهُ حَقًّا حَقًّا

بِسْمِ اللهِ الْأَمْنَعِ الْأَقْدَسِ

اللَّهُمَّ أَرِنَا حَقَائِقَ الْأَشْيَاءِ كَمَا هِيَ

O God, show us the realities of things as they truly are! ~ Prophetic saying

We write at a moment when the postwar liberal international order has effectively collapsed—from Washington to Caracas, Kiev to Tehran, and beyond.[1] The juridical fictions that once constrained power now persist largely as ornamentation or rhetoric, invoked selectively by those best positioned to violate them.[2] Sovereignty is overridden by necessity, legality by expedience, and norms by force, while institutions meant to arbitrate conflict function increasingly as *after-the-fact* legitimators rather than real restraints. What presents itself as "crisis" is in fact exposure: the revelation that the order in question depended less on law than on asymmetries of power temporarily held in check. The present conjuncture therefore marks not a deviation from the system's logic, but its consummation

because, as we would argue, the West's political ontology was always flawed to begin with. It rested on a metaphysics that reduced reality to administrable objects, persons to legal fictions, and justice to procedural compliance rather than ontological truth, let alone the "freedom" and "liberty" it professes. Once power was unmoored from any transcendent or substantive account of the Real, law could only ever function as an instrument of management—binding the weak, while remaining perpetually negotiable for the strong.

The present work emerges as a work of political theory, analytical jurisprudence, applied traditional metaphysics to contemporary social theory, theology, critique and historiography all at once. It both builds upon our previous work as well as clearing an opening for future ones where we will be dealing more extensively and critically with the subject of *theophanocracy* as a liberation theosophy. For present purposes, this prologomenon stands as the larger orientation for the topics being covered in this particular volume, and so the reader is urged to pay special attention to a few of its notes below. These notes are not preliminary in the sense of being dispensable; they articulate the conceptual horizon within which the arguments that follow can be properly understood. They establish the ontological and juridical presuppositions that govern the inquiry, clarifying the sense in which political order, law, and authority are here treated as expressions of deeper metaphysical commitments. Read in this light, the prolegomenon functions not merely as an introduction, but as a threshold through which the entire work must be entered.

But one presupposition in what we write is the following: From Athens onward, Western democracy was never born as a neutral extension of equality. Athenian democracy rested on slavery, imperial tribute, and the exclusion of women, foreigners, and the poor; its freedom for some was sustained by coercion over others. In Britain, parliamentary democracy emerged not through peaceful consensus but through civil war, regicide, colonial conquest, enclosure, and the violent disciplining of labor. Rights were not granted so much as wrested from below—and then carefully delimited to preserve property and hierarchy. In North America (as well as in Australasia), democracy was forged through settler colonial violence, chattel slavery, Indigenous dispossession, and later imperial

expansion, with constitutional order stabilizing these realities rather than abolishing them. As such, Western liberal democracy has historically functioned as a technology for domesticating violence, redistributing it away from the center and outward—toward colonies, racialized populations, the poor and the excluded—while presenting itself internally as peaceful, lawful, and consensual. The contradiction is structural: liberal democracy promises popular sovereignty, yet depends on prior exclusions that define who "the people" are allowed to be. Until that tension is confronted ontologically rather than morally, Western democracy's endemic violence remains not an aberration, but its very condition of being. One might therefore say that liberal democracy, as historically instantiated, has less often abolished domination than reformatted it, translating overt coercion into legal form, economic necessity, and administrative rationality. Violence does not disappear; it is displaced—into borders, policing, property regimes, debt, and imperial peripheries—where it can be rendered invisible to the *demos* itself. The celebratory narrative of democratic progress thus depends on a selective amnesia, one that treats violence as pre-democratic or accidental rather than as constitutive.[3] To recover this history is not to reject popular self-rule as such, but to refuse the myth that liberal democracy arrives innocent of blood or stands outside power's ontology. So given this, the transition of liberal democracy into the corporate administrative state that it has become now is, to us, a natural inevitability that the internal contradictions within liberalism itself generated—for the corporate administrative state is to Western liberal democracy what communism was supposed to be to socialism.

Be that as it may, to end this state of things globally will require more than a change of administrations in the metropole or a revival of procedural norms. It will require the creation of countervailing power capable of imposing real costs upon predation—legal, economic, and political—so that impunity ceases to be rational for empires and their corporate auxiliaries. Multipolarism and the **BRICS** as presently conceived will not offer that because it will require a reconstitution of economic sovereignty at the level of the commons itself: resources, labor, land, and information must be withdrawn from regimes of limitless extraction and re-placed under forms of trusteeship that cannot be dissolved

by debt, privatization, "development" rhetoric, imperial war, or changing the locus of the metropole from London, Paris and New York to Beijing, Seoul or Tokyo. Yet even these measures will remain fragile so long as the underlying metaphysics persists: a political ontology that treats persons as administrable units and the earth as raw material will endlessly regenerate new legalities for domination. The deeper work, therefore, is ontological as much as institutional—an outward reconstruction of law and economy grounded in an inward correction of what the modern order has taken reality to be. Such a correction cannot be achieved through technocratic adjustment or moral exhortation alone, because it demands a rupture at the level where legitimacy itself is generated. What must be displaced is the modern assumption that order precedes truth, that stability justifies violence, and that procedural legality can substitute for justice. In place of this, the work ahead requires a reorientation toward an order in which power is secondary to the Real, law is answerable to ontological limits, and authority derives from true guardianship[4] rather than domination. Only from within such a re-founded horizon can resistance cease to be merely reactive and become generative—capable not only of opposing the present configuration of power, but of rendering it obsolete by withdrawing the metaphysical ground on which it stands.

What follows here in the prologomenon, then, does not proceed by policy prescription or reformist proposal, but by *phenomenological excavation*. The analyses that unfold are intended to expose the ontological grammar that silently structures modern Western liberal mentality, and to measure it against older metaphysical horizons that refused to separate power from truth. By situating contemporary political forms within this deeper register, the work seeks to render visible what is ordinarily naturalized: without even naming them, the metaphysical violence embedded in seemingly neutral institutions. Only from within such a clarified horizon can the question of *liberation*—juridical, political, theological, and metaphysical—be posed with any rigor at all in future works. Such excavation is necessarily unsettling, for it demands that what presents itself as rational, humane, and inevitable be confronted as contingent, constructed, and *historically violent*.[5] It calls into question not merely particular policies or doctrines, but the deeper assumptions

about reality, authority, and order that make those policies appear self-evident. In this sense, the task undertaken here is preparatory but uncompromising: it clears the ground upon which any genuine discourse of emancipation must be built, even if that clearing requires the dismantling of categories long treated as *untouchable*.

Political Ontology

Now, political ontology concerns the mode of being presupposed by a political order.[6] It asks not how power is exercised, but what *must already be the case* for power to be intelligible and operative at all.[7] Every political system assumes a prior configuration of reality—what exists, what endures, what may be transformed, and what may not. Sovereignty, property, ownership, citizenship, class, gender, violence, and legitimacy are not merely institutional facts; they are expressions of an underlying ontology that determines whether the world appears as a field of sacred trusts, finite resources, administrable populations, or disposable matter. It precedes ideology, law, and economics. It operates at the level where the basic terms of reality are already decided: what a "person" is, what counts as "nature," whether value is intrinsic or exchangeable, whether authority is immanent or transcendent, whether time is cyclical, progressive, or terminal. Ideologies narrate these assumptions, laws stabilize them, and economic systems instrumentalize them—but none of these domains generate the ontological ground they presuppose. Political ontology as we are defining it here is thus *not a belief-system* but the silent grammar that makes belief, legality, ideology, and economic rationality possible at all.

Political ontology therefore defines what entities *may act* and *be acted upon* politically. Every political order draws an ontological boundary around agency and passivity: who may *speak*, who may *decide*, who may *own*, who may be *sacrificed*, and what may be *extracted*, *traded*, or *destroyed* without remainder. Humans may be reduced to labor-units, populations to statistics, land to resource, bodies to risk-factors, or elements to commodities—or, alternatively, persons, places, and forces may be treated as ontically inviolable. These are not ethical choices layered onto a neutral world; they are ontological

decisions about what kinds of beings exist in the political field and what kinds of relations to them are permitted. And it structures power as a fact of being, not merely of coercion. Power persists most effectively when it no longer appears as power, but as *reality itself*. By shaping what feels "natural," "inevitable," or "rational," a political ontology embeds domination into perception, habit, and common sense. Coercion enforces order at its limits, but ontology sustains it from within: it determines the horizons of the thinkable and the livable, such that alternatives appear unrealistic, utopian, or unintelligible before they are even contested.

In Bayānī terms,[8] political ontology is not a theory about power but a disclosure of the *rank of being* within which power may or may not appear at all. The Bayān begins by *re-situating* existence itself: all things are signs (*āyāt*) whose reality is measured not by utility, exchange, or administration, but by proximity to the Divine Command. To wit,

> ...It has not commanded any one of the existential possibilities (*mumkināt*)[9] except through the noesis (*maʿrifat*) of its own Logos-Self (*nafs*) and the affirmation of the Unicity (*tawḥīd*) of the inmost Reality of Its Being; for everything other than It is a created thing in Its Presence, having been created by Its Command (*amr*). Truly, to It belongs the creation and the Command, from before and after—that is Lord of the worlds! [10]

From this standpoint, politics is not primary; it is *derivative*. A political order is valid only insofar as it conforms to the ontological truth of creation as trust (*amāna*), not as possession. The question is therefore not "*who rules*?" but "*what mode of being has been assumed as real?*"—for any regime that misrecognizes the ontological status of the world already stands outside legitimacy, regardless of its procedures or laws. This is why, per the **11th Gate of the 9th Unity**,[11] the Bayān's categorical prohibition on the buying and selling of the Four Elements—earth, water, air, and fire—is not an economic injunction but an

ontological *verdict*. The Bayān's political ontology thus can be said to revolve around this centrifugal axis, because these elements are held not as commodities since they are not *things* in the commonly understood modern sense; they are the primordial conditions of Manifestation (*ẓuhūr*) through which bodies, lives, and worlds appear. In Marxian terms, it is the base of Bayānī political economy. Thus, to render these elements into objects of exchange is to commit an ontological error: it treats the conditions of existence as alienable property rather than as divine trusts held in custodianship. In Bayānī terms, a system that commodifies the elements thus does not merely act unjustly; it violates the structure of Being itself. Such a system is therefore *ontologically illegal* because its very mode of existence contradicts the order of creation. The Bayān thus draws an absolute boundary around political agency. No authority—state, market, or collective—may claim sovereignty over what God has placed beyond ownership. When earth becomes "real estate," water a "utility," air a "carbon market," and fire an "energy asset," the political order has already crossed from governance into *metaphysical transgression*. This is not a matter of ethics or regulation; it is a *falsification of reality*. The Bayān names this falsification in advance as *negation* (*nafy*)[12] and withdraws recognition from any regime built on it. Power that rests on ontological falsehood is therefore not merely oppressive; it is void. In other words, in this perspective the structure of the current human world is one built upon and animated by a metaphysical inversion and so an ontological illegitimacy.

Given this, by implication the Bayān understands domination as something that embeds itself into the texture of a world built upon Western capitalism because this world is one animated by negation (*nafy*) of all first principles. For his part, Ibn ʿArabī would say that this is a civilization inordinately imbalanced leaning towards non-existence (*ʿadam*) than Being (*wujūd*). When people come to experience the buying and selling of the elements as normal, inevitable, or rational, ontology has already been colonized and so, in some sense, negated from proper alignment and balance with first principles. Coercion becomes secondary and is an inevitable derivative of the misalignment while compliance is achieved with this misalignment because the world itself has been *re-presented* as a warehouse of resources and human beings as units of administration within it—this being the very

inversion of what the Qurʾān makes of *veridical humanicity* as the "*vicegerent of God on earth*" (**38:26**).[13] Against this, the Bayān does not propose reform or redistribution. It introduces *rupture*. By declaring the Four Elements inalienable, it collapses the metaphysical ground on which Western capitalist sovereignty stands. What follows is not an alternative policy but the *re-emergence* of another world—one in which legitimacy flows from ontological fidelity rather than from force, consensus, or accumulation. In this sense, the Bayān is not a critique of political economy as it is currently stands in political theory. Instead, it is its very annulment. It does not argue that the modern order is immoral. It declares that it does not *exist rightly*. And in Bayānic logic, what lacks ontological right lacks the intrinsic right to rule at all. Thus in Akbarian terms, the (post)modern Western capitalist (dis)order is the manifestation of the Divine Name "the Misleader" (*al-muḍill*).[14]

Now, contemporary discussions of political ontology—ranging from Heidegger's account of *world-disclosure* and *being-in-common*,[15] through Arendt's conception of the *world* as the condition of politics,[16] to Agamben's analyses of sovereignty and bare life,[17] Esposito's work on community and immunization,[18] and more recent anthropological approaches associated with Bruno Latour,[19] Philippe Descola,[20] and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro[21]—share a common intuition: that *politics presupposes an ontology*. Power, law, and legitimacy are intelligible only against prior assumptions about life, materiality, subjectivity, and the real. In these frameworks, political conflict is increasingly understood as a struggle over worlds, over what is allowed to count as *nature*, *person*, *resource*, or *community*. Yet in most of these approaches, ontology remains descriptive or diagnostic. It reveals the conditions under which political forms arise, but it rarely functions as a criterion capable of invalidating a political order at the level of Being itself. By contrast, the Bayān does not treat ontology as a neutral horizon to be mapped, pluralized, or indefinitely negotiated. It advances an ontological judgment. Existence is disclosed as entrusted manifestation rather than alienable matter, and this disclosure carries juridical force at the most fundamental level. Political authority, on this view, does not derive primarily from consent, procedure, or efficacy, but from correspondence to truth at the level of being. Where much contemporary political ontology remains post-foundational—exposing hidden assumptions while

suspending ultimate verdicts—the Bayān is unapologetically foundational in a different sense: its ground is ontological rank, proximity to Reality as such, rather than coherence within an internally consistent system.

This difference becomes clearest around *property* and *economy*. Modern political ontology, even in its critical and decolonial forms, typically treats ownership, commodification, and extraction as historical, ethical, or ecological problems.[22] The Bayān treats them as *ontological errors*. By prohibiting the buying and selling of the Four Elements, it denies that the conditions of manifestation themselves can ever become objects of exchange. This is not a regulative intervention within political economy, but a refusal of the metaphysical assumption that renders political economy possible in its modern form. From within this horizon, capitalist legality is not merely unjust; it is unreal, sustained by an inversion of first principles. So where contemporary theory often locates politics in openness, deferral, and perpetual contestation—whether through proceduralism, pluralism, or post-sovereign negotiation—the Bayān insists on the *legitimacy of decision*. Not decision as authoritarian closure, but decision as the refusal to suspend truth indefinitely within procedural time. The modern administrative order governs by postponement, dispersing responsibility through process, jurisdiction, and neutrality until judgment itself becomes unthinkable. The Bayān names the point at which deferral becomes illegitimate. It does not seek inclusion within existing grammars of legitimacy, nor does it aim to pluralize them. It displaces them by insisting that a shared world requires ontological coherence, and that without a decision about what is real, politics collapses into management. In this sense, the Bayān does not merely participate in contemporary debates on political ontology; it confronts them with a demand they are structurally trained to evade.

That stated, it should be understood that our work does not proceed from European existentialism, nor does it treat Islamic metaphysics as a decorative supplement to modern theory. It begins from the conviction that certain intellectual traditions—specifically those of Suhrawardī (d. 1191), Ibn ʿArabī (d. 1240), Mullā Ṣadrā (d. 1641), al-Aḥsāʾī (d. 1826) and

the Bāb (d. 1850)—offer a phenomenological depth and ontological precision that modern social theory lacks, particularly when confronted with contemporary forms of power that operate without spectacle, repression, or overt coercion. As such, this specific collection of essays should be read as a supplement to ***The Wretched of the Corporate State: A Fanonian Essay*** (2025). Thus, what the essays here undertake is a deliberate act of translation into the language of critique, and one conducted from the side of these traditions rather than from within the epistemic sovereignty of modern theory. The critical vocabulary is retooled under the pressure of Illuminationist, Akbarian, Ṣadrian, Shaykhī, and finally Bayānī ontologies, such that critique no longer presumes the modern subject, economy, or state as its implicit horizon. In this sense, translation becomes an instrument of reversal: modern power is rendered intelligible only insofar as it can be measured against ontological registers that it neither generated nor can fully absorb.

Now, modern existentialism, from Kierkegaard (d. 1855) through Heidegger (d. 1976) and Sartre (d. 1980), frames the problem of existence primarily in terms of subjectivity: *anxiety*, *choice*, *freedom*, *authenticity* and *alienation*.[23] Its central drama unfolds between the individual consciousness and a world experienced as absurd, hostile, or indifferent. This framework was historically indispensable, but it remains bound to a narrow ontological horizon. It presupposes a flat world of beings, a homogeneous field of appearance, and a conception of power that must announce itself through prohibition, violence, or bad faith in order to be recognized as such. As a result, modern existentialism remains structurally tied to a conception of power that is episodic, confrontational, legible, and, above all, Anglo-European at the level of experience. In this, power is something that interrupts freedom rather than something that configures its horizon in advance; it is encountered as an obstacle, a command, or a falsification, not as an ambient condition that quietly shapes what can appear as reasonable, actionable, or even thinkable. This leaves existentialism poorly equipped to account for regimes of governance in which domination is exercised not by saying "no," but by saying "not yet," "not here," or "not within this

framework." Where power operates through delay, deferral, procedural fragmentation, and the multiplication of neutral-seeming processes, the existentialist vocabulary of authenticity and choice begins to lose traction.

Moreover, by centering existence on the drama of decision, modern existentialism implicitly assumes that the subject stands before the world as a more or less intact agent, capable of recognizing his or her situation and responding to it through resolve. What it does not adequately theorize is the *slow deformation* of the subject itself: the ways in which perception, expectation, and moral intuition are recalibrated over time by institutional environments that never present themselves as adversaries. In such contexts, the subject is not confronted with an absurd world so much as absorbed into a managed one, where harm accrues without spectacle, responsibility is endlessly redistributed, and the very criteria by which injustice might be named are rendered opaque. The existential vocabulary of anguish and bad faith falters here, because there is no decisive moment of confrontation—only a continuous thinning of meaning, agency, and judgment. This limitation is not a failure of insight so much as a consequence of this existentialism's ontological commitment to its *europeanicity*. By presupposing a uniform plane of being and a subject–world opposition culturally-bound as the primary site of philosophical drama, it cannot easily accommodate a *ontotheocentric*[24]*-metadeocentric*[25] reality structured by gradation, mediation, and unequal intensities of appearance. Power that operates through atmosphere rather than command, through calibration rather than repression, and through normalization rather than prohibition remains largely invisible within this frame. It is precisely this invisibility—this capacity of power to function without declaring itself—that defines the contemporary corporate-administrative order (which, by and large, is now global), and it is here that modern existentialism reaches the edge of its explanatory reach and exhausts itself in deriving new meaning to this proverbial *crisis of the postmodern world*.

The contemporary corporate-administrative order of Western liberal democracies does not conform to this model. It rarely forbids. It seldom represses directly. It does not declare enemies. Instead, it governs through procedures, platforms, deferrals,

classifications, and jurisdictional partitions all the while smiling at the victim it administratively disfigures. Harm is acknowledged abstractly while responsibility is endlessly displaced. Violence, when it occurs, is cumulative, atmospheric, and difficult to localize. A phenomenology that begins and ends with conscious choice or subjective authenticity is therefore insufficient to grasp what is taking place here. Accordingly, and as was argued in the **Wretched of the Corporate State**, the corporate-administrative order must be understood less as a regime of overt domination than as an environment of managed indeterminacy. Its power lies not in issuing commands but in organizing pathways: directing conduct through forms, protocols, interfaces, and timelines that appear neutral precisely because they present themselves as *technical* rather than political. Decisions are fragmented across agencies, platforms, and jurisdictions in such a way that no single site can be identified as responsible for outcomes that are nevertheless predictable and patterned. The subject encounters not a sovereign will to which resistance might be addressed, but a labyrinth of processes in which every response is acknowledged, logged, and deferred, yet never allowed to culminate in judgment.

Within this architecture, harm accrues without ever crystallizing into an event. Injury is dispersed across time, administered incrementally through delays, requirements, exclusions, and conditionalities that rarely rise to the threshold of legal or moral emergency. Because each step appears minor, reversible, or procedurally justified, the cumulative effect remains difficult to name as *violence* at all. What is experienced instead is attrition: exhaustion replaces outrage, compliance substitutes for consent, and the erosion of dignity proceeds without any single moment that would authorize refusal. Power thus operates not by negating agency outright, but by exhausting the conditions under which agency could be meaningfully exercised. This mode of governance also reconfigures the field of visibility. By continuously offering explanations, apologies, and channels of recourse, it saturates the space of appearance with communicative gestures that simulate responsiveness while preventing decisive action. The subject is encouraged to speak, to submit, to appeal, and to participate, yet every act of participation is folded back into the

system as further data, further process, further delay. What appears as openness is in fact a form of *containment*: speech is permitted precisely because it has been rendered inconsequential. In such a setting, resistance that takes the form of assertion, protest, or self-expression is easily absorbed, normalized, or reclassified as procedural noise. In short, we are dealing with an *open Kafkaesque prison*.

For this reason, a phenomenology anchored in the immediacy of choice or the drama of authenticity cannot adequately register the operations of power at work here. The problem is no longer that the subject is forced to act against his or her conscience, but that conscience itself is slowly recalibrated to accommodate what is presented as *unavoidable*. Freedom is not denied; it is *modulated*. Responsibility is not rejected; it is redistributed until it dissolves. To grasp this form of domination requires an ontological account of how environments shape perception, how procedures pre-empt judgment, and how power can sustain itself precisely by refusing the clarity of confrontation. What is at stake is not a single decision but a field of conditioned possibilities within which certain responses come to feel natural, others excessive, and still others literally unthinkable. Domination no longer announces itself as command or prohibition; it installs itself as background, as workflow, as the *taken-for-granted horizon* against which all action must appear reasonable. In this way, power achieves its most stable form not by compelling obedience, but by training subjects to experience compliance as prudence and resistance as irresponsibility.

The *Islamaic* Counterpoint

Islamic existential metaphysics offers a different starting point, a different horizon—a different opening (*Lichtung*) in which light (*Licht*) is not subsequent to disclosure, but identical with the ontological condition of disclosure itself.[26] Rather than beginning from the isolated subject, it begins from *Being as it appears*, and from appearance as already structured, graded, and mediated. Suhrawardī's Illuminationist ontology treats reality as a hierarchy of Light and opacity, in which beings disclose themselves with varying degrees

of intensity.[27] In such a framework, domination need not take the form of negation or repression; it can operate through dimming, refraction, and dispersal. Truth need not be denied in order to be rendered ineffective—it need only be attenuated. Ibn ʿArabī deepens this insight by providing a phenomenology of disclosure (*ẓuhūr*) and veiling (*ḥijāb*) in which concealment is not the absence of appearance but one of its modalities.[28] Forms themselves veil. Excessive articulation obscures as effectively as silence. What appears as neutrality, process, or procedure may function as a veil more total than censorship. This allows us to understand how contemporary institutions can saturate the field with explanations, policies, and responses while preventing judgment from ever taking place. Mullā Ṣadrā's doctrine of transubstantial motion (*ḥaraka al-jawharīya*)[29] provides the temporal ontology required to understand administrative harm. Being is not static; it is always in motion. Transformation occurs gradually, internally, and often imperceptibly. The subject is not crushed in a single act but reshaped over time. Identity drifts. Dignity erodes. Exhaustion replaces defeat. This metaphysics makes intelligible forms of violence that do not culminate in an event and therefore evade recognition within legal or political frameworks oriented toward discrete acts. The Bāb introduces a final, decisive element: ontological rupture. In the Bayān, truth is not deferred, recognition is not negotiated, and legitimacy is not inherited. Authority is grounded in *presence*, not procedure. Law becomes an act of *re-founding* rather than regulation. From this perspective, the corporate-administrative state appears not merely unjust but structurally incompatible with a mode of existence that refuses procedural time, conditional recognition, and incremental validation. This is why such a system cannot assimilate the Bayān except by pathologizing, trivializing, or administratively neutralizing it.

Together, these spiritual thinkers provide a phenomenology capable of grasping domination that does not announce itself as domination; violence that operates without blows; and power that survives by refusing to decide. They allow us to analyze not only what institutions do, but how they configure the very field in which truth, harm, and responsibility appear. In this register, neutrality is not an epistemic mistake but an

ontological strategy; attrition is not failure but governance; and resistance is not first a demand for recognition, but a refusal of the grammar by which recognition is administered. This methodological choice is therefore not antiquarian, confessional, or symbolic. It is analytical. The Islamic existential tradition is mobilized here because it sees what modern theory cannot: that the deepest operations of power occur before *law*, before *politics*, and often before *consciousness* itself. To understand the corporate state we previously described, one must begin not with protest alone, but with the *phenomenology of how reality is made to appear*—and how it is quietly veiled.

What the Bayān especially adds to this constellation is not merely another metaphysical vocabulary, but a decisive clarification of what is at stake when ontology becomes political. Where Suhrawardī, Ibn ʿArabī, and Mullā Ṣadrā provide the resources to perceive graded appearance, veiling, and temporal deformation, the Bayān articulates the conditions under which such deformations must be refused rather than interpreted. It does not merely diagnose the structures by which truth is dimmed or deferred; it names the point at which deferral itself becomes illegitimate. In this sense, the Bayān is not simply descriptive but constitutive: it posits an order of being in which neutrality, postponement, and procedural mediation are no longer viable modes of existence. This is because central to the Bayān is the insistence that justice cannot be deferred to history, consensus, or gradual recognition.[30] Ontological truth, once present, demands immediate reconfiguration of law, economy, and social life. This is why the Bayān does not frame authority as something inherited, delegated, or bureaucratically administered, but as something that appears and compels by virtue of *Presence*. Recognition is not a right to be requested, nor a status to be earned through compliance with existing norms; it is a test that divides, here and now, between receptivity and veiling, Affirmation (*ithbāt*) and negation (*nafy*), Light (*nūr*) and infernal fire (*nār*).

From this perspective, the contemporary administrative order—whose power depends precisely on endless review, jurisdictional fragmentation, and the suspension of final judgment—is not simply unjust but *ontologically evasive*. Thus, the Bayān's political

ontology makes explicit what remains implicit in the earlier Islamic metaphysical tradition: that power operates most effectively not by forbidding action, but by regulating the horizon within which action can appear as meaningful. This is why the Bayān repeatedly targets procedure, commerce, and mediation at their root.[31] Its prohibition of the buying and selling of the four elements—earth, water, air, and fire—is not an ethical recommendation but an ontological intervention, because by removing the elemental conditions of existence from exchange, it abolishes the possibility that life itself can be leveraged, deferred, or rendered conditional.[32] In doing so, it does not eliminate labor or social differentiation, but it dissolves the structural basis of class, domination, and extraction. The Bayān thus names, at the level of Being rather than policy, the point at which exploitation becomes impossible.

Equally decisive is the Bayān's treatment of inclusion and exclusion. Against modern assumptions, exclusion here is not a moral failure but a condition of intelligibility. A polity ordered by a shared ontological grammar cannot incorporate its negation without collapsing into incoherence.[33] This is not sectarianism, but the recognition that judgment requires a common field in which truth can appear as truth.[34] Liberal pluralism, which treats all ontological commitments as commensurable, is revealed from this angle as a strategy of depoliticization: it neutralizes decision by dispersing it across procedures, rights, and interminable dialogue. The Bayān refuses this dispersion. It insists that a just order must be bounded, not because it fears difference, but because it recognizes that justice cannot survive the coexistence of incompatible criteria of legitimacy. In this way, the Bayān brings to completion the critique of the corporate-administrative state that the preceding metaphysical frameworks enable, and which we outlined in our **The Wretched of the Corporate State**. What appears elsewhere as dimming, veiling, or gradual erosion is here named as ontological incompatibility. The administrative state governs by deferral; the Bayān governs by *presence*. The former survives by refusing to decide; the latter begins with decision as the condition of truth. Where modern power presents itself as neutral

management, the Bayān exposes neutrality as a form of domination that precedes coercion and renders resistance unintelligible by absorbing it into process.

This is why the Bayān cannot be integrated into contemporary political theory as one discourse among others. It does not offer critique within the existing grammar of legitimacy; it displaces that grammar altogether. It does not seek recognition from institutions whose authority depends on postponing judgment; it renders those institutions ontologically obsolete. To read the Bayān politically is therefore not to extract a program or a theology, but to encounter a form of thought that treats the reconfiguration of reality as prior to reform, and presence as prior to procedure. In doing so, the Bayān confronts political theory with a demand it is structurally unprepared to meet: *the demand to decide*. Contemporary theory, shaped by liberal proceduralism and post-sovereign skepticism, tends to treat decision as *suspect*, *dangerous*, or *premature*.[35] Legitimacy is deferred to process; authority is dissolved into networks; responsibility is redistributed until it becomes anonymous. The Bayān refuses this dispersion. It insists that truth, once manifest, cannot be suspended without becoming false, and that justice, once known, cannot be postponed without being negated. Decision is not an optional supplement to deliberation; it is the very condition under which deliberation has meaning at all.

This is why the Bayān cannot be translated into the idiom of policy reform, rights discourse, or institutional critique. Its intervention is not corrective but foundational. It does not ask how existing systems might better approximate justice; it asks whether those systems are capable of justice in the first place. By grounding authority in presence rather than procedure, the Bayān exposes the extent to which contemporary governance relies on temporal deferral as a mode of power. What presents itself as prudence, neutrality, or due process is revealed as a strategy for avoiding judgment, and thus for perpetuating conditions that can never be brought to account. Therefore, the political force of the Bayān lies precisely in this refusal to inhabit procedural time. Where modern institutions survive by extending processes indefinitely—reviews, appeals, consultations, inquiries—the Bayān interrupts that extension by positing a moment of ontological clarity that demands

alignment rather than negotiation. It is not that the Bayān abolishes law, but that it *re-situates* law as an effect of truth rather than its arbiter. Law follows illumination (*ishrāq*); it does not manufacture it. In this sense, legality becomes secondary to legitimacy, and legitimacy is no longer something conferred by consensus or compliance, but something disclosed through recognition of what is present. Such a position is intolerable to contemporary political reason because it forecloses the possibility of endless management. A system that depends on delay cannot accommodate a form of thought that treats delay itself as a form of injustice. Nor can a regime organized around plural, incommensurable claims easily absorb a framework that insists on a single criterion of judgment as the condition for any shared world. The Bayān thus appears, from within modern theory, as excessive, absolutist, or untranslatable, even utopian—not because it lacks nuance, but because it refuses the ontological relativism that allows institutions to function without ever resolving the harms they administer.

To read the Bayān politically, then, is to encounter a challenge not only to specific arrangements of power, but to the temporal and ontological assumptions that sustain contemporary governance as such. It calls into question the legitimacy of systems that substitute procedure for justice, explanation for accountability, and participation for decision. In doing so, it opens the possibility of a different political imagination—one in which the task is not to optimize administration, but to restore the conditions under which truth can appear, judgment can be rendered, and responsibility can once again take a determinate form. Such a politics would not be oriented toward stability, inclusion, or management, but toward interruption: the capacity to halt illegitimate continuities and to expose the point at which order becomes domination. Its measure would not be effectiveness or consensus, but fidelity to manifestation itself, even where that fidelity unsettles institutions and renders inherited forms ungovernable.

Our essays that follow proceed from this conviction. They do not ask how to humanize administration, correct capitalism, or perfect pluralism. They ask what kind of ontology makes such systems possible in the first place, and what kind of ontological

rupture would render them untenable. In this sense, the Bayān is not invoked as an object of study, but as a *standpoint*: a position from which the contemporary order can be seen not merely as unjust, but as a mode of existence that has exhausted its claim to legitimacy. What is at issue is not reform within the world as it is given, but the conditions under which another world can appear at all. To adopt the Bayān as a standpoint is to refuse the consolation of incrementalism. It is to reject the idea that justice can be asymptotically approached through better management, more data, or finer-grained procedures. Instead, justice is understood as something that either appears or does not, something that demands alignment rather than optimization. From this angle, the persistence of injustice is not primarily a failure of will or competence, but a consequence of an ontological order that has organized itself around deferral, mediation, and the systematic avoidance of decision. The Bayān makes visible the point at which such avoidance ceases to be prudential and becomes structurally violent.

Accordingly, these essays do not seek to persuade institutions that already depend on neutrality and delay for their survival. They are not written in the hope of recognition, endorsement, or integration. They are written to clarify the stakes of a refusal: a refusal to inhabit procedural time, a refusal to accept legitimacy that is endlessly postponed, and a refusal to mistake participation for agency. The Bayān functions here as a measure or benchmark (*maḥak*) rather than a method, a criterion by which contemporary forms of power can be judged and found wanting, not on moral grounds alone, but on the deeper question of whether they can sustain a world in which truth, judgment, and responsibility still have meaning. What emerges, then, is not a blueprint for an alternative system, but an *opening*. By displacing the ontological assumptions that underwrite the present order, the Bayān creates the conceptual space in which another mode of existence might become thinkable. This is why the task is not to imagine a future arrangement in detail, but to identify the conditions under which appearance itself could be otherwise—under which reality would no longer be filtered through endless process, attenuated by neutrality, or exhausted by management. The possibility of another world does not begin with reform; it

begins with the recognition that the current one persists only by refusing to decide, and that such refusal is no longer tenable.

As a clear example to what we are interrogating: what now presents itself under the neutral idiom of online "platform governance" is in fact a decisive ontological mutation in the conditions of rule. Digital platforms do not merely host speech, mediate exchange, or regulate access; they instantiate a new mode of sovereignty—one that operates prior to law, beneath politics, and beyond appeal—and one that is simultaneously an *inversion* to all. Their rules do not function as norms in the juridical sense but as conditions of intelligibility: they determine in advance what counts as a *violation*, what counts as *evidence*, and what counts as *a subject capable of complaint*. In this respect, they no longer mirror political order; they *prefigure* it. The erosion of natural justice observable in these systems is therefore not an incidental failure of moderation, nor a temporary maladjustment awaiting regulatory correction. It is the logical expression of an ontology in which power no longer needs to justify itself to persons, but only to *processes*. The classical requirements of justice—hearing, reason-giving, proportionality, and appeal—presuppose a world in which authority remains answerable to truth, and truth remains something that emerges through contestation. Platform sovereignty presupposes something else entirely: that order precedes truth, that risk precedes persons, and that compliance *precedes meaning*. In this sense, platforms are not lawless. They are *post-juridical*—but in a negative sense Their procedures are exhaustive without being accountable; their decisions are final without being reasoned; their sanctions are absolute without being proportional. The subject addressed by this order is not a rights-bearing person but a *managed entity*—a node whose continued presence is conditional upon behavioural conformity. What disappears here is not merely due process, but the very ontological standing of the subject as someone to whom reasons are owed.[36]

This shift marks a deeper transformation in political being. Natural justice arose historically as a response to the arbitrariness of sovereign power; it functioned as a restraint upon command by binding authority to justification. Platform governance

reverses this trajectory. Power no longer issues commands that must be defended; it configures environments in which deviation is preemptively classified as error, harm, or risk. The question is no longer whether a decision is just, but whether it aligns with policy. Justice is displaced by optimization; truth by trust-and-safety; judgment by enforcement. Crucially, this logic does not remain confined to the digital domain. Administrative systems increasingly adopt the same ontological grammar. Welfare, immigration, policing, and child-protection regimes now operate through automated or semi-automated decision structures in which record replaces reality, prediction replaces evidence, and compliance replaces explanation. The platform becomes the model, not the exception. What is learned in the management of users is transferred to the governance of populations.

From the standpoint of political ontology, this represents the consolidation of a world in which Being itself is rendered administrable. Persons appear not as moral agents but as bundles of attributes to be scored, flagged, escalated, or removed. Time is no longer the *horizon of responsibility* but the axis of accumulation: infractions do not pass; they persist as data. Judgment no longer unfolds in the present but is deferred indefinitely, absorbed into the archive. In such a world, innocence ceases to be a meaningful category, because guilt no longer requires proof—only correlation. The Bayān cannot be reconciled with this order, because it does not merely contest its injustices; it *denies* its ontological legitimacy. The Bayān does not ask how power may be rendered fairer within an administrative reality. It asks what kind of reality makes such power possible at all. Where platform sovereignty presupposes a world of ownable data, exchangeable persons, and deferrable harm, the Bayān interrupts at the level of first principles. It refuses the conversion of elemental existence into objects of trade, management, or optimization. It refuses the reduction of beings to units within a system whose authority is nowhere accountable and everywhere enforced. In this light, the catastrophe sensed in our times by many is not metaphorical. It is ontological. A world habituated to rule without reasons is a world in which justice has ceased to be thinkable. Once this habituation becomes normal, appeals to rights sound naïve, and demands for explanation appear subversive. What emerges is not tyranny in the

classical sense, but something colder and more durable: a fully administered reality in which *domination no longer needs to declare itself*. Our point of view about it proceeds on the conviction that this order *cannot be reformed*, because it is grounded in a thoroughly false configuration of reality whose tangible final consequences would destroy both human society as well as the environment around it. So what is required is not better governance, but an *ontological rupture*—one that reopens the question of what it means *to be*, *to act*, and *to be accountable at all*. The Bayān is invoked here not as a historical artifact, but as a fault line: a point at which the prevailing order of being fractures, and another world becomes intelligible.

The Myth of the "Failed Messiah": A Civilizational Double Standard[37]

The claim by some that Siyyid ʿAlī Muḥammad Shīrāzī, the Primal Point, the Bāb represents a "failed messiah" is not a neutral historical judgment. It is a retrospective evaluation grounded in an unspoken criterion: that a messianic figure must achieve immediate worldly success—political consolidation, demographic growth, or institutional permanence—within history in order to be considered valid. This criterion is neither theological nor historical in any rigorous sense; it is sociological, and selectively applied. If this standard is applied consistently, it collapses at once. By the expectations of Second Temple Judaism, Jesus of Nazareth failed completely. He did not restore Israel, did not overthrow imperial rule, did not inaugurate visible justice, and was executed by the state as a criminal. His followers were scattered, his movement marginal, and his messianic claims—by contemporary Jewish standards—decisively refuted by events. What later "rescued" Jesus from the category of failure was not the outcome of his mission, but centuries of posthumous reinterpretation, delayed eschatology, and eventual imperial adoption. His validation is retrospective and civilizational, not intrinsic to the historical moment of his life. Yet the same generosity is systematically denied to the Primal Point, the Bāb.

When critics label the Bāb a failed messiah,[38] they cite precisely the features that Christianity later reinterpreted as redemptive: rejection, execution, minority status, and the deferral of fulfillment. The difference is not analytical; it is cultural. Jesus is shielded by two millennia of normalization within European civilization. The Bāb, being Iranian, modern, and disruptive of Islamic rather than Roman categories, is denied that hermeneutical patience. Failure is declared early, decisively, and then pathologized. This is because in this biased, politicized perspective the truth of a messianic claim is to be measured by immediate worldly success—political consolidation, demographic expansion, or durable institutional power. This criterion is neither theological nor historically neutral. It is a retrospective sociological judgment masquerading as analysis, and it is applied selectively. When applied consistently, it collapses.

The same logic applies even more forcefully to Imām Ḥusayn ibn al-ʿAlī (d. 680). By any metric of worldly success, the tragedy of Karbalāʾ represents absolute defeat: military annihilation, abandonment by supporters, the massacre of family, and the failure to dislodge an illegitimate regime. Yet within Shīʿī Islam, Karbalāʾ is not read as failure but as the supreme criterion of truth. Ḥusayn's "success" lies not in political victory but in ontological exposure—the revelation of false sovereignty through voluntary martyrdom. Defeat becomes authentication; loss becomes eternal triumph. Karbalāʾ inverts the very grammar of success and failure. Any framework that sanctifies Karbalāʾ while dismissing the Bāb as a failure is therefore not applying a coherent theological or historical standard but selectively suspending one. The Bāb stands squarely within this Husaynian paradigm rather than the Constantinian one. His claim is enacted through language rather than arms, through theophany rather than administration, through sacrifice rather than consolidation. Execution, rejection, and minority status are not external refutations of his claim; they are internally legible within Shīʿī metaphysics as signs of its intensity. For example, the *Qayyūm al-Asmāʾ* (The Commentary on the Sūrah of Joseph) performs authority in the moment of utterance. To judge it by outcomes is to misread its register entirely. The category of "failed messiah" thus reveals itself not as an analytical conclusion

but as a biased civilizational reflex: the elevation of power into a criterion of truth *after the fact*.

Once Jesus, Ḥusayn, and the Bāb are placed side by side, the double standard becomes unavoidable. If execution and apparent defeat invalidate the Bāb, then they must also invalidate the Cross and Karbalāʾ. If the Cross and Karbalāʾ are exempted, then worldly success cannot be the measure of messianic truth. Any attempt to rescue one while pathologizing another exposes not scholarship but bias—specifically, the protection afforded by civilizational familiarity. Jesus is shielded by Christian normalization, Ḥusayn by institutional Islamic sacral memory; the Bāb is denied both. The result is not theology but retrospective power deciding meaning. Thus the choice this analysis forces is stark and inescapable. Either revelation is judged by power, in which case Christianity and Shīʿī Islam collapse along with the Bāb; or power is judged by revelation, in which case the category of the "failed messiah" dissolves altogether. Karbalāʾ already resolved this question in blood and meaning. Any framework that redeems the Cross, sanctifies Karbalāʾ, and dismisses the Bāb does not apply history or theology consistently—it merely reflects the uneven distribution of interpretive mercy across civilizations. This reveals the real logic at work, which as we said relies on invalid criterion that is not about coherence but rather civilizational familiarity. A messianic figure is deemed "successful" if their movement later becomes structurally dominant; "failed" if it remains marginal or contested. This logic would retroactively invalidate nearly every prophetic figure at the moment of their appearance—and would have invalidated Christianity itself for centuries. From a serious theological or mystical perspective, the entire category of "failed messiah" is incoherent.

In traditions such as that of Ibn ʿArabī, a manifestation is judged by ontological disclosure, not by worldly outcome. Execution does not negate revelation; rejection does not refute truth. Indeed, intensity of rejection has often been understood as proportional to the radicality of the disclosure, such as the figure of al-Ḥallāj (d. 922).[39] By such measures, both Jesus and the Bāb stand or fall together. Therefore, those who wish to dismiss the Bāb as a failed messiah must therefore choose one of three positions, none of them comfortable:

either Jesus must be reclassified by the same standard; or worldly success must be abandoned as a criterion of messianic truth; or different figures must be judged by different rules. The first undermines Christian exceptionalism; the second dissolves the critique; the third exposes bias rather than scholarship. This is because persistence of the "failed messiah" label tells us less about the Bāb than about the frameworks brought to bear upon him. It is not a historical conclusion, but a civilizational reflex: power deciding truth after the fact, and calling it analysis. And if Suhrawardī (d. 1191) can be executed as a "failed prophet" and yet remain one of the most enduring illuminative voices in Islamic philosophy, then execution and historical defeat cannot be any criteria of truth.[40] They are merely indicators of where illumination collided with power. Thus, historically, the characterization of a revelatory figure as a "failed claimant" often functions as a preliminary move that, once shown to be inconsistent, gives way to psychological or chemical explanations. Such narratives do not arise from new evidence but from the exhaustion of interpretive frameworks willing to engage the claim on its own terms. The shift from historical judgment to pathologization marks not analytical progress but hermeneutical foreclosure, which is bad faith writ large[41]—yet one all too typical of (neo)liberal Anglo-European secular (post)modernism.

What is at stake in this foreclosure is not merely the misinterpretation of particular figures, but the consolidation of a regime of intelligibility in which revelation is admissible only insofar as it can be domesticated by power. Once ontological disclosure is denied standing in its own right, authority shifts decisively from truth to outcome, from manifestation to administration. The question ceases to be *what is disclosed?* and becomes *what prevailed?*—a substitution that silently installs the victors of history as the arbiters of reality itself. Within such a regime, failure is not a descriptive term but a political verdict, retrospectively naturalized as scholarship. The "failed messiah" thus becomes a conceptual instrument by which power immunizes itself against interruption, converting every irruption of truth that it cannot absorb into a case study in error, delusion, or pathology. In this way, the modern secular imaginary reproduces, under the guise of neutrality, a

theology of success no less dogmatic than the confessional systems it claims to have transcended. The designation of the "failed messiah" thus also functions as a mechanism by which Western liberal fallacies are normalized and rendered invisible. Liberal historiography presupposes that truth manifests through institutional survival, procedural legitimacy, and long-term stability; what does not consolidate into recognized authority is retroactively deemed error.[42] This converts contingent historical outcomes into epistemic criteria and smuggles a theology of success into ostensibly secular analysis. Under this logic, power's ability to endure becomes indistinguishable from its claim to truth, while interruption, sacrifice, and ontological rupture are reclassified as *irrationality* and delegitimized. The "failed messiah" thus stabilizes liberal self-understanding by ensuring that no revelation is acknowledged unless it confirms the world as it already is—or, rather, as *whiteness* falsely conceives the world to be.

The basic argument advanced here is that political life cannot be understood from within politics alone. Politics is never primary. It is downstream from an antecedent configuration of reality that determines what counts as real, ownable, exchangeable, deferrable, and inviolable. Polities, legal regimes, and economic systems are not neutral instruments but crystallizations of an implicit ontology. Ideologies narrate that ontology, laws stabilize it, and economies operationalize it—but none of them generates the ontological grammar they presuppose. The deepest power of a political order lies in making its assumptions appear indistinguishable from reality itself, so that domination is not merely enforced but inhabited as common sense. The Bayān intervenes at precisely this level. It does not offer moral critique within an accepted horizon of legitimacy; it discloses that horizon as such and judges it. In Bayānī terms, political legitimacy turns on rank of being: whether the mode of existence a regime assumes corresponds to truth or to falsification. Creation is not property but trust; authority does not originate in procedure alone but in ontological truth. From this standpoint, the decisive question is not who governs, but what has been named as real. A regime founded on a false ontology—one that

treats entrusted manifestation as alienable matter as secular modernist Western capitalism does—does not merely govern unjustly; it governs *without right*. Its authority collapses not by reform but by ontological verdict.[43]

This is why the Bayān's prohibition on buying and selling the Four Elements is not ancillary but axial. Earth, water, air, and fire are the conditions of manifestation itself, not resources to be commodified. To render them exchangeable is to invert first principles and to found a political economy on negation (*nafy*)—which is what we argue Western capitalism in all permutations amounts to. The contemporary corporate-administrative order, with its governance by deferral, procedure, and dispersed responsibility, is the mature form of this inversion. The Bayān does not seek to optimize such a system or correct it from within; it renders it ontologically obsolete. What follows, then, is not a program for better management, but an inquiry into the conditions under which truth can appear, judgment can be rendered, and responsibility can once again become determinate. Another world does not begin with reform. It begins with deciding what is *real*. Such a decision is not an act of policy but a rupture in the order of intelligibility itself, a refusal of the regime that renders beings calculable only insofar as they are administrable. To decide what is real is to withdraw assent from an ontology in which existence appears primarily as input, risk, or surplus, and to reassert instead a world in which manifestation precedes management and accountability precedes system. Only from such a rupture can justice re-enter history—not as procedure or compliance, but as a mode of *truth-bearing presence* irreducible to exchange.

The Bayān therefore confronts Western capitalist secular modernity not as a rival program but as a verdict upon its ontological exhaustion. It names the point at which administration replaces judgment, exchange replaces manifestation, and survival replaces truth. Against this, it insists that reality is not negotiable, not optimizable, and not owned by anyone other than God, the Real (*al-ḥaqq*). What is at stake is not the reform of a world already given, but the reappearance of a world that has been presently obscured by the *ahriman*. The world we seek is one in which being is accountable rather than unaccountable,

truth is interruptive rather than stabilizing, and justice is once again possible because it is no longer subordinated to material power. **Bayānī political ontology** names the configuration of reality presupposed by a world in which authority is answerable to manifestation rather than management, and judgment is grounded in ontological disclosure rather than procedural success. It begins not from the sovereignty of institutions, contracts, or administrative systems, but from the primacy of Being as that which appears, commands response, and imposes responsibility prior to consent. In this framework, power is legitimate only insofar as it remains exposed to truth, and governance is intelligible only as a derivative mode of accountability rather than a self-authorizing order. Political order does not generate reality; it receives it under judgment—and that judgement comes from Above.

From this standpoint, rights are not pre-political possessions but contingent recognitions arising from fulfilled obligation (*taklīf*), and justice is not a distributive mechanism but the event in which truth becomes actionable within the world. Bayānī political ontology thus refuses the modern conflation of legitimacy with endurance and authority with procedure. It treats history not as a tribunal that ratifies success, but as a field in which Revelation interrupts power and reorders what can count as real. It therefore judges political forms not by their stability or reach, but by the clarity with which they allow truth to appear and responsibility to be borne. Where modern systems seek insulation from interruption through law, policy, and abstraction, Bayānī ontology insists on exposure to the Real as the condition of legitimacy. Power that cannot be interrupted by Truth, and authority that cannot be judged, is not merely unjust—it is *unreal*. With that, the trajectory of the intellectual journey here in this volume will be from the Bāb to Frantz Fanon (d. 1961) with the final piece: our commentary on our own **19 Commandments** (*viz.* the **Fourteenth Unity of the Bayān**).

وَاللَّهُ خَيْرُ الْوَاجِدِينَ ۚ إِنَّهُ هُوَ خَيْرُ الْفَاسِحِينَ [44]

Notes

[1] Although Western liberal democracy has long been hollowed out at home, its outward-facing international order—the rules-based architecture that emerged after the Second World War promising collective security, legal restraint, and universal human rights—is now unmistakably dead. The unrestrained backing by Euro-American and Australian governments for Israel's genocidal campaign in Gaza following as escalation by Israel for Hamas's attack on 7 October 2023 has revealed the selective application of international law and shattered the credibility of the institutions once held up as global guardians of justice. Western powers refused meaningful sanctions or legal accountability even as Gaza was pulverised and humanitarian catastrophe deepened; this failure has been widely interpreted as a betrayal of the very norms the postwar order purported to uphold. Far from a contained conflict, the extension of Western patronage to aggressive military operations beyond Gaza has further hollowed out the liberal façade. What began as inter-state proxy escalation culminated in direct strikes on Iran's nuclear sites and military infrastructure in June 2025, with the United States acting as Israel's shield and offensive partner—a pattern that obliterates any pretense of adherence to restraint or legal constraint in interstate violence. Most recently, the dramatic abduction of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro by US forces in January 2026, rendered without credible multilateral mandate or legal basis, has crystallised this decay. This act—celebrated by sections of the Western political spectrum and met with tepid or fractured criticism from allies—is not an isolated misadventure but the logical endpoint of an order that has systematically abandoned the principles of sovereignty, non-intervention, and the rule of law. What remains is a geopolitics driven by raw power, unilateralism, and transactional alliances, where legal norms are invoked only when convenient, and where states with might can act with impunity. Taken together, these episodes are not random aberrations but symptomatic milestones: the postwar liberal order's commitments to equality, restraint, and justice have been eroded until they are rhetorical shells, leaving in their stead an international system ruled by force and hypocrisy— a system that is, in effect, dead and buried.

[2] As Craig Mokhiber argued in a recent **Mondoweiss** article published on 7 January 2026 (see our bibliography for the hyperlink), the contemporary global order has entered a new phase: not merely one of lawlessness, but of *institutionalized impunity*. What recent events in Venezuela,

Palestine, and across the Global South reveal is not an aberration or episodic excess, but the emergence of a political ontology in which power *no longer recognizes law even as a fiction*. Aggression, abduction, extermination, and collective punishment are no longer exceptional transgressions of the international legal order; they are its *operative norm*. The post-1945 juridical architecture—anchored in the prohibition of aggression, the sanctity of sovereignty, and the designation of genocide as an absolute red line—has not simply failed. It has been *actively dismantled* by the very powers that once claimed its authorship. The United States, in concert with its Israeli client-regime and a constellation of Western allies and vassals, has rendered international law selectively inoperative, preserving it only as an instrument against the weak while exempting itself and its partners from accountability. In this configuration, law survives only as *administrative rhetoric*, emptied of binding force. This condition did not arise overnight. It is the cumulative product of decades of normalized exception: the carceral excesses of the "war on drugs," the extrajudicial architecture of the "war on terror," the conversion of sanctions into tools of mass immiseration, and the steady substitution of domestic imperial law for international norms. Each step widened the circle of permissible violence. In a world where genocide itself no longer constitutes a red line, *no red lines remain*. The institutions designed to restrain power—the **United Nations**, the **International Court of Justice**, the **International Criminal Court**, and the **human rights system**—have been progressively neutralized through coercion, capture, intimidation, and selective enforcement. Courts are politicized, legislatures are subsumed by corporate and lobby power, and media systems function not as watchdogs but as launderers of imperial criminality. The result is a global order in which accountability mechanisms exist formally but are ontologically void.

To reiterate, the US assault on Venezuela crystallizes this new reality. Sanctions, blockades, coups, extrajudicial killings, piracy, bombing, invasion, and the abduction of a sitting head of state—all in manifest violation of the UN Charter, international humanitarian law, and human rights law—are carried out openly, without legal justification, and without fear of consequence. Domestic law is asserted extraterritorially to overwrite international law, revealing Empire's final claim: *that legality itself is whatever power declares it to be*. This regime of impunity is not merely imperial; it is *colonial, racialized,* and *extractive*. Its targets are those states and peoples that possess coveted resources, refuse subordination, or stand in opposition to settler-colonial violence—most notably in Palestine. The alignment of US aggression with Israeli destabilization strategies across Latin America and Western Asia is not incidental but structural. Empire now operates as a transnational apparatus of domination, armed with twenty-first-century technologies of surveillance, silencing, and precision killing. What emerges, then, is not the absence of order, but a *new order of unrestrained force*—a world in which diplomacy, international law, and multilateral institutions no longer mediate power but merely mask its exercise. The message delivered to the Global South is

unambiguous: law will not protect you; institutions will not save you; resistance will be met not with negotiation but with annihilation. This is the ***age of impunity***: a political condition in which violence has been ontologically normalized, legality subordinated to domination, and power emancipated from justification. Any serious political ontology of the present must therefore begin not with institutions or norms, but with this fundamental fact: the collapse of law is not a failure of enforcement, but (as we argue) a revelation of the metaphysical premises upon which the imperial order has always rested.

Yet this reality constitutes not merely the *failure* but the *refutation* of what Bahā'īs once hailed as the "*World Order of Bahāʾuʾllāh*." That vision claimed that history was tending toward a post-sovereign moral order in which collective security, international law, and supranational institutions would subordinate force to justice. The UN system and postwar legal architecture were retrofitted as providential manifestations of this unfolding order. But a world in which law binds only the weak, institutions are captured by power, and genocide proceeds with impunity cannot be redescribed as an "imperfect realization" of that vision. This is not delay or deviation; it is categorical negation. The structural error of the Bahā'ī World Order thesis lies in its ontology. It mistook administrative coherence for justice, procedure for truth, and power equilibria for moral progress. It assumed that institutions civilize sovereignty and that law precedes power, when in fact power has simply reabsorbed law the moment constraint became inconvenient. The result is a theology that sacralizes process while deferring justice indefinitely—a theology incapable of accounting for a world in which extermination is tolerated and legality is optional for the powerful. A Bayānī political ontology refuses this deferral. Justice is not emergent, procedural, or teleological; it is immediate, non-negotiable, and world-disclosing. Illegality is not chaos but a regime; impunity is not absence but structure. A world order that permits genocide is not unfinished—it is invalid. What we are witnessing is therefore not the collapse of law alone, but the exposure of the metaphysical premises upon which imperial order has always rested: that force may masquerade as norm, that exemption may be mistaken for sovereignty, and that administration may substitute for justice.

Against this Hobbesian order of exemption now openly embraced by Empire, **Red Bābī justice** begins from a radically different ontological premise: justice is not a product of power, nor a future outcome guaranteed by process, but an immediate and binding demand that precedes institutions, sovereignty, and law alike. Where Hobbes locates order in the monopolization of violence, and modern international law deferred justice to procedural containment, the Bayān insists that justice is anterior to rule, irreducible to administration, and violated the moment it is postponed. There is no covenant that licenses annihilation, no sovereignty that suspends obligation, and no historical teleology that excuses injustice in the name of eventual unity. In this

sense, Red Bābī justice exposes the present "age of impunity" not as a regression to chaos but as a metaphysical betrayal: the enthronement of exemption as norm. The Empire's selective Hobbesianism—law for the metropole, force for the periphery—is precisely what the Bayān names as ontological illegality. Illegality here does not mean the breaking of positive law, but the usurpation of the Real by power: the conversion of domination into legitimacy, and of violence into order. A regime that kills with impunity does not lack law; it has replaced justice with administration and truth with authority.

Where the Bahā'ī "World Order" deferred justice to institutional maturation and sacralized process as providence, the Bayān refuses deferral altogether. Justice cannot be entrusted to future institutions, supranational courts, or procedural harmonization, because injustice enacted now is not redeemed later. The murder of a people cannot be offset by consultation; genocide cannot be balanced by dialogue; abduction cannot be legalized by domestic statute. Any theology or political theory that asks the oppressed to wait has already sided with power. In Bayānī terms, mourning without resistance is betrayal, and unity without justice is complicity. Red Bābī ontology therefore collapses the distinction between ethics and politics at the point of injustice. Justice is not an external constraint imposed upon sovereignty; it is the criterion by which sovereignty is judged and found wanting. When law protects power rather than the vulnerable, *law itself becomes false*. When institutions normalize extermination, *institutions become idols*. The Bayān does not seek to perfect the world order; *it unmasks it*. It insists that no order is legitimate that requires the suspension of justice to sustain itself. Thus, the present collapse of international law and the exposure of imperial impunity do not merely falsify liberal or Bahā'ī teleologies; they vindicate the Bayān's refusal of procedural salvation. Justice, in the **Red Bābī** sense, is not a horizon toward which history advances, but an ever-present obligation that may place one in antagonism with the entire world. To stand with justice is therefore not to await the end of Empire, but to *negate its claim to reality now*. This is not quietism, nor nihilism, but ontological fidelity: the refusal to allow history, law, or institution to close the horizon of Divine demand. We will have more to say about this in the conclusion of the first essay.

[3] See Hannah Arendt *On Violence* (Harcourt, Brace & World: New York, 1970); Charles Tilly *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1992* (Blackwell: Oxford, 1992); Ellen Meiksins Wood *Democracy Against Capitalism: Renewing Historical Materialism* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1995); John Dunn *Setting the People Free: The Story of Democracy* (Atlantic Books: London, 2005); Domenico Losurdo *Liberalism: A Counter-History* (trans.) Gregory Elliott (Verso: London,, 2011); Sheldon S. Wolin *Democracy Incorporated: Managed Democracy and the Specter of Inverted Totalitarianism* (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 2008).

[4] That is, *wilāya* (providential guidance) as originally understood by the mystical traditions of Islam rather than those disfigured and warped interpretations subsequently offered by Islamists and the Khomeinists especially.

[5] And on that point, we highly recommend Joseph Massad's *Islam in Liberalism* (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 2015).

[6] For a general overview of the topic from the perspective of political science, see Colin Hay *Political Ontology* (Chapter 4) in *The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis* (ed. Robert E. Goodin and Charles Tilly): 78-96. The Wikipedia entry on the topic locates *political ontology* as a disciplinary approach within anthropology, but this is somewhat misleading; see, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_ontology (retrieved 29 December 2025). While the so-called "ontological turn" in anthropology has made the term prominent, political ontology is not reducible to an anthropological subfield. At its core, political ontology concerns the ontological presuppositions that make political orders, institutions, and conflicts intelligible at all: what entities are taken to exist, what *forms of agency* are recognized, what counts as *nature*, *personhood*, *property*, or *value*, and how *competing realities* are *authorized* or *suppressed*. In this broader sense, political ontology names a foundational problem that precedes disciplinary boundaries and traverses political theory, philosophy, law, political economy, and critical social theory, rather than a methodological niche within anthropology alone. What is undertaken here may be called a *Bayānī turn* by us in political ontology. Against both the anthropological localization of ontology and the modern tendency to collapse politics into procedure, the Bayān of the Bāb (d. 1850), its continuation by Ṣubḥ-i-Azal (d. 1912), and its textual completion by us in 2022 is approached as an *ontological act*: a re-inscription of reality in which beings, relations, and values are disclosed prior to their capture by law, property, or administration elsewhere. From this standpoint, modern political orders appear not merely unjust or violent, but *ontologically exhausted*—structures whose claim to reality depends upon suppressing alternative modes of being already articulated within the Bayān (the scripture of Bābism).

[7] This formulation distinguishes political ontology from analyses concerned with the *exercise* of power (institutions, actors, techniques, or strategies) by directing attention instead to the *conditions of intelligibility* that make power possible in the first place. Every regime of power presupposes a prior determination of what exists, what counts as an agent, what forms of action are meaningful, what kinds of beings may command or obey, and what realities can be rendered legible to law, administration, or knowledge. Political ontology as defined here thus interrogates the pre-political decisions—often naturalized or rendered invisible—through which power becomes operative at all. It asks not how power is deployed within a given order, but how that order's underlying ontology authorizes power to appear as real, necessary, or legitimate.

Prologomenon to Essays in Bayānī Political Ontology

[8] Here Bayān and Bayānī is interchangeable with Bābism and Azalī Bābism specifically. Those unfamiliar with this category should refer to our previous work, or (with some reservations) the *Encyclopedia Iranica* entry by Denis MacEoin; see also his *The Messiah of Shiraz* (2009) for a historical overview.

[9] In the grammar and diction of Islamic philosophy openly employed here by the Primal Point, all created things are existential possibilities (*mumkināt*) because they are neither *necessary-in-themselves* (*wājib bi-dhātihim*)—since only the Divine is *necessary-in-itself* as the Necessary Being *(wājib al-wujūd*)—nor are they impossible *(mumtani')* existents that are nonexistent and so incapable of *being* since they do in fact come into existence and later pass away due their existential contingency. These are all metaphysical terms and categories of Islamic Avicennism; see *Avicenna The Metaphysics of the Healing: A Parallel English-Arabic Text translated, introduced and annotated by Michael E. Marmura* (Brigham Young University Press: Provo, 2005).

[10] My translation from the exordium of the Persian Bayān:

حکم نفرموده احدی از ممکنات را إلّا بعرفان نفس خود و توحید کنه کینونیت خود إِذْ كُلُّ مَا سِوَاهُ خَلْقٌ عِندَهُ، قَدْ خُلِقَ بِأَمْرِهِ، أَلَا لَهُ الْخَلْقُ وَالْأَمْرُ مِنْ قَبْلُ وَمِنْ بَعْدُ، ذَٰلِكَ رَبِّ الْعَالَمِينَ

Lithograph edition: 2.

[11] Per the formulation in the **Arabic Bayān**: *Do not buy or sell the fourfold elements* (*my trans.*):

لَا تَبِيعُونَ عَنَاصِرَ الرُّبَاعِ وَلَا تَشْتَرُونَ

Page 43 in the lithograph edition; the vocalization above is ours. From this point forward, we will be citing the Bayān (whether in its Arabic or Persian version) by the subdivision of its subsection (gate) and chapter (unity) (e.g. the **11th Gate of the Ninth Unity**, etc., as shown above).

[12] While in the Bayān negation (*nafy*) is usually defined as being the denial of the Manifestation (*maẓhar*) of the age—that is, the divine prophet-messenger and their Book—here we are refining this Bayānic definition and extending it to the subjective denial (*nafy*) of *Reality-as-it-is*, whether individually or collectively. Its dialectical contrary is Affirmation (*ithbāt*), which stands as the subjective Affirmation of *Reality-as-it-is*, whether individually or collectively. Here the ontologically sovereign ground of *Reality-as-it-is* does not alter *in-itself* whether by the subjective denial or affirmation of individual or collective human subjects, a point already highlighted by

Ṣubḥ-i-Azal in the **4th Gate of the Eleventh Unity** of the *mutammim'ul-bayān*; for the *mutammim'ul-bayān*, see the hyperlink below.

[13] That, even when the literal wording of the verse is addressing the Prophet David as a Perfect Human (*al-insān al-kāmil*)

[14] Which in the Akbarian grammar is equivalent to "Satan," *the devil*.

[15] See Martin Heidegger *Being and Time: A Translation of Sein und Seit* (trans.) Josh Stambaugh (SUNY: Albany, 1996) §26.

[16] See Hannah Arendt *The Human Condition* (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1958).

[17] See Giorgio Agamben *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, (trans.) Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford University Press: Stanford, 1998).

[18] Roberto Esposito *Communitas: The Origin and Destiny of Community* (trans.) Timothy Campbell (Stanford University Press: Stanford, 2009).

[19] See Bruno Latour *Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy* (trans.) Catherine Porter (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, 2004).

[20] Philippe Descola *Beyond Nature and Culture* (trans.) Janet Lloyd and foreword by Marshall Sahlins (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 2013).

[21] See Eduardo Viveiros de Castro "Cosmological Deixis and Amerindian Perspectivism" in *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 4, no. 3 (1998): 469–488; and "*Cannibal Metaphysics: For a Post-structural Anthropology*. Edited and translated by Peter Skafish. (Univocal series: 2014).

[22] See especially Wendy Brown *Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism's Stealth Revolution* (Zone Books: New York, 2015).

[23] See Søren Kierkegaard *The Concept of Anxiety* (trans.) Reidar Thomte (Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ: 1980); Martin Heidegger *Being and Time* (see citation below), esp. **§§40–44** on anxiety (*Angst*), authenticity, and being-toward-death; Jean-Paul Sartre *Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology* (trans.) Hazel E. Barnes (Washington Square Press: New York, 1956), esp. Part One, chaps. 1–2, on freedom, negation, and bad faith; see also Jean-Paul Sartre, *Existentialism Is a Humanism* (trans.) Carol Macomber (Yale University Press: New Haven, CT, 2007).

[24] Centered on God understood ontologically, not merely theologically.

[25] Meaning, God as beyond conceptual mediation, yet determinative of all ontological horizons. All forms of Neoplatonism are by definition *metadeocentric*.

[26] In *Being and Time* (*Sein und Zeit*), Heidegger's notion of *Lichtung* (clearing) names the ontological opening within which beings may appear, but this clearing is not itself identical with light (*Licht*). Light, for Heidegger, illuminates what is already disclosed within the clearing; it does not constitute the clearing as such; see **§28**. By contrast, Islamic existential metaphysics—most explicitly articulated in Illuminationist (*ishrāqī*) and later in the Akbarian tradition as well as Shaykhism and

the Bayān—rejects the idea of a neutral or pre-luminous openness. Here, light (*nūr*) is not subsequent to disclosure but is itself the ontological condition of disclosure: that by which things appear, subsist, and are differentiated in the first place. There is no clearing prior to illumination (*ishrāq*), because illumination is what clears since it is *Theophany* (*tajallī*) (in its denotation of *God as the appearance of Light*). This difference is not merely terminological but structural: where *Lichtung* preserves a formal openness that can, in principle, be shaped independently of what appears within it, *nūr* names a theophanic field in which appearance, intelligibility, and Being are inseparable from luminosity itself: *for Being is Light* (إذ الوجود نور), Ibn ʿArabī in *The Bezel of the Wisdom of Light in the Word of Joseph* (**IX**) of *The Bezels of Wisdom* (*fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam*) (1980): 119-127.

As such, Islamic metaphysics offers not an alternative phenomenology of experience, but a different ontology of manifestation altogether. One might object that Heidegger's *Lichtung* is not a neutral container at all, but is already structured by *Da-sein*'s disclosedness, and thus cannot meaningfully be opposed to a theophanic ontology. Yet this defense concedes precisely the point at issue. Even when disclosedness is existentially conditioned, *Lichtung* remains a formally distinct horizon—an opening that is ontologically prior to whatever appears within it, including meaning, intelligibility, and presence. Disclosure, in Heidegger, still presupposes a structural openness that is not identical with Being itself. By contrast, in Akbarian metaphysics disclosure does not occur *within* Being; it *is* Being (its Act) insofar as Being *is* Light. When Ibn ʿArabī states that *wujūd* ***is*** *nūr*, he abolishes the ontological interval between openness and manifestation altogether. There is no prior "there" awaiting disclosure, because theophany itself is the event of Being's self-manifestation. What Heidegger safeguards as a formal distinction—between clearing and what is cleared—Islamic metaphysics dissolves as an ontological impossibility.

A second objection might claim that Heidegger's later thought, particularly his language of *Ereignis* and the self-showing of Being, ultimately converges with a luminous or quasi-theophanic ontology. But this apparent convergence remains asymmetrical. Heidegger never identifies Being with luminosity itself; he continues to guard the non-objectifiability of Being by maintaining a structural reserve, a withdrawal that prevents Being from coinciding with any mode of appearing. Islamic metaphysics, by contrast, does not fear such coincidence, because divine transcendence is preserved not by withdrawal from manifestation but by its inexhaustibility. Light does not exhaust God; rather, every disclosure is a limited theophany of an infinite luminosity. Thus where Heidegger preserves ontological difference by separating Being from its appearing, Ibn ʿArabī preserves transcendence by affirming that appearance itself is graded Light. The result is not a refinement of phenomenology but a fundamentally different ontology—one in which intelligibility, manifestation, and Being are inseparable, and where no neutral clearing can ever be abstracted from the radiance by which all things are.

A further objection might hold that such an identification of Being with luminosity risks collapsing ontology into appearance or perspectival disclosure. This is precisely where Ibn ʿArabī's notion of *nafs al-amr* ("*the thing as it is in itself*," or more precisely *the matter in its own right*, the *objective reality* of a thing) becomes decisive. Theophany is not self-authorizing. Although appearances are multiple, graded, and perspectival, their truth is measured against *nafs al-amr*: the determinate reality of things as they are in the divine order of Being, known by God prior to and independent of human apprehension. This is our *Reality-as-it-is* mentioned above. Islamic metaphysics therefore secures ontological objectivity without positing a neutral or pre-luminous substrate. Where Heidegger requires a clearing to preserve openness and avoid dogmatic closure, Ibn ʿArabī secures truth by grounding manifestation in divine determination rather than formal neutrality. There is no need for an ontologically empty horizon, because the measure of truth does not arise from unconcealment alone but from conformity to the real as it stands in God; see here especially Hasan Spiker's *Things as They are: Nafs al-Amr and the Metaphysical Foundations of Objective Truth* (Tabah Foundation: Abu Dhabi, 2021). Thus, the consequence is not a difference in phenomenological description but a fundamental divergence in the ontology of manifestation. *Lichtung* preserves a space in which appearance and Being remain formally separable, allowing intelligibility to be shaped independently of what appears. *Nūr*, by contrast, names a theophanic field in which appearance, intelligibility, and Being are inseparable, yet not arbitrary, because their differentiation is governed by *nafs al-amr*. Islamic metaphysics thus offers neither an alternative phenomenology nor a mystical supplement to modern existentialist ontology, but a rival metaphysical architecture altogether—one in which neutrality is ontologically impossible, illumination is constitutive, and Being itself is luminous through and through. The Bayān inherits all of this.

[27] See *Suhrawardi: The Philosophy of Illumination, A New Critical Edition of the Text of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq with English Translation, Notes, Commentary and Introduction by John Walbridge & Hossein Ziai* (1999).

[28] See William C. Chittick *The Sufi Path of Knowledge: Ibn al-'Arabi's Metaphysics of Imagination* (State University of New York Press: Albany, 1989), *passim*.

[29] See James Winston Morris *The Wisdom of the Throne: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā*. (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1981).

[30] This comes from its insistence that all things must be brought to their perfection per the **11th Gate of the Fourth Unity**: *For each thing, It has ordained a ruling: that those who are empowered over that thing must bring that thing to the height of its perfection* (از برای هر شیئ حکم فرموده که مقتدرین بر هر شیئ آن شیئ را بعلو کال برسانند).

[31] Such as the **18th Gate of the Fifth Unity** ("*you shall indeed permit buying and selling* [i.e. commerce] *among all My servants, when mutual consent is known between them*") (فَلْتَأْذَنَّ بِالْبَيْعِ وَالشِّرَىٰ كُلِّ عِبَادِي إِذَا عَلِمُوا الرِّضَا

Prologomenon to Essays in Bayānī Political Ontology

بَيْنَهُمْ); the **19th Gate of the Fifth Unity** (“*I have been commanded* [by God] *to have you encompass* [meaning, ‘*provide for*’] *every soul, from the moment it is born until it is seized* [by death], *with what it possesses—from everything in its splendor—so that you may be among the thankful*”) (قَدْ أُمِرْتُ أَنْ تُحِيطُنَّ كُلَّ نَفْسٍ مِنْ حِينِ مَا تَتَوَلَّدُ إِلَى أَنْ تُقْبَضَ مَا تَمْلِكُ، مِنْ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ بِهَائِهِ؛ لِتَكُونُنَّ مِنَ الشَّاكِرِينَ); the **16th Gate of the Sixth Unity** (“*whoever compels anyone in travel, even if* [the compulsion is merely] *a footstep, or enters someone’s house before being granted permission, or seeks to expel him from his house without his leave, or demands him from his house without right—his wife shall be forbidden to him for nineteen months. And should anyone transgress God's command in that, then it is incumbent upon the Witnesses of the Bayān to take from him ninety-five mithqāls of gold*”) (وَمَنْ يُجْبِرُ أَحَدًا فِي سَفَرٍ، وَلَوْ كَانَ قَدَمًا، أَوْ يَدْخُلُ فِي بَيْتِ أَحَدٍ قَبْلَ أَنْ يُؤْذَنَ، أَوْ يُرِيدُ أَنْ يُخْرِجَهُ مِنْ بَيْتِهِ بِغَيْرِ إِذْنِهِ، أَوْ يَطْلُبَهُ مِنْ بَيْتِهِ بِغَيْرِ حَقٍّ، فَيُحَرَّمُ عَلَيْهِ زَوْجَهُ تِسْعَةَ عَشَرَ شَهْرًا. وَإِنْ يَتَجَاوَزْ مِنْ أَمْرِ اللَّهِ فِي ذَلِكَ مِنْ أَحَدٍ، فَعَلَى شُهَدَاءِ الْبَيَانِ» أَنْ يَأْخُذُوا عَنْهُ خَمْسًا وَتِسْعِينَ مِثْقَالًا مِنْ ذَهَبٍ»); the **18th Gate of the Sixth Unity** (“*Forbidden upon you in your religion is* [the act of] *any one of you looking at the writing of another, except for him who has been granted permission, or* [for him who] *knows that he* [the other] *is content; so that you may perhaps feel modesty, and then become well-mannered*”) (حُرِّمَ عَلَيْكُمْ فِي دِينِكُمْ النَّظَرُ بَعْضُكُمْ إِلَى كِتَابِ بَعْضٍ، إِلَّا لِمَنْ أُذِنَ، أَوْ عَلِمَ أَنَّهُ يَرْضَى؛ لَعَلَّكُمْ تَسْتَحْيُونَ ثُمَّ تَتَأَدَّبُونَ); the **19th Gate of the Sixth Unity** (*It has ordained upon you in your religion that you answer anyone who addresses you with a statement that indicates either “no” or “yes.” And likewise concerning your writings: when anyone writes to anyone a letter, It has ordained upon him that he must write its answer in its wake* [immediately after], *if he is able; otherwise,* [in the wake] *of another’s* [message]. *And whoever returns a letter, or misplaces it, or is able to deliver* [it] *to someone and does not deliver* [it], *is not, in the sight of God, among the* [true] *servants*”) (فَرَضَ عَلَيْكُمْ فِي دِينِكُمْ أَنْ تُجِيبُوا مَنْ يُكَلِّمُكُمْ بِقَوْلٍ يَدُلُّ عَلَى «لَا» أَوْ «بَلَى». وَمِثْلُ ذَلِكَ فِي كُتُبِكُمْ: إِذَا يَكْتُبُ أَحَدٌ إِلَى أَحَدٍ كِتَابًا، فَرَضَ عَلَيْهِ أَنْ يَكْتُبَنَّ جَوَابَهُ بِأَثَرِهِ إِنِ اسْتَطَاعَ، وَإِلَّا أَثَرِ غَيْرِهِ. وَمَنْ يَرُدَّ كِتَابًا، أَوْ يُضَيِّعَهُ، أَوْ يَقْدِرَ أَنْ يُوصِلَ إِلَى أَحَدٍ وَلَا يُوصِلَ، لَمْ يَكُنْ عِنْدَ اللَّهِ مِنَ الْعَابِدِينَ); the **18th Gate of the Seventh Unity** (“*Whosoever imprisons someone, his wives become forbidden to him*”) (مَن يُحْبِسْ أَحَدًا، يُحَرَّمْ عَلَيْهِ أَزْوَاجُهُ); the **13th Gate of the Ninth Unity** (“*You are never ever to rend* [i.e. destroy] any book”) (أَنْتُمْ أَبَدًا كِتَابًا لَا تُخَرِّقُونَ); the **16th Gate of the Ninth Unity** (“*Never ever strike anyone*”) (لَا تَضْرِبُنَّ أَحَدًا أَبَدًا); the **18th Gate of the Tenth Unity** (“*And do not ever command that a hair's-breadth be taken from anyone, or that anything be diminished after God has completed the creation of his external form—by any decree in the Book of God—so that you yourselves may not grieve anyone. And whoever takes anything from anyone’s body, or changes its color by the measure of anything, or changes his garment, or desires to humiliate him, God has forbidden his wives to him for nineteen months in the Book of God; and there shall most certainly be incumbent upon him, from the limits [set] by God, ninety-five units of gold—so that you may fear Me. And you shall not command, nor do, nor consent. So do not ever wrong anyone by a mustard seed's weight, if you are believers in God and Its signs. And if you are not believers in God and Its signs, then you must acquire for yourselves a deed that*

does not expel you from your modesty; for before your creation you were, in the sight of God, a drop of water after clay, and you shall most certainly return to a handful of clay. So you must feel shame. And you shall not feel satisfied for anyone with less than what you are satisfied with for yourselves, while you, at the highest level of your lives are deliberating in your affairs. And do not ever destroy the creation of anyone after God has perfected his creation, for the sake of a fleeting glory or a transient wealth that you may desire; for both of them shall be cut off from you, and you shall enter the infernal fire after your death, wishing—as if you had not been created and had not earned anything—on account of the right of a single soul's grief. And if you would reason in your lives, you would wish [otherwise], *for you are but seldom grateful*") (وَلَا تَأْمُرَنَّ أَنْ يُؤْخَذَ مِنْ أَحَدٍ قَدْرُ وَمَنْ يَأْخُذْ مِنْ جَسَدِ أَحَدٍ مِنْ شَيْءٍ، أَوْ يُغَيِّرْ لَوْنَهُ قَدْرَ .شَعْرٍ، أَوْ يُنْقَصَ بَعْدَمَا أَكْمَلَ اللَّهُ خَلْقَ ظَاهِرِهِ مِنْ شَيْءٍ أَمَرَا فِي كِتَابِ اللَّهِ؛ لَعَلَّكُمْ أَنْتُمْ أَحَدًا لَا تَحْزَنُونَ شَيْءٍ، أَوْ يُغَيِّرْ لِبَاسَهُ، أَوْ أَرَادَ أَنْ يُذِلَّنَّهُ، قَدْ حَرَّمَ اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ أَزْوَاجَهُ تِسْعَةَ عَشَرَ شَهْرًا فِي كِتَابِ اللَّهِ، وَلَيَلْزَمَنَّهُ مِنْ حُدُودِ اللَّهِ خَمْسًا وَتِسْعِينَ وَاحِدًا مِنْ ذَهَبٍ؛ وَلَا تَأْمُرُونَ، وَلَا تَفْعَلُونَ، وَلَا تَرْضَوْنَ. فَلَا تُظْلِمُنَّ عَلَى أَحَدٍ قَدْرَ خَرْدَلٍ، إِنْ أَنْتُمْ بِاللَّهِ وَآيَاتِهِ مُؤْمِنُونَ. وَإِنْ لَمْ تَكُونُنَّ بِاللَّهِ وَآيَاتِهِ مُؤْمِنِينَ، .لَعَلَّكُمْ إِيَّايَ أَنْتُمْ تَتَّقُونَ وَلَا تَرْضَيْنَ لِأَحَدٍ دُونَ مَا .فَلْتَكْسِبُنَّ عَمَلًا لَا يُخْرِجُنَّكُمْ مِنْ حَيَائِكُمْ، فَإِنَّكُمْ قَبْلَ خَلْقِكُمْ كُنْتُمْ عِنْدَ اللَّهِ قَطْرَةَ مَاءٍ بَعْدَ طِينٍ، وَلَتَرْجِعُنَّ إِلَى كَفٍّ طِينٍ. فَلْتَسْتَحْيِيَنَّ وَلَا تُضَيِّعُنَّ خَلْقَ أَحَدٍ بَعْدَمَا قَدْ أَكْمَلَ اللَّهُ خَلْقَهُ، لِمَا تُرِيدُونَ مِنْ عَزِّ أَيَّامٍ مَعْدُودَةٍ أَوْ غِنَى أَيَّامٍ .تَرْضَيْنَ لِأَنْفُسِكُمْ، وَأَنْتُمْ بِأَعْلَى تَدَابِيرِ حَيَاتِكُمْ فِي أُمُورِكُمْ لِتَدَبَّرُونَ مَعْدُودَةٍ، فَإِنَّ كِلْتَيْهِمَا يَنْقَطِعُ عَنْكُمْ، وَأَنْتُمْ مِنْ بَعْدِ مَوْتِكُمْ فِي النَّارِ تَدْخُلُونَ، تَتَمَنَّوْنَ كَأَنَّكُمْ مَا خُلِقْتُمْ وَمَا اكْتَسَبْتُمْ، فِي حَقِّ نَفْسٍ مِنْ خُرْنٍ. وَإِنْ تَتَعَقَّلُونَ فِي حَيَوَاتِكُمْ، تَتَمَنَّوْنَ، إِنْ أَنْتُمْ قَلِيلًا مَا تَشْكُرُونَ.); and the **16th Gate of the Eleventh Unity** ("*Do not ever kill a soul, and do not ever sever anything from a soul/person*") (فَلَا تَقْتُلُنَّ نَفْسًا، وَلَا تَقْطَعُنَّ شَيْئًا عَنْ نَفْسٍ أَبَدًا).

What emerges from the ordinances whose *ratio decidendi* (reason for deciding) we have isolated above is not a miscellany of pious counsels or marginal ethical refinements, but the jurisprudential core of the Bayān. These rulings are the points at which the Bayān decisively departs from inherited Islamic legal paradigms and articulates a new juridical logic grounded in ontological inviolability rather than sovereign command. Across commerce, movement, dwelling, correspondence, bodily integrity, and the handling of texts, the same principle is reiterated with remarkable consistency: no human being may be used, coerced, diminished, appropriated, surveilled, or instrumentalized without explicit consent, and even consent is circumscribed by a deeper duty to preserve dignity, modesty, and freedom from harm. What gives these ordinances their jurisprudential weight is not the severity of their sanctions, but the clarity with which they identify *what counts as injury*—often at thresholds far below what classical law or modern positive law would even register. Seen together, these rulings establish a legal order in which coercion itself becomes the paradigmatic wrong. Compulsion in travel "even by a footstep," entry into a house without permission, imprisonment, bodily alteration "by a hair's breadth," the destruction of books, the withholding or interception of correspondence, the failure to answer another with clarity, even the act of looking at another's writing without consent—each is treated not as a minor infraction, but as a violation of the very conditions under which a soul may appear before God without grief. The repeated formula of marital prohibition and fixed material penalties is not

incidental; it functions as a juridical marker that these acts rupture the most intimate and socially foundational bonds. Law here is not primarily punitive or corrective, but *protective of ontic thresholds*: the boundary of the body, the home, the word, the page, the path, and the face of the other. In this sense, the Bayān legislates less for order than for *non-domination*.

The two **Fifth Unity** ordinances—permitting commerce only on the basis of known mutual consent, and commanding the community to "encompass every soul" from birth to death with what it possesses—are especially revealing. Together they establish the Bayān's economic axiom: exchange is licit only where it does not threaten subsistence, dignity, or security, and provision is not charity but *obligation*. Commerce is affirmed, not abolished, yet it is radically subordinated to consent and care. The right to trade is inseparable from the duty to ensure that no soul falls outside the sphere of provision. This already anticipates the logic of the **Ninth** and **Tenth** unities, where even the smallest subtraction from a person's body, appearance, or dignity is treated as an absolute wrong. What modern jurisprudence would separate into contract law, welfare, criminal law, and human rights are here unified by a single criterion: *does this act cause grief to a soul, even minimally, without right?*

When these ordinances are read in light of the **11th Gate of the Ninth Unity**, their deeper coherence becomes unmistakable. That Gate's prohibition on buying and selling the four elements does not function as an isolated economic oddity, but as the ontological key to the entire legal edifice. By declaring the elements—earth, water, air, fire—inalienable, the Bayān denies that the material conditions of life can ever become absolute property or objects of speculative domination. Human beings, whose bodies and lives are constituted from those very elements, therefore cannot be treated as commodities, resources, or instruments either. The ban on elemental commodification grounds the later bans on bodily harm, coercion, imprisonment, humiliation, and destruction: what cannot be owned at the level of nature cannot be violated at the level of the person. Law here flows downward from ontology, not upward from individual sovereign will. Thus, the society envisaged by the Bayān is neither statist nor anarchic, neither theocratic in the conventional sense nor liberal in the modern one. Instead, it is *theophanocratic*: a society structured around *guardianship without domination*, authority without coercion, and law as the maintenance of inviolable limits rather than the extraction of obedience. The **Witnesses of the Bayān** do not rule by discretion but intervene only where those limits are breached. Violence, confinement, censorship, surveillance, and humiliation are not merely regulated; they are rendered almost unthinkable by being placed beyond the pale of legitimate action. The animating ontology is one in which existence itself—lighted, entrusted, and transient—demands modesty (*ḥayāʾ*) as the supreme political virtue. In that sense, these ordinances are not peripheral rules but the *juridical skeleton of a metaphysics of non-harm*,

a legal form adequate to a world in which sovereignty belongs to God alone and human law exists solely to prevent grief from entering the space between souls.

What becomes striking when the specific Bayānic ordinances we have isolated above are read alongside Ibn ʿArabī's seventeenth chapter of the *Bezels of Wisdom* ("*The Bezel of the Wisdom of Existence in the Word of David*") is that both corpora converge on a shared reconfiguration of law away from acquisitive sovereignty and toward gifted responsibility, even as they operate in very different registers. Ibn ʿArabī's Davidic chapter insists that true authority—prophetic, juridical, or political—does not arise from *kasb* (acquisition), merit, or contractual exchange, but from *wahb*: pure divine bestowal. David's *khilāfa*/vicegerency is not earned, bargained for, or reciprocally compensated; it is given "*minnā faḍlan*" (a bounty from Us), without counter-claim. This logic of non-reciprocal gift underwrites the Bayān's core legal prohibitions: the refusal to commodify bodies, movements, dwellings, texts, or even elements themselves. What is given by God—existence, form, dignity, capacity—cannot become an object of coercive exchange without ontological violation. In both Ibn ʿArabī and the Bayān, law is legitimate only insofar as it *guards what has been given*, not insofar as it extracts obedience or surplus. This convergence is clearest when one juxtaposes Ibn ʿArabī's insistence that David's vicegerency is explicitly *khilāfat ḥukm*—a deputation to judge "*bi'l-ḥaqq*" (in truth) without following lust or whim—with the Bayān's relentless prohibition of coercion at the most granular level: compulsion "even by a footstep," imprisonment as such, striking "ever," taking "a hair's-breadth," humiliating the body or altering its appearance, or entering a house or a text without permission.

In Ibn ʿArabī, deviation from divine judgment is not framed as juridical error but as following a movement of the self not authorized by revelation; in the Bayān, the same principle is juridified as a *zero-tolerance regime toward domination*. Both refuse to locate authority in force, violence, or administrative command. Instead, authority is legitimate only when it aligns with a pre-given ontological order in which the human is already under divine care and therefore cannot be treated as raw material for rule. The Bayān's sanctions—marital prohibition, fixed compensations, and the intervention of the Witnesses of the Bayān—map closely onto Ibn ʿArabī's distinction between *khilāfa ẓāhira* (the outward caliphate of the sword) and *khilāfa maʿnawiyya* (the spiritual or ontological vicegerency). Where Ibn ʿArabī argues that killing pertains only to the outward caliphate born of imagined dual sovereignty ("*if there were two gods…*"), the Bayān systematically empties law of lethal force altogether. Killing, striking, imprisoning, even humiliating are not merely regulated; they are ontologically excluded. The Bayān thus radicalizes Ibn ʿArabī's insight: if all effective judgment in the world is, in truth, God's judgment by the sovereignty of the Divine Will, then human law has no warrant to replicate divine power through violence. Its *sole task* is to prevent grief from entering the created order—and since all current

orders (religious and secular), in the name of regulating the environment and human behaviour compound grief in the world, on this level alone they stand as illegitimate. In this sense, the Bayān can be read as the juridical formalization of Ibn ʿArabī's metaphysics of non-competition with divine sovereignty. This alignment becomes even more pronounced in the Bayān's ordinances on correspondence, books, and writing, when read against Ibn ʿArabī's doctrine of *reception* versus *acquisition*. Ibn ʿArabī then distinguishes sharply between the one who takes judgment by transmission and the one who takes it directly from God, insisting that true vicegerency consists not in innovation but in faithful reception without distortion. The Bayān translates this directly into law: letters must be answered, writings must not be destroyed, others' texts must not be read without consent. Communication is treated as *a trust,* not an instrument. To intercept, withhold, or efface the word of another is to usurp a prerogative that belongs only to God as the ultimate speaker. Here, jurisprudence becomes a discipline of epistemic humility, mirroring Ibn ʿArabī's insistence that even the most exalted caliph remains outwardly a follower, never an originator.

Finally here, both systems are animated by an ontology in which *mercy* precedes and encloses judgment. Ibn ʿArabī's extended meditation on the Divine Will, the inevitability of divine judgment, and the ultimate precedence of mercy ("*sabaqat raḥmatuhu ghaḍabahu*") provides the metaphysical backdrop against which the Bayān's insistence on non-harm makes sense. If all beings inevitably return to mercy, then to cause unnecessary grief—even "*by the weight of a mustard seed*"—is to place oneself momentarily at odds with the direction of existence itself. The Bayān's society, like Ibn ʿArabī's cosmos, is one in which coercion is always a misalignment with reality, not merely a moral fault. Law, in both, exists not to perfect control but to discipline human action so that it does not rival God's governance. In that sense, the Bayān's core ordinances do not merely resemble Ibn ʿArabī's Davidic wisdom in the *fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam*; they can be read as its juridical consummation: a political-legal order shaped by the recognition that sovereignty (*mulk*), like existence (*wujūd*), is given, *not seized*.

[32] Compare this also with the Bayān's ruling (per the **17th Gate of the Eleventh Unity**) on the absolute inviolability of the home/dwelling with its categorical prohibition on the eviction of anyone, effectively declaring all finance capitalist regimes of rent, lending and mortgage categorically illicit (*ḥarām*), which functionally abolishes any known system of *banking* as well—the root of all evil under capitalism as well as its mercantile feudal predecessors. Per the **Arabic Bayān**, this (together with its penalty) is stated as,

> *And whosoever commands that someone be expelled from their house, or city, or village, or from their domain of authority—let it be forbidden to them for nineteen months, and let them be*

bound to render to him[/her] [i.e. the victim] *nineteen mithqāls of gold as a prescribed limit in the Book of God, that perhaps you may be God-wary.*

وَمَنْ يَأْمُرْ أَنْ يُخْرِجَ أَحَدًا مِنْ بَيْتِهِ أَوْ مَدِينَتِهِ أَوْ قَرْيَتِهِ أَوْ مِلْكِ سُلْطَانِهِ، فَلْيُحَرِّمَنَّهُ عَلَيْهِ تِسْعَةَ عَشَرَ شَهْرًا، وَلْيُلْزِمَنَّهُ تِسْعَةَ عَشَرَ مِثْقَالًا مِنْ ذَهَبٍ أَنْ يَرُدَّنَّ إِلَيْهِ حَدًّا فِي كِتَابِ اللهِ، لَعَلَّكُمْ تَتَّقُونَ

This gate of the Bayān does not merely "discourage harsh landlords." Although it prescribes a hefty monetary penalty, it targets the *structural form* of displacement: the commanded removal of a person from dwelling and place by an actor with authority, whether that authority is private (landlord, creditor) or public (court, police, sovereign). The graduated scope—house, city, village, and the domain of one's authority—signals that the ordinance is meant to cover every scale at which expulsion operates, from domestic tenancy to territorial jurisdiction. Its penalty is not advisory but a fixed limit (*ḥadd*): the act is made juridically illegitimate, and restitution is imposed in quantified, deterrent form. Read in the wider Bayānī grammar (including the inalienability logic drawn from the prohibition on commerce with the Four Elements), the legal point is not "be compassionate," but: *do not convert right, contract,* or *power into the violent unworlding of a person from their place*. A housing order that depends on forced removal as its enforcement mechanism becomes, under this rule, structurally impossible. That yields a direct critique of modern housing law. Contemporary regimes treat land and housing as fully alienable commodities and then build enforcement around that premise: a mortgage or lease is not merely a promise; it is a legal machine that authorizes *state-backed dispossession* when payment fails. Foreclosure and eviction are the system's essential instruments for translating abstraction (debt, title, arrears) into bodily relocation (sheriff's notice, lockout, removal). This Bayānī ordinance strikes at precisely this conversion. It does not need to deny contracts to deny eviction; it denies the *enforcement grammar* that makes contracts into instruments of displacement. Modern housing law thus appears, from this standpoint, as the *institutionalization of ontological violence*: the reduction of dwelling—world, continuity, belonging—to a lever for financial discipline, enforced through administrative force while masking itself as neutral procedure.

Compared to Islamic *fiqh* (jurisprudence), the contrast is sharp and illuminating. Classical jurisprudence certainly recognizes ownership (*milk*) and contractual transfer, and it elaborates *ijāra* (lease/hire) as a valid contract with mutual obligations (rent, usufruct, term, maintenance duties, and so on). But *fiqh*'s moral architecture generally frames property as stewardship under divine law, and it disciplines harm through maxims like "*no harm and no reciprocating harm*" (*lā ḍarar wa-lā ḍirār*) and through protections around necessity, shelter, and public interest—while still permitting, in

ordinary doctrine, remedies for breach (including termination of lease and, in many historical settings, removal after due process). In other words, *fiqh* typically regulates eviction within a property-validating ontology, see Siraj Sait and Hilary Lim *Land, Law and Islam: Property and Human Rights in the Muslim World* (2006). The Bayānī ordinance goes further: it does not merely soften landlord power; it refuses the legitimacy of commanded expulsion as such—and extends that refusal beyond lease relations to broader jurisdictional belonging ("city," "village," "domain of authority"). Where *ijāra* presupposes alienable usufruct (the right to enjoy the use and advantages of another's property short of the destruction or waste of its substance) and enforceable remedies, the Bayān's rule reclassifies forced displacement as a prohibited act that cannot be normalized as a contractual consequence.

This is also a clean, concrete example of *political ontology overriding political economy*. A political-economic analysis might debate housing in terms of incentives, supply, risk, credit markets, and efficiency; it treats eviction as an unfortunate but "necessary" enforcement tool to keep the system functioning. Political ontology asks a prior question: *what kind of being is a dwelling, and what kind of act is removal from it?* In the Bayānī frame, dwelling is not merely an asset-class; it is a condition of *worldly intelligibility*, of *embodied continuity*, of *life in place*. Once that ontological status is affirmed, the economic "necessity" of eviction becomes irrelevant—because the polity has already ruled that some instruments of power are *metaphysically inadmissible*, even if they "work." This is exactly what it means for ontology to govern economy: the system is not redesigned by tweaking interest rates or tenancy statutes, but by declaring that the displacement-function itself is illegitimate—thereby forcing the emergence of alternative arrangements (risk-sharing, non-displacing debt remedies, community custodianship, usufruct without expulsion, etc.) that conform to the prior ontological judgment.

Now, extending the argument and Bayānic ordinance to settler colonialism: This phenomenon is not, at its core, a historical accident or a contingent abuse of power; it is the political expression of an ontology in which dwelling is made revocable. What Subḥ-i-Azal's explanation of this Bayānī prohibition on expulsion exposes in the *mutammim'ul-bayān* (The Continuation of the Persian Bayān) is precisely this ontological condition. In settler regimes, habitation is never treated as a primary fact of being but as a conditional status, perpetually subordinate to title, sovereignty, contract, or administrative designation. The settler order does not merely displace bodies; it reorders reality such that presence itself becomes something granted, withdrawn, and redistributed by authority. This is why eviction, removal, and forced migration are not anomalies within settler colonial systems but their most truthful operations. From a Bayānī political ontological standpoint, the decisive violence of colonialism lies not in its brutality alone but in its inversion of precedence. The Bayān posits dwelling as ontologically prior to rule: once a soul has settled, no later command—

royal, legal, or popular—can override that fact without corrupting the moral structure of the world itself. Settler colonialism reverses this order. It installs sovereignty as anterior to presence, such that land, habitation, and life are rendered legible only through colonial authorization. In doing so, it creates a political reality in which the expulsion of First World peoples is not a crime but a routine act of governance, justified through doctrines of discovery, improvement, productivity, or security.

Subḥ-i-Azal's insistence in the *mutammim'ul-bayān* that expulsion rebounds upon the expeller as an ontological inversion is particularly illuminating for understanding colonial modernity. Colonial regimes do not simply dispossess Indigenous peoples; they degrade the moral intelligibility of their own actions. What becomes lawful in such systems is sustained only through permanent exception, continuous force, and the normalization of contradiction. The Bayān names this condition precisely: when expulsion is authorized, law itself loses coherence. This is why settler societies are structurally addicted to policing, surveillance, incarceration, and border regimes. They are not enforcing order; they are compensating for an ontological breach they cannot repair.

The Bayānī concept of return (*raj'a*), as inferentially clarified by Subḥ-i-Azal in this gate of the *mutammim'ul-bayān*, further reframes the colonial question. What returns is not the displaced subject but the displaced act. Colonial eviction, once institutionalized, becomes recursive. It reproduces itself across generations, legal systems, and geographies, eventually turning inward—a point repeatedly underscored by contemporary scholars of colonialism and critical race theory regarding the Second World War and the Holocaust (such as Charles W. Mills in his *The Racial Contract*, 1999), see also Joseph Massad *The Age of Independence: A Global History of Settler-Colonialism* (*forthcoming*). The history of First World colonial societies demonstrates this with disturbing clarity: techniques developed for Indigenous removal are later redeployed against racialized minorities, the poor, migrants, and dissenters. The violence returns not as moral retribution but as structural inevitability. A polity that governs by expulsion must continually find new populations to expel in order to sustain itself. Equally crucial is Subḥ-i-Azal's reconfiguration of *hijra* (*migration*) in that gate of the *mutammim'ul-bayān*. In colonial narratives, forced migration is often reframed as resilience, adaptation, or progress, placing the ethical burden on the displaced rather than the displacer. The Bayān refuses this logic. Migration, in this ontology, is not sanctified endurance but a sign of *collective failure*. It is a warning directed at the polity that has made dwelling impossible. Applied to First World colonial contexts, this exposes the ideological cruelty of narratives that romanticize Indigenous survival while leaving untouched the structures that necessitated displacement in the first place. Perhaps most devastating for settler colonial modernity is the Bayānī ethical criterion Subḥ-i-Azal articulates: one must not permit upon the souls of others what one does not permit upon one's own soul. Settler colonialism fails this test categorically on every level. Its legal architecture depends on a double standard in which settlers experience land as secure, inheritable,

and absolute, while Indigenous peoples are rendered perpetually removable. This asymmetry is not accidental; it is the very condition of settler colonial legitimacy. The Bayān thus identifies settler colonialism as an order that cannot, by definition, attain recognition (*maʿrifa*) or certainty (*yaqīn*), because it rests on an ontological lie.

Thus, Subḥ-i-Azal's analysis in the *mutammim'ul-bayān* clarifies by direct implication why colonialism did not merely oppress First World peoples but deformed the very societies that enacted it. By normalizing expulsion, colonial regimes trained populations to accept a world in which belonging is conditional and violence is administrative. The result is a pervasive moral numbness, a political culture incapable of hospitality, and a constant fear of reversal. In Bayānī terms, colonialism does not simply steal land; it hollows out the conditions under which truth, justice, and community can appear at all. What it leaves behind is not only dispossession but a permanently destabilized world, condemned to govern through exclusion because it has forgotten how to dwell. At this point the convergence with Fanon becomes unavoidable, though the Bayān ultimately exceeds him. Fanon diagnosed colonialism as a deformation of being, a world split into zones where humanity itself is differentially allocated. His account of *epidermalization*, spatial segregation, and colonial violence in both *Black Skin, White Masks* (1952) and *The Wretched of the Earth* (1961) describes the phenomenology of an ontology already broken. The Bayān supplies what Fanon gestures toward but does not fully articulate: the ontological principle that has been violated. For Fanon, colonialism dehumanizes; for the Bayān, it *falsifies reality*. Settler colonialism does not merely deny recognition; it institutes an order in which recognition itself becomes impossible because dwelling is no longer treated as inviolable. This is why Subḥ-i-Azal's ethical criterion—*do not permit upon the souls of others what you do not permit upon your own soul*—is not moral sentiment but ontological test. Settler societies fail this test structurally. Settlers experience land as secure, inheritable, and protected by law; Indigenous peoples are rendered permanently provisional, their presence contingent upon administrative tolerance. This asymmetry is not accidental injustice but the very mechanism by which settler legitimacy is produced. The Bayān therefore identifies by inference settler colonialism as an order incapable of attaining certainty or recognition, because it rests on a foundational contradiction: it claims permanence through the permanent threat of removal. This is because what colonialism has done to First World peoples, then, is not only dispossession but ontological training. Entire populations have been habituated to a world in which belonging is conditional, violence is bureaucratic, and exclusion is normalized as governance. This training does not stop at the colonial frontier; it reshapes metropolitan life itself. Housing insecurity, migration panic, racialized policing, and administrative cruelty are not deviations from liberal order but its logical expressions once dwelling has been made alienable. Subḥ-i-Azal's analysis makes this unmistakable: a society that

governs by expulsion will eventually experience itself as expellable, haunted by the very techniques it once deployed against others.

In Bayānī political ontology, then, colonialism is therefore not merely unjust; it is *unreal*. It fabricates a world that cannot sustain truth, because truth requires a ground where presence is not perpetually threatened. To abolish colonialism, on this view, is not to reform policy or redistribute property within the same ontological frame. It is to restore the precedence of dwelling over sovereignty and to render expulsion impossible as a legitimate act. Until that rupture occurs, settler societies remain trapped in a cycle of displacement that no amount of legal refinement can redeem, condemned to administer violence in order to preserve a reality that has already forfeited its claim to legitimacy.

[33] This is why we hold most contemporary ecumenical movements to be colonially motivated whilst pretending differently. We say this because liberal ecumenism is still animated by the logic of capitalist reification and *markets*. It presupposes that religious traditions are discrete, equivalent, and ultimately interchangeable units, capable of being translated into a lowest common denominator of "shared values" suitable for circulation within global civil society. In this framework, truth is displaced by process, ontology by procedure, and commitment by consensus. What cannot be rendered legible to liberal managerial reason—claims of exclusive truth, metaphysical hierarchy, sacred law, or ontological rupture—is quietly neutralized in the name of inclusivity.

Unitarian Universalism offers a paradigmatic example of this logic. Despite its rhetoric of radical openness, UU functions less as a tradition than as a *clearinghouse of spiritual commodities*, in which doctrines, practices, and symbols are abstracted from their ontological grounds and reassembled as individually consumable ethical sentiments. The famous "Seven Principles," while presented as universal moral axioms, operate in practice as a regulatory framework that disciplines religious difference into forms compatible with liberal democracy, therapeutic individualism, and the nonprofit institutional order. Traditions are welcomed only insofar as they submit to prior moral criteria that are not themselves negotiable—criteria that emerged historically from Protestant liberalism, Enlightenment moral philosophy, and the administrative needs of settler-colonial societies. What makes this ecumenism colonially inflected is not merely its Western provenance, but its *asymmetrical structure of recognition*. Traditions rooted in law, revelation, metaphysical realism, or sacral authority are tolerated only after being stripped of precisely those features that challenge liberal sovereignty. They are translated into "sources," "inspirations," or "stories," rather than living ontological orders. In this sense, liberal ecumenism does not overcome colonial power; it refines it, replacing overt domination with epistemic domestication. Difference is preserved *aesthetically* but neutralized politically and metaphysically.

By contrast, the Bayānic vision—and the broader metaphysical jurisprudence it exemplifies—refuses this logic at its root. It does not seek harmony through exchange, dialogue, or synthesis, but through the protection of inviolable ontological limits that no consensus may override. Truth is not negotiated, dignity is not conditional, and coexistence is not achieved by flattening difference into moral platitudes. From this perspective, liberal ecumenism appears not as a post-religious peace project, but as a late-stage spiritual technology of governance: a means of integrating religious life into the circuits of capitalist rationality while disarming its capacity to contest the world as it is. Its promise of harmony depends on the prior foreclosure of any claim that might interrupt market logic, administrative sovereignty, or the procedural management of difference. What it cannot accommodate is a form of religion that legislates limits on power rather than offering values for negotiation, or that grounds justice in ontological truth rather than consensual ethics. In this way, ecumenism becomes less a space of encounter than a mechanism of *containment*, ensuring that religion remains expressive, therapeutic, and symbolic—but never structurally transformative, let alone revolutionary. Our bitter experience with Dale Husband has etched this truism into rock.

[34] This being our interpretation of the Bayān's earlier insistence that unbelievers be excluded from a Bayānī polity, a stipulation which we have now abrogated per our ***Completion of the Bayān*** due to its impracticality. In a non-technological world of feudal Qājār Iran; and had the early Bābīs decisively triumphed over their adversaries and taken over Iran by converting a significant portion of the population, which they would have; this ordinance would have been implementable—never mind being quite effective as a mechanism in halting the penetration of Western imperialism and colonialism into Iran, Iraq, and the region as a whole. Today and into the distant future—unless this specific ordinance be made to only function on an *ad hoc* initiatic and organizational level as a way to vet who comes in and out of a local Bayānī community—it will not be conducive to an effective polity building effort, never mind any future survival as a creed. Nevertheless, the reasoning originally provided by the Primal Point for that time, and in the circumstances of mid-19th century Iran, were indeed sound and completely justifiable—especially given what Western imperialism inflicted subsequently on that region. Now, ontological exclusion must not be confused with political repression, for the former concerns the conditions under which truth, judgment, and collective intelligibility are possible, whereas the latter concerns the coercive management of bodies and conduct. To refuse the incorporation of an ontological negation is not to punish or silence persons, but to acknowledge that no polity can sustain meaning if it dissolves the very grammar by which meaning appears via the boundaries of such meaning. Modern readers conflate these domains because contemporary power disguises coercion as inclusion, treating neutrality as a moral absolute rather than as a metaphysical assumption. This work intervenes precisely at that

point of confusion, insisting that the question is not who is excluded, but whether a shared ontological field exists at all within which justice, deliberation, and truth can take place.

That said, other than the **Fourteenth Unity of the Bayān**, which are the **19 Commandments**, the reader should note that here in this study we will not be broaching our other amendments, augmentations and abrogations to the Bayān per our ***Completion of the Bayān***. Discussion of those as it pertains to political ontology are left for another time. Here we have limited ourself up to the end of the **11th Unity** only by the Bāb and Ṣubḥ-i-Azal together with our **Fourteenth** (the subject of the final chapter of this book). Everything else by us will be left for that future discussion.

[35] Contemporary political theory frequently treats decision as suspect or dangerous, preferring procedural legitimacy or ethical indeterminacy over substantive judgment. In liberal proceduralism, exemplified by John Rawls, decisive claims grounded in metaphysical or comprehensive doctrines are excluded from public reason as destabilizing, with legitimacy relocated to fair procedures rather than the truth of outcomes (*The Law of Peoples*, 1999). Post-sovereign theory radicalizes this suspicion: in Jacques Derrida's account, decision is constitutively aporetic, lacking ultimate justification and therefore always ethically compromised, so that justice is perpetually deferred rather than decisively enacted (*Politics of Friendship*, 2005). Despite their differences, both strands converge in neutralizing decision by subordinating it either to consensus-driven procedure or to undecidability, rendering ontologically grounded or revelatory judgments structurally illegitimate within contemporary theory.

[36] Some of this discussion is covered by Shoshana Zuboff in her outstanding *The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight For A Human Future At The New Frontier Of Power* (Profile Books: London, 2019), *passim*. Zuboff provides the most systematic empirical and conceptual account of this emergent form of power. Her analysis demonstrates how platform governance is not an accidental by-product of digital innovation but the institutional expression of a new economic and political logic in which human experience is appropriated as raw material for behavioural prediction and control. While Zuboff frames her critique primarily in terms of capitalism, democracy, and human autonomy, the present argument extends her diagnosis ontologically: surveillance capitalism presupposes a reconfiguration of reality itself, in which persons appear as behavioural surplus, truth as operational compliance, and authority as *pre-juridical environmental control* rather than accountable judgment.

[37] This section is an augmentation of a blogpost by us from December 2025, online, https://wahidazal303.blogspot.com/2025/12/the-myth-of-failed-messiah.html (retrieved 1 January 2026).

[38] Like some Ex-Bahā'ī liberals do.

[39] In that regard, see Louis Massignon's magisterial study *The Passion of al-Ḥallāj: Mystic and Martyr of Islam* (trans.) Herbert Mason, 4 volumes (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1982).

[40] See our comments in the introduction *to The Prayers to the Orient of Light: A translation and text of Shihābuddīn Yaḥyā Suhrawardī's The Spiritual Influxes and Sanctifications (al-wāridāt wa'l-taqdīsāt)* (2025).

[41] Whatever the consequences that followed, this was why we had no choice but to forcefully intervene against Chris Bennett of *Cannabis Culture* in early November 2025 after he published his absolutely disgraceful *Getting High With The Báb – The Drug Infused Origins of The Bahá'í? (Some Notes)*, online, https://www.cannabisculture.com/content/2025/11/05/getting-high-with-the-bab-the-drug-infused-origins-of-the-bahai-some-notes/ (retrieved 29 December 2025). See also our *Against the Postmodern Germ: Essays in Parapolitical Disinformation Architecture and the CESNUR-Bennett-Cannabis Culture Controversy* (2025). A century from now, this whole episode will not be read as a personal dispute, nor even as a controversy narrowly confined to questions of drugs, history, or religion. It will read as an index of how truth, authority, and distortion circulated in the early digital age: how sensationalism flourished in unregulated media ecologies, how institutions calculated silence as a strategy, and how individuals outside those institutions bore the cost of intervention. What remains archived here is not simply a rebuttal to misrepresentation, but a record of epistemic asymmetry—of how minority traditions and independent scholars were compelled to defend ontological and historical integrity in spaces structurally hostile to it. If *Against the Postmodern Germ* endures, it will be because it named that condition with clarity, documented its mechanisms without illusion, and refused to surrender the right of a living tradition to speak from within its own intellectual sovereignty. From a historiographical standpoint, the Azal-Bennett episode will thus likely be read as a paradigmatic case of early twenty-first-century knowledge production under conditions of digital fragmentation. On one side stand a series of polemical, sensationalist articles produced within a countercultural media ecosystem, valuable primarily as artifacts of their moment—revealing how inherited sectarian narratives, psychedelic mythologies, narrative laundering and algorithmic incentives converged to produce distortion without rigorous source engagement (Bennett = negation, لا إله). On the other stands *Against the Postmodern Germ*, a work situated deliberately within the archival and scholarly record, offering not merely rebuttal but a genealogy of how such distortions arise, circulate, and acquire the appearance of legitimacy (Azal = Affirmation, إلّا الله). Future scholars will likely treat Bennett's four screeds as symptomatic evidence of media ecology and transparent parapolitical drift, and ours as a primary source for understanding how minority religious traditions, denied institutional defense, articulated self-

representation and epistemic resistance in an era when authority was increasingly detached from evidence.

[42] Our own historical dispute with the Liberal Bahā'īs (i.e. Juan R. I. Cole, Alison and Steve Marshall, et al.)—all white, Anglo-European, middle-class, ontologically First World, lineal and genealogical heirs and beneficiaries of Anglo-European colonial settler regimes—essentially crystallizes this problem in miniature. Their interpretive posture is not merely a difference of historical judgment but an expression of a liberal ontology in which legitimacy is retroactively conferred by institutional success, bureaucratic continuity, and global reach. Within this framework, the triumph of the Haifan Bahā'ī administrative order becomes proof of its truth, while the violent suppression and juridical erasure of the Bayānī dispensation is reclassified as *evidence of its failure*—the irony here is compounded by the fact that people such as Juan R. I. Cole, Alison and Steve Marshall, etc., were themselves targeted victims of the brutalism of the Haifan Bahā'ī administrative order's uncompromising bureaucratic mentality. But what presents itself as neutral historiography in their written works is already normatively saturated: survival is treated as verification, defeat as refutation. The result is not history written from evidence alone, but history disciplined by an unexamined commitment to Western liberal criteria of validity—criteria that quietly equate *power with truth* and *administration with revelation*.

To us, this constitutes the ontology of *whiteness* itself—not as a biological or moral category, but as a *regime of being* that universalizes its own historical conditions as neutral criteria of truth. Whiteness here names an ontological position from which power appears as legitimacy, endurance as validation, and institutional continuity as *evidence of rightness*. It is an ontology that forgets its own *situatedness* by presenting its standards—procedural regularity, administrative success, global recognition—as self-evident measures rather than historically contingent achievements secured through asymmetrical force and global violence. In short, it is no more and no less than an ideological tautology of white Anglo-European imperial supremacy and dominance. Within this frame, what survives is assumed to deserve survival, and what is extinguished is presumed to have extinguished itself. Revelation that interrupts rather than consolidates, that exposes rather than stabilizes, is thus rendered unintelligible except as failure, deviance, or pathology. In this sense, the "failed messiah" trope around the Bāb and the Bayān is not merely a category error; it is the ontological reflex by which *whiteness* secures its authority over the meaning of history itself. Our experience over a lifetime of being in the West has proven to us, by empirical observation rather than mere philosophical abstraction, that whiteness largely understands itself as the bearer of rights without reciprocal exposure to obligation even (and especially) when it speaks the language of rights about others. Rights appear as inherent, pre-political, and self-justifying, while duties are externalized—assigned to institutions, procedures, or abstract norms rather than borne as

existential responsibility. This asymmetry produces a subjectivity that experiences constraint as injustice but power as neutrality, entitlement as natural but *accountability as intrusion*. Within such an ontology, the invocation of rights does not function as a claim within a shared moral order, but as a shield against interruption, judgment, or reversal.

What is decisive here is that this posture presents itself as universal while remaining structurally particular. Whiteness does not experience its rights as historically conferred or contingently secured, but as the default condition of legitimate existence. As a result, those who appear primarily as obligated—regulated, scrutinized, managed, or required to justify themselves—are tacitly positioned as *ontologically secondary*. Rights become unevenly distributed not merely at the level of law, but at the level of being itself. This helps explain why appeals to justice that do not conform to liberal procedural grammar are dismissed as irrational, excessive, or dangerous: they threaten a world in which rights circulate without cost, and power is exercised without being named as such. In this sense, the *ontology of whiteness* is not defined by overt domination alone, but by the quiet expectation that the world should remain intelligible, navigable, and answerable on its own terms, and no one else's. When that expectation is disrupted—by revelation, by rupture, by claims that do not seek permission from existing institutions, nay by truth itself—it is experienced not as a demand for justice, but as an illegitimate disturbance. The refusal to recognize obligation alongside right is thus not incidental; it is the condition that allows power to persist while continuing to believe in its own innocence.

To reiterate, within the ontology of whiteness where rights are experienced as inherent, pre-political, and self-justifying, duties are displaced onto institutions, procedures, or abstract norms. Constraint is felt as injustice, but power is felt as neutrality; entitlement appears natural, whereas accountability is perceived as intrusion. Within this frame, the language of rights no longer functions as a claim within a shared moral order, but as a shield against interruption, judgment, or reversal. What presents itself as universal is in fact structurally particular: a subject-position that presumes the world should already be arranged to recognize it without demand. But from a Bayānī standpoint, this asymmetry marks a fundamental ontological error. The Bayān does not recognize rights detached from responsibility; it grounds being itself in *taklīf*—answerability to truth prior to entitlement, obligation prior to claim. Existence is not a possession to be secured, but a trust to be borne, and manifestation is inseparable from responsibility. Where liberal ontology begins with the self as rights-holder and negotiates duties afterward, the Bayān begins with exposure, judgment, and ontological accountability, from which any legitimate claim must arise. What liberalism experiences as oppression—the demand to answer, to submit, to be judged—is, in Bayānī terms, the very condition of truth. The refusal of obligation alongside right is therefore not merely an ethical failure but an ontological foreclosure: a world that insists on entitlement without answerability

cannot recognize revelation, only manage disruption while engaging in repression masquerading as rights.

[43] This argument draws on a convergent line of inquiry spanning political ontology, metaphysical jurisprudence, and critical genealogy. The claim that political and legal orders presuppose an antecedent configuration of reality rather than generating their own foundations resonates with Martin Heidegger's account of *Seinsverständnis* (understanding of Being) as the unthematized ground of historical worlds in *Being and Time*, as well as with Michel Foucault's analysis of regimes of truth that render power operative by normalizing its epistemic conditions, see especially his *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–1977* (ed.) Colin Gordon (Pantheon Books: New York, 1980). In Islamic metaphysics, the priority of ontology over law is articulated with particular clarity by Ibn ʿArabī, for whom authority (*ḥukm*) is legitimate only insofar as it accords with the divine order of being rather than human convention (see *fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam*, especially per the Davidic chapter/17), and by Mullā Ṣadrā's doctrine of the primacy of existence (*aṣālat al-wujūd*), which subordinates juridical form to ontological reality. The Bayān radicalizes this insight by translating ontological truth directly into juridical limits: treating creation as *amāna* (trust) rather than property, and coercive governance as a falsification of being rather than merely a moral failure. In this sense, its critique operates prior to ideology and reform, issuing not a political objection but an ontological verdict on the legitimacy of rule itself.

[44] **Trans.** *And God is the best of those who give Being; truly, It is the best of those who give expansion* (*wa-Llāhu khayru-l-wājidīna innahū huwa khayru'l-fāsiḥīna*).

1

The Primal Point

From the Bābī Revolution to the Bahā'ī Counter-Revolution

The revolutionary message of Siyyid ʿAlī Muḥammad Shīrāzī, the Primal Point, the Bāb (d. 1850)[1] as crystallized in the Bayān, heralded a profound metaphysical, legal, and social upheaval in nineteenth century Iran—a rupture with the exoteric Islamic dispensation, a metaphysical deconstruction of the orthodox notion of prophethood, and a theurgical revolution aimed at transforming the cosmos itself through Divine Manifestation (*ẓuhūr*) all at the same time.[2] In stark contrast, Bahā'ism—particularly in the original form articulated by Mīrzā Ḥusayn-ʿAlī Nūrī (d. 1892), known as Bahāʾuʾllāh—emerges as a *counter-revolution*: an institutionalizing, pacifying, and imperial reconfiguration of the Bāb's radical project.[3] While Bābism sought to destroy the religious, epistemic, and oppressive socio-political order of its time in preparation for a new divine modality, Bahāʾism repackaged this rupture into a homogenizing, bureaucratic faith centered on obedience, flat-land universalism, diplomacy, and accommodation with Western imperial powers. We argue that Bahā'ism, far from being the fulfillment of the Bāb's message, was its complete and utter betrayal[4]—a restoration of a hegemonic patriarchal human order against the divine sophianic *dissensus*, a compromise with Empire against the divine insurgency of the Bayān.

This is because the Bayān is not merely a legal code or an apocalyptic text; it is a literal metaphysical revolution for *Islamaic* civilization. And just as in Akbarian metaphysics with the Complete Human (*al-insān al-kāmil*), the Bāb likewise reconfigured the very structure of revelation, proclaiming the *Manifestation of God* (*maẓhar ilāhī*) as the ontological axis of all Being. Revelation, for him, was no longer a historical accident but a perpetual theophanic self-disclosure (*tajallī*), unfolding in ever-renewing modes, *ad infinitum*. This was also due to the fact that the Bāb declared that all religious laws were both symbolic theophanic vessels (*ẓuhūrāt*) as well as ordinances (*aḥkām*) of the Divine Will, but only contingent to the time and place they were revealed—abrogable, transient, and intentionally unstable. Even the *sharīʾa* of the Qurʾān, which Islam regarded as eternal and unchanging, was subject to annulment. This logic culminates in the Bayān's most audacious gesture: the absolute centrality of *man yuẓhiruhu'llāh* (He whom God shall make Manifest)—the future divine figure from the Bāb's own time whose authority would supersede not only the Bāb's own teachings but all religious dispensations. To wit,

> ...Verily I am God; there is no other god besides Me. None apart from Me shall ever attain unto Me. And whoso desires to attain unto Me, let him assuredly attain unto *He whom God shall make Manifest* (*man yuẓhiruhu'llāh*)—for this is a Path Impregnable, Inviolable. And verily I am God; there is no other god besides Me. Nothing shall ever behold Me. And whoso desires to gaze upon Me, let him assuredly gaze upon *He whom God shall make Manifest*—for this is a Path Impregnable, Inviolable (*mumtaniʾ manīʾ*). And verily I am God; there is no other god besides Me. Nothing shall ever know Me. And whoso desires to know Me, let him assuredly know *He whom God shall make Manifest*—for this is a Book Lofty, Exalted. And verily I am God; there is no other god besides Me. Nothing shall ever be able to love Me. And whoso desires to love Me, let him assuredly love *He whom God shall make Manifest*—for this is a Path Magnificent, Splendid. Verily I am God; there is no other god besides Me. None shall hear My remembrance. And whoso

desires to hear My remembrance, let him assuredly hear the remembrance of *He whom God shall make Manifest*—for this is a Path Radiant, Resplendent.

Verily I am God; there is no other god besides Me. Nothing shall ever unify Me. And whoso desires to affirm My unity, let him not conjoin anything with *He whom God shall make Manifest*—for this is a true Path, Majestic, Sublime. And verily I am God; there is no other god besides Me. None has power to glorify Me. And whoso desires to glorify Me, let him assuredly magnify *He whom God shall make Manifest* on the Day of His manifestation—for this is a True Path, Complete, Beautiful. Verily I am God; there is no other god besides Me. Nothing shall ever sanctify Me. And whoso desires to sanctify Me, let him assuredly *praise He whom God shall make Manifest* in the days of His manifestation—for this is a True Path, August, Mighty.

Verily I am God; there is no other god besides Me. None shall ever reach Me in order to obey Me. And whoso desires to obey Me, let him assuredly obey *He whom God shall make Manifest*—for this is a True Path, Luminous, Light-Bestowing. Verily I am God; there is no other god besides Me. Nothing has power to strengthen Me. And whoso desires to strengthen Me, let him assuredly strengthen *He whom God shall make Manifest*—for this is a True Path, Invincible, Mighty. Verily I am God; there is no other god besides Me. I was a Hiddenness, Eternally, Pre-Existent; and I cease not—nay, I shall assuredly ever be—Self-Subsisting, Impregnable, Primordial...(*my trans.*)[5]

But far from being a messianic comfort, the Bāb's language renders *man yuẓhiruhu'llāh* as a destabilizing, cataclysmic principle: an ever-renewing Divine Fire to consume old form. This figure is not a unifier, but a *Shiva*-like destroyer of all inherited certainties. Every law in the Bayān is provisional—its real meaning resides not in its literal application, but in its capacity to prepare for this *ẓuhūr* (Manifestation)—as well as the ones

that will come after it without cessation. For example, in the *Book of the Five Grades* (*kitāb-i-panj shaʾn*), the Bāb states:

> ...So when you have understood this, bear witness that the knowledge of God is not manifested except through the knowledge of the locus of the Manifestation of Its Logos-Self (*maẓhar nafsihi*), for all that the contingent beings have come to know of their Lord is only through what the messengers of God have taught them. Thus, the beginning of gnosis is through them, and the end of gnosis is unto them—for they are the veils of God: none comprehends them save God. Their likeness is as that of a mirror (*al-mirʾāt*): naught is seen in them but God. Therefore, they desire nothing but what God has willed; they will nothing but what God has desired; they determine nothing but what God has determined; they decree nothing but what God has decreed; they permit nothing but what God has permitted; they delay nothing but what God has delayed; they inscribe nothing but what God has inscribed. So sever yourself from the limit (*ḥadd*) of Names and their meanings, for they shift and turn by the command of God however It wills in every Theophanic Manifestation (*ẓuhūr*).
>
> And I bear witness that the likeness of every Manifestation (*ẓuhūr*) is as the rising of the sun: if it rises upon innumerable places, it is but one sun; and if it sets upon innumerable places, it is still but one sun. Likewise, take the similitude of the Sun of Reality (*shams al-ḥaqīqa*): for the First *is* the Last, and the Manifest *is* the Hidden. There is seen in the celestial thrones (*al-aʿrāsh*)[6] none but its Discloser (*mujalīhā*), and in the goblets none but its Nurturer. And if it were possible that a soul from among the creation might abide from the First—It Who has no beginning—unto the Last—It Who has no end—and be of the dwellers in the Ocean of Reality (*baḥr al-ḥaqīqa*), that soul would follow the First Who has no beginning and would follow the Last Who has no end, for in both is one single radiant Sun. And that is the Sun of the Manifestation of God (*shams ẓuhūr allāh*), which is not encompassed by spatial realms, nor is it encompassed by inward

realities; it is not limited by limits, nor defined by definitions. It is exalted above resemblance, transcendent beyond similarity, sanctified from likeness, and hallowed beyond comparison. It is unique beyond all parity. All names are Its Name, while It has no Name; all Attributes are Its Attribute, while It has no attribute. Its inward Reality is the *logoic*-Word: *lā ilāha illā allāh* (there is no god but God), and its outward form in the Qurʾān is Muḥammad, the Messenger of God. And in the Bayān: the Essence of the Seven Letters (*dhāt ḥurūf al-sabʿ*). And in the Gospels: Jesus, the Spirit of God (*ʿīsā rūḥ allāh*). And in the Psalms: David, the Chosen One of God (*dāwūd ṣafī allāh*), And in the Torah: Moses, the Speaker with God (*mūsā kalīm allāh*). And after the Bayān: *He whom God shall make Manifest* (*man yuẓhiruhu'llāh*). And after *He Whom God shall make Manifest*: the *One whom God shall make Manifest*. And after the *One whom God shall make Manifest*: [another] *One whom God shall make Manifest*. And after that *One whom God shall make Manifest*: [another] *One whom God shall make Manifest*. And after that *One whom God shall make Manifest*: [another] *One whom God shall make Manifest*. And after that *One whom God shall make Manifest*: [another] *One whom God shall make Manifest*. And after that *One whom God shall make Manifest*: [another] *One whom God shall make Manifest*. And after that *One whom God shall make Manifest*: [yet another] *One whom God shall make Manifest*.

And verily, I shall speak of Them so long as I remain alive—never shall my heart be emptied of the sweetness of Their remembrance (*ḥalāwat dhikrihim*), nor has there been over My heart anything dearer than that remembrance. And were I to speak until the end of the One Who has no end, indeed God shall cause it to be made manifest—for It has no limit. Nor is the creation of God in the dominion (*al-mulk*) circumscribed, for it has neither beginning nor an end. And whosoever limits the thrones of Reality (*aʿrāsh al-ḥaqīqa*) in the Bayān—such a one is among those who believe not in God. And I seek forgiveness from God for that...[7]

Earlier in the same chapter, the Bāb writes:

...God, in every Manifestation (*ẓuhūr*), renews the creation of all things, that you might be renewed; and We have renewed the Light of the Furqān [i.e. the Qurʾān] with the Light of the Bayān. Therefore, those are they who pass from Light unto Light, and who, in Light, in the presence of Light, are illumined. You have witnessed what has been decreed concerning them and have heard; and God shall make you witness in your end and shall make you hear that by which your heart will be content—above what it is content with, and above the above of what it is content with—all being contented. And by the life of that Light in the Furqān, that Light in the Bayān is indeed more luminous in the sight of God and nearer in the [cosmic] Book, but the people do not know.

And you shall surely see the angels of Paradise (*al-firdaws*) and of Riḍwān descending therein, made mighty by the Light of God. And indeed, that which God has singled out from among the Names is the Name of Light (*nūr*), for there remains in it no veil to prevent it from affirming all affirmations. Thus does God exalt whom It wills from Its presence; verily, there is no god but It, the One, the All-Illuminating (*al-wāḥid al-nawwār*).

And verily, as for the meaning of "God is the Light of the heavens and the earth" [**Qurʾān 24:35**]—if you desire, through it, to be among the knowers in the inner-most of the inner (*bāṭin al-bāṭin*) after the outer-most of the outer (*ẓāhir al-ẓāhir*)—the Gate was the first to believe. Thus does God strip away the veils, that you may see with your own eyes that God is Light before and after, and that by Its Light all are guided. But you will observe [otherwise] in the days of *He whom God shall make Manifest* (*man yuẓhiruhu allāh*), for you, O people of the Bayān, will assuredly be tested. Perhaps you will recite these verses while, in your own selves, you shall depart from the Light and enter into that which is not Light, supposing that you do good—like those who failed to recognize Ḥusayn, the Light of God—while they recited the Verse of Light in the Book of God [i.e. the Qurʾān]; and this after they had recognized the Illuminator of Lights (*munawwir al-anwār*) in the

Bayān, while [now] possessing all the verses of Light in the Furqān to recite. And the lamp is mentioned with the Light only because it burns and nothing of it remains. Thus does God show you the lamps of lights, that you may be guided. And by the life of *He whom God shall make Manifest*, the Light of lights (*nūr al-anwār*) is more luminous than all the lamps, but most of the people see not.

So behold the power of God: how God creates servants who consent to be a Light for God, like the lamp—they burn by their own selves and give light to those around them. This is from the bounty of God upon them and upon you, yet you are not thankful. Do you suppose that the creation of Light is like [any other] creation? Say: God is exalted above that! All are [guided] by the Light of God, that they may be just. See how they care neither for denial/negation (*al-nafy*) nor for what accompanies it, and how they worshipped God manifestly amid their multitudes, their assemblies, and their means, while those causes bore witness; and all of this will be recorded by the possessors of knowledge in their books, for those who will remember thereafter. Thus does God create strength in the hearts of those who have been given the Light.

And likewise you have heard of the logoic-Word of the *ḥāʾ* (ح) [i.e. Ḥusayn], when thousands of soldiers confronted Him, while He stood with His own person and seventy in number—they affirmed the affirmation (*al-ithbāt*) and negated the negation (*al-nafy*), were patient with God, and did not sleep for a blink of an eye. It behoves those who have been given the Bayān to be like the possessors of the lights; but God bestows bounty upon whom It wills of Its servants. Verily, there is no other god but It, the One, the All-Illuminating…(*my trans.*)[8]

In this way, Bābism was also a legal and theurgical revolution. The Bayān prohibits commerce in the four elements (as mentioned), attacks the clerical authority of the Shiʿi ecclesiastical order, demands purity in speech and action, and restricts marriage, property, and religious architecture in ways that shatter Islamic jurisprudence.[9] The Bāb instituted

ritual practices that blurred the line between prayer and magic, rendering everyday life a domain of divine invocations, sigilic work, and numerological mysteries. The *abjad* lettrist system, the Arabic letters of the alphabet, and astrological correspondences were not incidental to this creed—they are, according to the Bāb, integral to the operation of the Divine Will in the world and the praxis of the wayfarer.[10] To wit,

> ...Verily I am God; there is no other god besides Me. I created the heavens and the earth and all that lies between them by My command—*Be*, and it is. I created the letters and made them the keys to every knowledge from Our presence, for We are powerful over all things. O All-Things,[11] reflect—from the remembrance of the Most High down to the lowest atom—that you yourselves are all of that which is within the twenty-eight letters; let you bear witness just as you have borne witness to all the letters within them. Let, then, all the spirits of the letters bear witness within their spirits, for We are knowing of all things.
>
> Verily I am God; there is no other god besides Me. From the First who has no first, I created the substance of a brocaded, hidden knowledge and stored it within the veils of the Unseen from the First who has no first until that time—an exaltation from Our presence, for We are strengthening. We found no servants upon whom to send down that knowledge, and so We concealed it with Us until that time as a safeguarding from Our presence, for We are a guardian over all things. Yet We knew the Thrones of Reality and the First Living in every manifestation, and We commanded them to conceal it; but when We beheld, in that valuation, the Names of all things by which We are inferred, We willed to bestow that knowledge upon them as a grace from Our presence, for We are bountiful. This is a knowledge which, within the letters, you are able to make certain: that all is in the First Living, and that the numbers of the Living are in the First Point; and you, as guides of all things to the Unity, draw this forth by inquiry. This is the exposition of what the ancients expounded: everything that was created and is created is in the Furqān, and all of it terminates in the Line of the

First, which We sent down upon the letters of the One. Before this you were not given that knowledge, nor were you witnesses to it, save for what you interpreted from what you recovered without proof, by which you reasoned and informed those who sought inquiry from the Book of God. But God shall surely teach you, at this time, through what descends upon the Point of the Bayān—an exaltation from God—for those who, on the Day of the Resurrection, shall believe in *He whom God shall make Manifest*. Had God not willed to take as a witness to this [knowledge] *He whom God shall make Manifest*, and then the First Living in the other Resurrection, God would not have sent down that knowledge [of lettrism]. Yet you, standing before God on the Day of His Manifestation, give thanks: this is a knowledge with God more mighty than all things, and by it you bear witness to All-Things as numbers within the First Unity—and then let you bear witness from the First Unity without number...(*my trans*.)[12]

...Among the gifts bestowed by the Lord of Pre-Eternity upon the Point of the Bayān is the knowledge of all things within a Single Soul, through which generation (*takwīn*) in the world of letters is beheld with the very eye of certitude. This is a complete proof over all, like the revealed verses, and belongs to the hidden treasuries of divine knowledge that had not previously descended. It is more exalted than every other science: upon this knowledge all scriptures have been sent down, and upon it they shall yet descend. From this knowledge proceeds the command by which *"Your God is One God"* (**Qur'ān 2:163**) was first revealed, in the exposition of the manifestations of Lordship under the shadow of this verse in the gates of Paradise; and likewise concerning the Fire: *"Over it are nineteen"* (**Qur'ān 74:30**). Something of this has been expressed in Arabic formulations, and—God willing—it will be fully whispered and perfected within the Bayān itself.

In brief: nothing exists beyond the twenty-eight letters, and likewise the generation of all things lies wholly within the meanings of these letters. The Real—glorified and exalted be It—has gathered them, by Its knowledge, into

eleven degrees and constituted them as the Talismanic-Temple of the Primal Will, which is the First Human: its outward form is [the letter] ***hā'*** (ه), its inward reality [is the letter] ***wāw*** (و). Under the shadow of this Talismanic-Temple It fashioned eighteen talismanic-temples within the Ocean of the Divine Names. It cannot perish, for the final limit of the number of God's Names is the Name *mustaghāth* (the Aid Invoked). Whoever contemplates the talismanic-temples will infer this matter in its most perfect form.

This knowledge was sent down unto the talismanic-temples solely to serve as demonstrative proof for the Guides of the Bayān, and not for others—namely, to show how the entirety of the Qurʾān can reside within the Point and yet issue forth from it, even though the creation of the Greater World is contained within the Book. Previously, such claims remained mere gnosis, lacking firmer proof or decisive demonstration. Now, however, through this mode of knowledge, the matter has been established by conclusive proof and demonstrative evidence. The Bayān has guarded it as the pupil of the eye and has not bestowed it upon one who does not know its worth, for this belongs to the substance of substances, and none but the possessors of substance may hold it. Through a mirror that points to God, it preserves the forms of the talismanic-temples and derives the final Names, until the day when God shall unveil the mysteries of the talismanic-temples and bestow upon whom It wills among Its servants. Truly, It is the Possessor of bounteous grace![13]

But the Bāb's laws were not meant to last—they were conceived as a spiritual gauntlet, a divine ordeal (*miḥna*), a set of esoteric challenges through which the believer-*cum*-wayfarer would prove fidelity not to the outer *form* of religion but to its inner *Source*. The Bayān thus invites a metaphysical anarchism, where no law is final, no form is absolute, and all is suspended in awaiting *man yuẓhiruhu'llāh* (He whom God shall make Manifest) and what comes after Him—an endless divine *becoming* that will never be enclosed by

institutions. In this sense, the Bayān is not only apocalyptic—it is in one sense *anti-historical*, calling for a continuous severance from the material husks of the past, a permanent revolution of meaning that leaves the true wayfarer and gnostic precisely in that kind of inner comportment where Ibn ʿArabī insists they should always remain: *ḥayra* (bewilderment).

Enter Bahāʾuʾllāh (d. 1892).[14] While initially claiming allegiance to the Bāb and occupying the periphery of the Bābī movement during its formative period, Bahāʾuʾllāh gradually asserted his own claim to being *man yuẓhiruhu'llāh* over twenty[15] other claimants who had preceded him as a way to undermine the entire Bābī Revolution, systematically erasing the Bāb's theurgical and revolutionary core in the process.[16] In texts like his *kitāb-i-aqdas*,[17] Bahāʾuʾllāh softens or nullifies most of the radical ordinances of the Bayān—while toughening some of those the Bayān had softened[18]—replacing the high esotericism of the Bāb with generalized moral exhortations, thereby constructing an institutional religious system organized around obedience, administration, and a hegemonic authoritarian order.[19] Where the Bāb spoke in the fire of divine command (*amr*) designed for the complete transformation of both existing material and spiritual conditions, Bahāʾuʾllāh introduces an opportunistic ethic of moderation that in many ways resembles Protestant Christianity—but one in an exotic, oriental packaging and garb. Where the Bāb demanded apocalyptic separation from stultifying Islamic orthodoxy, Bahāʾuʾllāh calls for strategic harmony and liberal bourgeois unity. The *House of Justice* (*bayt'ul-ʿadl*), the cornerstone of Bahā'ī administration, is precisely the sort of legal-institutional apparatus the Bābī texts resist. In essence, therefore, Bahāʾuʾllāh recoded the Revolution into a liberal reformist mold firmly centered in the most toxic elements of capitalist European modernity.

Moreover, Bahāʾuʾllāh's messianism is totalizing: whereas the Bāb opened a field of infinite theophany, Bahāʾuʾllāh closes it, declaring himself the terminal point of a divine arc, the seal of all future revelation until an indefinite eschaton of 500,000 years.[20] The result is a metaphysical foreclosure—where the Bāb's *man yuẓhiruhu'llāh* was a cipher for the uncontainable Divine, Bahāʾuʾllāh turns it into a personality cult and a centralized theology of bureaucratic command. This closure is not merely doctrinal but temporal and

political: by arresting revelation within an extended horizon of deferment, Bahāʾuʾllāh transforms apocalyptic imminence into managed expectation. The disruptive urgency that characterized the Bayān—its refusal to allow law, hierarchy, or ontology to settle—gives way to a regime of patience, obedience, and administrative continuity. Revelation is no longer an event that interrupts history, but a completed deposit to be guarded, interpreted, and administered by authorized institutions. In this way, eschatology is neutralized by elongation: the end is postponed so far into abstraction that it *ceases to function* as a criterion of judgment upon the present. What emerges instead is a closed metaphysical economy in which divine authority circulates only through sanctioned channels, and meaning is stabilized by bureaucratic procedure rather than renewed disclosure. The infinite openness of theophany is this way replaced by a monopoly on interpretation, sometimes enforced through administrative violence[21] but usually through the moralized language of unity, order, and loyalty. This is why Bahā'ī messianism can coexist so comfortably with modern governance: it sacralizes continuity, disciplines dissent as disunity, and renders rupture not heretical but unthinkable. Against this, the Bāb's vision remains *irreducibly dangerous*—not because it promises another institution, but because it refuses to allow the Divine to be concluded, contained, or deferred into managerial eternity.

Now, Bābism's revolutionary edge invited persecution. The movement's resistance to Qājār and Shiʿi clerical power structures, its militant self-defense, and its refusal to compromise with religious orthodoxy made it a target of the Iranian state and the clerical *ʿulamāʾ*. Bahāʾuʾllāh, by contrast, sought accommodation. From the 1860s onward, he sent letters to global rulers—Napoleon III, Queen Victoria, the Pope—advocating peace, disarmament, and a liberal world unity.[22] While cloaked in prophetic language, these were not revolutionary calls—they were appeals to Empire for legitimacy. Meanwhile, after the martyrdom of the Bāb in July 1850, his loyal followers in Iran covertly worked tirelessly to undermine the Qājār and reactionary Shiʿi clerical establishment both, which they partially succeeded by directly triggering the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1905-09.[23] This was a democratic Revolution that Bahāʾuʾllāh's son and successor, ʿAbd'ul-Bahāʾ Abbās Effendī (d. 1921), openly forbad his Bahāʾī followers from supporting. Instead, in at least

one treatise close to the timeline of that Iranian constitutional revolutionary period,[24] ʿAbd'ul-Bahāʾ effectively supported the Qājārs and their absolutist monarchical statism—finding himself on the same side as the Revolution's most bitter, turbaned enemies: the proverbial *turbanators* who two generations earlier had viciously persecuted the Bābīs and signed the Bāb's own *fatwā* of death.

This turn to a centrist globalist liberalism—in rhetoric, at least, while never in practice—is foundational to modern Bahāʾism in almost all of its forms.[25] In its Universal House of Justice headquartered in Haifa, with its emphasis on global governance, Bahāʾism aligns itself with Western liberal globalism and its institutions, and not with any kind of political or spiritual insurrection. Its "oneness of humanity" doctrine, while rhetorically progressive, functions as an ideological lubricant for global integration and the sanitization of cultures under bourgeois European modernity, and not a critique of global capitalism or imperialism. The result is a sanitized, spiritualized globalization—an echo of the very kind of colonial and capitalist modernity the Bāb's teachings opposed. Thus, Bahāʾism functions analogously to Thermidor after the French Revolution or the Stalinist bureaucracy after the Russian one: it codifies what was meant to remain uncodified, institutes what was meant to be de-institutionalized, and renders into a pacified order what was meant to be a divine upheaval.

To identify Bahāʾism as the Counter-Revolution is also to recall the silencing of Subḥ-i-Azal (d. 1912), the Bāb's appointed successor and Mirror.[26] While the Bāb's final writings clearly identity Him as a minor *ẓuhūr*—the proverbial first Imām of the dispensation of the Bayān—Subḥ-i-Azal maintained the spirit of waiting (*intiẓār*) insisting that *man yuẓhiruhu'llāh* had not yet appeared in that time and that the *Bayān* must be preserved intact in its radical incompletion until a ripe future would manifest him.[27] Unlike Bahāʾuʾllāh, Subḥ-i-Azal rejected institutional power, avoided public self-aggrandizement, and maintained an esoteric, often hidden leadership—with some Bābīs of that period even referring to him as the "Hidden Azal."[28] But his silence was not passivity. Instead, it was both fidelity to the Bāb's ethic of unfulfilled expectation as well as to his direct counsel to him that he preserve himself at any cost as the bridge to that next Manifestation.[29] Yet the

demonization and selective erasure of Subḥ-i-Azal from Bahāʾī historiography is a classic operation of a counter-revolution: to declare the old order illegitimate, to opportunistically rewrite history as always pointing to the new regime. The Azalī tradition, though not nearly extinguished, remains the true continuity of the Bāb's revolutionary revolt—uncompromising, hidden, metaphysically destabilizing. To us, its obscurity is the proof of its unassailable authenticity, because in a confused world that seeks whitewash and plastic order, the divine manifests as rupture and uncompromising Truth.

In short, the Bāb lit a fire meant to consume all ossified forms of authority. His revolution was ontological, legal, and a spiritual one all at once—a call to divine freedom and the renewal of all *being* from age to age through theophanic irruption. Bahāʾism, in contrast, douses that fire. It is not the continuation of the Bayān but its suppression, not the fulfillment of the Bāb's promise but its reversal. In this light, Bahāʾism stands not as the successor of Bābism but as its Thermidor: the moment the Revolution was stopped and turned back. Thus, to be faithful to the Bayān is not to build temples, institutions, and world councils—but to remain perpetually awaiting the uncontainable eruption of Divine Theophany into the world, in whatever form, name, or non-name it may take—and, above all, to struggle for social, political and economic justice during the interregnum. It is to live without closure, without stultifying canon, without Empire. That is the path of the True Revolution—and this is why we proudly call ourself a Bayānī and oppose Bahā'ism as the quintessence of negation.

That stated, the Bābī movement erupted during the 1840s in a Qājār Iran stratified by entrenched landholding aristocracy, a merchant-based elite, and an obscurantist and reactionary *ʿulamāʾ* clerical class.[30] The Bāb's message—and especially the radical legislation in the Bayān—represented a proto-socialist, anti-hierarchical rupture. As noted, it was hostile to clerical power: And even though the rump of its top leadership came from this class, nevertheless the Bāb directly disqualified the authority of the entrenched *status quo* Shīʿī clerics by declaring their careerism finished. The implication was material: the *waqf* system, control of legal-religious endowments and arbitration, and so their influence over peasant life was to be dismantled. Universal economic restrictions in the ordinances of the

Bayān to cease trade in the four elements—Air, Fire, Water and Earth—implied an end to commodification of the natural world. Further laws forbade excessive wealth accumulation, upheld justice in transactions, forbad the forced homelessness of anyone, and put severe restrictions on exploitative commerce. His proto-egalitarianism and emphasis on spiritual station independent of lineage, wealth, or clerical rank challenged the very foundations of Iranian feudal society. In many ways, the Bayān was a metaphysical manifesto for social transformation, threatening the ruling classes' entire power base. Within its ranks, the early Bābīs included disenfranchised minor clerics, radical merchants, peasants, and women like Ṭāhirah Qurrat al-ʿAyn (d. 1852),[31] whose unveiling and defiant oratory threatened patriarchal class norms. The Bāb's message therefore appealed to those *outside* the corridors of power. As such, the Bāb was a messianic insurgent whose teachings carried radical implications for the dissolution of class oppression, clerical supremacy, and inherited privilege in 19th century Iran.

By contrast, Bahā'u'llāh restructured a movement he usurped to be palatable to the gentry, diplomats, merchants, and imperial authorities. Bahā'u'llāh himself came from an aristocratic family of landed bureaucratic nobility (the *nawwābs*) with close ties to the Qājār royal court. His early position was not that of a dispossessed radical, but of a privileged aristocrat with mystical leanings. As mentioned, in his *kitāb-i-aqdas* Bahā'u'llāh's reverses many of the Bāb's revolutionary policies—or significantly softens and disfigures others. While the Bayān spoke of divine rupture, Bahā'u'llāh emphasized opportunistic moderation, gradualism, and globalist world order—a discourse compatible with the desires of middle and upper classes. Bahā'u'llāh's "Tablets to the Kings and Rulers"[32] especially reveal not a revolutionary platform but a call to enlightened autocracy. He sought respect and recognition from the Ottoman and European monarchs and potentates of his time. His diplomatic tone and visions of a world court, law, and order appealed to liberal constitutional monarchists, not class warriors. In other words, the Bahā'ī faith he created was to be a form of exotic bourgeois religiosity—and there is no way to define it otherwise. Thus, the Bahā'ī faith developed an almost solipsistic ethic of personal improvement whilst simultaneously subsuming it into rigid community conformity as well

as meritocracy, all topped up with capitalist international commerce. Its post-Bahā'u'llāh expansion—particularly under ʿAbdu'l-Bahāʾ and then Shoghi Effendi (d. 1957)—was built through urban professionals, intellectuals, and white Western progressives, rather than the downtrodden—the proverbial *wretched of the earth*. As such, Bahā'u'llāh represents a reabsorption of the Bāb's revolutionary ethos into a liberal-progressive paradigm that could be endorsed by property owners, reformist bureaucrats, and global elites. In short, under the Bahā'ī faith, the original Bābī revolutionary ethos was thoroughly sabotaged, captured, disfigured and redirected to counter-revolutionary ends in the service of Empire.

With that said, it should be underscored that on the opposite pole of Bahā'ism, the Bāb's movement functioned within the typology Max Weber calls *charismatic disruption*—wherein a radical spiritual figure overturns established religious and economic legitimacy in favor of a new order grounded in immediacy, transcendence, and rupture.[33] His teachings abolished positivist notions of historical time: He declared the *Day of Resurrection* (*qīyāma*) had come, the Islamic *sharīʿa* abrogated with a new *hierohistorical* cycle of humanity begun—that itself would eventually be superseded and replaced. For example, in the **7th Gate of the Second Unity** of the **Persian Bayān**, he says:

> The intention by the Day of Resurrection (*yawm al-qiyāma*) is the Day of the Manifestation of the Tree of Reality (*shajarat al-ḥaqīqa*), and it is not observed that any of the Shīʿa have comprehended the Day of Resurrection. Rather, all have imagined something illusory, conceiving of a matter that has no reality with God. But that which is intended by God—and in the understanding of the knowers of Reality—by the Day of Resurrection is this: from the moment of the Manifestation of the Tree of Reality in each age, by whatever Name it appears, until its setting, that whole span is the Day of Resurrection.
>
> For example, from the Day of the Mission (*biʿthat*) of Jesus—peace be upon Him—until the day of His ascension was the Resurrection of Moses, for

the Manifestation of God at that time was made manifest through that Reality, and He rendered judgment upon each soul: whoever had believed in Moses, according to his own statement, was rewarded, and whoever had not believed, was punished, again according to his own statement—because that which *God testified* at that time was that which *God testified in the Gospel*. And after the Day of the Mission of the Messenger of God—may blessings and peace be upon Him and His family—until the day of His ascension was the Resurrection of Jesus—peace be upon Him—for the Tree of Reality was manifest in the form of the Muḥammadan Temple (*haykal Muḥammadī*), and He rendered judgment upon every person: whoever had believed in Jesus was rewarded, and whoever had not was chastised, according to his own declaration. And from the moment of the manifestation of the Tree of the Bayān until its setting is the Resurrection of the Messenger of God—may blessings and peace be upon Him and His family—which God promised in the Qur'ān. The beginning of that was after two hours and eleven minutes from the night of the fifth of Jumādā al-Ūlā in the year 1260 [AH]—which becomes the year 1270 [of the *biʿthat*]—that moment marked the beginning of the Day of Resurrection of the Qurʾān, and until the setting of the Tree of Reality, it is the Resurrection of the Qurʾān. For a thing does not enter its *resurrection* until it reaches the station of perfection (*maqām al-kamāl*), and the perfection of the religion of Islam was consummated at the commencement of this Manifestation; and from the beginning of this Manifestation until its setting, the fruits of the Tree of Islam will be brought forth and made manifest.

And the Resurrection of the Bayān shall occur in the Manifestation of *He whom God shall make Manifest*, for today the Bayān is in the station of seed (*maqām al-nuṭfah*); and at the beginning of the Manifestation of *He whom God shall make Manifest*, the ultimate perfection of the Bayān will become manifest, such that the fruits of the trees that He planted will be

> harvested—just as the Manifestation of the *Qāʾim* (ariser) of the progeny of Muḥammad—peace be upon Him—is in reality the same as the Manifestation of the Messenger of God, and it will not become manifest except by His gathering of the fruits of Islam from the Qurānic verses that He planted in the hearts of the people (*my trans.*)[34]

All of this carried material implications, since the Bāb was unequivocally claiming to be the *mahdī* in person bearing the divine authority to abrogate the material form of Islam—and specifically its *sharīʿa*. Legal contracts based on Islamic law, clerical enforcement of property rights, and land ownership regulations were now suddenly declared obsolete. The result was a social destabilization of the Iranian ruling classes' ideological grip, even if the Bāb Himself didn't articulate a proletarian theory. His followers enacted it by refusing to pay taxes in a few cases, fighting back against corrupt provincial governors, and asserting radical spiritual equality in several major instances such as the Badasht conference in the summer of 1848 and during the assorted Bābī uprisings that followed it.[35] This was a form of apocalyptic class undoing.[36] It did not proceed through economic program or institutional reform, but through the suspension of the very legal and symbolic structures that rendered class power intelligible in the first place. By dissolving the juridical authority of the ʿulamāʾ and the moral legitimacy of Qājār governance, the Bābī movement transformed obedience itself into a theological impossibility. What was threatened was not merely the distribution of wealth or authority, but the ontological foundations that made such distributions appear divinely sanctioned. In this sense, Bābī action constituted not a politics of redistribution, but an eschatological negation of class as a stable category within history itself.

By contrast, Bahā'u'llāh fits more with Weber's second type: *routinized charisma*, wherein a former revolutionary movement is domesticated into institutions, structures, and administrative order.[37] His was universalist but not radical: Bahā'u'llāh's teachings stress unity of *mankind*, obedience to government, and orderliness. His legal structure reintroduced patriarchal hierarchy (via the Universal House of Justice), merit-based

advancement, and economic liberalism under capitalist domination—and no class abolition. His is an institutional religion *par excellence*. While the Bāb's movement threatened clerics, Bahā'u'llāh built a global clerisy of Bahā'ī administrative *apparatchicks*.[38] Class distinctions reemerged—not as feudal rank, but as meritocratic management of the global Bahā'ī community.[39] On economic doctrine, while Bahā'u'llāh pays lip service to wealth redistribution in principle, it is however through voluntary contributions and moderate taxation. This aligns with bourgeois liberalism, not revolutionary socialism. He is not calling for the collectivization of the means of production as the Bāb does by forbidding the buying and selling of the four elements. Instead, he is thoroughly validating the existence of capitalism itself—this world devourer. Thus, Bahā'u'llāh's ethics are *developmentalistic* and opportunistically strategic, promoting the dominant mainstream pedagogies of the West and economic enterprise under capitalism—not class struggle. So while the Bāb threatened the class structure by abolishing it symbolically and spiritually, Bahā'u'llāh accommodated it, reworking it into a modern managerial vision of global order not too different to the one we have already seen since the post-WWII period. On the other hand, the Bāb represents a revolutionary rupture rooted in metaphysical egalitarianism, threatening feudal, clerical, and patriarchal power structures alike—making his message fundamentally anti-elite. Bahā'u'llāh, by dissimilarity, rearticulates that energy the Bāb had rejected into a moderated, over-structured, and class-accommodating universalism of the bourgeoisie, which appeals to reform-minded elites, imperial administrators, and liberal technocrats. This class analysis reveals not just theological divergence—but a shift in both social alliance and ontology: From the dispossessed and insurgent to the managerial and upwardly mobile. One look at their meglomanical shrine complexes on Mount Carmel, Haifa in the heart of the Zionist settler colony proves what we say.

The decisive transformation here is not merely organizational but *ontological*. Where the Bāb's intervention destabilized the metaphysical grammar that made hierarchy, property, and clerical mediation intelligible, Bahā'u'llāh restores a world in which order is once again naturalized—now under the sign of universality rather than revelation. Routinized charisma does not simply preserve a movement; it translates its original rupture

into administrable norms, ethical codes, and procedural obedience. In this sense, Bahā'u'llāh's project is not the continuation of the Bayān by other means, but its total neutralization. What had appeared as an eschatological suspension of law becomes a new law; what had functioned as an interruption of authority becomes a centralized apparatus of governance. The Universal House of Justice is not an accidental development but the structural telos of this transformation: a body that displaces revelation with administration and substitutes metaphysical immediacy with managerial continuity. Weber's model thus clarifies why the Bahā'ī order could scale globally while the Bābī movement could not—and why that scalability came at the cost of revolutionary negation.

This shift also explains the profound difference in social alignment. The Bāb's movement cohered around those whose existence was rendered precarious by the Qājār clerical–landed order: merchants, artisans, itinerant preachers, marginal clerics, women, and the rural poor. Bahā'u'llāh's movement, by contrast, increasingly appealed to those already fluent in bureaucratic rationality: administrators, professionals, educators, and upwardly mobile intermediaries capable of navigating empire, capital, and international institutions. Its universalism is therefore not insurgent but integrative, designed to harmonize difference within an already dominant global order rather than to rupture it. This is why Bahā'ī discourse consistently frames injustice as moral deficiency or lack of education rather than as structural antagonism, and why its remedies emphasize *consultation*, *moderation*, and *incremental reform* over confrontation, Revolution or abolition. What emerges is not a politics of emancipation but a pedagogy of adaptation—one that mirrors the postwar liberal international order in both tone and substance. In this light, the contrast between the Bāb and Bahā'u'llāh is not simply doctrinal or historical; it marks a transition from apocalyptic negation to managerial world-maintenance, from a metaphysics that abolishes class as such to one that reorganizes it under the language of unity and progress.

What is decisive, then, is that this is not merely a difference of temperament or historical circumstance, but a fundamental divergence in *political ontology*. The Bāb speaks from within an eschatological horizon that renders existing social forms provisional,

dissolvable, and ultimately illegitimate before the imminence of divine judgment. Bahā'u'llāh, by contrast, presupposes the durability of the world-system and seeks to manage it ethically rather than abolish it ontologically. Where the Bayān interrupts history, Bahā'īsm administers it; where the Bāb discloses a metaphysical emergency that levels all ranks, Bahā'u'llāh stabilizes hierarchy under the claim of unity. The result is not the continuation of a revolution, but its neutralization—an insurgent revelation translated into a theology of governance compatible with empire, capital, bureaucratic modernity and, as have argued many times, *whiteness*. In this sense, Bahā'ī universalism functions less as a challenge to the global order than as its spiritual alibi, offering moral language that reconciles domination with conscience. Unity is abstracted from justice, obedience from liberation, and harmony from rupture, producing a vision of peace that presupposes the continued operation of the very structures that generate dispossession. The Bayān, by contrast, refuses reconciliation with the given world: its prohibitions, symbolic equalizations, and metaphysical reversals are unintelligible within a logic of gradual reform. What separates the two, finally, is not simply radicalism versus moderation, but negation versus management—an ontology of ending set against an ontology of indefinite continuation.

A sober conclusion follows from this contrast. If the Bayān cannot be assimilated to modern political theology, it is because it does not offer a program for governing the world but a judgment upon it. Its force lies precisely in its refusal to stabilize, institutionalize, or render itself useful to existing regimes of power. Bahā'u'llāh's project, whatever its ethical aspirations, achieves global viability only by relinquishing that refusal—by translating revelation into administration and eschatology into pedagogy. The question at stake, then, is not which figure is more humane or more successful, but which ontology one is willing to affirm: a revelation that abolishes the conditions of domination by declaring them void before God, or a religion that sanctifies continuity by teaching subjects how to live virtuously within domination. To choose between the Bāb and Bahā'u'llāh is therefore not merely to choose between two leaders or doctrines, but between two irreconcilable ways of inhabiting history itself—one that announces its end, and one that learns to manage it

indefinitely. What follows from this is that fidelity to the Bayān cannot take the form of stabilized succession, consolidation, or institutional inheritance without negating its very logic. Any attempt to stabilize its force into a congealed doctrine, law, or administration repeats the gesture it was revealed to undo—and this truism holds true for the Bayānīs themselves as much as the Bahā'īs who hijacked their creed. The Bayān endures only as permanent *interruption*[40]—as a standing refusal of closure, continuity, and managerial reason in the face of divine imminence. Its truth is thus not preserved by endurance in time, but by its capacity to render time itself provisional.

What this refusal of stabilization amounts to, at the level of language itself, is a metaphysics of *barred access* rather than deferred proximity. The Bayān does not merely interrupt history; it interrupts the very grammar by which theological continuity is ordinarily secured. Its God is not rendered absent through distance, nor protected through abstraction, but asserted as actively unbreachable—a sovereignty that does not permit mediation, succession, or conceptual penetration. This is why the Bayān's most decisive gestures occur not at the level of doctrine but at the level of naming: the lexicon itself becomes the site where domination is foreclosed. The question, then, is not simply how the Bayān resists institutional capture in practice, but how it renders such capture metaphysically impossible in principle. Nowhere is this more concentrated than in the Primal Point's use of the term *al-amnaʿ*, whose semantic force articulates, with uncompromising precision, the ontological refusal upon which the entire Bayānic vision turns.

On the function of the Baha'i misrendering of amnaʿ (أمنع)[41]

Now, *amnaʿ* (**أمنع**) is the elative form (*afʿal al-tafḍīl*) of *manʿ* (**منع**). The core semantic field of *manʿ* is not epistemic concealment but active prevention, barring, warding-off, refusal of access by force or right. Classical *lexica* (*Lisān al-ʿArab*, *Tāj al-Arūs*, *Lane*) consistently give *manīʿ* (**منيع**) as fortified, strongly defended, impregnable; *amnaʿ* (**أمنع**) as more so than all others in *manʿ*—i.e. most able to prevent, most strongly defended, most unassailable. This is a language of *fortification* and *sovereignty*, not mere remoteness. Thus, "Most Inaccessible"

is a weak rendering. "Inaccessible" instead suggests "passive distance," "epistemic difficulty" and "remoteness from approach." But *amnaʿ* (**أمنع**) implies *active resistance*, *absolute inviolability*, *impossibility of breach*, not just of approach. In other words: we are not barred because *we cannot reach It;* we are barred because *nothing can penetrate It.* That is a crucial metaphysical distinction. In *bismillāh al-amnaʿ al-aqdas* (**بسم الله الأمنع الأقدس**) the pairing matters:

- *al-amnaʿ* = unbreachable, unassailable, sovereignly closed;
- *al-aqdas* = utterly purified of all taint, relation, or determination.

If one translates *al-amnaʿ* as "Most Inaccessible," and leaves it at that, one collapses it into a quasi-Neoplatonic distance model. But the Primal Point is doing something sharper and far more nuanced. He is saying the Godhead is not merely beyond access—*It repels all access categorically*. This aligns perfectly with:

- ***aḥadīya*** (the Exclusive Oneness) as *absolute ipseity*;
- the Bayān's systematic foreclosure of theological penetration;
- the Primal Point's war on representational theology as represented by the *kalām* theological models of seminarian orthodox Islamic scholasticism.

Thus, "*Most Impregnable*" is a far superior rendering because it preserves force, inviolability, defensive sovereignty. Its only weakness probably is that modern English hears "impregnable" almost exclusively in military terms, whereas *al-amnaʿ* is broader: juridical, ontological, and metaphysical. Still, if forced to choose, the hierarchy is clear:

- **Most Inaccessible** (passive, epistemic, misleading);

- **Most Impregnable** (active, inviolable, ontologically consonant).

As such**,** rendering *al-amnaʿ* as "Most Inaccessible" domesticates the term, softens its ontological violence, and undermines the Bayān's radical metaphysics. The Primal Point does not merely say God is *far*. He says access to God *qua* the Essence is categorically *barred*. Given this, rendering it exclusively as "Most Inaccessible" is also not an innocent lexical preference; it is *a diagnostic symptom of a metaphysical posture*.

When almost *every* Bahā'ī translator converges on "Most Inaccessible," what we are seeing is not philology but *doctrinal sanitization*. "Inaccessible" is safe. It implies distance without exclusion, transcendence without prohibition, mystery without negation. It allows one to say: God is far, but still meaningfully speakable, nameable, *administrable.* That is precisely the metaphysical space Bahā'ī theology requires in order to preserve a continuous chain of authorized mediation, maintain a surface theology of *progressive revelation* without ontological rupture, and, most importantly, keep the Godhead conceptually "open" to institutional articulation (which is *key* here for them). To therefore translate *al-amnaʿ* as *Most Impregnable*, as we do, would immediately introduce a problem that cannot be solved within Bahā'ī thinking: If the Godhead is *actively unbreachable*, then no institutional voice can claim proximity to It—only *radical exclusion* remains. This would collapse representational theology (which Bahā'ism recreated in its own context), destabilize claims of authorized interpretive succession and, above all, render any attempted *administrative* metaphysics impossible.

In short: an impregnable Godhead is ungovernable theology and obviates Bahā'ism's theological domestication, because "Inaccessible" is a term of epistemic modesty whereas "Impregnable" is a term of *ontological violence*. Bahā'ī translators overwhelmingly choose the former because their pseudo-metaphysical mentality is *managerial* rather than apophatic, conciliatory rather than catastrophic, and, most importantly, system-preserving rather than abyss-facing. As such, "Inaccessible" is possible in language due to the straitjacketed Bahā'ī concept of the "Covenant" whereas the Bayān shatters that entire epistemic posture altogether from the very beginning. By contrast, the Bayān is destructive

in the strict sense: it destroys theological access routes—and specifically postured administrative ones.

The irony is sharp: The very tradition that claims to supersede the Bayān systematically neutralizes its most radical metaphysical terms in translation. What results is a God who is distant but still narratable, exalted but still *administrable*, transcendent but still *institutionally proximate*. But that is not the God of *bismillāh al-amnaʿ al-aqdas* (**بسم الله الأمنع الأقدس**). Instead, what it reveals about the underlying Bahā'ī mentality (which is a quintessentially European colonial one) is fear of ontological negation, allergy to apophatic extremity, a preference for *distance over refusal* (which is a bureaucratic frame of mind), and a theology that cannot survive a truly barred Godhead, since such a Divinity is not predictable as Bahā'ī theology surreptitiously attempts to make It. Our rendering thus restores the knife-edge of the term. And once that edge is restored, the entire metaphysical economy behind the Bahā'ī rendering of *al-amnaʿ as* "Most Inaccessible" is exposed for what it is: translation as ideological *containment*, and thus a colonial imposition through language.

What has occurred at the hands of the Bahā'īs is thus *hermeneutical violence*—and that is precisely why it is so pervasive and often difficult to contest. Once a tradition controls the translation, it controls the *conditions of intelligibility*. By the time doctrine appears, the work has already been done. In the case of the Bayān, the pattern is consistent:

- **Apophatic extremity** is softened into reverential vagueness;
- **Ontological negation** is reframed as epistemic humility;
- **Active exclusion** (*manʿ*) is rendered as passive distance ("inaccessible");
- **Catastrophic rupture** is rewritten as smooth succession.

This is not accidental. It is systematic domestication at the lexical level.

Texts like the Bayān are dangerous precisely because they operate prior to doctrine (and especially the domesticated, colonially-captured doctrine the Bahā'īs deliberately disfigured the Bayān by)—at the level of naming, grammar, and metaphysical orientation. If *al-amnaʿ* is allowed to mean *Most Impregnable*, mediation (and particularly administrative mediation) collapses, authority loses ontological grounding and the manufactured succession proposed by the Bahā'īs becomes metaphysically incoherent. So they neutralized the word right when their theology begins. That is why the struggle is visible at the very *level of language*.

What makes this especially insidious is that such renderings are presented as "standard," "reverent," "clear" and "natural English." But preference is never neutral when it is structurally aligned with institutional survival (the fundamental Bahā'ī obsession). Choosing *Most Inaccessible* over *Most Impregnable* is therefore not a stylistic choice; it is a *metaphysical decision*. One of the reasons for this is because traditions that cannot metabolize apophatic absolutism convert it into transcendental etiquette. They do not deny transcendence; they attempt to *tame it*. The Bayān, however, does not permit taming. Its Godhead does not withdraw politely, does not invite reverent speculation, and does not tolerate a sanitized conceptual approach. It *bars*. Once this is seen, the cumulative effect becomes undeniable as to what the Bahā'īs have done:

- lexical softening;
- semantic narrowing;
- grammatical smoothing;
- metaphysical reorientation.

None of this is noisy. None of it looks hermeneutically violent on the surface. Yet taken together, it amounts to a total re-engineering of the text's ontological posture. Thus, the Bayān is not merely superseded by the Bahā'īs; it is linguistically disarmed by them.

And recovering the original force of its language is not polemic—it is *philological repair* and so a **Battle for the Soul of the Bayān** itself.

What, then, comes into view is that the contest between the Bayān and Bahā'īsm is not decided at the level of competing moralities, nor even at the level of historical success, but at the level where a tradition decides what counts as thinkable. The Bayān is dangerous because it makes certain reconciliations impossible: it refuses the conversion of revelation into a stabilizing "worldview," refuses the conversion of the Divine into an object of pedagogical management, refuses the conversion of eschatology into a long horizon of patient obedience. Its polemical edge is not primarily anti-clerical or anti-state, though it is both; it is anti-*mediation* as such whenever mediation hardens into a right. For that reason, the Bayān's central gesture is not to found a community that persists by continuity, but to inaugurate a condition in which continuity itself becomes suspect—where the religious instinct to preserve is unmasked as the metaphysical desire to keep the world governable. From this perspective, the Bahā'ī counter-revolution is intelligible not as a crude act of betrayal alone, but as a systematic *translation* of ungovernable theophany into governable religion. It does not merely alter or sanitize laws; it alters the temporal structure of expectation and the linguistic conditions of authority. The decisive move is the production of a "safe" divinity: distant enough to warrant reverence, yet sufficiently accessible to sustain authorized speech, interpretation, and administrative embodiment. Once revelation is recast as a completed deposit and the future sealed by deferred time, the entire religious economy shifts from *event* to *institution* (and thus the *routinization of charisma*), from rupture to procedure, from the catastrophic to the consultative. That is why the struggle shows up so sharply in words like *al-amnaʿ*: lexical domestication is not an ancillary problem but the very mechanism by which metaphysical intensity is made compatible with bureaucratic endurance.

The conclusion, then, is not merely that the Bayān was historically suppressed, but that it names a form of fidelity that cannot be rendered sociologically "normal" without ceasing to be itself. If the Godhead is truly *Most Impregnable*, then every theology of authorized proximity becomes a *metaphysical fiction*; if access is barred in principle, then institutional speech can only be administration of surfaces, not mediation of the Real. The Bayān therefore forces a choice that modern religiosity—and especially modern liberal

religiosity—tries to evade: either accept the abyssal consequences of apophatic sovereignty and live in a posture of perpetual destabilization, or convert transcendence into a manageable distance that can be narrated, governed, and inherited. In that light, philology is not a scholarly afterthought but a field of struggle over the very possibility of interruption: whether the divine still has the power to *end* worlds, or whether it will be permitted only to improve them.

And once that choice is faced without evasions, the criterion of judgment becomes brutally simple: whatever can be cleanly administered is already a *compromised form of theophany*. A revelation that is truly interruptive will not merely inspire institutions; it will continuously *de-authorize* them, because its authority is not transmissible as office, procedure, or sanctioned interpretation. This is why the Bayān cannot be "implemented" as a settled program and why its most faithful heirs have so often been driven into obscurity: the Bayān's truth does not coincide with visibility, scale, or institutional success, but with the maintenance of a metaphysical *non-coincidence* between God's irruption and every human attempt to possess it. Where a tradition begins to treat continuity as a virtue in itself—where unity becomes a disciplinary norm and consultation becomes a *technology of neutralization*—there the Bayān's knife has already been blunted, and the old world has quietly been granted its right to continue. The practical consequence is that Bayānic fidelity must be measured less by confessional membership than by an *ethos*: the refusal to allow injustice to be moralized into patience, the refusal to allow domination to be re-described as "order," the refusal to allow divine transcendence to be turned into a rhetorical halo around existing power. In this sense, the Bayān is not a nostalgia for an unrealized past but a standing weapon against every regime that survives by converting catastrophe into administration—whether that regime is clerical, imperial, liberal, or "spiritual." To remain Bayānī is therefore to keep the end *operative*: to let imminence judge the present, to let the Impregnable bar every claim of authorized proximity, and to let the grammar of revelation remain what it was disclosed to be—an *unassimilable force* that makes the world answerable, rather than a piety that teaches the world how to persist.[42]

What follows from this is that Bahā'ism's fixation on administration and bureaucracy is not merely a secondary sociological feature but a decisive metaphysical confession. The relentless emphasis on assemblies, procedures, consultative unanimity,

credentialed authority, and reputational hygiene signals a theology that has already resolved the problem of revelation in favor of continuity, legibility, and control. Revelation is no longer an event that interrupts the world but a resource to be stabilized, managed, and rendered harmless through process. This is why "administration" in the Bahāʾī case is never neutral: it is the apparatus by which the dangerous excess of the Bayān it has rejected is domesticated into a form compatible with imperial reason. Where the Bayān insists on a standing asymmetry between divine irruption and worldly order, Bahāʾism insists on their reconciliation through governance. The result is not merely institutional religion but a sacralized bureaucracy—one whose highest virtue is not truth but manageability. This logic aligns seamlessly with what may be called *whiteness* as a metaphysical posture rather than a phenotype: the demand that reality be transparent, orderly, narratable, and above all non-disruptive to existing regimes of power. Whiteness, in this sense, is not about belief but about orientation—it privileges stability over justice, civility over truth, optics over substance, and procedure over redress. Bahā'ism's obsessive concern with public image, "unity," and reputational cleanliness functions precisely within this grammar. Conflict must be laundered into consultation, dissent pathologized as disunity, and structural violence re-described as unfortunate misunderstanding. In this way, whiteness operates not as explicit supremacy but as administrative innocence.

The imperial character of this posture becomes clear when one observes how Bahāʾī administration consistently aligns itself with global liberal norms—NGO culture, managerial humanism, depoliticized pluralism—while remaining structurally incapable of confronting empire as such. Empire is never named as violence; it is treated as a misunderstanding to be gently corrected by better discourse, better representation, better governance. This is the hallmark of whiteness: the refusal to recognize catastrophe except insofar as it can be converted into a problem of administration. By contrast, the Bayān's insistence that injustice must be named as injustice, that false order must be exposed as domination, and that patience under tyranny is not a virtue but a betrayal, is therefore intolerable to a system whose survival depends on procedural calm. Therefore, Bahāʾism does not merely coexist with empire; it provides empire with a moral aesthetic—peaceful, inclusive, and impeccably managed (this being a key reason why Empire promotes it).

Seen from this angle, the Bahāʾī preoccupation with optics is not accidental but diagnostic. Optics matter because legitimacy is no longer grounded in truth but in *appearance*; authority no longer issues from rupture but from recognition. Whiteness, here, names the condition under which violence becomes invisible precisely because it is administered politely. The Bayān threatens this entire economy by refusing to allow injustice to be redescribed as order or suffering to be spiritualized into growth. Its grammar is intolerable to a world that survives by converting catastrophe into continuity. Bahā'ism's administrative obsession thus marks not a fulfillment of the Bayān but its complete negation: a theological migration from the dangerous clarity of Revelation into the safe ambiguities of wordly governance. Where the Bayān demands that the world answer to God, Bahā'ism teaches the world how to persist—cleanly, civilly, and without interruption—and therefore how to bow to Mammon and be answerable to Satan: Empire.

And so here below, as a conclusion to this essay, we rewrite in a summarized, re-Imagined form ʿAlī Sharīʿatī's ***Red Shiʿism and Black Shiʿism*** thesis in light of these issues.

Red Bābism vs. Black Bābism: Revelation, Martyrdom, and the Betrayal of the Bayān

The Bayān is a religion which entered the history of humanity with a cry of ***"No!"***—from the Bāb, the Gate of God, the Manifestation of Divine interruption, the inaugurator of a new dispensation of Reality; a ***"No"*** uttered against inherited authority, clerical mediation, dynastic legitimacy, juridical religion, and metaphysical stagnation.[43] A ***"No"*** that begins with the cry of a *new creation*, a cry reiterated whenever the Bayān confronted compromise, quietism, and the petrification of Truth into institution and governability.

Bābism differentiates itself and chooses its direction in sacred history with the ***"No"*** of the Bāb Himself: the *"No"* spoken to the *ʿulamā*, to the Qājār shāhs, to the guardians of precedent, to the theology of postponement and obedience. This ***"No,"*** until the moment of its capture by a new usurping Bahā'ī priesthood, was the very substance of the Bābī movement: a movement recognized by its enemies as *heresy*, *rebellion*, *sedition*, and *apostasy*—and by its adherents as fidelity to Divine Justice and Truth. It was grounded not in an inherited Shiʿi jurisprudence nor in a mere quietist Sufi interiority, but in the Bayān itself, proclaimed by the Primal Point and sealed by His own blood in Tabrīz.

The history of Iran follows a tragic path: a path in which kings, courtiers, jurists, and opportunists—Persian, Mongol, Tatar, Turkic, Safavid, Qājār—claimed, at various times, the right to rule in the name of Islam while exterminating those who bore its most radical truth. In the name of religion, they executed Revelation. In the name of order, they annihilated justice. Bābism begins with a ***"No"*** to this history. A ***"No"*** against a history that, in the name of the **Qurʾān**, served thrones of blood and swords of injustice, and in the name of law, murdered the children of Divine unveiling. The Bābīs rejected this path chosen by history. They denied the legitimacy of the clerical order that ruled through fear and excommunication. They turned away from the seminaries, courts, and pulpits of power, and turned instead toward the prison cells of the Bāb in Mākū and Chihrīq, the scaffolds of Shaykh Ṭabarsī, the trenches of Zanjān, the martyrdom of Nayrīz. They found there all that they had been seeking.

The Bāb (The Will/*al-mashīʾa*)[44]**:** the Manifestation of Divine immediacy in the flesh, the embodiment of the rights of the oppressed, the *embodification* of the first absolute objection against religious tyranny, the Living Proof that Revelation may erupt against history rather than ratify it.

Mullā Ḥusayn (The Volition/*al-irāda*)[45]**:** the Gate of the Gate, the first to recognize the irruption of Revelation into the world before it became history, the threshold through which the Bayān passed from solitude into community. The exemplar of recognition itself—the one who did not negotiate, postpone, or domesticate the command, but answered it wholly. In Him, fidelity appears in its quintessence. He is the Manifestation of the **First Name of God** (*ism allāh al-awwal*).

Quddūs (The Determination/*al-qadar*)[46]**:** the incarnation of fidelity unto death, sacrificed at the altar of corrupt legality, His body torn apart in Sabzemaydān by a society that could not endure the collapse of its false certainties. At Shaykh Ṭabarsī He stood in the full theophanic intensity of the Bayān itself, not as a mere disciple but as a living locus of Divine Manifestation itself. He is the **Last Name of God** (*ism allāh al-ākhir*).

Qurrat'ul-ʿAyn (The Authorization/*al-qaḍāʾ*)[47]**:** the return of Fāṭima, the Unveiled Truth, the cry of liberation, the scandal of justice, murdered not merely for disbelief but for the refusal of lies and injustice.

The Martyrs of Ṭabarsī, Zanjān, and Nayrīz (The Realization/*al-imḍāʾ*)[48]**:** witnesses to all who have been slain by power throughout history, heirs of every uprising against inequality and coercion, messengers of martyrdom, embodiments of revolutionary sacrifice.

Subḥ-i-Azal (The Appointed Time/*al-ajal*)[49]: the bearer of the Sealed, Sacred Trust, the Mirror of God, the Guardian of the Bayān, the Preserver of the Book as its *embodified* command.

Red Bābism (The Book/*al-kitāb*)[50] took its slogans from the suffering and hope of the dispossessed. Conscious of power and in rebellion against it, it cried out:

Choose the **Bayān** against inherited law.
Choose Divine justice against clerical authority and its imitators.
Choose obedience to Revelation against obedience to the state.
Choose martyrdom against survival through compromise.

Choose leadership grounded in responsibility, not charisma.
Choose organization disciplined by principle, not hierarchy.
Choose concealment when necessary—not as cowardice, but as strategy *against extermination*.

Choose remembrance of martyrdom not as ritualized grief, but as an *unending summons to action*.

Remember the executions—not to weep, but to refuse reconciliation with the order that killed them.

Remember that the question "What is to be done?" is answered only by resistance.
Remember that history is divided eternally between *those who renew creation* and *those who manage decay*.

Red Bābism understood from the beginning that Revelation cannot survive when transformed into institution. It understood that mourning which does not accuse power becomes an *opiate*. It understood that theology without justice becomes treason. For this

reason, throughout the nineteenth century in Iran, whenever tyranny intensified—whenever peasants were crushed, dissent silenced, bodies policed, and belief regimented—the Bābī front grew stronger. What began as Revelation became a socio-political movement of the masses that culminated in the **Iranian Constitutional Revolution** of 1905-09. What began as theology became outright social rebellion. What began as scripture became blood.

And for this reason, the rulers and their clerics hated the Bābīs with a hatred reserved only for those who expose the lie at the heart of power. They massacred them, blinded them, burned them alive, erased their graves, falsified their history, and anathematized their memory. Courts that tolerated Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians declared Bābīs worse than unbelievers. Marriage with foreigners was permitted; marriage with Bābīs forbidden. Such was the fear inspired by a faith that refused domestication.

Yet history repeated its oldest betrayal.

Out of the ruins of martyrdom arose a new accommodation. A new elite. A new theology of survival. Revelation was postponed, rebellion spiritualized, justice deferred. The Bayān was declared provisional, a mere *herald*. Martyrdom was rebranded as tragedy rather than mandate. Organization replaced uprising. Respectability replaced rupture.

Thus **Red Bābism** was transformed into **Black Bābism** in the form of Bahā'ism. The religion of martyrdom became the religion of cynical consultation with corrupt powers. The faith of interruption became the faith of pragmatic continuity. The cry of ***"No!"*** became the language of bureaucratic administration**. Black Bābism** sanctified patience where the Bāb had demanded action. It memorialized the dead while neutralizing their meaning. It preserved names while abandoning their demands. It built grandiose institutions on the demolished homes of Palestinians and thrived under white colonial settler regimes from North America to Australasia to the Levant. It preached unity where justice had been postponed as a means of endlessly deferring it and so sabotaging it. It reconciled with history where the Bayān had declared war upon it.

And so the Gate was closed—not by the Shāh, not by the *ʿulamā*, but by those who falsely claimed to inherit Him—that is, until We reopened it once more from within the center of our blaze-flux (*fuʾād*) and unleashed the fury of the Bayān as its Voice (*nāṭiq*) upon those infernal betrayers of the Primal Point and His Mirror.

This original Bābism—what may rightly be called **Red Bābism**—was the religion of protest and martyrdom not because it fetishized death, but because it refused reconciliation with an unjust order. Martyrdom here was not a cultic practice or a ritualized memory; it was an *ontological position*. To bear witness to Revelation in a world organized against it is already to place one's life in antagonism with power because it is to stand with the true Revolution. The Bāb knew this. His followers knew this. The history of the Bayān is therefore written not primarily in books, but in prisons, trenches, gallows, mass graves, and family archives denied as legitimate by entrenched institutions of power.

From the beginning, **Red Bābism** chose its direction with a decisive ***"No"***: no to the *ʿulamā* who claimed monopoly over divine meaning; no to the Qājār state that ruled by violence sanctified by law; no to the Shiʿi theology of postponement that deferred justice to an indefinitely absent future. Against all of this, the Bayān affirmed *immediacy*: the immediacy of Revelation, the immediacy of responsibility, the immediacy of judgment, for the Imām was here in the form of the Essence of the Seven Letters, the Bāb. God was no longer safely mediated through precedent or institution. God spoke again—and in speaking again, rendered obsolete every authority that depended on silence.

The figures of **Red Bābism** are therefore not administrators, jurists, or system-builders. They are *witnesses* to the Real. The Bāb Himself stands as the Primal interruption: the Gate through which Divine Command shattered the inherited grammar of legitimacy, the Manifestation of *the disclosure of the glorifications of the Divine Majesty without indication*![51] Mullā Ḥusayn is the standard through which the Divine Command first diffused itself, the Manifestation of *the erasure of conjecture in the realization of the Known*![52] Quddūs embodies fidelity carried to the point of annihilation, His body torn apart not because He failed, but because He succeeded too completely—for He is the Manifestation of *the lifting of the veil by the Victory of the Secret*![53] Qurrat'ul-ʿAyn incarnates Unveiled Truth, not as metaphor but as scandal—executed not just for Her disbelief in state orthodoxy, but for refusing to cloak justice in patriarchal law, given that She was the Manifestation of *the ecstatic attraction of the Exclusive Oneness by the attributive apprehension of the Divine Unicity*![54] Ṣubḥ-i-Azal stands as the True Inheritor and Mirror Who is constitutive of the animating grammar of the Bayān itself as its *embodification*, for He was the Manifestation of *a Light Illuminating from the*

Dawn of Pre-Eternity and shedding its traces upon the Talismanic-Temples of Unicity![55] *So extinguish the lamp, for the Dawn* **of the Bayān** *has* **once again** *arisen* **through Us**, ***in Truth***![56]

Given this, **Red Bābism** has always understood something that Bahā'ī theology has worked tirelessly to forget: that Revelation is not compatible with administration because the Bayān could never be safely integrated into an existing order without being neutralized. It could not be preserved without being betrayed. It therefore developed, under conditions of terror, a disciplined ethic of resistance: concealment not as duplicity but as survival; organization not as hierarchy but as solidarity; remembrance not as mourning but as mobilization. To remember the martyrs was to refuse closure. To recall their deaths was to indict the order that killed them—and *every order that resembled it* such as the Bahā'ī Administrative Order.

This is why **Red Bābism** terrifies power. It exposes the *lie* that religion exists to legitimate authority. It reveals instead that authority exists, historically, to suppress Revelation. Here, as it were, eternity belongs to God while history belongs to the devil. As we said, courts that tolerated Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians once declared Bābīs worse than unbelievers, because the latter did not threaten the metaphysical foundations of rule. The Bābīs did. They denied the right of history to declare itself complete, symbolically foresaking the devil in the process. They denied the right of man-made law to define justice. They denied the right of power to speak in God's name.

Yet hidden history, the Hand of God, is not defeated once and for all. It adapts. It absorbs. It waits—and then it bursts forth like a broken dam as it did once more beginning as of the morning of **7th of November 2002** at 6:35am (Australian Eastern Standard Time).

Now, as we said, out of this ruin of massacre and exhaustion of the 1850s emerged **Black Bābism** as of the 1860s: the transformation of a religion of interruption into a creed of continuity (an Amway cult with prayer, as it were); turning martyrdom into monetization dressed as mourning; making of Divine Revelation into its containment as institution. Under the sign of survival, the Bayān was declared provisional by **Black Bābism** with the Bāb merely a herald to Bahāʾuʾllāh's aristocratic compromise with power. Its radical commands were deferred or abolished, denied, or reinterpreted as symbolic. Justice was postponed indefinitely. Revolution was translated into a sanitized universal ethic

palatable to imperial *whiteness*. History, once rejected, was cautiously *re-entered* with the memory of all of the martyrs of Shaykh Ṭabarsī, Zanjān and Nayrīz sold out to the very Qājārs who had brutalized and murdered them.

Yet **Black Bābism** does not deny the martyrs. It memorializes them by monetizing them. And it empties their deaths of command. Monetized mourning replaces mandate. Suffering becomes performatively sanctified rather than mobilizing. The cry of **"No"** is softened into a language of *patience*, *unity*, and *gradualism*. What had been a summons to rupture becomes a narrative of inevitable progress that *never comes*. What had been a theology of responsibility becomes a theology of administration acting on behalf of colonialism.

This transformation is not accidental. It corresponds to a profound shift in political ontology. **Red Bābism** presupposed a world in which Truth precedes order, justice precedes law, and Revelation precedes all attempts at institutionalization. **Black Bābism** reverses this priority. It treats order as the condition of truth, administration as the vehicle of justice, and institution as the guardian (nay, *prison warden*) of Revelation. In doing so, it aligns itself decisively with the very logic the Bayān came to destroy.

This is the decisive fault line between the Bayān and Bahā'ī institutional theology. The latter does not merely interpret the former differently; it operates within a different ontology altogether. Where the Bayān understood history as the site of struggle between Revelation and material power, Bahā'ī theology reimagines history as a smooth, cumulative process. Where the Bayān identified law as a contingent instrument subject to divine interruption, Bahā'ī administration elevates governance itself into a quasi-divine form. Where the Bayān demanded readiness for sacrifice, Bahā'īsm prioritizes preservation, respectability, and institutional longevity.

The result is not merely theological divergence, but political reversal. A movement born among the dispossessed becomes aligned—structurally and rhetorically—with order, stability, colonialism, and Western managerial rationality: Empire. The language of unity replaces the demand for justice. The critique of power dissolves into a discourse of harmony. The martyrs are honored in name—but only insofar as they no longer threaten the present and only because they line pockets, that of the Bahā'īs.

Black Bābism thus functions as a religion of reconciliation with history—a reconciliation with the devil. It reconciles Revelation with the world as it is, rather than measuring the world against Revelation. It accepts the corporate administrative state as a neutral instrument rather than a false metaphysical configuration. It treats suffering as pedagogical rather than accusatory. In doing so, it seeks to kill the Bayān. But the Bayān will not die!

To recover **Red Bābism**, as we thoroughly have, is not to reenact the nineteenth century verbatim, nor to romanticize violence or martyrdom. It is to recover the Bayān's *ontological posture* as we have: its refusal to allow history, law, or institution to close the horizon of *Divine demand*. It is to insist that justice is not a future outcome guaranteed by process, but an *ever-present obligation* that may place one in antagonism with the entire world. It is to remember that mourning without resistance is betrayal, and unity without justice is *complicity*. In this sense, **Red Bābism** names a fidelity that survives precisely by remaining ungovernable: a refusal to translate ethical demand into administrative patience or spiritualized delay. It demands a posture of readiness rather than reassurance, of exposure rather than belonging. Its task is not to preserve a community at all costs, but to keep the wound of injustice open to judgment—so that no order, however sanctified, can claim the right to persist unchallenged and thereby sanitize the wound without ever answering for it.

The question posed by the Bayān cannot be answered by **Black Bābism** and its like, only endlessly deferred: What kind of world must be overthrown for Revelation to be true? **Red Bābism** refuses to let that question ever be silenced. **Black Bābism** declares it resolved through the idolatry of administration and complete acquiescence to the powers that be. The Bayān, through us as its Voice in this Day, answers ***"No!"***

اللهُ أَكْبَرُ اللهُ أَعْظَمُ[57]

Notes

[1] See our *Journey with Me unto the Divine Throne* (2013).

[2] As should be clear, we do not recommend official Bahā'ī histories or doctrinal works on this subject. These texts function largely as tendentious hagiographies that retroject later theological positions onto earlier historical contexts—a process the late Denis MacEoin incisively diagnosed as *conflation* in his seminal study, "*From Babism to Baha'ism: Problems of Militancy, Quietism, and Conflation in the Construction of a Religion*" (*Religion* 13 [1983]: 219–55). Since the early 2000s, the Haifan Bahā'ī establishment has systematically marginalized dissenting scholarship, allowing its authorized narrative to circulate largely unchallenged within Western academia. This has been reinforced through the promotion of establishment-aligned academics—often insufficiently trained in the relevant source languages—alongside organizations such as CESNUR, whose role has been to launder and normalize these narratives under the guise of scholarly neutrality. With minor reservations, we do, however, recommend Denis MacEoin's *The Messiah of Shiraz* (2008) as a reliable introduction to early Bābī history and doctrine, precisely because it resists the distortions imposed by the dominant Bahā'ī historiographical lens. We further note that since the late 1990s the Bahā'ī Universal House of Justice has sponsored a Chair of Bahā'ī Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem—first under Moshe Sharon and now Meir Bar-Asher—which, in our assessment, constitutes a highly politicized and monetized attempt to secure institutional legitimacy for official Bahā'ī positions through the Israeli state's academic apparatus. Until such interested monopolies of narrative authority are dismantled, genuinely critical scholarship in this field will remain structurally constrained by top-down control at the highest institutional levels.

[3] In the final chapters of his unpublished Persian MA thesis—submitted to Shahīd Bihishtī University during the early teens of the 21st century—and entitled *asnādī darbāri-i-jāygāh-i-mīrzā yaḥyā-i-nūrī ṣubḥ-i-azal dar nigāh-i-sayyid ʿalī-i-muḥammad-i-bāb* (Documentary Material Regarding the Position of Mīrzā Yaḥyā Nūrī Subḥ-i-Azal from the Perspective of Siyyid ʿAlī Muḥammad, the Bāb), the Iranian historian Siyyid Miqdād Nabavī-Razavī underscores the pivotal role of the Parsi British imperial agent Manakjī Līmjī Hatarīa (d. 1890) in orchestrating the schism that ultimately dethroned Ṣubḥ-i-Azal's designated leadership and catalyzed the emergence of the Bahāʾī faith under Bahāʾuʾllāh as of the Baghdad period (1852-63) of Middle Bābism. Far from the typical conspiracy-laden narratives that dominate Persian-language discourse on this subject, Nabavī-Razavī presents a rigorously sourced and historically grounded analysis that resists easy dismissal. His argument gains further weight when viewed through the lens of Bahā'ism's enduring colonial alignment—an alignment

that has demonstrably facilitated its political and economic flourishing within settler-colonial contexts such as North America, Australasia, and Israel. For a recent treatment in English of a few of the issues that Nabavī-Razavī highlights, see our *The Organizational Hierarchy of the Bābīs during the period of Ṣubḥ-i-Azal's residency in Baghdad (1852–1863)* (2018). See also our comments in the third essay of *Against the Postmodern Germ* entitled *Bahāʾism as a Western Soft-Power Replacement Theology*.

[4] See Peter Lamborn Wilson's *False Messiah: Crypto-Xtian Tracts & Fragments* (2022): 76-7.

[5] *Kitāb-i-panj shaʾn,* lithograph edition: 3-4:

...إِنَّنِي أَنَا ٱللَّهُ لَا إِلٰهَ إِلَّا أَنَا، لَنْ يُدْرِكَنِي أَحَدٌ مِنْ دُونِي، وَمَنْ أَرَادَ أَنْ يُدْرِكَنِي فَلْيُدْرِكَنَّ مَنْ يُظْهِرُهُ ٱللَّهُ، فَإِنَّ هٰذَا صِرَاطٌ مُمْتَنِعٌ مَنِيعٌ. وَإِنَّنِي أَنَا ٱللَّهُ لَا إِلٰهَ إِلَّا أَنَا، لَنْ يَرَانِي مِنْ شَيْءٍ، وَمَنْ أَرَادَ أَنْ يَنْظُرَنَّ إِلَيَّ فَلْيَنْظُرَنَّ إِلَىٰ مَنْ يُظْهِرُهُ ٱللَّهُ، فَإِنَّ هٰذَا صِرَاطٌ مُمْتَنِعٌ مَنِيعٌ. وَإِنَّنِي أَنَا ٱللَّهُ لَا إِلٰهَ إِلَّا أَنَا، لَنْ يَعْرِفَنِي مِنْ شَيْءٍ، وَمَنْ أَرَادَ أَنْ يَعْرِفَنِي فَلْيَعْرِفَنَّ مَنْ يُظْهِرُهُ ٱللَّهُ، فَإِنَّ هٰذَا كِتَابٌ مُشْتَمِخٌ شَمِيخٌ. وَإِنَّنِي أَنَا ٱللَّهُ لَا إِلٰهَ إِلَّا أَنَا، لَنْ يَسْتَطِيعَنَّ أَنْ يُحِبَّنِي مِنْ شَيْءٍ، وَمَنْ أَرَادَ أَنْ يُحِبَّنِي فَلْيُحِبَّنَّ مَنْ يُظْهِرُهُ ٱللَّهُ، فَإِنَّ هٰذَا صِرَاطٌ مُبْتَذَخٌ بَذِيخٌ. إِنَّنِي أَنَا ٱللَّهُ لَا إِلٰهَ إِلَّا أَنَا، لَنْ يَسْمَعَ ذِكْرِيَ مِنْ أَحَدٍ، وَمَنْ أَرَادَ أَنْ يَسْمَعَ ذِكْرِي فَلْيَسْمَعَنَّ ذِكْرَ مَنْ يُظْهِرُهُ ٱللَّهُ، فَإِنَّ هٰذَا صِرَاطٌ مُبْتَهِجٌ بَهِيٌّ. إِنَّنِي أَنَا ٱللَّهُ لَا إِلٰهَ إِلَّا أَنَا، لَنْ يُوَحِّدَنِي مِنْ شَيْءٍ، وَمَنْ أَرَادَ أَنْ يُوَحِّدَنِي فَلَا يَقْتَرِنَنَّ بِمَنْ يُظْهِرُهُ ٱللَّهُ مِنْ شَيْءٍ، فَإِنَّ هٰذَا صِرَاطٌ حَقٌّ مُجْتَلِلٌ جَلِيلٌ. وَإِنَّنِي أَنَا ٱللَّهُ لَا إِلٰهَ إِلَّا أَنَا، لَنْ يَقْدِرَ أَحَدٌ أَنْ يُسَبِّحَنِي، وَمَنْ أَرَادَ أَنْ يُسَبِّحَنِي فَلْيُمَجِّدَنَّ مَنْ يُظْهِرُهُ ٱللَّهُ يَوْمَ ظُهُورِهِ، فَإِنَّ هٰذَا صِرَاطٌ حَقٌّ مُجْتَمِلٌ جَمِيلٌ. إِنَّنِي أَنَا ٱللَّهُ لَا إِلٰهَ إِلَّا أَنَا، لَنْ يُقَدِّسَنِي مِنْ شَيْءٍ، وَمَنْ أَرَادَ أَنْ يُقَدِّسَنِي فَلْيُثْنِيَنَّ مَنْ يُظْهِرُهُ ٱللَّهُ فِي أَيَّامِ ظُهُورِهِ، فَإِنَّ هٰذَا صِرَاطٌ حَقٌّ مُعْتَظِمٌ عَظِيمٌ. إِنَّنِي أَنَا ٱللَّهُ لَا إِلٰهَ إِلَّا أَنَا، لَنْ يُدْرِكَنِيَ مِنْ أَحَدٍ لِيُطِيعَنِي، وَمَنْ أَرَادَ أَنْ يُطِيعَنِي فَلْيُطِيعَنَّ مَنْ يُظْهِرُهُ ٱللَّهُ، فَإِنَّ هٰذَا صِرَاطٌ حَقٌّ مُتَنَوِّرٌ نُوِّيرٌ. إِنَّنِي أَنَا ٱللَّهُ لَا إِلٰهَ إِلَّا أَنَا، لَنْ يَقْدِرَ أَنْ يُعَزِّزَنِي مِنْ شَيْءٍ، وَمَنْ أَرَادَ أَنْ يُعَزِّزَنِي فَلْيُعَزِّزَنَّ مَنْ يُظْهِرُهُ ٱللَّهُ، فَإِنَّ هٰذَا صِرَاطٌ حَقٌّ مُتَعَزِّزٌ عَزِيزٌ. إِنَّنِي أَنَا ٱللَّهُ لَا إِلٰهَ إِلَّا أَنَا، كُنْتُ غَيْبًا أَزَلًا قَدِيمًا، وَلَا يَزَالُ لَأَكُونَنَّ قَيُّومًا مُمْتَنِعًا قَدِيمًا...

[6] Meaning, the theomorphic *embodifications* of the Divine, i.e. the Complete Humans, prophets, messengers, saints, and avatars. In other words, the theomorphic Divine Manifestation *is* God's "Throne." In his final set of communications with Ṣubḥ-i-Azal, the Bāb explicitly refers to his successor in this way as well, and especially in his last will and testament; see our translation of this document in the forthcoming *Studies in the Bayān*, issue 2, volume 1.

[7] *Kitāb-i-panj shaʾn*: 313-15 (*my trans.*):

فَإِذَا عَرَفْتَ ذٰلِكَ فَاشْهَدْ أَنَّ عِرْفَانَ ٱللَّهِ لَمْ يَظْهَرْ إِلَّا بِعِرْفَانِ مَظْهَرِ نَفْسِهِ، إِذْ كُلُّ مَا قَدْ عَرَفَتِ ٱلْمُمْكِنَاتُ رَبَّهُمْ بِمَا قَدْ عَلَّمُوهُمْ رُسُلُ ٱللَّهِ، فَإِذَا مَبْدَأُ ٱلْعِرْفَانِ إِيَّاهُمْ، وَيَنْتَهِي ٱلْعِرْفَانُ إِلَيْهِمْ، إِذْ هُمْ حُجُبُ ٱللَّهِ، لَا يُدْرِكُهُمْ أَحَدٌ إِلَّا ٱللَّهُ، وَإِنَّ مَثَلَهُمْ كَمَثَلِ ٱلْمِرْآةِ لَا يُرَى فِيهِمْ إِلَّا ٱللَّهُ، وَلِذٰلِكَ مَا يَشَاؤُونَ إِلَّا مَا قَدْ شَاءَ ٱللَّهُ، وَلَا يُرِيدُونَ إِلَّا مَا قَدْ أَرَادَ ٱللَّهُ، وَلَا يُقَدِّرُونَ إِلَّا مَا قَدْ قَدَّرَ ٱللَّهُ، وَلَا يَقْضُونَ إِلَّا مَا قَدْ قَضَى ٱللَّهُ، وَلَا يَأْذَنُونَ إِلَّا مَا قَدْ أَذِنَ ٱللَّهُ، وَلَا يُؤَجِّلُونَ إِلَّا مَا قَدْ أَجَّلَ ٱللَّهُ، وَلَا يَكْتُبُونَ إِلَّا مَا قَدْ كَتَبَ ٱللَّهُ، وَٱنْقَطَعَ عَنْ حَدِّ ٱلْأَسْمَاءِ وَمَعَانِيهَا، فَإِنَّهَا تَتَقَلَّبُ بِأَمْرِ ٱللَّهِ كَيْفَ يَشَاءُ فِي كُلِّ ظُهُورٍ. وَأَشْهَدُ بِأَنَّ مَثَلَ كُلِّ ظُهُورٍ كَمَثَلِ طُلُوعِ ٱلشَّمْسِ، إِنْ تَطْلُعْ إِلَىٰ مَا لَا عَدَّ لَهَا فَإِنَّهَا هِيَ شَمْسٌ وَاحِدَةٌ، وَإِنْ تَغْرُبْ إِلَىٰ مَا لَا عَدَّ لَهَا فَإِنَّهَا هِيَ شَمْسٌ وَاحِدَةٌ. كَذٰلِكَ فَٱسْتَضْرِبِ ٱلْمَثَلَ فِي شَمْسِ ٱلْحَقِيقَةِ، فَإِنَّ ٱلْأَوَّلَ هُوَ ٱلْآخِرُ، وَٱلظَّاهِرَ هُوَ ٱلْبَاطِنُ، لَا يُرَى فِي ٱلْأَغْرَاشِ إِلَّا مُجَلِّيهَا، وَلَا فِي ٱلْأَكْرَاسِ إِلَّا مُرَبِّيهَا. وَإِنْ يُمْكِنْ أَنْ تَبْقَىٰ نَفْسٌ مِنْ خَلْقِ أَوَّلِ ٱلَّذِي لَا أَوَّلَ لَهُ إِلَىٰ آخِرِ ٱلَّذِي لَا آخِرَ لَهُ، وَكَانَ مِنْ سُكَّانِ بَحْرِ ٱلْحَقِيقَةِ، بِمِثْلِ مَا ٱتَّبَعَ أَوَّلَ ٱلَّذِي لَا أَوَّلَ لَهُ، يَتَّبِعُ إِلَىٰ آخِرِ ٱلَّذِي لَا آخِرَ لَهُ، لِأَنَّ فِيهِمَا شَمْسًا وَاحِدَةً ظَاهِرَةً، وَذٰلِكَ شَمْسُ ظُهُورِ ٱللَّهِ، لَا تُحِيطُ بِهَا ٱلْأَمَاكِنُ، وَلَا تَحْوِي إِلَيْهَا ٱلْبَوَاطِنُ، وَلَا تُحَدُّ بِحُدُودٍ، وَلَا تُنْعَتُ بِمَحْدُودٍ. عَلَا عَنِ ٱلْمُشَابَهَةِ، وَتَعَالَىٰ عَنِ ٱلْمُشَاكَلَةِ، وَتَنَزَّهَ عَنِ ٱلْمُمَاثَلَةِ، وَتَقَدَّسَ عَنِ ٱلْمُقَارَنَةِ، وَتَفَرَّدَ عَنِ ٱلْمُجَانَسَةِ. كُلُّ ٱلْأَسْمَاءِ ٱسْمُهُ وَهُوَ لَا ٱسْمَ لَهُ، وَكُلُّ ٱلْأَنْعَاتِ نَعْتُهُ وَهُوَ لَا نَعْتَ لَهُ. بَاطِنُهُ كَلِمَةُ لَا إِلٰهَ إِلَّا ٱللَّهُ، وَظَاهِرُهُ فِي ٱلْفُرْقَانِ مُحَمَّدٌ رَسُولُ ٱللَّهِ، وَفِي ٱلْبَيَانِ ذَاتُ حُرُوفِ ٱلسَّبْعِ، وَفِي ٱلْإِنْجِيلِ عِيسَىٰ رُوحُ ٱللَّهِ، وَفِي ٱلزَّبُورِ دَاوُدُ صَفِيُّ ٱللَّهِ، وَفِي ٱلتَّوْرَاةِ مُوسَىٰ كَلِيمُ ٱللَّهِ، وَمِنْ بَعْدِ ٱلْبَيَانِ مَنْ يُظْهِرُهُ ٱللَّهُ، وَمِنْ بَعْدِ مَنْ يُظْهِرُهُ ٱللَّهُ مَنْ يُظْهِرُهُ ٱللَّهُ، وَمِنْ بَعْدِ مَنْ يُظْهِرُهُ ٱللَّهُ مَنْ يُظْهِرُهُ ٱللَّهُ، وَمِنْ بَعْدِ مَنْ يُظْهِرُهُ ٱللَّهُ مَنْ يُظْهِرُهُ ٱللَّهُ، وَمِنْ بَعْدِ مَنْ يُظْهِرُهُ ٱللَّهُ مَنْ يُظْهِرُهُ ٱللَّهُ، وَمِنْ بَعْدِ مَنْ يُظْهِرُهُ ٱللَّهُ مَنْ يُظْهِرُهُ ٱللَّهُ. وَإِنْ أَقُولَنَّ إِلَىٰ مَا دُمْتُ حَيًّا لَا يَفْرَغُ فُؤَادِي عَنْ حَلَاوَةِ ذِكْرِهِمْ، وَلَمْ يَكُنْ عَلَىٰ فُؤَادِي شَيْئًا أَعَزَّ مِنْ ذٰلِكَ ٱلذِّكْرِ، وَإِنْ أَقُولَنَّ إِلَىٰ آخِرِ ٱلَّذِي لَا آخِرَ لَهُ، فَإِنَّ ٱللَّهَ لَيُظْهِرَنَّهُ، وَلَا حَدَّ لَهُ، وَلَا تَتَحَدَّدُ خَلْقُ ٱللَّهِ فِي ٱلْمُلْكِ، فَإِنَّهُ لَا أَوَّلَ لَهُ وَلَا آخِرَ، وَمَنْ يُحَدِّدْ أَعْرَاشَ ٱلْحَقِيقَةِ فِي ٱلْبَيَانِ ذٰلِكَ مِمَّنْ لَا يُؤْمِنُ بِٱللَّهِ، وَأَسْتَغْفِرُ ٱللَّهَ عَنْ ذٰلِكَ...

[8] *Kitāb-i-panj shaʾn,* ibid., 295-6:

... ٱللَّهُ فِي كُلِّ ظُهُورٍ يُجَدِّدُ خَلْقَ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ لَعَلَّكُمْ تَتَجَدَّدُونَ، وَقَدْ جَدَّدْنَا نُورَ ٱلْفُرْقَانِ بِنُورِ ٱلْبَيَانِ، فَأُولٰئِكَ هُمْ مِنَ ٱلنُّورِ إِلَى ٱلنُّورِ، وَفِي ٱلنُّورِ لَدَى ٱلنُّورِ لَمُنَوَّرُونَ. قَدْ شَهِدْتَ مَا قَدْ قُضِيَ عَلَيْهِمْ وَسَمِعْتَ، وَسَيُشْهِدُكَ

ٱللَّهُ فِي أُخْرَاكَ وَيُسْمِعُكَ مَا يَرْضَىٰ بِهِ فُؤَادَكَ، وَفَوْقَ مَا يَرْضَىٰ، وَفَوْقَ فَوْقَ مَا يَرْضَىٰ، كُلُّ ٱلرَّاضِينَ. وَلَعَمْرُ ذٰلِكَ ٱلنُّورِ فِي ٱلْفُرْقَانِ، ذٰلِكَ ٱلنُّورِ فِي ٱلْبَيَانِ، لَأَنْوَرُ عِندَ ٱللَّهِ وَأَقْرَبُ فِي ٱلْكِتَابِ، وَلٰكِنَّ ٱلنَّاسَ لَا يَعْلَمُونَ. فَسَوْفَ تَرَيْنَّ مَلَائِكَةَ ٱلْفِرْدَوْسِ وَٱلرِّضْوَانِ يَنْزِلُونَ هُنَالِكَ وَهُمْ بِنُورِ ٱللَّهِ يَتَعَزَّزُونَ. وَإِنَّ مَا ٱخْتَصَّ ٱللَّهُ مِنَ ٱلْأَسْمَاءِ ٱسْمُ ٱلنُّورِ، لَمَّا لَمْ يَبْقَ فِيهِ حِجَابًا يَمْنَعُهُ عَنْ إِثْبَاتِ ٱلْإِثْبَاتِ. كَذٰلِكَ يَرْفَعُ ٱللَّهُ مَنْ يَشَاءُ مِنْ عِندِهِ، إِنَّهُ لَا إِلٰهَ إِلَّا هُوَ ٱلْوَاحِدُ ٱلنَّوَّارُ. وَإِنَّ مَعْنَى ٱللَّهِ نُورُ ٱلسَّمٰوَاتِ وَٱلْأَرْضِ، لَوْ أَرَدْتَ أَنْ تَكُونَنَّ بِهِ مِنَ ٱلْعَالَمِينَ فِي بَاطِنِ ٱلْبَاطِنِ بَعْدَ ظَاهِرِ ٱلظَّاهِرِ، ٱلْبَابُ أَوَّلُ مَنْ آمَنَ. كَذٰلِكَ يَكْشِفُ ٱللَّهُ ٱلْحُجُبَ لِتَرَيْنَّ بِعَيْنَيْكَ بِأَنَّ ٱللَّهَ نُورٌ مِنْ قَبْلُ وَمِنْ بَعْدُ، وَكُلٌّ بِنُورِهِ يَهْتَدُونَ. وَلٰكِنْ سَتُرَاقِبَنَّ أَيَّامَ مَنْ يُظْهِرُهُ ٱللَّهُ، فَإِنَّكُمْ أَنْتُمْ أَنْ يَا أُولِي ٱلْبَيَانِ لَمُبْتَلَوْنَ. رُبَّمَا تَقْرَؤُنَّ تِلْكَ ٱلْآيَاتِ وَأَنْتُمْ بِأَنْفُسِكُمْ تَخْرُجُونَ عَنِ ٱلنُّورِ وَتَدْخُلُونَ فِي غَيْرِ ٱلنُّورِ، وَتَحْسَبُونَ أَنَّكُمْ مُحْسِنُونَ، مِثْلَ ٱلَّذِينَ هُمْ مَا عَرَفُوا حُسَيْنًا — نُورَ ٱللَّهِ — وَهُمْ آيَةُ ٱلنُّورِ فِي كِتَابِ ٱللَّهِ يَقْرَؤُونَ، وَمِنْ بَعْدِ مَا عَرَفُوا مُنَوِّرَ ٱلْأَنْوَارِ فِي ٱلْبَيَانِ، وَهُمْ آيَاتُ ٱلنُّورِ كُلُّهُنَّ فِي ٱلْفُرْقَانِ لِيَتْلُونَ. وَإِنَّمَا يُذْكَرُونَ ٱلْمِصْبَاحَ بِٱلنُّورِ لِأَنَّهُ يَحْرِقُ وَلَمْ يَبْقَ لَهُ مِنْ شَيْءٍ. كَذٰلِكَ يُرِيكُمُ ٱللَّهُ مَصَابِيحَ ٱلْأَنْوَارِ لَعَلَّكُمْ تَهْتَدُونَ. وَلَعَمْرُ مَنْ يُظْهِرُهُ ٱللَّهُ نُورُ ٱلْأَنْوَارِ أَنْوَرُ مِنْ كُلِّ ٱلْمَصَابِيحِ، وَلٰكِنَّ أَكْثَرَ ٱلنَّاسِ لَا يُبْصِرُونَ. فَٱنْظُرْ فِي قُدْرَةِ ٱللَّهِ كَيْفَ يَخْلُقُ ٱللَّهُ عِبَادًا يَرْضَوْنَ بِأَنْ يَكُونُوا نُورًا لِلَّهِ، مِثْلَ ٱلْمِصْبَاحِ يَحْرِقُونَ بِأَنْفُسِهِمْ وَيَسْتَضِيءُ مَنْ فِي حَوْلِهِمْ. هٰذَا مِنْ فَضْلِ ٱللَّهِ عَلَيْهِمْ وَعَلَيْكُمْ، وَلٰكِنَّكُمْ لَا تَشْكُرُونَ. أَتَحْسَبَنَّ أَنَّ خَلْقَ ٱلنُّورِ خَلْقٌ عَدِيلٌ؟ قُلْ تَعَالَى ٱللَّهُ عَنْ ذٰلِكَ. كُلٌّ بِنُورِ ٱللَّهِ لِيَعْدِلُونَ. ٱنْظُرْ كَيْفَ لَا يُبَالُونَ بِٱلنَّفْيِ وَلَا بِمَا عِنْدَهُ، وَعَبَدُوا ٱللَّهَ ظَاهِرِينَ بَعْدَ مَا تَشْهَدُ أَعْدَادُهُمْ وَأَعْدَادُهُمْ وَأَسْبَابُهُمْ، وَسَيُثْبِتُونَ كُلَّ ذٰلِكَ أُولُوا ٱلْعِلْمِ فِي كُتُبِهِمْ لِلَّذِينَ هُمْ مِنْ بَعْدُ يَذْكُرُونَ. كَذٰلِكَ يَخْلُقُ ٱللَّهُ ٱلْقُوَّةَ فِي قُلُوبِ ٱلَّذِينَ أُوتُوا ٱلنُّورَ. وَمِثْلَ ذٰلِكَ قَدْ سَمِعْتَ عَنْ كَلِمَةِ ٱلْحَاءِ، حَيْثُ لَمَّا قَابَلَهَا أُلُوفٌ مِنَ ٱلْجُنُودِ بِنَفْسِهِ وَسَبْعِينَ عَدَدًا، قَدْ أَثْبَتُوا ٱلْإِثْبَاتَ وَأَنْفَوُا ٱلنَّفْيَ، وَمَا صَبَرُوا فِي ٱللَّهِ، وَمَا رَقَدُوا طَرْفَ عَيْنٍ. يَنْبَغِي لِلَّذِينَ أُوتُوا ٱلْبَيَانَ أَنْ يَكُونَنَّ مِثْلَ أُولِي ٱلْأَنْوَارِ، وَلٰكِنَّ ٱللَّهَ يُؤْتِي ٱلْفَضْلَ مَنْ يَشَاءُ مِنْ عِبَادِهِ. إِنَّهُ لَا إِلٰهَ إِلَّا هُوَ ٱلْوَاحِدُ ٱلنَّوَّارُ...

[9] Let us offer here a few of these ordinances as of the **15th Gate of the Fourth Unity** of the Arabic *Bayān* (hereafter the notations are given as **15:4**) ("*Do not forbid anyone who seeks refuge in God, then in the Letters of the Living, at the time of the Manifestation—both in the finality and, before that, in the primality. You are to command by this. And indeed, were anyone to seek refuge in someone, and that one were killed in the Path* [of God], *rather than turning him away* [as a consequence of which he would be killed], *it would be better in the sight of God* [not to turn him away]. *So, O My servants—grant refuge!*"); **3:5** ("*We have made the year to be nineteen months, so perchance you may journey/walk in the Unity!*"); **11:5** ("*You shall magnify* [the Name of] *God over the newborn five times while standing, and after each time you shall say, nineteen*

times: 'Verily, we are all in God believers; then, verily, we are all in God certain; then, verily, we are all in God originated; then, verily, we are all in God returned; then, verily, we are all in God content'. And over the dead: six times. Then you shall say, nineteen times: 'Verily, we are all God's worshippers; then, after having magnified God in the first [instance], *verily, we are all to God prostrators; then, verily, we are all to God devout; then, verily, we are all for God laboring; then, verily, we are all to God sincere; then, verily, we are all to God grateful.' And you shall bury* [the body] *in crystal or polished stone, that perchance you may find tranquility. And you shall place the seal-ring on the right hand, engraved upon it the verse that I command, that perchance you may find familiarity. Say: Let it be inscribed for the male: 'To God belongs whatsoever is in the heavens and the earth and whatsoever is between them, and God is All-Knowing, All-Powerful, All-Resistant'. Say to the female: Let it be enjoined as revealed in the Mighty Book: 'And to God belongs the dominion of the heavens and the earth and whatsoever is in between them, and God is All-Knowing, All-Powerful, All-Resistant'!"*); **14:5** ("*The Name of God shall purify you when you recite* ***God is the Most Pure*** *(Allāhu aṭhar) sixty-six times; then 'the Point' (al-nuqṭa) and what shines forth from It of the signs of God, then Its logoic-Words—if you are among those who are certain of them; then the one who enters the true religion; then what transforms its essential reality; then fire, air, water, and earth; then the sun—when it dries* [things]. *So, O My servants, give thanks!*"); **18:5** ("*You shall permit all My servants to engage in buying and selling, provided they have attained knowledge of mutual satisfaction* (*riḍā*) *between them. But as for those who engage in trade* (*yatagharūn*), *they do not seek the appointed term* (*ajal*), *and they curtail the destined time* (*ḥīn*)"); **2:6** (*"In every land, you shall construct a Free House (bayt ḥurr). And you shall render all your land, and everything within it, refined and gentle—in the most excellent manner you are empowered to enact—lest My Eye witness it in aversion. So be mindful of Me, O My servants! That is nearer than all things, if you but possessed knowledge!"*); **4:6** ("*You shall salute unto God while saying: 'Allāhu akbar'* (*God is the Most Great*), *then respond: 'Allāhu Aʿẓam'* (*God is the Most Mighty*), *then: 'Allāhu abhāʾ* (*God is the Most Splendid*), *and whoever responds with: 'Allāhu ajmal'* (*God is the Most Beautiful*), *then it is Me you shall be conscious of!*"); **11:6** ("*Say: 'O Muḥammad, my teacher, do not strike me before I have completed five years* [of age], *not even with the blink of an eye—for my heart is tender, tender. And after that, discipline me, but do not expel me beyond the bounds of my dignity. And if you wish to strike, do not exceed five* [blows], *and do not strike the flesh unless you place a covering between them. For if you transgress, your spouse becomes forbidden to you for nineteen days—and this applies even if you forget. And if you have no spouse, then you shall pay, for what you struck, nineteen mithqāls of gold* [i.e. a *mithqāl* is a classical Islamic weight measure, often equivalent to approximately 4.25 grams of gold]—*if you desire to be among the believers. And do not strike except with utmost lightness, utmost lightness. And you shall settle the young girls upon a bed, or throne, or chair—for such time shall not be counted from their lifespan. And you shall permit them what delights them. And you shall teach the shikastih script—for that is what God loves, and It has made it the gate of Its Logos-Self among the scripts—so that perhaps you may write in a manner that turns your hearts away from intoxication. And* [this] *shall make you water for He whom*

We shall make Manifest, so that when your eyes behold Him, you are drawn to Him, as We once wrote. And I have paired you with the One who shall inherit, lest the Throne of your Lord be grieved in His infancy. And entrust Him to those who shall not cause grief. Say: If you bear witness, I shall sever from you what I have granted you from My dominion. So, O My servants—be God-conscious!"); **17:6** ("*Whatever issues from the animal, do not recoil from it—unless you are moved by love to render it gentle!*"); **6:7** ("*Do not bear among yourselves the weaponry of war, nor wear what terrifies young girls, that you might, through He whom God shall make Manifest, in truth, not become among the sorrowful!*"); **14:7** ("*It is forbidden in your religion to give repentance before anyone except He whom We shall make Manifest or one authorized by Him. Rather, seek forgiveness from God, your Lord, the Sovereign—and to It alone shall you return in repentance!*"); **17:7** ("*You shall recite on the Day of Friday, while facing the sun, these verses—so that perchance on the Day of Resurrection, before the Sun of Reality, you shall declare: 'The Splendor from God be upon thee, O thou rising sun! For I bear witness to what God has borne witness unto Its Logos-Self: that, verily, there is no god but It, the Granderous, the Beloved!*"); **18:7** ("*Whosoever imprisons a person, his wives are rendered unlawful to him; and if he approaches* (them), *it shall be written against him nineteen mithqāls of gold for every month. And if there results from* (his) *fluid* (a child), *it becomes incumbent upon the Witnesses* (*al-shuhadāʾ*) *to banish him; and no act of faith* (*īmān*) *shall be accepted from him. Say: O My servants, so be conscious of Me. And whoever deliberately grieves any soul with anything, there shall be written against him nineteen mithqāls of gold as blood-money* (*ḍīyā*), *if he is able; otherwise, of silver—except if permission has been granted. And whoever forgets* (*unintentionally*), *let him seek forgiveness from God, his Lord, nineteen times. Say: O My servants, so be conscious of Me!*"); **19:7** ("*The entirety of the ritual prayer* (*ṣalāt*) *has been lifted from you—save for* [that which is] *from dusk to dusk* (*zawāl īlā zawāl*)*—nineteen units* (*rakʿa*), *one by one, consisting of standing* (*qiyām*), *devotional supplication* (*qunūt*), *and sitting* (*quʿūd*)*—that perchance you may, on the Day of Resurrection, stand before God, then prostrate, then perform qunūt, then sit. And within your hearts there shall be, from the "Letters of the One"* (*ḥurūf al-wāḥid*), *a sign* (*āya*) *for God, your Lord—so that through it you may attain salvation. Then Me—so be conscious of* [Me] (*fa-ittaqūn*)*—and to God prostrate!*"); **10:8** (*You shall, after partaking of your provision, cleanse your mouths using toothpicks* (*khilāl*) *and toothbrushes* (*siwāk*). *Then rest. Thereafter, wash your faces and hands—up to the limits of the palms—if you intend to perform prayer. Then, using a cloth* (*mindīl*), *gently wipe* (*tulaṭṭifūn*) *your faces and hands. And in the House of Purity* (*bayt al-ṭuhr*), *preserve within a cloth any item that emits fragrance so that you do not encounter what opposes your delight. Perform your ablutions upon the Temple of Divine Unity (haykal al-tawḥīd) using perfumed water—such as rosewater—so that on the Day of Resurrection you may enter before God with the scent of rose and perfume. For the fragrance you bear shall not alter the worth of your deeds. And if you recite the basmala ('In the Name of God') five times, that shall suffice you in place of ablution—if you are unable to find water, or should it be difficult for you to use it—so that you may show gratitude. Say: In every Manifestation* (*ẓuhūr*), *the essential natures of fire are transformed into Light. Yet how* [can you understand this], *when your*

actions come from your own selves? You are to gaze toward the Point of Command (*nuqṭat al-amr*), *for He has absolved you of what you behold in visions and dreams. You are bewildered of yourselves about yourselves—but you must recognize the worth of that water [i.e. semen], for it is the cause of the creation of a soul that worships God. You are placed in the abode of Might* (*makman al-ʿizz*) *so that you may be preserved—and that through the fruits of your own souls, you may bring victory to the religion of God. And when you find water* [i.e. semen] *by your own volition, perform ablution—then prostrate—and say nineteen times: 'Glory be to Thee, O God! There is no other god but Thee! Glory be to Thee! Truly, I have been amongst those who glorify!' And if you immerse yourselves fully in water* (*ghusl*), *it suffices for you after you have performed ablution. Similarly, you shall wash your heads, your bellies, your hands, and your feet. And while engaged in action, give praise to God. As for women: when they experience menstrual blood, neither prayer nor fasting is required of them. However, they should perform ablution and recite glorification* (*tasbīḥ*) *ninety-five times from dusk to dusk, saying: 'Glory be to God, the One Possessed of Radiance and Beauty!' And when you and they are travelling, after descending and taking rest, in place of each obligatory prayer, prostrate once; then glorify God therein. Afterward, sit upon the Temple of Divine Unity and glorify God eighteen times—then rise. All of this is so that you may show gratitude in the religion of God!*"); **9:9** ("*You shall not pray in congregation, but you shall attend the mosques, and while seated upon the chair, you shall mention (the name of) God and offer exhortation in a manner beloved to God. Except in the prayer for the dead, wherein when assembled, you shall pray—but each individually, with distinct intent. And you shall establish a locus of dignity* (*maḥall ʿizz*) *in your homes as your own mosque. And if you attend the mosques, it is better for you—so that you may, on the Day of the Manifestation of God, hasten in the Cause of God!*"); **11:9** ("*Do not buy or sell the Four Elements*"); **12:9** ("*Let not your prayers be nullified by the hair of an animal, nor by that in which no spirit is breathed* [i.e. flatulence]. *Be you, in the religion of God, among the thankful!*"); **13:9** ("*You are never to destroy any book!*"); **16:9** ("*Never ever strike anyone*"); **1:10** ("*Do not be wary/afraid of a dog or other* [such animals], *and if moist hair from it touches you, then* [*you are not defiled*]*—except that you may wish to cleanse yourselves out of love of cleanliness!*"); **2:10** ("*Say: In the Second — Verily, God has permitted those who have believed in the Bayān—from among the ḥurūf* (males) *and ḥurūfāt* (females)*—to look upon one another, and* [for] *them* (the women) *to look upon them* (the men), *if they so wish or if the women so will, without witnessing therein what God does not love in their gazing* [i.e. with craven lust], *whether from the men or from the women. And God desires to create between you and them that by which you may enter into mutual love in Its good-pleasure* (*al-riḍwān*)*!*"); **14:10** (" *God has prescribed upon your fathers and your mothers that they provide for you from the beginning of your creation until the completion of nineteen full years; and upon you it is incumbent to provide for them until the end of their lives, if they are not able to do so. And upon them is it to provide for you if they are able as long as you are upon the earth, and are not able until that age. That is, each according to the bounds of their religion. And if one of them secludes themselves, then you are to pardon them* [i.e. are not to demand provision]. *But whoever secludes themselves from the bounds of God in this matter, then let them*

be bound—that in every year, they expend nineteen mithqāls of gold in the path of God as a fixed ordinance in the Book of God so that you may become God-fearing (muttaqūn)!"); **15:10** ("*Do not ride upon cattle (baqar), nor overburden them with anything, if you are among those who believe in God and Its signs! And do not drink the milk of donkeys, nor burden them with loads, nor* [burden] *any other animal beyond its capacity—this is what God has prescribed upon you, that you may become God-fearing (muttaqūn)!*"); **18:10** ("*Do not command that a single hair's breadth be taken from anyone, nor that anything be diminished, after God has completed the creation of his outward form—this is a decree in the Book of God, that you may not grieve anyone. And whoever takes anything from the body of another, or alters its color by any degree, or changes their clothing, or intends to humiliate them—God has forbidden such a one his wives for nineteen months, according to the Book of God. And he shall be bound by a penalty from the limits (ḥudūd) of God: ninety-five units of gold, that you might be among those who fear Me. So do not command, do not act, and do not consent to such actions. Do not wrong anyone by even the weight of a mustard seed, if you are truly believers in God and His signs. But if you are not believers in God and Its signs, then earn for yourselves a deed that does not strip you of your dignity, for truly, before your creation, you were a drop of water with God, after [having been] clay, and you shall return to a handful of clay. So be ashamed* (i.e. cultivate *ḥayāʾ*/modesty)*, and do not consent for others to endure what you would not accept for yourselves. And while you are at the height of managing your lives, you are to govern your affairs with discernment. Do not ruin the form of anyone after God has perfected their creation, merely for the sake of a few days of pride or a few days of luxury, for both will come to an end for you. And after your death, you will enter the Fire, wishing that you had never been created, nor acquired for yourselves that which brought sorrow to a soul. And if you had used your reason in your lives, you would now be wishing* [for salvation]*— but how little is it that you give thanks!*"); **3:11** ("*Whoever mocks a believing man or a believing woman, let him be bound to pay the number of 'the One'* (i.e. the *abjad* value of *al-wāḥid* = 19) *in gold, then in silver, then to utter the phrase of seeking forgiveness (istighfār) ninety-five times, that you may be God-fearing. And do not mock, lest they* (i.e. those mocked) *be returned in judgment to the one who mocked them, if he is able* (to recompense)*. But if he is not able, then the obligation of gold and silver is lifted from him, yet he remains bound to perform the prescribed seeking of forgiveness. And if he has no tongue* (i.e. is mute) *but mocks through gestures, then let him choose on his behalf someone who will seek forgiveness for him. O My servants! Be God-fearing toward God!*"); **16:11** ("*Do not kill any soul, nor sever anything from any soul ever, if you be believers in God and Its signs. And whoever commands such an act, or does it, or is able to prevent it but does not prevent it, or is pleased with it—then he is bound by the Book of God to pay eleven thousand mithqāls of gold, to be returned to those who inherit from the one killed. And every consort* (i.e. wife) *is forbidden to him for nineteen years, as a proof in the Book of God that his essential being was created in opposition to God's love and good pleasure. He shall enter the Fire after his death, and God shall never forgive him, ever. However, if he follows the prescribed boundaries, then what has been decreed for him shall be lessened, so be God-fearing, and then be God-fearing again. But if one kills another without intent, then there*

is no blame upon him, provided that the heirs of the slain are satisfied and he offers an apology for them, and that he is considered by his Lord God among those who seek forgiveness. Indeed, such a case is like a divine decree that has fallen upon a soul— so be mindful of God, O every soul! Then be mindful of It again!"); **17:11** ("*Whosoever commands that someone be expelled from their house, or their city, or their village, or the domain of their sovereignty, then let their consort be forbidden to them for nineteen months, and let them be bound to pay nineteen mithqāls of gold, to be returned to the one expelled, as a fixed penalty (ḥadd) in the Book of God, that perchance you may be God-fearing!*"). We should mention here in passing that every gate (sub-section) of the *Bayān* aligns with one of 361 Divine Names delineated by the Bāb in his *Book of the Names of All-Things* (*kitāb asmāʾ al-kullu-shayʾ*). These 361 Divine Names are then held to correspond to each of the 361 days (**19x19**) of the Bayānī calendar.

[10] See especially the comments of Denis MacEoin in his *Nineteenth Century Talismans*, now in *The Messiah of Shiraz*: 537-57.

[11] Meaning, the believers in the Bayān.

[12] *Kitāb-i-panj shaʾn,* ibid., 405-6:

إِنَّنِي أَنَا ٱللَّهُ لَا ٱلَهَ إِلَّا أَنَا، قَدْ خَلَقْتُ ٱلسَّمَاوَاتِ وَٱلْأَرْضَ وَمَا بَيْنَهُمَا بِأَمْرِي كُنْ فَيَكُونُ، وَخَلَقْتُ ٱلْحُرُوفَ وَجَعَلْتُهَا مَفَاتِيحَ كُلِّ عِلْمٍ مِنْ لَدُنَّا، إِنَّا كُنَّا عَلَىٰ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ لَقَادِرِينَ. إِنْ يَا كُلَّ شَيْءٍ، فَلْتَفَكَّرَنَّ مِنْ ذِكْرِ ٱلْعَلِيِّ إِلَىٰ ذَرَّةِ ٱلْأَدْنَىٰ، بِأَنَّكُمْ أَنْتُمْ كُلُّ ذٰلِكَ فِي حُرُوفِ ٱلثَّمَانِيَةِ مِنْ بَعْدِ ٱلْعِشْرِينَ، لَتَشْهَدُونَ بِمِثْلِ مَا قَدْ شَهِدْتُمْ كُلَّ ٱلْحُرُوفِ فِيهِنَّ، فَلْتَشْهَدَنَّ كُلُّ أَرْوَاحِ ٱلْحُرُوفِ فِي أَزْوَاجِهِنَّ، إِنَّا كُنَّا بِكُلِّ شَيْءٍ عَالِمِينَ. إِنَّنِي أَنَا ٱللَّهُ لَا ٱلَهَ إِلَّا أَنَا، مِنْ أَوَّلِ ٱلَّذِي لَا أَوَّلَ لَهُ، قَدْ خَلَقْتُ جَوْهَرَ عِلْمٍ مُطَرَّزٍ مَكْنُونٍ، وَخَزَنْتُهُ فِي حُجُبِ ٱلْغَيْبِ مِنْ أَوَّلِ ٱلَّذِي لَا أَوَّلَ لَهُ إِلَىٰ حِينَئِذٍ، عِزًّا مِنْ لَدُنَّا، إِنَّا كُنَّا لَمُعَزِّزِينَ. وَمَا شَهِدْنَا عِبَادًا نُنَزِّلُ ذٰلِكَ ٱلْعِلْمَ عَلَيْهِمْ، وَأَكْتَمْنَاهُ عِنْدَنَا إِلَىٰ حِينَئِذٍ، حِفْظًا مِنْ لَدُنَّا، إِنَّا كُنَّا عَلَىٰ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ لَحَافِظِينَ. وَلَكِنَّا قَدْ عَلِمْنَا أَعْرَاشَ ٱلْحَقِيقَةِ، ثُمَّ ٱلْحَيَّ ٱلْأَوَّلَ فِي كُلِّ ظُهُورٍ، وَأَمَرْنَاهُمْ أَنْ يَكْتُمُونَ. وَلَكِنَّا حِينَئِذٍ لَمَّا شَهِدْنَا فِي تِلْكَ ٱلْقِيمَةِ أَسْمَاءَ كُلٍّ، عَلَيْنَا مُسْتَدِلُّونَ، قَدْ أَرَدْنَا أَنْ نَمُنَّ عَلَيْهِمْ بِذٰلِكَ ٱلْعِلْمِ فَضْلًا مِنْ لَدُنَّا، إِنَّا كُنَّا فَاضِلِينَ. هٰذَا عِلْمٌ أَنْتُمْ فِي ٱلْحُرُوفِ تَسْتَطِيعُونَ أَنْ تَسْتَيْقِنُونَ، بِأَنَّ كُلًّا فِي ٱلْحَيِّ ٱلْأَوَّلِ، ثُمَّ أَعْدَادَ ٱلْحَيِّ فِي ٱلنُّقْطَةِ ٱلْأُولَىٰ، وَأَنْتُمْ كُلُّ شَيْءٍ أَدِلَّاءُ ٱلْوَاحِدِ تَسْتَنْبِئُونَ. هٰذَا بَيَانُ مَا قَالَ ٱلْأَوَّلُونَ: كُلُّ مَا خُلِقَ وَيُخْلَقُ فِي ٱلْفُرْقَانِ، وَكُلُّ ذٰلِكَ يَنْتَهِي إِلَىٰ سَطْرِ ٱلْأَوَّلِ ٱلَّذِي قَدْ نَزَّلْنَاهُ عَلَىٰ حُرُوفِ ٱلْوَاحِدِ. أَنْتُمْ قَبْلَ هٰذَا مَا أُوتِيتُمْ ذٰلِكَ ٱلْعِلْمَ، وَمَا كُنْتُمْ عَلَيْهِ لَشَاهِدِينَ، إِلَّا كُلَّ مَا قَدْ فَسَّرْتُمْ بِمَا ٱسْتَدْرَكْتُمْ مِنْ غَيْرِ حُجَّةٍ، تَسْتَطِيعُونَ أَنْ تَسْتَدِلُّونَ وَتُنَبِّئُونَ بِهَا كُلَّ مَنْ أَرَادَ أَنْ يَسْتَنْبِئَ مِنْ كِتَابِ ٱللَّهِ. وَلَكِنَّ ٱللَّهَ حِينَئِذٍ لِيُعَلِّمَنَّكُمْ بِمَا يَنْزِلُ عَلَىٰ نُقْطَةِ ٱلْبَيَانِ، عِزًّا مِنْ عِنْدِ ٱللَّهِ، عَلَى ٱلَّذِينَ هُمْ يَوْمَ ٱلْقِيمَةِ بِمَنْ يُظْهِرُهُ ٱللَّهُ مُؤْمِنُونَ. وَلَوْلَا أَرَادَ ٱللَّهُ أَنْ يَسْتَشْهِدَنَّ عَلَىٰ ذٰلِكَ مَنْ يُظْهِرُهُ ٱللَّهُ، ثُمَّ ٱلْحَيَّ ٱلْأَوَّلَ فِي ٱلْقِيمَةِ ٱلْأُخْرَىٰ، مَا نَزَّلَ ٱللَّهُ ذٰلِكَ ٱلْعِلْمَ. وَلٰكِنَّكُمْ أَنْتُمْ بَيْنَ يَدَيِ ٱللَّهِ يَوْمَ ظُهُورِهِ

تَشْكُرُونَ. هٰذَا عِلْمٌ عِنْدَ ٱللَّهِ لَأَعَزُّ مِنْ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ، وَأَنْتُمْ بِهِ كُلُّ شَيْءٍ فِي ٱلْوَاحِدِ ٱلْأَوَّلِ أَعْدَادًا تَشْهَدُونَ، ثُمَّ مِنْ ٱلْوَاحِدِ ٱلْأَوَّلِ مِنْ غَيْرِ عَدَدٍ تَشْهَدُونَ...

[13] *Kitāb-i-panj shaʾn,* ibid., 446-7:

> و از جمله مواهبی که حضرت لم یزل بنقطهٔ بیان عطا فرموده علم کل شئ است در نفس واحد که تکوین را در عالم حروف بعین یقین مشاهده نمایند و این حجتی است کامله برکل بمثل آیات و از مخزونهای علم الهی بوده که تا حال نازل نفرموده و اعز است از هر علمی بر این علم نازل شده کل کتب و نازل خواهد شد و از این علم است که امر و "الهکم الٰه واحد" قبل نازل شده در بیان مظاهر ربوبیت در ظل آین ایه در ابواب جنت و همین قسم در نار "علیها تسعه عشر" و بیان آن قدری در کلمات عربیه شده و انشاءالله در خود بیان نجواتم و اکمل خواهد شد مجمل قول آنکه کل شئ از حروف ثمانیه و عشرین خارج نیست همین قسم هم تکوین کل شئ از معانی این حروف خارج نیست و این حروف را حق سبحانه و تعالی در یازده درجه جمع فرموده بعلم خود و انرا هیکل مشیت اولیه که انسان اول است قرار داده که ظاهر هیکل هاء باشد و باطن واو و در ظل این هیکل هیجده هیکل جعل فرموده در بحر اسماء و میت نتواند شد زیرا که منتهی عدد الله اسماء اسم مستغاث بوده و نظر که در هیاکل شود استنباط این مطلب بر نحو اکمل خواهد شد و نازل نشد این علم در هیاکل الا از برای استدلال ادلاء بیان از برای غیر انها در بیان انکه کل قران چکونه میشود که در نقطه باشد و از ان ظاهر کردد و حال انکه خلق عالم اکبر در کتاب است قبل انچه ذکر مینمودند محض عرفان باقی بود دلیل متقن و حجت مبرهن نبود ولی حال بحجت متقن و دلیل مبدهن ثابت شده باین نوع علم و بیان حفظ نموده او را کعینیک و عطا ننموده او را بمن لا یعرف قدره فان هذا من جوهر الجواهر لا ینبغی ان یملکه الا اولو الجواهر و بمرآت مدله علی الله نموده که صورت هیاکل را نگاه داشته و استنباط اسماء آخر را فرموده الی یوم یبین الله اسرار الهیاکل و یؤتی من یشاء من عباده انه فضل کریم.

[14] Aside from a handful of Arabic and Persian sources, critical biographies of the Bahā'ī founder remain virtually absent in Western-language print—for reasons already outlined. While sufficient primary historiographical material is now accessible to support a proper academic monograph, as past experience has proven, the main obstacle facing any objective researcher is the entrenched political interests previously noted—interests that would almost certainly obstruct, interfere with, or suppress both the research and its publication. See the opening comments to our *The Organizational Hierarchy of the Bābīs during the period of Ṣubḥ-i-Azal's residency in Baghdad (1852 – 1863)* noted above; see also William M. Miller *The Baha'i Faith: It's History and Teachings* (1974).

[15] See MacEoin *The Messiah of Shiraz*, ibid., 376-389.

[16] A few notable sources (some which are not even authored by the Bayānīs) are quite suggestive of Bahāʾuʾllāh's opportunism. We note especially the following tidbit cited by ʿAbd'ul Ḥusayn Ayātī *Avārih* (d. 1953)—a one-time secretary of ʿAbd'ul -Bahā's who publicly broke with the whole Bahā'ī movement under Shoghī Effendī—in the first volume of his *kashf'ul-ḥīl* (Uncovering Deception):

> ...I myself heard directly that the late Sepahsālār, four years before his death, on a day when the writer together with Sayyid Naṣrallāh Bāqerāf had gone to his house—and Bāqerāf was inclined to proselytize him to the Bahāʾī faith—that late man listened to his words, smiled, and said: *My father used to say: I was in the house of Mīrzā Āqā Khān, the Ṣadr-i Aʿẓam, when they brought Mīrzā Ḥusayn-ʿAlī Nūrī to me under guard, on the very day that Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh had been shot. When they brought the Mīrzā in* [i.e. Bahāʾuʾllāh]*, the Ṣadr-i Aʿẓam became angry with him and said: 'Out of shared homeland ties I was a friend of your father, and he was not a bad man. It was possible that you might have taken his place and attained a position of chancery and courtly administration. But you are so wretched that you attach yourself to the Sayyid-i-Bāb—about whom it is not even known what madness possessed him—and now you are also inciting the killing of the Shāh!'*
>
> *The Mīrzā immediately replied that he did not believe in Sayyid-i-Bāb, nor even in his ancestors* [meaning, Muḥammad and the Imāms]*...*—but he immediately restrained his tongue. The Ṣadr-i Aʿẓam also rebuked him sharply and said, 'Do not be impertinent,' and gestured that they should take him away; so they took him. After his departure from the assembly and his entry into confinement, the Ṣadr-i Aʿẓam said: This statement which Mīrzā Ḥusayn-ʿAlī uttered involuntarily was in fact true—that he does not even believe in the *Bāb's ancestors* [i.e. the Fourteen Infallibles]—*because he is absolutely not upon the path of religion and has no aim other than misuse and exploitation* (*my trans.*).

خودم بلاواسطه شنیدم مرحوم سپهسالار چهار سال قبل از وفاتش در روزی که نگارنده با سید نصرالله باقراف بمنزلش رفته بودیم و باقراف میل داشت اورا به بهائیت تبلیغ نماید آن مرحوم سخنان وی را شنیده خندان شد و گفت پدرم میگفت در منزل میرزا آقاخان صدر اعظم بودم که میرزا حسینعلی نوری را تحت الحفظ به نزد من آوردند در همان روزی که ناصرالدین شاه را تیر زده بودند چون میرزا را وارد کردند صدر اعظم بر او تغیّر کرده گفت من بر حسب هم وطنی با پدرت دوست بودم و او آدم بدی نبود و

ممکن بود شما جای او را گرفته به مقام انشاء و استیعاء درباری نائل شوید ولی تو بقدری بدبخت هستی که به سیّد باب که معلوم نیست چه جنونی بر سر داشته میگروی و حال هم تحریک به قتل شاه میکنی! میرزا فوری جواب داد که من به سیّد باب عقیده ندارم بلکه به جد او هم..... ولی فوراً زبان خود را حفظ کرد صدر اعظم هم به او تشر زد که فضولی مکن... و اشاره کرد که او را ببرید و بردند و پس از خروج او از مجلس و دخول در محبس صدر اعظم گفت این کلمه را میرزا حسینعلی از روی بی اختیاری راست گفت که به جد باب هم عقیده ندارد زیرا او ابداً در خط مذهب نیست و جز سوء استفاده هیچ منظوری ندارد

Paage 16. And, of course, this account in *Hasht Bihist* by Kirmānī and Rūḥī (a Bayānī source):

> At that time, the management of affairs was entrusted to Mīrzā Ḥusayn-ʿAlī [Bahāʾuʾllāh], the elder brother [of Ṣubḥ-i-Azal]. And since from the beginning of his life he had associated extensively with every group and every persuasion—even ruffians and libertines, dervishes, state officials, poets, and mystics— he had therefore acquired a certain breadth of outlook and laxity in religious matters, as is the habit of such persons. During the period of residence in Baghdad, when in his own imagination the desire to champion and aid the religion of the Bayān had taken hold in his mind, by the exigency of the affinity of natures—for "like is drawn toward like"—he gathered around himself a number of ignorant ruffians and libertines, foundlings of the profligate quarter, who had no entrance into the Path of Unity, the discipline of Truth, or the religion of the Bayān. They had no knowledge of the sensorium/prehension (*mashʿar*) of the blaze-flux (*fuʾād*), no scent had reached their senses from the fragrance of the world of realities, and they had perceived not even a ray of the lights of gnosis, as the poet says:
>
> *You have not taken even a few steps toward the quarter of knowledge;*
> *You have not read even a few names from the ledger of fidelity;*
> *You have not kept vigil through a few nights seeking the dawn;*
> *Yet you set about defaming a few good names.*
>
> Since this condition was contrary to the way of the People of Truth and of those who seek true humanity, and since the very foundation of the religion of the Bayān—which had manifested solely for the purpose of conveying beneficial

insight, setting in motion the light of gnosis, and breathing the sanctified spirit— stood in complete contradiction and opposition to it, a number of leading believers therefore intervened. Among them were His Excellency Ākhūnd Mullā Muḥammad Jaʿfar Narāqī (the rival), His Excellency Ākhūnd Mullā Rajab-ʿAlī Qahīr, His Excellency Ḥājjī Sayyid Muḥammad Iṣfahānī, His Excellency Ḥājjī Mīrzā Aḥmad Kātib, His Excellency the Mutawallī-Bāshī of Qum, His Excellency Mīrzā Buzurg of Kermānshāh, His Excellency Mīrzā Muḥammad Riḍā, and a number of others. With His Excellency Ḥājjī Sayyid Javād— who was one of the Letters of the Living— appointed as arbiter, they forbade, reproached, and rebuked Mīrzā Ḥusayn-ʿAlī for these reprehensible actions and indirect, crooked modes of conduct, to such an extent that the matter escalated into estrangement and weighed heavily and bitterly upon the said Mīrzā.

Angrily, by night, he departed from Baghdad toward Sulaymānīya and went among the Kurds, where he remained for nearly two years, without news of the other believers. After the location of the aforementioned person became known, and after from there he had written supplications with a thousand entreaties and pleadings to the Presence of the Fruit [i.e. Ṣubḥ-i-Azal], and had appointed His Excellency Ḥājjī Sayyid Javād as his intercessor, a written decree and permission were issued by the Source of Command allowing Mīrzā to return to Baghdad. And His Excellency Ḥājjī Sayyid Javād wrote this poem in reply to him:

Would that that departed generosity, unreconciled,
Might return— for the eyes of lovers are upon the door.

During that same period, Mīrzā Asad'ullāh the *Dayyān*, who was one of the second-tier of the Letters of the Living and the manifestation of the Judas Iscariot of this community, and whom the Primal Point had appointed as scribe in the Presence of the Fruit, and who knew the Hebrew and Syriac languages well, having found within himself— through borrowed illumination and the effect of the lights of revelation— a light in his own soul, laid claim to the station of the Promised One (*man yuẓhiru-hu'llāh*). And Mīrzā Ibrāhīm validated his claim. In a gathering, after much questioning and disputation with Mīrzā Ḥusayn-ʿAlī, Mīrzā Ḥusayn-ʿAlī incited his attendant, Mīrzā Muḥammad Māzandarānī, to kill Mīrzā Asad'ullāh.

After the killing of Mīrzā Asad'ullāh, Mīrzā ʿAbd'ullāh, known by the pen-name *Ghūghā*, laid claim to this station; and he was one of the fearless Qalandars and

agile Sufis. After him came Ḥusayn Mīlānī— known as Ḥusayn-Jān—who in Tehran claimed the station of the Promised One. After him followed a blind man from Kāshān, and after that Sayyid Ḥusayn Iṣfahānī, and after that Mīrzā Muḥammad Nabīl, the tongue-tied of Zarand, each of whom began to make this claim. Matters reached such a point that every person, upon rising in the morning from the previous night's sleep, would adorn himself with the garments of this claim.

And the natural consequence was this: that the gate of claim and vicegerency was closed by the explicit texts and declarations of the Point of the Bayān. Yet the general temperament of the people of Iran would not bow their heads to a spiritual guide who possessed less than the rank of divinity. Thus, from every side arose disparate lords and diverse deities, and they would not step down below the hem of godhead. Whenever anyone attempted to restrain them, statements such as the following would be voiced: "No one has the right to object to another."

Mīrzā Ḥusayn-ʿAlī, seeing the situation descend into chaos and disorder in this manner, judged it expedient at that time to fashion this claim for himself, since in every respect he regarded himself as superior and more advanced than these persons and considered the means of action to be more fully prepared. At the same time, from another side, Āqā Jān the bald soap-seller of Kāshān—who was the Ṣamarī of the age [i.e. the creator of the Golden Calf]—adopted the methods of ingratiation and flattery and cast the hapless Mīrzā into this ambition. That Calf, too, was stirred into motion by the power of covetous desire, and secretly rose to make preparations and arrangements for this undertaking. Anyone among the believers whom he perceived as opposed or incompatible with his enterprise became the object of his designs for elimination and annihilation.

At that same time, because of the great tumult and the large gatherings of the Bābīs in Baghdad, the scholars of the holy shrines raised an outcry, and the Iranian government likewise became alarmed. Strong and emphatic instructions were issued to Mīrzā Ḥusayn Khān Mushīr al-Dawla, the special ambassador at the Ottoman court, to formally request from the Ottoman Ṣultān that the Bābīs be removed from Baghdad and settled in one of the remote regions of Ottoman lands where there would be no passage or traffic of Iranians. The Ottoman government, in accordance with considerations of expediency—so that daily quarrels and

fighting between Iranians and the Bābīs in Baghdad might not occur— accepted this request, summoned them to Istanbul, and after bringing them to Istanbul and detaining them for four months in the capital, sent them on respectfully to Adrianople (*my trans.*).

در آن هنگام پیشکاری امور بعهدهٔ میرزا حسینعلی برادر بزرگتر بود و مشارالیه چون از ابتدای عمر با هر طایفه و هر مشربی حتی الواط و دراویش و امناء دولت و شعراء و عرفا معاشرت بسیاری کرده بود لهذا یکنوع وسعت مشرب و رخاوتی در مذهب چنانکه عادت اینگونه اشخاص است به هم رسانیده ایام توقف بغداد که به خیال خود خولیای نصرت دین بیان در سرش جایگیر شده بود به اقتضای مجانست طبیعت که شبه الشیء ینجذب الیه پاره اوباش و الواط جُهال هزره سرای یافته در اطراف خود جمع کرده بود که هیچ وارد بر مشرب توحید و مسلک حقیقت و دین بیان نبودند و از مشعر فوائد خبری نداشتند و بویی به مشامشان از رایح عالم حقایق نرسیده از انوار معرفت شعاعی ندیده بودند چنانکه شاعر گوید:

تا رفته بکوی معرفت گامی چند
ناخوانده ز دفتر وفا نامی چند
ناورده بصبح در طلب شامی چند
بد نام کننده نکو نامی چند

چون این حالت منافی طریقه اهل حقیقت و مردم انسانیت طلب بود و اساس دین بیان که محض از برای القای مشعر فوائد و جلیان نور معرفت و نفخ روح قدسی تجلی نموده منافات و مباینت کلی داشت لهذا جمعی از بزرگان اصحاب مانند جناب آخوند ملا محمد جعفر نراقی (رقیب) و جناب آخوند ملا رجبعلی قهیر و جناب حاجی سید محمد اصفهانی و جناب حاجی میرزا احمد کاتب و جناب متولی باشی قمی و جناب میرزا بزرگ کرمانشاهی و جناب میرزا محمد رضا و جمعی دیگر در حالیکه جناب حاجی سید جواد را که از حروف حی بود حکم قرار داده بودند میرزا حسینیعلی را از این حرکات ناگوار و اطوار غیر مستقیم منع و توبیخ و سرزنش نمودند بطوریکه کار به تکدیر کشیده و میرزای مزبور را سخت و گران آمد شبانه از بغداد خشمناک بطرف سلیمانیه و در میان اکراد رفت و قریب دو سال در آنجا بی خبر از سایر اصحاب بسر میبرد و بعد از معلوم گشتن محل مشارالیه که از پس آنجا مناجات با هزار تضرع و نیاز به حضرت ثمره نوشته بود و جناب حاجی سید جواد را شفیع خود قرار داده از جناب مصدر امر توقیع و اذن به عودت میرزا بسوی بغداد صدور یافت و جناب حاجی سید جواد این شعر را در جواب به او نوشته بودند:

کاش آن بخشم رفته نا آشتی کنان
باز آمدی که دیده عشاق بر در است

هم در آن قربت میرزا اسدالله دیان که از حروف حی ثانی و مظهر یهودای اسخر یوطی این قوم بود و حضرت نقطه او را کاتب حضرت ثمره قرار داده بودند و زبان عبرانی و سریانی را نیکو میدانست از پرتو عاریتی و اثر انوار وحی نوری در نفس خود یافته ادعای مقام موعود (من یظهره الله) را نمود و میرزا ابراهیم نام او را مصدق شد و در یک مجلس با میرزا حسینعلی سؤال و جواب بسیار کرده میرزا حسینعلی میرزا محمد مازندرانی را که پیشخدمتش بود برانگیخت تا میرزا اسدالله را بکشد و پس از کشتن میرزا اسدالله میرزا عبدالله متخلص به غوغا ادعای این مقام را نمود و او یکی از قلندران بی باک و صوفیان چالاک بود پس از او حسین میلانی که او را حسین جان میگفتند در طهران ادعای مقام موعود نمود و از دنبال او شخص اعمی کاشانی و از پی آن سید حسین اصفهانی و پس از آن میرزا محمد نبیل اخرس زرندی هر یک این ادعا را نمودن گرفتند و کار بجایی رسید که هر کس بامدادن از خواب پیشین بر میخاست تن را به لباس این دعوی می آراست و سر طبیعی این بود که باب ادعا و وصایت به واسطه نصوص و تصریحات نقطه بیان بسته شد عموم طبایع اهالی ایران هم به مرشدی که کمتر از رتبه الوهیت داشته باشد سر فرود نمی آوردند لذا از هر طرف ارباب متفرقه و الهه متنوعه پیدا آمدند و از دامن الوهیت پای پائین تر نمیگذاشتند همیشه که کسی آنان را بخواست منع کند مشابه این عبارات بیان میشدند که: هیچکس را حق اعتراض بر دیگری نیست.

میرزا حسینعلی که اوضاع را بدینگونه هرج و مرج دید مصلحت وقت در آن یافت که خود این دعوی را ساز کند که از هر جهت خویش را از این اشخاص پیش و بیش میدید و اسباب کار را آماده تر داشت و هم از طرف دیگر آقاجان کچل صابون فروش کاشانی که سامری وقت بود بطریقه مداهنه گوئی و چاپلوسی را پیش گرفته میرزای بیچاره را به این طمع انداخت آن گوساله را نیز قوه طامعه بحرکت آمد مخفیانه به تهیه و تدارک این کار برخاست و هر یک از اصحاب را منافی و مباین کار خود میدید در خیال تلف و تمام کردن ایشان افتاد و هم در آن اوقات به واسطه غوغای عظیم و اجتماع کثیر حضرات بابیه در بغداد علمای عتبات به فریاد آمده دولت ایران نیز اندیشناک گشت و به میرزا حسین خان مُشیرالدوله سفیر کبیر دربار دولت عثمانی تأکیدات بلیغ شد که از سلطان عثمانی رسماً بخواهد حضرات را از بغداد به یکی از نقاط دور دست بلاد عثمانی که محل عبور و مرور اهل ایران نباشد سکونت دهند دولت عثمانی نیز به مقتضای مصلحت که هر روز میان ایرانیها با حضرات بابی در بغداد نزاع و جنگ اتفاق نیفتد این خواهش را پذیرفته حضرات را به اسلامبول خواست و پس از آوردن ایشان در اسلامبول و چهار ماه توقف در عاصمیه آنان را محترمًا بادرنه فرستاد.

233-4 (PDF).

[17] See the Bahá'í Reference Library, online: https://www.bahai.org/library/authoritative-texts/bahaullah/kitab-i-aqdas/ (retrieved 1 January 2026). While some of the Bayānīs have often claimed the *kitāb-i-aqdas* as a rehash of the Bayān, our position is that this is only the surface of the matter. Rather, the *kitāb-i-aqdas* of Bahāʾuʾllāh represents an attempted neutralization of the Bayān masquerading as rehash.

[18] For example, the **Bayān 16:11** prohibits the mutilation and violent dismemberment of any individual—including the enemies of the Bayān. But in the *kitāb-i-aqdas* (**para.45**), Bahāʾuʾllāh institutes a harsh punitive ordinance regarding thieves wherein they are to be permanently branded on the forehead while in **para.62** arsonists are to be burned alive.

[19] For instance, the all-male Universal House of Justice is conferred *infallibility* by Bahāʾuʾllāh in one of his 'tablets', see https://bahai-library.com/vafai_infallibility_uhj#fn2 (retrieved 2 August 2025).

[20] To wit,

> *...Erelong you will hear the call of the clamorous impostor, don't pay attention unto him, but leave him to himself*" [Bahá'u'lláh says that someone will soon come claiming to be a Manifestation but that his manifestation only appears once in 500,000 years] *Say: If in each day another one* [another Manifestation] *is manifested, the cause of God will not find rest in the cities and the lands. This is the Revelation* [or Manifestation] *that manifests itself* [or His own Self] *only once every 500,000 years time. Thus have we unveiled the cover and we lifted the veil. Blessed is the man that recognized ('arif) the purpose of God. In his recognition ('irafah), he has rejoiced in his heart and been made firm in the Cause, such that he be made to stumble* [even] *by the entire creation...* Trans. by Hajir Moghaddam & Aziz Mboya (2021).

Original, online: https://reference.bahai.org/fa/t/b/MAS8/mas8-22.html https://reference.bahai.org/fa/t/b/MAS8/mas8-23.html (retrieved 2 August 2025).

[21] Via threats of being declared a "covenant breaker," disfellowshipping and shunning. Countless lives of former Bahā'īs, dissidents and schismatics have been structurally destroyed via this mechanism in the possession of Bahā'ī authorities.

[22] See https://bahaiteachings.org/stunning-trumpet-blast-bahaullahs-letters-kings/ (retrieved 2 August 2025).

[23] See Siyyid Miqdād Nabavī-Razavī's seminally important *tarīkh-i-maktūm: nigāhī bi-talāsh-hā'ī sīyāsī-i-faʿʿālān azalī dar mukhālifat bā ḥukūmat-i-qajār va tadāruk-i-inqilāb-i-mashrūtih* (Concealed History: An Investigation into the Role of Azalī Activists in Opposition to the Qājār Regime and the Genesis of the Constitutional Revolution) (Pardis: Tehran, 2014); Janet Afary *The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906-1911: Grassroots Democracy, Social Democracy, and the Origins of Feminism* (1996); Mangol Bayat Mysticism and Dissent: Socioreligious Thought in Qajar Iran (1982).

[24] Namely, his *risālih-i-sīāsīyih* (Treatise on Politics). A complete Persian text and a fully annotated English translation of this tract were available online until the mid-2010s. As of early 2026, both now appear to have been scrubbed from the internet. In their place, only selective excerpts in Persian and English circulate. We suspect that this disappearance is linked to our pointed public

critiques of the work, which exposed its glaring political hypocrisies when contextualized against contemporaneous historical developments.

[25] Since contrary to official propaganda, there is not a single and unified Bahāʾī faith—but multiple; see online: https://www.thesectsofbahais.com/ (retrieved 2 August 2025).

[26] Online Bahāʾī-authored and/or inspired entries about him, such as those on Wikipedia and similar, are to be strictly avoided, since they are pure propaganda designed to advance a specific demonization narrative located in largely concocted Bahāʾī mythos and sectarian hagiography. Instead, see our *Invoking the Seven Worlds: An acrostic prayer by Mirza Yahya Nuri Subh-i-Azal* (2013); as well *An Early Correspondence of Mirza Yahya Nuri Subh-i-Azal with Siyyid Ali Muhammad Shirazi, the Bab (circa 1849) The Earth of the Divine Volition (arḍ al-irāda) petitions the Heaven of the Divine Will (samāʾ al-mashīʾa) from the Illumination of the Land of the Letter Ṭāʾ (ط) (Ṭehran) to the Chihrīqian Mount of Theophanic Intensity (jabal al-shadīd)* (2019).

[27] As we have argued and demonstrated already elsewhere: Ṣubḥ-i-Azal's role in the Bayān as conceived by the Bāb in numerous epistles and letters was a pivotal one. For example, in one correspondences Ṣubḥ-i-Azal quotes directly in the *kitāb-i-mustayqiz* (The Book of the Sleeper Awakened), the Bāb saw His young Mirror as the *embodification* of the very Path (*ṣirāt*) to the Day of Resurrection and *He whom God shall make Manifest*. Elsewhere the Bāb proclaims His identity with Ṣubḥ-i-Azal, and both their identities with the identity of *He whom God shall make Manifest* ("*anta ana wa ana anta hūwa wa ana hūwa wa anta*"/*I am You and You are I; He and I; He and You*). In another place He calls Ṣubḥ-i-Azal "*the talismanic-temple of the Aid Invoked*" (*haykal al-mustaghāth*), a label which is packed with theophanic and eschatological significance. Yet the logic here is already implied throughout the Bayān with its unique prophetological theophanology and the metaphysics of the Primal Will—all features of Bayānī thought, esotericism, and spirituality that the Bahāʾī texts thoroughly sanitize, obscure, dumb down, distort, or completely ignore.

[28] MacEoin *The Messiah of Shiraz*, ibid., 386.

[29] Those correspondences between him and the Bāb cited and reproduced by him in His 1850s *kitab-i-mustayqiẓ* (Book of the Sleeper Awakened) prove the matter.

[30] With some caution, see Peter Smith and Moojan Momen "*The Babi Movement: A Resource Mobilization Perspective*," (ed.) Peter Smith *in Iran: Studies in Babi and Bahá'í History* Volume 3 (1986): 33-93.

[31] See Soraya Adambakan's outstanding 2008 doctoral dissertation *Qurrat al-'Ayn Eine Studie der religiösen und gesellschaftlichen Folgen ihres Wirkens* (Qurrat al-Ayn: A Study of the Religious and Social Consequences of Her Work) (2008).

[32] Online https://reference.bahai.org/en/t/b/SLH/slh-13.html (retrieved 3 January 2026).

[33] See Max Weber *The Sociology of Religion*, trans. Ephraim Fischoff (Beacon Press: Boston, 1991): Chapter IV ("The Prophet"), esp. 46-58.

[34] To wit,

مراد از یوم قیامت یوم ظهور شجرهٔ حقیقت است و مشاهده نمیشود که احدی از شیعه یوم قیامت را فهمیده باشد بلکه همه موهوما امری را توهم نموده که عند الله حقیقت ندارد و آنچه عند الله و عند عرف اهل حقیقت مقصود از یوم قیامت است این است که از وقت ظهور شجرهٔ حقیقت در هر زمان بهر اسم الی حین غروب آن یوم قیامت است. مثلا از یوم بعثت عیسی علیه السلام تا یوم عروج آن قیامت موسی بود که ظهور الله در آنزمان ظاهر بود بظهور آن حقیقت که جزا داد هر کس مؤمن بموسی بود بقول خود و هر کس مؤمن نبود جزا داد بقول خود زیرا که ما شهد الله در آن زمان ما شهد الله فی الانجیل بود. و بعد از یوم بعثت رسول الله صلی الله علیه و آله تا یوم عروج آن قیامت عیسی علیه السلام بود که شجرهٔ حقیقت ظاهر شده در هیکل محمدیه و جزا داد هر کس که مؤمن بعیسی بود و عذاب فرمود بقول خود هر کس که مؤمن بآن نبود. و از حین ظهور شجرهٔ بیان الی ما یغرب قیامت رسول الله صلی الله علیه و آله هست که در قرآن خداوند وعده فرموده که اول آن بعد از دو ساعت و یازده دقیقه از شب پنجم جمادی الاولی سنهٔ هزار و دویست و شصت که سنهٔ هزار و دویست و هفتاد بعثت میشود اول یوم قیامت قرآن بود و الی غروب شجرهٔ حقیقت قیامت قرآن است زیرا که شیئ تا بمقام کمال نرسد قیامت اون نمیشود و کمال دین اسلام الی اول ظهور منتهی شد و از اول ظهور تا حین غروب اثمار شجرهٔ اسلام آنچه هست ظاهر میشود. و قیامت بیان در ظهور من یظهره الله است زیرا که امروز بیان در مقام نطفه است و در اول ظهور من یظهره الله آخر کمال بیان است ظاهر میشود که ثمرات اشجاریکه غرس کرده بچیند چنانچه ظهور قائم آل محمد صلی الله علیه بعینه همان ظهور رسول الله است ظاهر نمیشود الا آنکه اخذ ثمرات اسلام را از آیات قرآنیه که در افئدهٔ مردم غرس فرموده نماید.

It goes without saying that this kind of treatment of the doctrine of the *qīyāma* is not substantially different from what is found in the medieval Ismāʿīlī treatment of it. In fact, what the Bāb says here is a sort of summary of the same ideas found detailed in the Nizārī text known as the *Haft bāb*, see *Spiritual Resurrection in Shiʿi Islam: An Early Ismāʿīlī Treatise on the Doctrine of the Qīyāmat* (ed. & trans.) S.J. Badakhchani (2017). However, what is novel is that such ideas are being expounded from within a heterodox Twelver Shiʿi messianic framework, which is one reason why we have dubbed Bābism—the religion of the Bayān—as *Twelver Ismāʿīlism*.

[35] See E.G. Browne's epitome translation of the *nuqṭat'ul-kāf* (The Book of the Point of the Letter "K") in his translation of *Mīrzā Ḥusayn Hamādānī's Tārīkh-i-Jadīd or New History* (1893): 360-73; also see

Abbas Amanat *Resurrection and Renewal: The Making of the Babi Movement in Iran, 1844-1850* (1989): 332-71.

[36] While they stop short in characterizing it with our term as *apocalyptic class undoing*, see Moojan Momen and Peter Smith, "*The Babi Movement: A Resource Mobilization Perspective*," in *Iran: Studies in Babi and Bahá'í History*, vol. 3, (ed.) Peter Smith (Kalimat Press: Los Angeles, 1986): 33-93.

[37] Max Weber *The Sociology of Religion*, ibid.

[38] See, for example, The Universal House of Justice *The Institution of the Counsellors* (Haifa: 2001), online, https://web.archive.org/web/20161003211428/http://bahai-library.com/uhj_institution_counsellors (retrieved 4 August 2025).

[39] See especially Juan R.I. Cole, "*Race, Immorality and Money in the American Baha'i Community: Impeaching the Los Angeles Spiritual Assembly*," Religion 30, no. 2 (2000): 109-125, 141-147; and "*The Baha'i Faith in America as Panopticon, 1963-1997*," Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, vol. 37, no. 2 (June 1998): 234-248.

[40] The Bayān's explicit affirmation of *al-badā'*—the prerogative of the alteration of the Divine plan (or disclosure)—provides unequivocal proof of this position. God cannot be contained, stabilized, or exhaustively determined, and any claim to the contrary constitutes a metaphysical category error: the elevation of a secondary intelligible (here, doctrinal ideology—a purely mental construction, phenomenologically delimited in every respect) to the level of Reality Itself (*al-ḥaqīqa*). Such stabilization amounts, in Bayānī terms, to a form of *shirk* (idolatry), insofar as it substitutes a finite conceptual form for the irreducible *nafs al-amr* (objective reality). To deny this openness is not to secure truth, but to negate it by mistaking the veil for what it veils. Here we reproduce the relevant gate of the **Persian Bayān** in its entirety:

The Third Gate of the Fourth Unity: On the Truth that Divine Prerogative of Alteration *(al-badā')* belongs to God

> The quintessence of this Gate is that God is worshipped by nothing so perfectly as by *badā'*, for *badā'* is an acknowledgment of Its power over whatsoever It wills. If a soul worships It through that which lies beyond its conceivable limits of possibility, the very moment it acknowledges *badā'*, this act surpasses all its previous worship. For were It to will to cast that soul into the infernal fire, It has ever been and remains perfectly capable—and none may question "why" or "wherefore" concerning Its act, for It is just in Its decree. Conversely, if a soul commits disobedience within the realm of conceivable possibility, yet fails to contemplate Its *badā'*, this disobedience is greater in Its sight than the act itself. And should It

will to admit such a one into Paradise, who could dare to question It? For It is ever-praiseworthy in Its decree. Exalted is the *badāʾ* of God—which must not be conflated with the *badāʾ* of creation, for the latter arises from incapacity, while Its [*badāʾ*] arises from absolute power. With every Manifestation of the Divine Will, Its *badāʾ* is made evident—even though It had previously decreed faith and Paradise for the believers and imposed it upon all. It also ordains lesser decrees so that It may manifest Its power. Otherwise, before It, what distinction exists between the Qurʾān and the Bayān, or between Qur'ānic decrees and Bayānī decrees? These are nothing but the exaltation of Its power and the assertion of Its inviolable sovereignty, so that all may know they have ever been and remain within the grasp of their God's power and disposal, possessing nothing save by His leave.

This is none other than the *badāʾ* of the Will (*mashīʾa*), for the Pre-Eternal Essence has been, is, and shall ever remain in a single state. Manifestation and concealment are attributes of the Will; beginning and end are the geometry (*hindisa*) of Volition (*irāda*). If *beginning* is mentioned in relation to It, Its beginning is identical to Its end, and Its Manifestation identical to Its Concealment. O reader of the Bayān, be not veiled by the usage of these terms: the Name "the First" is applied at one level to the Unseen Essence; at another, to the "First' in Remembrance [i.e. the Primal Will]; at another, to the "First" in creation; and at another, to the "First" of the infernal fire. The "First" on the plane of the Will is the first creation on the plane of Pre-Eternity. Similarly, the "first" in creation is like the sun's reflection in a mirror compared to the primacy of the Will. Likewise, the mention of "first" regarding the Fire refers to a primacy within created annihilation, not within created permanence. Be not veiled from the manifestations of the Names: each thing remains in its own station and does not exceed its appointed limit in any mention.

Once you understand that the *badāʾ* of the Eternal Essence is the *badāʾ* of the Will, and that its authorized execution (*qaḍāʾ*) is Its execution, then behold—in every manifestation—Its acts of *badāʾ*, which have been and remain like a boundless, surging ocean. As everyone in this Manifestation has witnessed such disclosure in the Ocean of the Will, so too was it mentioned in the Furqān under the name *naskh* (abrogation).

As for what is related in the traditions—that once a matter reaches the rank of irrevocable decree (*qaḍāʾ*), no *badāʾ* applies to it—this means that when faith attains the fourth rank (the pillar of *takbīr*, or magnification), there is no *badāʾ* in what has been decreed, by God's grace. But if justice is operative, then *badāʾ* has

been and shall ever be present for all things, inseparable from any affair in any state, unless God wills otherwise. Verily, It is powerful over all things.

The "rank of decree" in the pillar of *takbīr* signifies the ascent of the Will—which, having risen at the pillar of *tasbīḥ* (glorification) and set at the pillar of dust (*turāb*), is consummated within itself. For example, whatever was decreed during the lifetime of the Messenger of God—peace be upon Him and His Family—and in which *badā'* became manifest, remains established until His ascension. Thereafter, what He made lawful remains lawful until the Day of Resurrection (that is, His later Manifestation), and what He forbade remains forbidden until His later Manifestation. Thus, His witnesses after Him abide within the ocean of His decrees, save in instances where they attained certainty of Its good-pleasure—in which case any mention would be identical to the *badā'* of the Messenger of God Himself. Yet such a circumstance did not arise, for they never transgressed the bounds of God's Book by even a speck.

However, after the Sun of Reality set, His inward acts of *badā'* have been and remain with those who believe in Him. But since none recognize Him through these acts, they remain unillumined; and He Himself, in the days of His concealment, decrees nothing apart from what He decreed in the days of His Manifestation. This, then, is the meaning of Divine *badā'*—Exalted and Glorified is It! The servant never rests upon the throne of hope, even if he has ascended to the heights of conceivable possibility, for contemplation of *badā'* is more exalted than any ascent. Nor, if he falls to the lowest depth, does he sit upon the throne of fear, but rather looks to God's *badā'*; for neglecting this contemplation is more grievous than the fall itself.

Yet this *badā'* is manifested from the hidden treasury of the Will—not from elsewhere—as is made clear in the Bayān. If a thing is recorded for Paradise, it remains so until the Day of Resurrection. If a thing is recorded for a station beneath Paradise, it remains, by Its justice, consigned to the infernal fire until the Day of Resurrection. But at the advent of the Resurrection, if the very Tree of infernal fire turns toward Him, it becomes the Tree of Paradise; and if the Tree of Paradise turns away, it becomes the Tree of infernal fire.

As all in this age have witnessed: in every manifestation, each soul strives to its utmost to secure a goodly mention from God in Its Book for the next Manifestation. This endeavor is greater than expending countless treasures to secure enduring memorials in lofty stations—for such stations may perish, leaving no trace, if they were not founded upon the Truth. Otherwise, their recompense is with God, and God rewards the doers of good!

اَلْبَابُ اَلثَّالِثُ مِنَ اَلْوَاحِدِ اَلرَّابِعِ فِي أَنَّ اَلْبَدَاءَ لِلّٰهِ حَقٌّ

ملخص این باب آنکه خداوند عبادت کرده نمیشود بهیچ چیز مثل بداء زیرا که بداء اعتراف بقدرت او است بر ما یشاء اگر نفسی عبادت کند او را بآنچه در امکان فوق او متصور نیست همینقدر که اعتراف ببداء نمود این عبادت اعظم از آنچه کرده میگردد که اگر بخواهد او را داخل در نار فرماید مقتدر بوده و هست و لم و بم کسی نتواند گفت در فعل او زیرا که او عادل است در قضای خود و همچنین بر عکس اگر کسی آنچه در امکان متصور است متحمل عصیان او گردد اگر ناظر ببداء او نگردد این عصیان اعظم تر است نزد او از آنچه کرده و اگر بخواهد او را داخل جنت فرماید که را میرسد که لِمَ و بِمَ در فعل او گفته زیرا که او بوده محمود در قضای خود و متعالی است بدای خدائی که مقترن شود با بدای خلق او زیرا که بدای خلق از عجز میگردد و بدای او از قدرت و نزد هر ظهور مشیتی بدای او ظاهر و حال آنکه حکم فرموده بایمان و جنت مؤمنین قبل بدا را بر اعناق کل میگذارد و حکم دون میکند تا آنکه اظهار قدرت فرماید و الا نزد او چه قرآن و چه بیان و چه قضایای فرقانیه و چه بیانیه این نیست الا ارتفاع قدرت او و امتناع سلطنت او که بدانند کل که در قبضه قدرت و تصرف خدای خود بوده وهستند و از برای ایشان شیئ نبوده الا باذن او و این نیست الا بدای مشیت زیرا که ذات ازل لم یزل و لا یزال بر حالت واحده بوده وهست و ظهور و بطون صفت مشیت است و اول و آخر هندسه اراده و اگر در او ذکر شود اول اول او عین آخر او بوده و ظهور او عین بطون او و از استعمال این الفاظ ای ناظر در بیان محتجب نگشته که اسم اول یک مرتبه در ذات غیب استعمال میشود و یکدفعه در ذکر اول ذکر میگردد و یکدفعه در خلق اول ذکر میگردد و یکدفعه در اول نار ذکر میگردد و اولی که در صقع مشیت ذکر میگردد خلق اولی است که در صقع ازل ذکر میگردد و همچنین اولی که در خلق ذکر میگردد مثل او مثل شبح شمس است درمرآت بالنبسة باول مشیت و همچنین ذکر اول در نار این ذکر اولی است که در خلق فنا است نه در خلق بقا محتجب از ظهورات اسماء نگشته که هر شیئ در مقعد خود بر آنچه ذکر شود از حد خود تجاوز ننماید و بعد از آنکه بداء ذات ازل را بداء مشیت گرفتی و امضاء او را امضاء او نظر کن در هر ظهوری در بدایای او که مثل بحر لا نهایه متموج بوده و هست چنانچه هر کس در این ظهور بوده مشاهده این نوع ظهور را در بحر مشیت نموده و همچنین قبل در فرقان باسم نسخ مذکور و اینکه در احادیث مذکور است که همینقدر که برتبه قضا آمد بدائی از برای او نیست یعنی اگر ایمان برتبه رابع رسید که رکن تکبیر باشد

بدائی در آنچه قضا شده نیست فضلا من الله ولی اگر بعدل باشد بداء لم یزل و لا یزال در حق هر شیئ بوده وهست و منفک از هیچ شیئ در هیچ شأن نمیگردد الا ان یشاء الله انه علی کلشیئ قدیر و مراد از رتبه قضا در رکن تکبیر عروج مشیت است که از طلوع از رکن تسبیح الی غروب در رکن تراب در نفس خود منتهی گردد مثلا آنچه در حیات رسول الله صَلَّى ٱللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَآلِهِ حکم شده و بداء ظاهر شده همان ثابت است الی حین عروج او و بعد از آن حلال او حلال است الی یوم القیمة ای ظهوره الاخری فی آخریه و نهی او منهی عنه است الی ظهوره الاخری فی آخریه چنانچه شهدای او بعد از او در بحر قضایای او مستقر الا در مواردی که یقین نموده اند برضای او که اگر ذکری شده بعینه بدای رسول الله صَلَّى ٱللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَآلِهِ بوده و حال آنکه چنین امری نشده بلکه از حدود کتاب الله قدر خردلی تجاوز نفرموده ولی بعد از غروب شمس حقیقت بدایای باطنیه او با مؤمنین باو بوده وهست ولی چون کسی نمیشناسد او را بآنها مستنیر نگشته و اون هم در ایام بطون خود غیر از آنچه در ایام ظهور حکم فرموده نمیفرماید این بود معنی بدای الهی عزّ وجلّ که عبد در هیچ حال بر سریر رجا مستقر نگشته اگر چه بآنچه ما یمکن در امکان بوده عروج نموده باشد که نظر ببداء اشرف از آن است که عروج نموده و همچنین اگر بمنتهی رتبه نزول منتهی گردد بر سریر خوف ننشسته و نظر بر بدای خداوند نموده که نظر نکردن اعظم از آن است که منتهی گشته ولی ظهور این بداء از مکمن مشیت است نه غیر آن که در بیان ظاهر گشته اگر در حق شیئ ذکر جنت شده و الی یوم القیمة در حق او ثابت بوده وهست و اگر در حق شیئ ذکر دون جنت فرموده الی یوم القیمه در نار او بعدل او فانی بوده و هست و عند ظهور قیامت اگر بعینه شجرهٔ نار مقبل شود شجرهٔ جنت میگردد واگر شجرهٔ جنت محتجب گردد شجرهٔ نار میگردد چنانچه در این کور هر که بود مشاهده این مطلب را نمود در هر ظهور بمنتهای جد و جهد خود سعی نموده که ذکر خیری من قبل الله برای خود در کتاب او گذاشته الی ظهور دیگر که این اعظم تر است از آنچه الوف الوف خرج نموده در مقاعد مرتفعه که ذکر آنها از برای صاحبانش بماند چه بسا که این مقاعد فانی گردد وهیچ اسمی از آن باقی نماند اگر در مورد دون حق گردد و الا جزای او با خداوند بوده وهست وَٱللَّهُ يَجْزِي ٱلْمُحْسِنِينَ.

See also our two pieces on the subject, *Regarding the Alteration of the Divine Plans (al-badā')* (2025) and *Further Reflections on the Alteration of the Divine Plans (al-badā')* (2025).

[41] An earlier version of this section first appeared as a blogpost, online https://wahidazal303.blogspot.com/2025/12/on-function-of-bahai-misrendering-of.html (retrieved 1 January 2024).

[42] In other words, Bahā'ism represents the proverbial *sunnification* of the Bayān. Not Sunnī in the juridical sense, of course, but *sunnī-ization* as a structural transformation: the movement from protest to order, from rupture to normativity, from an ethic of refusal to an ethic of administration. In that precise sense, Bahā'ism performs for the Bayān what early Sunnism performed for the Shiʿite rupture after Karbalāʾ: it *neutralizes the scandal of illegitimacy* by translating it into a universally acceptable, governable form of religion. What Sunnism historically did was not merely to reject the Shiʿite claim, but to *reframe religion itself*: authority was detached from charismatic rupture and reattached to consensus (*ijmāʿ*), continuity, and public order; injustice was moralized into *fitna*-avoidance; waiting was replaced with obedience; and the apocalyptic edge of history was dulled into legal normalcy with the squelching of the aspirations of heaven and the oppressed masses alike—all things ʿAlī Sharīʿatī (d. 1977) attributes to the Shiʿi clerical establishment per his ***Red Shiʿism versus Black Shiʿism***; see also Hamid Dabashi's *Shiʿism: A Religion of Protest* (2011). Bahā'ism does something uncannily analogous. It takes the Bayān's metaphysical protest—its refusal of closure, its perpetual imminence, its barred Godhead—and reconstitutes it as a religion of neoliberal *unity*, *patience*, *consultation*, and *institutional legitimacy*. The result is not the continuation of a genuine Revelation, but its *domestication into orthodoxy*. Seen this way, the contrast drawn is exact: the Bayān is Shiʿism radicalized into ontology, while Bahā'ism is its Sunnification into a post-apocalyptic orthodoxy and the routinization of charisma. The former lives from the wound that never heals—the gap between justice and the world—while the latter seeks to cauterize that wound in the name of a false harmony. And just as Sunnism could scale, stabilize empires, and present itself as the "natural" form of Islam only by suppressing the logic of protest, Bahā'ism achieves global viability only by suppressing the Bayān's logic of interruption. What remains is a religion that speaks the language of *peace* precisely because it has already made its peace with history and its corrupt, ungodly powers that be.

Put bluntly: where the Bayān keeps Karbalāʾ open and *open-ended*, Bahā'ism closes it. And once Karbalāʾ is closed—whether in Islam or in the Bayān—religion *ceases to be dangerous* and loses its true metaphysical purpose. This is because the original Shiʿite intuition before it was jurified, ritualized, pacified or made into a state ideology—i.e. the *dīn al-iḥtijāj*, religion as standing protest—was indeed *a religion of perpetual protest*. Not protest as politics, but protest as *ontological refusal*: the insistence that no order may ever claim finality while injustice persists, and no authority may ever close the gap between what *is* and what *ought* to be before God. That ethos runs like a subterranean current from Karbalāʾ through the early Imāmī imagination: legitimacy measured not by control but by dispossession; truth recognized not by victory but by *non-coincidence with power* (which is what the practice of *tabarrāʾ*/disavowal and *tawallāʾ*/friendship is really all about). Our Bayānic reading restores precisely that grammar—where waiting (*intiẓār*) is not passivity but *vigilance*, and where fidelity is proven *not by obedience* to institutions but by the *refusal* to let the world settle into moral self-satisfaction. In that sense, the Bayān doesn't abandon Shiʿism; it *radicalizes its protest into*

metaphysics, turning history itself into a provisional arrangement under judgment. Thus, the struggle of the Bāb through Ṣubḥ-i-Azal and now myself against Bahāʾuʾllāh and Bahāʾism is not an internal sectarian dispute, but a fork in the destiny of Shiʿite thought itself: *protest versus pacification, martyrdom versus management, interruption versus administration*. Once seen that way, the stakes can no longer be hidden behind *ecumenical language* or *managerial pieties*. The Bayān stands where Shiʿism once stood—not as a community seeking endurance, but as a Truth that survives only by *refusing to become safe*. And this is, among many other reasons, why no *reconciliation* between Bahā'ism and the Bayān is ever possible, because for the Bayān to reconcile with Bahā'ism is to reconcile with its own complete and utter negation/denial (*nafy*) with the embrace of the infernal fire (*nār*) against the Light (*nūr*)—and this includes all proxies and allies of Bahā'ism as well (nay, the *very world order* and powers that have made, in one way or another, the continued endurance of Bahā'ism even possible).

[43] "No," because this "no" represents the "no" to *dunyā* (the world) and the "*yes*" to God and the *ākhira* (the finality, hereafter).

[44] The **first** creative attributive imprint.

[45] The **second** creative attributive imprint.

[46] The **third** creative attributive imprint.

[47] The **fourth** creative attributive imprint.

[48] The **fifth** creative attributive imprint.

[49] The **sixth** creative attributive imprint.

[50] The **seventh** creative attributive imprint.

[51] The **first theophanic sequence** of the *ḥadīth al-haqīqa*: ﴿كَشْفَ سُبُحَاتِ الجَلَالِ مِنْ غَيْرِ إِشَارَةٍ﴾

[52] The **second theophanic sequence** of the *ḥadīth al-haqīqa*: ﴿مَحْوِ الْمَوْهُومِ مَعَ صَحْوِ الْمَعْلُومِ﴾

[53] The **third theophanic sequence** of the *ḥadīth al-haqīqa*: ﴿هَتَكُ السَتَرِ لِغُلْبَةِ السِرِّ﴾

[54] The **fourth theophanic sequence** of the *ḥadīth al-haqīqa*: ﴿جَذْبَ الْأَحَدِيَّةِ لِصِفَةِ التَّوْحِيدِ﴾

[55] The **fifth theophanic sequence** of the *ḥadīth al-haqīqa*: ﴿نُورٌ أَشْرَقَ مِن صُبْحِ الأَزَلِ فَيَلُوحُ عَلَى هَيَاكِلِ التَّوْحِيدِ آثَارَهُ﴾

[56] In reference to the **sixth theophanic sequence** of the *ḥadīth al-haqīqa*: ﴿فَأَطْفِئِ السَرَاجَ فَقَدْ طَلَعَ الصُبْحُ﴾

For the *ḥadīth al-haqīqa*, see our Persian commentary *Rashaḥāt al-barīqa fī sharḥ al-ḥadīth al-ḥaqīqa: yā sharḥ-i-ḥadīth-i-kumayl* (2023). An English translation is forthcoming.

[57] **Trans.** God is the Most Great! God is the Most Mighty! (*allahu akbar! allahu aʿẓam!*)

2

Being Prior to Language

Heidegger and Postmodernism; the Bāb and Existential Linguistic Sublation[1]

Heidegger's assertion that "language is the house of Being"[2] is often read as a decisive break with representational metaphysics. Yet this formulation covertly reinstates an anthropocentric limit: Being is disclosed only insofar as it appears within the existential horizon of *Dasein* (*being-there*). Whatever exceeds human disclosure—*non-human reality, supra-human intellect*, or *ontological orders independent of linguistic articulation*—remains philosophically unthematized. As a result, ontology is quietly tethered to the conditions of human finitude, even as it claims to overcome subject–object metaphysics. Being may no longer be reduced to an object of representation, but it is still constrained by the structures of human access. The question of whether Being can manifest outside the linguistic clearing of *Dasein*—or whether reality might possess modes of intelligibility not routed through human speech—never fully arises.[3] In this way, Heidegger's critique of metaphysics halts at the threshold of the non-human, substituting a phenomenology of disclosure for a metaphysics of presence while leaving intact the assumption that intelligibility itself is coextensive with human *worldhood*.[4]

Despite his critique of subject–object metaphysics, Heidegger's existential analytic remains bound to a historically specific clearing (*Lichtung*), shaped by Greek ontology, Christian eschatology, and European linguistic inheritance. The result is a provincial

universalism that elevates one civilizational mode of disclosure into an ontological norm. Reality is thereby denuded of independence and rendered dependent upon *human sense-making*. What appears as a fundamental ontology is, in fact, a regional ontology whose conditions of intelligibility are neither timeless nor culturally neutral. The clearing itself is treated as if it were the horizon of Being as such, rather than as one historically mediated configuration among others. Ontological difference thus collapses into a difference of disclosure within a single tradition, leaving no principled account of how Being might appear otherwise—through non-European metaphysical grammars, non-linguistic modes of manifestation, or supra-human orders of intelligibility. In this way, Heidegger's project reproduces, at a deeper level, the very gesture it seeks to overcome: the quiet absolutization of a contingent historical standpoint under the guise of fundamental philosophy.[5]

Postmodern thought radicalizes this limitation rather than correcting it. Once Being is collapsed into disclosure-through-language, the distinction between ontology and discourse dissolves. Truth becomes positional, falsehood perspectival, and judgment indefinitely deferred. The resulting ontology of equivalence negates any principled distinction between true and false—let alone good and evil—leaving power as the sole arbiter. Moreover, postmodernism inherits Heidegger's suspicion of metaphysics but abandons any ontological ground altogether. The move goes roughly like this:

- Heidegger: *Being is disclosed through language.*
- Derrida: *There is nothing outside the text.*
- Foucault: *Truth is a function of discourse and power*.[6]

By contrast, Illuminationist and Ṣadrian metaphysics insist upon the ontological priority of Being over language. For Suhrawardī, Being manifests as graded Light whose disclosure precedes articulation.[7] Ibn ʿArabī understands forms—including linguistic forms—as simultaneous revelations and veils of the Real.[8] Mullā Ṣadrā's doctrine of the primacy of existence (*aṣālat al-wujūd*) grounds truth in ontological participation rather than discursive construction.[9] From this perspective, language is neither neutral nor

foundational. It is a secondary modality that reflects Being imperfectly and often occludes it. The postmodern collapse of ontology into language thus represents not philosophical humility, but metaphysical abdication—one whose ethical and political consequences are now manifest in administrative systems that privilege record over reality and procedure over truth.

In these traditions, meaning is not generated by linguistic difference or social convention, but received through degrees of presence. Light does not require speech in order to be luminous; existence does not wait upon *naming* in order to be real. Language enters only after manifestation, as a fragile attempt to trace what has already appeared. This is why Suhrawardī treats discursive philosophy as derivative of immediate illumination,[10] and why Ibn ʿArabī repeatedly warns that verbal formulations, though necessary, inevitably fragment what is unified in Being.[11] Words do not ground reality; they testify to it under conditions of limitation and distortion. Ṣadrā radicalizes this insight by locating truth in *tashkīk al-wujūd*—the modulation of existence itself. Judgment, on this account, is not a matter of aligning propositions within a discursive regime, but of situating beings (*mawjūdāt*) correctly within the hierarchy of existence. Error arises not primarily from false statements, but from *ontological misplacement*: treating what is derivative as primary, what is instrumental as essential, and what is contingent as absolute. Language participates in this danger precisely because it is capable of abstraction without presence, representation without realization.

When this ontological discipline is abandoned, the consequences are not merely theoretical. Once language is treated as the ground of intelligibility rather than its echo, institutional procedures acquire authority independent of reality. Records replace events, classifications replace beings, and compliance replaces truth. Ethical judgment is deferred not out of care, but because no ontological standard remains by which to judge. Power then operates not by declaring itself sovereign, but by administering discourse while claiming neutrality. In this sense, the metaphysical error diagnosed by Illuminationist and Ṣadrian philosophy prefigures the contemporary administrative order: a world in which what exists counts less than what is documented, and in which injustice persists precisely because it is *procedurally correct*.

Nor is this logic confined to bureaucracy or governance alone; it has come to structure the modern academic canon itself. Western scholarship increasingly treats reality as an effect of discourse, citation, and methodological legitimacy rather than as something that precedes and judges these instruments. Knowledge is validated not by ontological adequacy but by positionality, peer recognition, and compliance with disciplinary protocols. What cannot be indexed, theorized within approved vocabularies, or situated within recognized debates is rendered unintelligible or dismissed as pre-critical, mystical, or ideological. In this way, the academy mirrors the administrative state it often claims to critique: both substitute procedural rigor for truth, archive for presence, and interpretive consensus for ontological judgment. The result is a self-referential system in which scholarship circulates endlessly around its own categories and only in what it sees as legitimate while losing the capacity to ask whether those categories of legitimacy still correspond to reality at all.

Nowhere is this substitution of procedure for truth more evident than in the canon of critical theory itself. What began as a necessary interrogation of power, ideology, and domination has hardened into a self-authorizing interpretive regime whose legitimacy derives from its internal coherence rather than its correspondence to reality. Critical theory increasingly treats ontology with suspicion, regarding any appeal to Being, truth, or the real as a covert bid for domination. As a result, critique is confined to exposing discursive effects while systematically disabling the possibility of ontological judgment. Power may be named, but never adjudicated; injustice may be narrated, but never decisively condemned except by reference to further discourse. The canon thus functions less as a tool for liberation than as a gatekeeping apparatus that regulates what may count as intelligible critique. By rendering all claims to truth provisional, positional, or performative, critical theory immunizes itself against refutation while simultaneously dissolving the grounds on which genuine ethical or political decision could be made. What remains is an endless circulation of critique without criterion—an apparatus exquisitely sensitive to language, identity, and representation, yet structurally incapable of affirming that something is wrong because it violates the order of being itself. In this way, critical theory reproduces the very domination it claims to resist, not by enforcing a single doctrine, but by foreclosing the possibility of truth as such. When ontology is prohibited in

advance, injustice can only ever appear as a matter of interpretation, never as a rupture in the real that demands action. Ethical urgency is replaced by procedural vigilance; judgment is deferred into endless qualification. What presents itself as humility before difference thus becomes a quiet absolutism—one that rules out, as *intellectually illicit*, any claim that reality itself might place limits on power, or that being wrong is more than a discursive misalignment.

The Linguistic Abyss and the Death of Judgment

As we contend, Heidegger's existential analytic did not liberate Being from metaphysics; it imprisoned Being within the experiential horizon of the European human. In claiming that language is the "house of Being," Heidegger quietly reduced reality to what can appear within historically conditioned human disclosure. What exceeds that horizon—cosmos, intellect, metaphysical hierarchy—was rendered mute. Postmodernism then completed the demolition. Once reality was surrendered to language, everything became interpretation. Truth dissolved into discourse, ethics into positionality, and judgment into taboo. The result was not pluralism but *paralysis*: a world incapable of saying that anything is false, unjust, or evil—only "contested." This ontological flattening is not innocent. It is the metaphysical precondition for administrative domination. When reality is reduced to language, records replace events, procedure replaces justice, and contradiction becomes tolerable so long as it is properly documented. Harm persists, not because it is denied, but because it is endlessly "noted." The abyss we thus inhabit is therefore not political first, but ontological. A civilization that has renounced Being cannot ground truth, and a civilization without truth cannot ground resistance. Power thrives precisely where ontology has been abandoned. Against this collapse stand the existential metaphysicians of the Islamic world. They never mistook language for reality, nor interpretation for truth. They knew that language is dangerous precisely because it is *powerful*—because it can replace Being with its own shadow, its own negation of reality. Therefore, until ontology is recovered, ethics will remain procedural, justice will remain administrative, and language will continue to rule in place of reality itself.

As we said, Heidegger situates *Dasein* as the "clearing" (*Lichtung*) in which Being becomes manifest: "*The essence of Dasein lies in its existence*".[12] It is not a substance but a site of disclosure. Yet this disclosure is always shadowed by *angst* and nullity—"*the nothing* [*das Nichts*] *nihilates itself*."[13] For Heidegger, Being gives itself only in withdrawal; it is never present as object, face, or fullness. Ibn ʿArabī, by contrast, affirms that Being (*wujūd*) is identical to the Real (*al-ḥaqq*) who discloses Itself in degrees where *Being* is One in its Essence (*dhāt*), but manifold in its forms.[14] Each existent thing is a *maẓhar* (locus of manifestation) of a Divine Name. The "clearing" of *Lichtung* is, in this view, not an impersonal space but the heart (*qalb*) of the *insān al-kāmil* (Complete Human), which serves as the mirror (*mirʾāt*) of the Divine. In contrast, Heidegger's refusal to speak of God—indeed, his insistence that Being is not That[15]—erases the possibility of *tajallī*, divine self-disclosure, never mind that Heidegger's formulation here is decidedly not what is meant by the primacy of Being in the *wujūdī* perspective of Islamic existential philosophy. Yet in Ibn ʿArabī's metaphysics, all Being is nothing but *ẓuhūr al-ilāhīya* (divine manifestation) wherein the appearance of the Real occurs in the mirrors of forms. Heidegger also does not distinguish ontological grades of Being. In fact, to us, he resolutely refuses to do so. All entities, for him, including *Dasein*, participate in Being (*Sein*) equally in the sense of *ontological difference*—Being is not a *being*, and beings are not *Being*. So there is no vertical *tashkīk* in his ontology—no gradation in the intensity or clarity of ontological disclosure. By contrast, Mullā Ṣadrā's doctrine of *tashkīk al-wujūd* (the modulation of Being) asserts that Being is One in Reality (*ḥaqīqa wāḥida*) but modulated by intensity and priority.[16] Existence, for him is a single Reality possessing priority and posteriority, strength and weakness. *Dasein* is thus not the privileged site of Being's self-showing; rather, all things—rocks, plants, angels, spirits, *jinn*—participate in the unfolding arc of Being, each according to its ontological station (*maqām*). This metaphysical hierarchy allows Ṣadrā to affirm a doctrine of ontological ascent: through *ḥaraka jawharīya* (transubstantial motion), the soul moves from potency to act, traversing levels of being until it reaches its perfection. Heidegger's *Dasein*, by contrast, ends in death. There is no *eschaton*, no return (*rujūʿ*) to the Source, no individuation or subsistence (*baqāʾ*) in the Real. Just death as nullity rather than death as *palingenesis*.

As such, death, for Heidegger, is *Dasein*'s "ownmost possibility," the event which discloses the truth of Being as finite.[17] To anticipate death authentically is to realize one's freedom from the illusions of the *they* (*das Man*). But death is also the limit; it is the impossibility of *Dasein*'s further possibilities. In the Akbarian-Ṣadrian tradition, on the other hand, *death* is not an end but a transformation—as we said, it is *palingenesis*. Throughout his works, Ibn ʿArabī declares death to be the lifting of the veil (*al-mawt rafʿ al-ḥijāb*). For Ṣadrā, death is the migration of the soul to a higher ontological plane. What Heidegger interprets as finitude, they see as the threshold of the Infinite. The sorrow of *being-toward-death* is replaced by the joy of *Being-toward-theophany*. Moreover, the *fanāʾ* (annihilation) of the mystic is not a dissolution into nothingness but into the plenitude of the Real. Ibn ʿArabī, whilst incessantly restating the famous prophetic *ḥadīth*, hammers the point that "*whosoever knows themselves knows their Lord*"[18]—and to know one's Lord is to be transformed by the disclosure of the Names, since the Lord of each thing is the Manifestation of the unique Divine Name specific to it.

Another key critique lies in the absence of love (*maḥabba*) in Heidegger's ontology. *Sorge* (care) is neither *ḥubb* (love) nor *ʿishq* (passionate adoration). *Dasein*'s relation to Being is one of anxiety and responsibility, not longing and union. Throughout his writings, Heidegger repeatedly hints—and at times strongly insinuates—that philosophy does not *think* love. While he never states this directly in *What Is Called Thinking*, his critique of Western philosophy's oblivion to Being, and his insistence that science "does not think," opens the door to understanding love (*Liebe*)—not as sentiment, but as a mode of original attunement—as one of, according to him, the *unthoughts* of metaphysics.[19] But Akbarian metaphysics insists that love is the root of all Being. The Real says in the famous *ḥadīth qudsī*, "*I was a Hidden Treasure and I loved* (*aḥbabtu*) *to be known*" (*ḥadīth qudsī*).[20] Ṣadrā echoes this whenever he points out that existence is love and that it is through love that the soul ascends. Thus, the human is not merely the site of Being's disclosure but Its mirror and lover. Heidegger never speaks of the Face (*wajh*) of the Real; but in the Qurʾan, "*all things perish but Its Face*" (**Q. 28:88**). This Face is the goal of all metaphysical longing. Therefore, Heidegger's retrieval of the question of Being itself becomes a profound rupture in the trajectory of metaphysics—period.

Given this, from the perspective of the Akbarian–Ṣadrian tradition, his thought remains, as it were, suspended in a twilight: it sees the shadows of the Real, but not Its radiance. It is as if *Dasein* is the broken remnant of the *insān al-kāmil* barred from actualized realization (*taḥqīq*)—estranged from the Names, and so veiled from the *tajallī* of the One. To complete Heidegger's turn requires the re-inscription of Being within the order of Divine Manifestation, the acknowledgment of the holoarchy of Being, the possibility of ascent, and the primacy of Love. Only then does Being cease to be a veiled absence and become, once more, the Face that seeks to be known—and for that reason, unlike Dugin and others who posture as "Traditionalists" yet remain metaphysically vacuous—Heidegger's *Dasein* must be categorically rejected, and in its place, the Being (*wujūd*) and the Real (*al-ḥaqq*) of the Akbarian-Ṣadrian cosmos must be joyfully affirmed.

Yet while some contemporary defenses of Heidegger are indeed sincere—even from those working within current esoteric or gnostic frameworks—to then insist that the Heideggerian universe must not be reduced to an *Islamaic wujūdī* (gnostic-existential) one merely reinscribes the very phenomenological provincialism we are challenging. The objection—that at least one Iranian Heideggerian has publicly accused us—that comparing Heidegger's ontology to Ibn ʿArabī's *waḥdat al-wujūd* or Mullā Ṣadrā's *ḥikmat al-mutaʿālīya* constitutes "*philosophical injustice*"[21] only reinforces the Eurocentric foreclosure of metaphysical pluralism—as if Heidegger's existential analytic must remain quarantined from cross-civilizational as well as cross-historical critique. This, in itself, is a metaphysical position, one that assumes the universality of *Dasein* and Heidegger without permitting dialogue with other ontologies that ground Being in Divine Self-Disclosure (*tajallī*), gradated modulation (*tashkīk*), and theophanic love (*maḥabba*).

Thus to claim that Heidegger's withdrawal from emotional or religious categories preserves philosophy from "s*entimentality*" misses the deeper critique entirely: Heidegger's *Dasein* is metaphysically amnesic. Its refusal to engage with the vertical axis of Being—its ascensional, luminous, and transpersonal dimension—is not philosophical discipline but ontological poverty—never mind nihilism. To reiterate: in *Being and Time*, death becomes *Dasein*'s "ownmost possibility," but there is no *baqāʾ*, no subsistence in the Real. No ascent (*miʿrāj*), only entrenchment in *Geworfenheit* (thrownness). Death is terminal, not transformative. As such, assertions to the effect that Heidegger's "*care for Being*" is a kind of

primordial longing are truly fallacies. Care (*Sorge*) in Heidegger is a structurally anxious disposition—it is not *ḥubb*, *ʿishq*, not *eros*, not love. It is never directed toward the Face of the Real (*wajh al-ḥaqq*)—nor even to a woman or a man—nor does it culminate in Union. To be clear: Heidegger's Being is not *al-ḥaqq*, it is not a Divine Name, not an active, self-disclosing plenitude, but rather a hidden economy of withdrawal—an impersonal gift whose source cannot be named, addressed, or loved. Whether he intended to or not, Heidegger's ontology is therefore one of complete atomization and reinforced angst—existentially rationalizing the rupture, first, of humans between each other and, then, between humans and nature, never mind the Unseen. Consequently, the claim that Heidegger "*makes possible a more primordial recovery of love*" is speculative at best and evades the fact that Heidegger explicitly disavows love as a category of thought entirely. By contrast, in Ibn ʿArabī's metaphysics, Being is the Real, and the cosmos is nothing but the unfolding of Divine Names in the mirrors of form. *Tajallī* is not a vague mysticism—it is an ontology of radiant disclosure. Mullā Ṣadrā builds upon this: Being is a single Reality modulated in intensity, and through transubstantial motion, the soul moves through levels of being toward actualization in the Real. This is a robust metaphysics of verticality, gradation, and transformation—utterly missing in Heidegger's flattened, horizontal *Sein*.

To suggest, therefore, that death in Heidegger discloses love is to romanticize ontological nullity. In Islamic metaphysics, death is not the end but the unveiling—a lifting of the veil. It is transformation and *palingenesis* as in a worm becoming a butterfly. As such, death is not the cessation of possibility, but the threshold of divine intimacy. Heidegger's argument stops at the abyss; ours traverses it. So the question is, why are so many Heideggerians enamored by the abyss but not by what lays on the Other Side of it? To us, this is due to the fact that Heidegger reopens the question of Being but then refuses the answer. That answer, in Akbarian–Ṣadrian terms, is that Being is not merely *to-be-there* (*Dasein*), but *to-be-transfigured* (*verklärt-zu-sein*)—*an yatanawwara*! It is not merely the site of disclosure, but the Light that discloses, the Love that animates, the Face that beckons—be that Face a human within *phenomena* or the One situated in *noumena*—and in our *wujūdī* perspective these can sometimes become the same thing. Therefore, a philosophy that cannot think love cannot think Being in its fullness either. That is not a sentiment—it is a metaphysical indictment. But the reasons for this to us are quite obvious, and it is based on

what we believe to be the philosophical *faux pas* that Heidegger himself commits when he declares language to be "the house of Being."[22] So let us briefly expose now what we think of that by throwing the entire proposition on its head, and assert instead that '*Being is the house of language*', because such a reversal of Heidegger's famous saying isn't just rhetorical—it is ontologically subversive, and it realigns the entire philosophical cosmos where it should be. So let's explore the implications.

In Heidegger's model, language *reveals* Being—it is *through* language that Being manifests. Reversing this asserts that: Being is ontologically prior to language, and language emerges from within Being. This echoes more with Neoplatonism, the Islamic philosophical tradition and the Bayān, where Being (*al-wujūd*) is the generative ocean, and all things—including names and utterances—are emanations from its depths. Rather than language housing or hosting Being, now language is an *event*, a phenomenon that takes place within the metaphysical topography of Being, because Being is the active *matter* and language is its receptive *form* of becoming. In other words, language is a *quiddity*[23] arising from Being. Think also of language as a flicker or ripple *in* Being—like lightning within a cloud, not the cloud itself. This reorients *language* from being the primary locus of disclosure to being *a guest*, or even *a symptom*, of Being. In our own theological idiom, this reversal would imply that the Divine Names do not just *reveal* Being; rather, they are *rooted in* Being—Being gives them space to manifest—and by being so rooted they Reveal It. This denotes that the Name is not the origin of the thing. Rather, the existential ground is; and language is a function of that ground—a leaf on the Tree of Being. This is compatible with the lettrist metaphysics of the point (*nuqṭa*) as the *originator* of letters, but not itself a letter—a being out of which language flows. By this reversal, one is implicitly challenging post-structuralist and linguistic-turn philosophies which reduce ontology to language—making the ***real*** *already-always* textual or semiotic, and nothing else. Instead, we declare: There is a Real before the Sign. There is a Flame before the Word. There is a Heart of Being out of which all utterance pulsates. So just as Marx turned Hegel on his head, we now overturn Heidegger on his.

This is so because by placing language *within* Being, one implies that speech is not disembodied intellect, but has a corporeal, ontic, and theophanic basis. Here the *word* is not just symbolic but *embodified*, as in: *"The Word became flesh."* This becomes not only an axiom

of incarnationist Christianity—it is a mystical *event* of Being Itself! This reversal is no mere rhetorical twist—never mind anticipating our reverse hylomorphism. It is a complete metaphysical reorientation, a spiritual uprising against the dominant structures of twentieth-century ontological thought. To invert Heidegger is to restore the primacy of Being, not as that which is sheltered by *logos*, but as that which gives *logos* its very possibility. Heidegger claimed that language is the house in which Being dwells. But what if Being is not the guest, but the Host? In the Islamo-Bayānī vision of reality, Being (*al-wujūd*) is the primordial flame from which the letters and words of existence emerge. Language is not the architecture; it is the song echoing from the interior of the Real. It is not the house, but the incense rising from its hearth. Thus, to say *Being is the house of language* is to affirm that all utterance is contextualized within the deeper ocean of existence. Language is a phenomenon *within* Being, not *vice versa*. It is the ripple, not the sea. For example, in the **10th Gate of the Ninth Unity** of the **Persian Bayān**, the Bāb says:

> ...And if you were to desire that, throughout your whole life, you journey in the pure ocean of Love and Celestiality (*ʿilliyyīn*), then you already have the provision for the Path. For if the entirety of existence were to journey by a single *logoic*-Word of *allāhu aʿẓam* (God is the Most Mighty/the Supreme) they would all arrive at the destination, which is *He whom God shall make Manifest*, for He is the One Manifest by the manifestation of this Word! (*my trans.*)

In this utterance by the Bāb, He succinctly articulates a metaphysical vision in which language is not the foundation of Being, but rather its trace, its traveling emissary, its crystallized ripple across an ontological sea. When he states, *"If all of existence were to journey by a single logoic-Word—'allāhu aʿẓam'—they would all arrive at the destination, which is He Whom God Shall Make Manifest,"* he affirms that the Word is not the originator of the Real, but the vehicle of its unveiling. The logoic-Word *allāhu aʿẓam* functions here as a conduit—a concentrated axis of divine directionality—but the journey it enables presupposes an ontological horizon already in motion: the entirety of Being. The logoic-Word does not generate Being; it arises within it. Indeed, it is only because there is an ocean of love and

the exalted realm of *ʿilliyyīn* already sustaining the journey, that the logoic-Word becomes meaningful, even transformative. Thus, the "Word" (*kalima*) is not a metaphysical architect, as in Heideggerian logocentrism, but a *signpost* within the self-disclosure of the Real—an emanated Light, not the primordial Essence. Furthermore, the Bāb's final phrase—*"for He is the One Manifest by the manifestation of this Word"*—establishes a delicate layering: the logoic-Word reveals the Manifestation of *man yuẓhiruhu'Llāh*, but only because He already exists as *ẓāhir* through *ẓuhūr*, i.e. through Being's own inherent self-disclosing impulse. Here, the priority is ontological and theophanic, not linguistic. The Word "manifests" the Manifestation only in the sense that it names what Being has already disclosed. Thus, this sentence obliterates any metaphysical primacy of the Word; it reinstates *tajallī* (divine manifestation) as the origin, and language as the delayed reverberation of a prior ontological act. The journey through the Word is a journey *within* Being, not *toward* it; the Word is a vessel, not a vessel-builder. This again aligns precisely with the Bāb's lettrist cosmology, wherein the *nuqṭa* (point) precedes the letter, and Being itself is the generative force from which all names and utterances issue. The Real is not spoken into being; it is the *speaking*. It is not housed by language; it is the house from which all speech departs. In this way, the Bāb's metaphysics anticipates and affirms the reversal: Being is the house of language, not the guest of its architecture.

This reversal is also now a challenge to postmodern linguistic idealism. Philosophers from Derrida to Rorty have danced in the labyrinths of the signifier, forsaking the sanctuary of the *signified*. But in the Islamo-Bayānī reordering, the signified is not absent. The Real is not deferred. There is a Ground before grammar, a Flame before *phoneme*, a Truth before *trope*. Language is not the source of truth. It is the *trace* of the True—the Real. So if Being is the house, then language is its resident spirit—sometimes manifesting as angel, sometimes as a *jinn*, most times as a human, animal, plant, mineral, or even just a thought. Here words are not mere symbols; they are *embodified* manifestations. The Islamo-Bayānī mystic therefore does not merely speak or write. They *incarnate*. They cast forth language as bodies from the womb of Being. This is not metaphor. This is lettristic theurgy—it is *divine midwifery*. Thus, where Heidegger speaks of dwelling, we speak of *birthing*. The house of Being is a womb, not a dwelling. Language is its child, not its master.

As such, in our Islamo-Bayānī cosmology, the *point* precedes the letter. The *nuqṭa* (point) is the ontological seed out of which the alphabet blossoms. Even the sacred Name arises from the *point*. Accordingly, language is not foundational. It is derivative. The *point* is not linguistic; it is *existential*. It is Being. And so: The *logos* does not house Being. The logos is *housed*. In this reversal, language is no longer the host but the *guest*. The Word is a visitation upon the temple of Being. A *prophet* does not shape Being with his or her speech; she or he is shaped by Being into speech. As fire makes the coal burn, so Being kindles the tongue. The Divine Names do not conjure existence. They emerge from it. Consequently, to say *Being is the house of language* is to bring ontology back to its luminous core. It is to untether language from its arrogant claim to be the ground of all meaning. It is to return to the Mystery, where the *point* speaks only when called, and the Word does not precede the Flame. Thus, in the House of Being, language finds not a throne but a prayer mat. Let the letter prostrate. Let the tongue become incense. Let the Name burn. For Being is the sanctuary, and language merely its echo.

What follows from this ontology of the Point is decisive for ethics. If Being precedes language—if the *nuqṭa* grounds the letter rather than being constituted by it—then judgment is not a linguistic imposition upon reality but a response elicited by Reality itself. Ethics does not arise from discursive hesitation, semantic undecidability, or the infinite deferral of meaning; it arises from exposure to Being *qua* Dasein as demand. In this register, judgment is not an act of conceptual violence but the form responsibility takes when *Dasein* discloses itself as non-neutral. The refusal to judge is therefore not humility before mystery but resistance to its claim. Where Being is treated as luminous and originary rather than as an effect of language, ethics cannot remain suspended in reverent hesitation. It must answer. To defer judgment indefinitely is already to side with whatever order happens to prevail, allowing continuity to masquerade as innocence and persistence to masquerade as legitimacy.

It is precisely here that the Derrida–Heidegger ethical lineage reveals its ontological limit. By tethering ethics to the prohibition against determining or indicting *Dasein*, it implicitly reinstates language, discourse, and procedural openness as the final arbiters of legitimacy. Ethics becomes a matter of posture rather than response, of restraint rather than interruption. What is lost is the *nuqṭa* itself: the originary demand that precedes

discourse and renders the world answerable before any grammar of deferral can be installed. Once this demand is eclipsed, ethics is easily absorbed into administration, where concern replaces judgment and process replaces truth. The subsequent translation of this posture into institutional religion—most clearly in the Bahā'ī Administrative Order—should therefore not surprise us. When language forgets that it is housed, when procedure forgets that it is guest, ethics forgets how to judge. What remains is a piety of continuity, a spirituality of management, and an order that persists precisely because it has learned to speak endlessly without ever having to answer. The Derrida–Heidegger ethical lineage rests on a shared prohibition: ethics must not judge *Dasein*. Any attempt to name ontology as violent, unjust, or complicit is dismissed as "metaphysical," while ethical seriousness is redefined as restraint, hesitation, and deferral. Heidegger sacralizes waiting under the name of openness; Derrida radicalizes this posture by rendering justice infinitely deferred and every decision structurally compromised. In both cases, ethics is severed from interruption. It may witness, gesture, or mourn, but it may not indict. Responsibility becomes infinite precisely because it is never allowed to terminate in judgment.

Simon Critchley's critique of Levinas,[24] for example, is the moral codification of this prohibition. Levinas is condemned not for ethical weakness but for ethical decisiveness: by naming *Dasein* as violent, he allows ethics to pass sentence on ontology rather than merely hover above it. This, for Critchley, is an unforgivable regression into metaphysics. Yet the charge reveals more about the accuser than the accused. What is defended under the banner of post-metaphysical rigor is not ethics as such, but the immunity of *Dasein* from judgment. The so-called "completion of metaphysics" thus names not philosophy's transcendence but its retreat: the point at which thought renounces the authority to interrupt the world in the name of justice. Against this lineage, the Bayānic position is categorical. Ethics does not wait upon the clearing of *Dasein*, nor does it defer justice to an indeterminate future. Imminence judges. Revelation does not preserve the openness of the question; it closes the world's claim to innocence. To name injustice is not to totalize *Dasein* but to expose its false neutrality. Where post-metaphysical ethics forbids determination, the Bayān insists that determination is precisely what renders the world answerable. The refusal to judge is not humility; it is *complicity*.

And once ethics is forbidden from judging *Dasein*, power acquires a decisive advantage: it no longer needs to justify itself as just, only as orderly. This is the hidden political ontology of the Derrida–Heidegger ethical lineage. By treating determination as violence and interruption as metaphysics, it quietly elevates *material continuity* into the highest good. Whatever persists without rupture acquires a presumption of legitimacy. In this way, post-metaphysical ethics becomes perfectly compatible with liberal administration and capitalism, whose defining features are the conversion of injustice into procedure, domination into governance, extraction as a way of life. This is where *whiteness* must be understood not as phenotype but as metaphysical orientation. Whiteness, in this sense, names the demand that reality remain legible, manageable, and non-interruptive; that violence appear only as breakdown, excess, or exception, never as structure. The Derrida–Heidegger ethical posture aligns seamlessly with this orientation. An ethics that never judges *Dasein* cannot name *empire as empire*, administration as domination, order as coercion, or extraction as injustice. It can lament endlessly, but it cannot indict. Justice is always "to come," while the present order continues unchallenged.

Liberal regimes thrive precisely under such conditions. They do not require ethical endorsement; they require ethical suspension. A philosophy that sacralizes hesitation and condemns decisiveness provides the perfect moral atmosphere for bureaucratic power: conscientious, anguished, and inert. This is why post-metaphysical ethics circulates so easily within Western institutions, NGOs, liberal human-rights discourse, and procedural governance. It supplies a language of concern without authorizing rupture, a conscience without teeth. The Bayān stands in irreducible opposition to this configuration. It does not treat continuity as a virtue, nor deferral as fidelity. It refuses the whitening of injustice into process. Imminence judges not because it possesses truth, but because it exposes *false order as false*. In Bayānic terms, an ethics that cannot interrupt administration is not ethical at all; it is merely the spiritual etiquette of domination. Against the metaphysics of restraint that underwrites liberal whiteness, the Bayān insists on a scandalous claim: that the world must answer—not eventually, not asymptotically, but *now*.

Now, the Bahā'ī administrative order offers a paradigmatic case of how post-metaphysical ethics becomes operational as governance. Far from being an accidental sociological development, Bahā'ī administration embodies with unusual clarity the

Derrida–Heidegger ethical logic translated into institutional form: ethics without judgment, authority without accountability, unity without truth. What presents itself as a spiritually neutral framework of consultation and order is in fact a highly disciplined apparatus for the management of dissent, the neutralization of rupture, and the conversion of injustice into process. At the heart of Bahā'ī administration lies a categorical refusal of interruption. Conflict is never allowed to appear as conflict; it must be redescribed as misunderstanding, spiritual immaturity, or failure to consult properly. Injustice is not named as injustice but reframed as deviation from procedure. Structural harm is never acknowledged as such; it is dissolved into pastoral language, appeals to patience, and invocations of unity and "further deepening." This is precisely the ethical posture inherited from post-metaphysical thought: determination is treated as violence, judgment as metaphysical excess, and decisiveness as spiritual danger.

This logic aligns seamlessly with *whiteness* understood as metaphysical orientation. Bahā'ī administration insists on legibility, civility, and reputational cleanliness. It privileges optics over substance, harmony over truth, and continuity over justice. The system's greatest anxiety is not falsehood but disruption—not injustice but scandal. Whiteness here does not operate through explicit racial ideology but through a regime of administrative innocence: power that claims only to coordinate, exclude, or discipline for the sake of order, never to dominate. Those who suffer harm are not wronged; they are "misaligned," "confused," "not deepened enough" or "insufficiently obedient to process." The prohibition against dissent is enforced not through overt coercion but through ethical foreclosure. Because judgment itself is stigmatized, the injured party is deprived of the language needed to name injury. Any attempt to indict authority is immediately recoded as disunity, negativity, or ego. This is post-metaphysical ethics functioning exactly as designed: responsibility is endlessly invoked, but never permitted to crystallize into accountability. Justice is always deferred to institutional channels that cannot, by definition, indict themselves.

What makes the Bahā'ī case especially revealing is its claim to spiritual universality. By presenting administration as the divinely sanctioned culmination of religion, Bahā'ī governance performs a *theological whitening of power*. The Bayān's explosive insistence on imminence, judgment, and non-coincidence between God and human order is replaced

with a theology of superficial continuity, consultation, and procedural harmony. Revelation is no longer interruptive; it is managerial. Transcendence no longer judges the world; it authorizes its persistence. From a Bayānic standpoint, this is not a development but a betrayal. The Bayān refuses to allow injustice to be moralized into patience or domination to be redescribed as order. It does not sanctify unity at the expense of truth, nor consultation at the expense of accountability. To remain Bayānī is to reject administration as a substitute for judgment and to refuse the ethical laundering of power through spiritualized procedure. Where Bahā'ī administration teaches a corrupt world how to continue cleanly, the Bayān insists that the world must answer. In this sense, Bahā'ī administration is not merely compatible with liberal empire; it is its *spiritual analogue*. It offers empire a conscience without interruption, unity without justice, and ethics without teeth. Against this configuration, the Bayān stands as an unassimilable remainder: a form of fidelity that cannot be institutionalized because it judges institutions, cannot be administered because it interrupts administration, and cannot be *whitened* because it names violence where others insist on harmony.

Be that as it may, we hold that this betrayal is not merely institutional but ontological. The elevation of administration, procedure, and consultative language to quasi-sacral status rests on a deeper inversion in which language is mistaken for the house of Being rather than recognized as its dependent echo. Once discourse is enthroned as ground, judgment is displaced by process, ethics by interpretation, and transcendence by management. Being is no longer permitted to confront the world as demand; it is filtered through grammars of harmony that render injustice speakable yet untouchable. It is this inverted ontology—where words govern reality rather than *answer to it*—that has carried the modern world to its present abyss: a global order fluent in moral language, meticulous in administration, *and yet* structurally incapable of translating ethics into interruption, judgment into accountability, or moral speech into lived justice.

The Bāb's Revelation against Linguistic Idolatry

Now, most people are unaware regarding one of the significant reasons as to why the Bāb often deliberately bent the rules of Arabic grammar and syntax. This is because the

metaphysics of the Bāb represents the most radical resolution of the problem Heidegger bequeathed and postmodernism exacerbated. Where Heidegger bound Being to language, and postmodernism dissolved Being into discourse, the Bāb *reasserts ontological primacy through revelation without linguistic absolutism*—and among the reasons why the Primal Point bent rules of grammar and syntax in Arabic is precisely this very fact. The Bāb's disruption of grammatical normativity is thus neither error nor eccentricity, but a deliberate ontological gesture. By fracturing the apparent sovereignty of language, He exposes grammar as contingent upon revelation rather than constitutive of it, subordinating syntax to the event of divine disclosure. Meaning, in this register, does not arise from linguistic conformity but from proximity to the Real, which exceeds every stable form of articulation even as it speaks through them. In this way, the Bāb breaks the spell of both classical rationalism and modern linguistic captivity, restoring Revelation as a site where Being gives itself prior to, and in excess of, grammatical law.

In the Bayān, language is neither the house of Being nor a neutral vehicle of meaning. It is a *theophanic instrument*—powerful, dangerous, and provisional. The Word does not ground Reality; Reality grounds the Word. Revelation does not sanctify language; it exposes its limits and then simultaneously sublates it. The mullāhs never understood this process or the truth behind it. What they mistook for linguistic error was in fact a deliberate metaphysical provocation. By absolutizing grammar and canonizing form, they inverted the true order, treating language as sovereign rather than answerable to Revelation. The Bayān refuses this inversion: it renders language luminous only insofar as it remains obedient to the Real that speaks through it, and opaque the moment it claims autonomy. In doing so, it exposes clerical literalism as a form of idolatry—an attachment not to meaning, but to the husk that meaning temporarily inhabits. Authority collapses the moment it mistakes mediation for origin. The Bayān thus weaponizes instability against ossification, forcing meaning to remain *evental* rather than archival. What persists is not a fixed grammar but a demand: that language continually die to itself in order to serve what exceeds it. This is why the text scandalizes the jurist—it refuses to let power hide behind syntax.

The Bāb's ontology is explicitly anti-flattening. Existence is not a neutral field of interchangeable perspectives but a *graded, asymmetrical,* and *hierarchical* reality, structured

according to degrees of proximity to the Real. Being is weighted; it carries gravity. Entities, acts, and modes of consciousness do not occupy the same ontological plane, nor do they bear the same consequences. Against the postmodern presumption that all positions are equally valid by virtue of being positions at all, the Bayān affirms that Reality itself is differentiated, and that this differentiation precedes language, culture, and interpretation. Truth, accordingly, is not plural by convention—as if multiple truths coexist simply because multiple viewpoints exist—but *multiple by manifestation*, unfolding through distinct ontological stations without dissolving into relativism. The Real discloses itself in diverse forms, yet remains internally coherent and hierarchically ordered. Multiplicity does not negate unity; it presupposes it. What appears as plurality is the refraction of a single Reality through different degrees of existential capacity, not the collapse of truth into subjective preference or discursive contingency. From this standpoint, ethical and political consequences are inseparable from ontology. To deny ontological hierarchy is not merely to adopt a different theory of truth, but to evacuate responsibility, judgment, and consequence from existence itself. The Bayān thus stands as a direct challenge to modern egalitarian ontologies that confuse moral equality with metaphysical sameness, mistaking the refusal to rank for humility. What it restores is not domination, but discernment: a cosmos in which freedom is real precisely because reality is structured, weighted, and responsive to how one stands within it.

Within this framework, judgment is neither deferred nor dissolved. It is not suspended in discourse, endlessly postponed through interpretation, nor outsourced to procedural neutrality. Judgment is *ontologically grounded*—rooted in the structure of Being itself—and therefore inseparable from moral consequence. Acts matter because Reality is not indifferent. Choices align one with higher or lower degrees of existence; they draw the subject toward Light or consign it to opacity. Judgment is thus not merely juridical or rhetorical; *it is existential.* To act is already to be judged, because action reconfigures one's ontological station rather than merely one's social standing. There is no refuge in ambiguity, no neutral ground where consequences are indefinitely deferred. The Bayān thus abolishes the modern fantasy of consequence-free interpretation, insisting that existence itself responds to how one stands, chooses, and orients. Judgment is not imposed

from without; it unfolds from within the very fabric of Reality, as the inevitable echo of alignment or deviation from the Real.

This is why the Bayān insists upon decisive distinctions—between belief and disbelief, justice and injustice, life and death, Light and fire, Affirmation and negation—without reducing these polarities to sociological constructs or symbolic binaries. These distinctions are not imposed by power, nor negotiated through consensus; they are disclosed by reality. To deny them is not to achieve tolerance, but to abolish meaning itself. In restoring these distinctions, the Bāb does not reintroduce dogmatism; he restores *ontological seriousness*. He reclaims the right to say that something is higher or lower, truer or false, just or unjust—not because language decrees it so, but because Being itself does. What modern sensibility experiences as harshness is, in fact, clarity born of metaphysical responsibility. The Bayān refuses the comfort of indeterminacy where nothing is finally at stake and no orientation is binding. By reasserting real distinctions, it restores the gravity of choice and the cost of alignment, reminding the subject that freedom is inseparable from consequence. In a world anesthetized by relativism, this insistence does not close meaning down—it reopens it by anchoring it once more in the structure of the Real itself.

Most importantly, however, the Bāb refuses linguistic idolatry. The sacred text itself is not final; it anticipates its own supersession. Language is continuously overturned by the Reality it points toward. In this sense, the Bayān is a metaphysical critique of language from within language—a Revelation that destroys the illusion that words can ever exhaust Being. By inscribing impermanence into the very structure of the text, the Bāb denies language the right to congeal into absolute authority or to masquerade as the Real Itself. Meaning is thus returned to its proper place: not as an endless play of interpretations, nor as a closed system of signification, but as a threshold that must be crossed and then left behind. The text does not invite infinite hermeneutics; it demands existential decision. Language is exposed as provisional, instrumental, and accountable to a Reality that precedes it and ultimately annuls it. In doing so, the Bayān disarms both metaphysical dogmatism and postmodern relativism at once, affirming that while words can guide, warn, and judge, they can never replace the ontological truth they serve. What finally remains is not a text to be mastered, but a demand to be answered. The Bayān thus shifts the burden from interpretation to transformation, from reading to becoming. One does not stand *before* the

text as an exegete, but *within* the reality it discloses, where neutrality is no longer possible. In this way, revelation ceases to be an object of contemplation and becomes an ontological summons—one that cannot be deferred, relativized, or reduced to language without betraying its very purpose.

Against the postmodern abyss, the Bāb restores ontological gravity—and with it, *clarity*—by re-anchoring existence in a hierarchy of Reality that does not depend on discourse for its validity. Being is no longer flattened into competing narratives but disclosed as asymmetrical, weighted, and consequential. Against administrative language, which substitutes notation for truth and procedure for justice, he restores judgment as an ontological act rather than a bureaucratic function: a decisive differentiation grounded in Reality itself, not deferred endlessly through process. And against the tyranny of interpretation—where meaning proliferates without end and nothing can finally be said to be true or false—he restores Reality as that which exceeds language, overturns its idols, and renders interpretation accountable to what *is*, rather than allowing it to reign in place of Being. What emerges is not a return to premodern authority, but a rupture with the modern evacuation of consequence. The Bayān insists that Reality answers back—that existence is responsive to orientation, allegiance, and refusal. In doing so, it exposes the contemporary condition not as one of excessive certainty, but of systematic evasion, where responsibility is endlessly displaced into language, systems, and interpretation. Against this evasion, the Bāb restores the terrible dignity of truth: that something *is*, that it matters, and that one must finally stand in relation to it.

For example, the Bāb's *basmalic* formulation at the beginning of the Bayān—***bismillāh al-amnaʿ al-aqdas*** (*In the Name of God the Most Impregnable/Inaccessible, the Most Holy*)—is not a devotional ornament but an ontological intervention. It announces, at the very threshold of Revelation, that language does not house Being, nor does it possess Reality. The Name is invoked only to mark the limit of naming; God is identified precisely as *al-amnaʿ*, the Most Impregnable, and *al-aqdas*, the Most Sanctified/Holy beyond contamination. This is not a softening entry into discourse but *a rupture*: language is permitted to speak only under erasure. What is Named is that which cannot be captured by naming, and what is sanctified is that which remains untouched by conceptualization. The *basmala* thus functions as a warning against linguistic idolatry, declaring from the outset that words neither contain

nor stabilize the Real they point toward. By beginning in this way, the Bayān denies the reader the false comfort of semantic mastery before it can even arise. Revelation does not invite possession through comprehension; it enforces humility through inaccessibility. The divine Name here does not open a space for discourse so much as it seals one, reminding the reader that all subsequent language unfolds under the sign of insufficiency. What follows is thus not a system to be decoded, but a reality to which language must continually yield, fracture, and finally submit.

Thus, against Heidegger's claim that language is the house of Being, the Bayān asserts the opposite order of priority: *Being is the condition of language,* not its product. Language arises within Being and is therefore secondary, provisional, and accountable. The Bāb does not absolutize discourse; he undermines it from within. By naming God as the Most Impregnable and the Most Holy, he denies epistemic mastery, interpretive sovereignty, and metaphysical appropriation alike. Reality is not plural because it is relative, nor indeterminate because it is linguistic; it is absolute, asymmetrical, and hierarchically manifest. Multiplicity belongs to manifestation, not to interpretation. Judgment is therefore real, distinctions are decisive, and truth is grounded in ontological rank rather than discursive consensus. What this order forecloses is the modern conceit that meaning can be generated, suspended, or neutralized at will. Language is answerable because Being answers back. The Bayān thus relocates responsibility from interpretation to *orientation*: not what one *says* about reality, but how one stands within it. In doing so, it restores truth as a matter of alignment rather than argument, and freedom as the capacity to respond to a Reality that is already structured, weighted, and inexorably real.

In this light, the Bayān emerges as a metaphysical critique of language enacted through language itself. The text anticipates its own supersession because it refuses to allow revelation to congeal into linguistic finality. Meaning is not an endless play of interpretations but a threshold that must be crossed and left behind. Sanctity here is not moral sentiment but ontological purity from contamination by words. Where postmodernism dissolves truth into discourse and equalizes all interpretations, the Bāb restores gravity, clarity, and consequence. This *basmala* is not merely how the Bayān begins; it is the law that governs everything that follows. Language does not reveal Being—it points, fractures, and withdraws before it. The Bayān thus begins by placing language in its proper

place, and in doing so, restores Reality to its own. What follows from this placement is a reversal of modern expectations: one does not approach the text to master meaning, but to be displaced by it. The Bayān does not ask to be interpreted so much as to be endured, obeyed, and ultimately surpassed by *He whom God shall make Manifest* who knows its true interpetation.[25] Its authority lies not in semantic closure but in ontological exposure—forcing the reader to confront a Reality that no formulation can contain. In this way, the text fulfills its purpose not by securing itself as final, but by compelling the passage beyond itself, where language falls silent and Being alone remains decisive.

Furthermore, the first chapter of the *kitāb panj shaʾn* (The Book of the Five Grades) does not merely caution that language is inadequate; it legislates the inadequacy of language as a metaphysical boundary. The Bāb repeatedly closes every ordinary route by which theology attempts to reach the Godhead: praise, sanctification, obedience, even the very act of "reaching" God. One is told, with relentless force, that none of these attach to God directly; they attach only to *He whom God shall make Manifest*—and that this alone is the "straight path," the sole line of access. In doing so, the Bāb abolishes every metaphysical shortcut by which the intellect seeks to bypass mediation and claim immediacy. The Godhead is not approached through ascent, analogy, or conceptual refinement, but encountered only through the locus of manifestation appointed by Reality itself. Language, devotion, and intention are thus stripped of autonomous salvific power and rendered effective only insofar as they are reoriented toward this singular ontological axis. What is legislated here is not distance from God, but the impossibility of seizing the Absolute by thought, speech, or piety apart from the form in which It chooses to appear.

The consequence is devastating for every "high metaphysics" that imagines it can stabilise God under supreme predicates, because to paraphrase how someone once beautifully put it in our Mullā Ṣadrā course: all *metaphysical languaging* is ultimately a secondary intelligible. For the Bāb explicitly states that all self-attribution is redirected: "everything I have attributed to Myself is attributed to He whom God shall make Manifest."[26] Divine naming is thereby exposed as a regime of address, not a disclosure of Essence. Names do not terminate in the Godhead; they terminate in the living locus of manifestation. Language, then, does not deliver God; it delivers a demand: recognize the locus by which God wills to be known. What collapses here is the very ambition of

speculative theology to arrest the Absolute in conceptual form. Essence remains inviolate precisely because naming is displaced from ontology to obedience, from description to recognition. The function of language is thus redefined: not to grasp God, but to orient the subject toward the site where divine agency is historically and ontologically operative. In this way, metaphysics yields to decision, and knowledge is inseparable from allegiance to the form through which the Real consents to be encountered.

The Persian doctrinal synthesis in the final subsection of the first chapter of the *kitābi-i-panj shaʾn* sharpens this to the point of rupture: everything describable within possibility—every predicate, every attribute, every conceptual capture—belongs to createdness. "No thing has ever had, nor will ever have, a path toward It," except insofar as the divine self-discloses "in every *ẓuhūr* by the locus of Itself." The entire field in which philosophy moves—being, light, essence, attribute, existence—now stands revealed as internal to *imkān* (possibility), and therefore incapable of grounding access to the Godhead Itself. Here the Bāb delivers the most radical verdict imaginable against ontological domestication: "Its existence, by Itself, is proof of the impossibility of Its existence." In one stroke, the predicate "exists" is shown to be too small, too late, too created. This is not merely apophasis; it is a demolition of the metaphysical habit of reducing God to *wujūd*—even in its most refined Ṣadrian form. For if "existence" can be said, then it already belongs to the order of predication; and if it belongs to the order of predication, it cannot contain the Godhead. Such is one of the meanings to *bismillāh al-amnaᶜ al-aqdas* (*In the Name of God the Most Impregnable, the Most Holy*).

What remains, therefore, is not a purer concept but a purer orientation. Everything "from God" appears from the Thrones of Reality; everything "to God" ascends to the Thrones of Reality; and this entire economy is named the most impregnable, most holy veil and the most exalted mirror—an architecture of manifestation that both reveals and forbids. This is precisely why the *shahāda* itself is re-made into "*lā ilāha illā'Llāh ḥaqqan ḥaqqan*" (there is no other god but God Truly, Truly) as a test of recognition rather than a theorem of metaphysics, because by itself "*lā ilāha illā'Llāh*" is not true by utterance but only by refusing to "veil oneself" from the locus of the *ẓuhūr* (Manifestation) of the Reality of realities (*ḥaqīqa al-haqāʾiq*). Truth here is not secured by correct formulation but by unveiled alignment. The *shahāda* becomes efficacious only when it passes from speech into

recognition, from formula into fidelity to the site where Reality discloses Itself. To affirm God while refusing the locus of manifestation is, in this economy, not transcendence but concealment—a self-imposed veiling masquerading as piety, hence negation (*nafy*). What the Bayān demands, therefore, is not repetition but exposure: the willingness to let orientation, allegiance, and being itself be judged by the Reality that alone authorizes truth.

Thus the *kitāb-i-panj shaʾn* supplies the inner logic of the Bayān's opening and closing: God is not captured by names, not contained by Being, not exhausted by Light. God is the Most Impregnable—*al-amnaʿ*—and yet present as the luminous path only where manifestation occurs, only where the veil is honoured as veil and the mirror is honoured as mirror. Language becomes true not when it defines, but when it points; not when it grasps, but when it obeys the discipline of address. To violate this discipline is to turn Revelation into possession and the mirror into an idol. The Bayān therefore trains language to remain faithful to its own finitude, compelling it to serve manifestation without pretending to replace it. What is restored is a proper humility of speech before the Absolute: words are permitted to guide, warn, and summon, but never to enthrone themselves as truth. In this obedience of language to Reality, the Bayān completes its rupture with both metaphysical capture and linguistic sovereignty, leaving only orientation, recognition, and response as the measure of meaning.

And so, if the Bāb is correct that revelation exposes the limits of language and that misrecognition becomes world-shaping only through linguistic stabilization, then any theology that re-stabilizes revelation into a closed linguistic system necessarily negates the very event it claims to fulfill. Measured by this criterion, Bahā'ī theology does not extend the Bayān but neutralizes it, and so the claims made by Bahāʾuʾllāh collapse under the Bāb's own logic of Manifestation. What presents itself as fulfillment is, on this reading, a retreat into precisely the linguistic finality the Bayān was designed to abolish. By canonizing doctrine, stabilizing meaning, and enclosing Revelation within a self-authorizing interpretive regime, Bahā'ī theology reinstates the very idolatry of language the Bāb relentlessly dismantled. The result is not continuity but inversion: manifestation is subordinated to system, recognition to assent, and ontological rupture to administrative coherence. Judged by the Bayān's own metaphysical demands, such a move does not

complete Revelation—it arrests it, transforming an event meant to shatter linguistic sovereignty into a structure that depends upon it for survival.

This is because the Bāb's revelation enacts radical *tanzīh* (transcendence) and radical *tashbīh* (immanence) simultaneously: God is utterly inaccessible in Essence and utterly present in Manifestation. This simultaneity destroys every mediating ontology and exposes language itself as the site of both delusion and recognition. Misrecognition occurs when language is treated as final; recognition occurs when language yields to encounter—one is *lā ilāha* (misrecognition/negation) with the other being *illa allāh* (recognition/Affirmation). Within the Bayān's framework of radical transcendence and radical immanence, any claim to unmatched uniqueness across vast stretches of time is conceptually incoherent. Manifestation is not an ontological magnitude to be ranked, nor a temporal monopoly to be secured. It is an event that breaks language at the moment of its occurrence. By appealing to temporal gigantism and comparative supremacy (i.e. 500,000 years), Bahāʾuʾllāh's claim re-stabilizes language, collapses manifestation into static ontology, and negates the very conditions of recognition articulated by the Bāb. Under the Bayān's logic, temporal duration carries no theological weight. God does not wait, delay, or withhold according to calendars. God appears whenever God appears, and recognition is demanded then and there. Any appeal to vast stretches of time as proof of uniqueness or finality is a linguistic strategy for stabilizing belief, not a criterion of truth. In short, it is language attempting to house Being which cannot nor will ever be housed since It is the One *already-always* housing language, and not the other way around.

God does what God does whenever God does it! Time does not apply to It, and It is the doer of whatsoever It desires![27]

Notes

[1] The following essay is an augmentation of a blogpost by the same title from December 2025, online, https://wahidazal303.blogspot.com/2025/12/being-prior-to-language-heidegger-and.html (retrieved 1 January 2026).

[2] In the *Letter on Humanism*, in (ed.) David Farrell Krell *Martin Heidegger Basic Writings: from Being and Time (1927) to The Task of Thinking (1964)* (1993): 239.

[3] Arguably, what appears as a phenomenological restraint is in fact a metaphysical inheritance: the unexamined assumption that intelligibility is coextensive with human logos. In this sense, the linguistic clearing of *Dasein* functions as a secularized version of Aristotle's rational animal—retaining the primacy of human disclosure while disavowing its classical metaphysical vocabulary. Aristotle defines the human as ζῷον λόγον ἔχον (*zōon logon echon*)—the living being that has *logos*. Logos here is not merely speech, but *articulable rationality*: the capacity to disclose beings as beings through predication, judgment, and intelligible form. Once this definition is granted, several things follow:

- Intelligibility is coextensive with logos;
- Logos is proper to the human;
- Therefore, *Being is disclosed where human rational articulation occurs*.

Even when Aristotle acknowledges *nous*, *aisthēsis*, and *phantasia*, full *being-as-such* is ultimately stabilized in conceptual articulation. Non-human disclosure never achieves ontological primacy. This is the metaphysical seed and it is something that Jacques Derrida is in fact right about, see his *On Grammatology* (1997); see also Foucault's critique in *The Order of Things: An Archeology of Human Sciences* (2004). By contrast, Illuminationist and post-Avicennan Islamic metaphysics decisively reject the equation of intelligibility with *logos*. For Suhrawardī, Being is Light, self-manifesting through presence (*ḥuḍūr*) prior to and independently of linguistic articulation; for Ibn ʿArabī, the Real discloses Itself to all beings according to their ontological capacity (*istiʿdād*), rendering human language one modality of reception rather than the condition of manifestation; and for Mullā Ṣadrā, intelligibility is grounded in the primacy of existence (*aṣālat al-wujūd*), with language and concept emerging as secondary intensifications of Being rather than its transcendental horizon. From this

perspective, Heidegger's clearing functions not as openness itself but as a local epistemic posture mistakenly elevated to a universal ontological condition, thereby foreclosing modes of manifestation that precede, exceed, or bypass human speech altogether.

[4] Despite Heidegger's rejection of representational metaphysics, *Being and Time* consistently restricts ontological intelligibility to the structures of Dasein's disclosure **(§§7, 31–34, 44)**. *Worldhood*, *understanding*, *discourse*, and *truth* are all analyzed as existential determinations of *being-there* (*Dasein*), leaving no thematic space for modes of Being independent of human access (**§§12–18**). Henry Corbin's final interview is also instructive here, see *FROM HEIDEGGER TO SUHRAVARDI: AN INTERVIEW WITH PHILIPPE NEMO*, online, https://www.amiscorbin.com/en/biography/from-heidegger-to-suhravardi/ (retrieved 29 December 2025).

[5] This limitation has been noted by multiple critics, who argue that Heidegger's fundamental ontology remains tethered to a Greek–Christian–European semantic horizon and thereby elevates a historically contingent mode of disclosure into a universal ontological framework (Levinas 1969; Derrida 1989; Corbin 1971; Schürmann 1987).

[6] This trajectory—from Heidegger's linguistic disclosure of Being to Derrida's denial of extra-textual grounding and Foucault's identification of truth with discursive power—has been widely noted and critiqued as resulting in the collapse of ontology into discourse and the deferral of judgment (Heidegger **§§31–34**).

[7] See **Section Two** of *The Philosophy of Illumination*.

[8] See here Chittick's *The Sufi Path of Knowledge*, *passim*.

[9] See especially Part I of *The Wisdom of the Throne*.

[10] Although analytically dealing with logic and epistemology through a Aristotelian lens, the first three discourses to Part 1 of *The Philosophy of Illumination* attempt to convey this very fact.

[11] We take this as one of the central messages of his *futūḥāt al-makkīyah*.

[12] §9 "The Theme of the Analytic of Dasein" (*Das 'Wesen' des Daseins liegt in seiner Existenz*.).

[13] Heidegger *What is Metaphysics?* in *Martin Heidegger: The Basic Writings*: 103.

[14] See *The Sufi Path of Knowledge*, *passim*.

[15] Heidegger *Letter on Humanism*, ibid, 252-3.

[16] See the first five propositions to Part I of *The Wisdom of the Throne*.

[17] Heidegger, 1962, ibid. 307

[18] In the chapter of Noah (3), he says:

> *Thus, the Prophet linked the knowledge of the Real (al-ḥaqq) to self-knowledge, saying: 'Whoever knows their self, knows their Lord'. And God, exalted be It, said: "We shall show them Our signs on the horizons"* **(Q. 41:53)***—meaning that which is outside of you—"and within themselves" —meaning your very essence—"until it becomes clear to them that It is*

the Real," that is, to the one who perceives, from the perspective that you are Its form and It is your spirit (my trans.)

[19] See Martin Heidegger *What Is Called Thinking?* (1968), esp. 8–9, where he asserts that "science does not think" because it does not reflect on Being itself. For deeper explorations of *Liebe* in Heidegger's thought, see Jacques Derrida *On Touching—Jean-Luc Nancy* (2005) and particularly Giorgio Agamben *The Adventure* (2018).

[20] For a brief study of this pivotally important source of Sufi metaphysics—and of all *Islamaic* esotericism generally—see Moeen Afnani *Unraveling the Mystery of The Hidden Treasure: The Origin and Development of a Hadith Qudsi and Its Application in Sufi Doctrine* (PhD dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 2011).

[21] Facebook, July 2025.

[22] Heidegger *Essay on Humanism*, in *The Basic Writings*, ibid., 217.

[23] From Latin *quidditas* ("whatness"), this is the philosophical term referring to the *essence* or *whatness* of a thing—what makes a thing *what it is*, as distinct from *that it is* (its existence). It denotes the set of essential attributes that a thing must possess to be recognized as that particular kind of thing. In Western scholastic and Islamic metaphysics (especially in the thought of Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus), *quiddity* is contrasted with *haecceity* ("thisness") and is central to the distinction between essence (*essentia*) and existence (*existentia*). *Haecceity* in Islamic philosophical terminology is the *taʿayyun* (self-essentialization, entification) or *shakhṣīya* (individuation) of a given thing, and is often held as being the *differentia* of a given quiddity (*ʿayn*, *māhīya*). For a contemporary source on this notion, see David Oderberg *Real Essentialism* (2007).

[24] In *The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas* (1992): 19.

[25] See the **2nd Gate of the Second Unity of the Persian Bayān** and the **3rd Gate of the Second Unity of the Arabic Bayān**.

[26] *Kitāb-i-panj shaʾn* (The Book of the Five Grades), chapter 1, ibid.

[27] يَفْعَلُ ٱللّٰهُ مَا يَفْعَلُهُ حِينَ يَفْعَلُهُ لَا يَجْرِي عَلَيْهِ زَمَانٌ وَهُوَ الْفَعَّالُ لِمَا يُرِيدُ

3

A Bayānī Commentary on Malcolm X's "*I Have a Nightmare*"[1]

Brothers and sisters, I'm here to tell you that I charge the White man. I charge the White man with being the greatest murderer on earth. I charge the White man with being the greatest kidnapper on earth. There is no place in this world that that man can go and say he created peace and harmony. Everywhere he's gone he's created havoc. Everywhere he's gone he's created destruction. So I charge him. I charge him with being the greatest kidnapper on this earth. I charge him with being the greatest murderer on this earth. I charge him with being the greatest robber and enslaver on this earth. I charge the White man with being the greatest swine-eater on this earth, the greatest drunkard on this earth.

He can't deny the charges. You can't deny the charges. We're the living proof of those charges. You and I are the proof. You're not an American, you are the victim of America. You didn't have a choice coming over here. He didn't say, "Black man, Black woman, come on over and help me build America." He said, "Nigger, get down in the bottom of that boat and I'm taking you over there to help me build America." Being born here does not make you an American. I'm not an American. You're not an American. You are one of twenty-two million Black people who are the victims of America.

> *You and I, we've never seen any democracy. We ain't seen no democracy in the cotton fields of Georgia. That wasn't no democracy down there. We didn't see any democracy on the streets of Harlem and the streets of Brooklyn and the streets of Detroit and Chicago. That wasn't democracy down there. No, we've never seen democracy; all we've seen is hypocrisy. We don't see any American dream. We've experienced only the American nightmare* ~ ***Malcolm X***[2]

What confronts us here is not a series of unfortunate encounters with individual antagonists, but the encounter with a regime of power that has perfected the art of appearing innocent. Fanon teaches us that colonial domination does not merely operate through violence or law; it operates through *the production of reality itself.*[3] The colonizer does not only command territory—he commands meaning, legitimacy, and the grammar of the human. In this sense, the white liberal subject does not experience himself as dominant at all. He experiences himself as the measure of the real.

The white liberal order thus encounters non-European juridical or ontological traditions not as interlocutors, but as pathologies. They are immediately framed as excessive, dangerous, irrational, or "absolutist," not because they are violent, but because they refuse the colonizer's arbitration. This is precisely what Fanon identifies as the moment of epistemic violence: the colonized subject is not refuted, but reclassified.[4] His law becomes fanaticism, his metaphysics becomes delusion, his refusal to translate becomes proof of unfitness. The violence here is not physical; it is ontological. It is the violence of being told that one's mode of existence is unintelligible unless it passes through the colonizer's reason. In this schema, the white liberal man appears not as a brute, but as a self-appointed *civilizing agent*. He does not say "I dominate you"; he says "I am worried about you." He does not say "I will destroy your tradition"; he says "I will reinterpret it for your own good." He does not say "submit"; he says "be reasonable." This is the genius of liberal colonialism: domination without confession. Fanon already warned us that this form of power is more insidious than overt brutality, because it recruits the language of care, progress, and universality to conceal its coercive core.

What is denied at every stage is the reality of race and power. The white liberal subject insists that he is merely defending reason, democracy, secularism, or pluralism. But this insistence is itself the symptom. As Fanon makes clear throughout his work, the colonizer's greatest anxiety is not rebellion, but *opacity*—the refusal of the colonized to render himself transparent to colonial understanding. The non-assimilable tradition terrifies precisely because it cannot be fully translated, moderated, or absorbed without remainder. It stands as a limit to liberal sovereignty. The result is a familiar cycle. First comes denunciation: the tradition is declared dangerous. Then reinterpretation: it is stripped of its juridical force and reframed as symbolic, ethical, or merely cultural. Finally, capture: intermediaries—often liberal, progressive, or "spiritual" figures adjacent to power—are deployed to tame, sanitize, and render the tradition safe for incorporation. Throughout, the colonizer insists that nothing political or racial is occurring. This is simply reason doing its work. But Fanon is unequivocal: this denial is the very mechanism of domination. The white liberal order does not merely govern bodies; it governs *horizons of possibility*. It decides which worlds may exist and which must be reduced to curiosities, threats, or errors. Those subjected to this order are then accused of hostility, extremism, or ingratitude when they refuse assimilation. In truth, they are *refusing erasure*. In this light, the contemporary liberal subject who attacks, disciplines, or "critiques" from a position of unmarked authority is not an aberration. He is the heir of a long tradition of colonial reason. He may not carry a whip or a gun, but he carries something more enduring: the presumption that he speaks from nowhere, for everyone, and against no one in particular. Fanon teaches us to name this presumption for what it is—not neutrality, but power masquerading as universality.

Now, if Martin Luther King Jr.'s *"I Have a Dream"* names the liberal promise at its most generous—formal equality, civic inclusion, recognition under law—then Malcolm X's *"I Have a Nightmare"* names the truth that liberalism cannot acknowledge: that the very economic order underwriting liberal freedom continuously manufactures racial hierarchy as a condition of its own operation. The nightmare is not the failure of liberalism to live up to its ideals; it is that liberalism, once historically realized as capitalism, requires inequality, disposability, and racial differentiation in order to function at all. Capitalism is not a betrayal of liberalism. It is *its fulfillment*. From this vantage, racism is not an accidental

prejudice that capitalism might someday outgrow. It is a structural necessity. Capital requires differential valuation of bodies, lands, and lives; it requires zones of extraction and zones of protection; it requires populations rendered cheap, fungible, and expendable. The racialized subject is not a moral aberration but an economic product. As Fanon saw with terrifying clarity, the colonial world is divided not merely by ideology but by *ontology*: some are made into bearers of value, others into resources.[5] Liberalism may preach universality, but capitalism operationalizes hierarchy—and race is its most efficient technology.

This is where the Bayān intervenes, not as ethics, not as metaphor, but as *juridical sabotage*. The ordinance of the **9th Gate of the Eleventh Unity of the Bayān** forbidding the buying and selling of the Four Elements—earth, water, air, and fire—constitutes a direct assault on the metaphysical foundation of capitalist modernity. Capitalism presupposes that the elements of existence themselves may be abstracted, owned, priced, and exchanged. Land becomes real estate, water becomes commodity, air becomes carbon credit, fire becomes energy futures. The Bayān declares this entire grammar illicit. It does not seek regulation or reform; it names alienability itself as a metaphysical crime. In doing so, the Bayān strikes simultaneously at *base and superstructure*. At the level of the base, it abolishes the possibility of accumulation by denying capital its raw materials as commodities. At the level of the superstructure, it dismantles the ideological fiction that markets are neutral, natural, or race-blind. For once the elements are removed from exchange, the racial logic that governs their extraction is exposed as unjustifiable. You cannot commodify land without first rendering its inhabitants disposable. You cannot sell water without deciding whose thirst matters. You cannot trade air without calculating whose lungs are worth protecting. The Bayān collapses these calculations by refusing their premise. This is why the Bayān cannot be assimilated into liberal pluralism. Liberalism can tolerate critique, symbolism, even dissent—but it cannot tolerate a law that abolishes its economic ontology. The prohibition on buying and selling the Four Elements is not a spiritual flourish; it is an anti-capitalist ordinance of the highest order. It renders impossible the very processes through which liberal societies produce racialized subjects while denying that race is operative at all. In this sense, the Bayān does what liberalism never could: it attacks racism not at the level of attitudes, but at the level of economic being.

Thus the nightmare: a world that speaks endlessly of tolerance while perfecting extraction; that denounces racism while reproducing it daily through markets; that celebrates freedom while pricing the conditions of life itself. Against this nightmare, the Bayān does not offer a dream of inclusion. It offers rupture. It does not ask to be recognized by the liberal order; it declares that order metaphysically void. And it is precisely this—far more than any doctrinal claim—that provokes hostility, denunciation, and attempts at capture. For a capitalism that must racialize in order to survive cannot tolerate a law that makes the world itself inalienable.

Liberal Pluralism, Capital, and the Fiction of Tolerance

That said, liberal pluralism is not a neutral ethic of tolerance; it is a market logic masquerading as moral virtue. What liberalism calls "pluralism" is in fact the regulated circulation of difference within parameters set by capital. Beliefs, identities, cultures, and even forms of dissent are tolerated only insofar as they remain *exchangeable*, non-sovereign, and non-obstructive to accumulation. Difference is welcomed as long as it behaves like a commodity: portable, aestheticized, decontextualized, and ultimately disposable. Pluralism, in this sense, is not the recognition of irreducible otherness, but its conversion into *consumable variety*. This is why liberal pluralism recoils not from violence or hatred as such, but from non-marketable forms of difference. Traditions that can be translated into lifestyle choices, symbolic ethics, or private spirituality are embraced; those that assert juridical force, ontological priority, or limits on exchange are immediately pathologized. The question liberalism asks is never "Is this true?" or even "Is this just?" but "Can this be managed, moderated, or monetized?" Where the answer is no, pluralism ends and coercion begins—usually under the sign of reasonableness, safety, or public order.

Capital is therefore the *hidden legislator* of liberal tolerance. It determines in advance which differences may coexist and which must be neutralized. This is why liberal societies can celebrate diversity while intensifying racial inequality, why they can host endless dialogue while foreclosing structural change, and why they can tolerate *radical aesthetics* while suppressing *radical law*. As soon as a tradition threatens the commodification of land, labor, life, or meaning—as the Bayān does through its prohibition on the buying and selling

of the Four Elements—it exceeds the bounds of permissible plurality. It cannot be pluralized because it cannot be priced. Seen this way, liberal pluralism is not the opposite of domination but one of its most refined techniques. It replaces overt exclusion with conditional inclusion, open repression with managed visibility. It does not say "you may not exist," but "*you may exist only in forms compatible with circulation*." Against this, any tradition that insists on inalienability—of land, of life, of law, of truth—appears not merely intolerant, but unintelligible. And it is precisely this unintelligibility that exposes liberal pluralism for what it is: not an ethic of coexistence, but the cultural superstructure of capital itself.

Now, Karl Polanyi's central insight in *The Great Transformation* (1944) is that modern capitalism rests on a *foundational lie*: the treatment of land, labor, and money as commodities, when in fact none of them are produced for sale. They are what Polanyi famously calls *fictitious commodities*. Land is the earth itself, labor is human life-activity, and money is a social relation. To subject these to market logic is not merely inefficient or unjust—it is civilizationally catastrophic. Society, Polanyi argues, is then forced into a perpetual "double movement": market expansion on the one hand, social protection on the other, with mounting violence when protection fails. Liberal pluralism emerges historically as the cultural and ethical supplement to this commodifying regime. It promises tolerance, diversity, and coexistence—but only after land, labor, and life have already been abstracted into exchangeable units. What liberalism tolerates is not difference as such, but difference *after* the material world has been rendered alienable. Pluralism thus follows the logic of capital, not the logic of justice. It can celebrate cultural multiplicity precisely because the elemental conditions of existence have already been priced, owned, and governed by market sovereignty. This is why liberal pluralism is perfectly compatible with racial domination. Once land is a commodity, those tied to land can be dispossessed. Once labor is a commodity, bodies can be ranked, priced, and exhausted. Once money becomes the universal mediator, human worth becomes legible only through productivity and consumption. Race enters here not as a moral error but as an economic technology: a way of differentially valuing laboring bodies and expropriated lands. Capitalism does not accidentally produce racism; it requires it.

"I Have a Nightmare": Malcolm X as Political Economist

Read in this light, Malcolm X's "I have a nightmare" is not a racial rant but an indictment of a political economy. When he says "I charge the white man," the charge is not against pigmentation but against a *historical formation*: a world-devouring system that commodified land, kidnapped labor, and monetized life on a planetary scale. His catalogue—murder, kidnapping, robbery, enslavement—is not metaphorical. It is the literal history of capitalist expansion. Malcolm's insistence that Black Americans are "victims of America" rather than participants in its democracy is a direct refusal of liberal pluralist mythology. Democracy, he observes, never existed where labor was coerced, land was stolen, and bodies were owned. What was offered instead was inclusion *after the fact*: civil rights without economic sovereignty, recognition without restitution, pluralism without decommodification. The nightmare, then, is not hypocrisy alone—it is the structural impossibility of democracy within a system that commodifies the conditions of life itself.

This is where the Bayān enters with devastating clarity. Its ordinance prohibiting the buying and selling of the Four Elements—earth, water, air, and fire—is not a mystical flourish or symbolic ethic. As we said, *it is a juridical negation* of the very foundation Polanyi identifies as destructive. The Bayān abolishes fictitious commodities at their root. It declares that the elements of existence are *inalienable*, not subject to exchange, ownership, or price. In Bayānī terms, capitalism is not merely unjust; it is *metaphysically illegitimate*. To sell land is to deny its divine trusteeship. To sell water is to deny its universal right. To sell air is to deny shared breath. To sell fire—energy—is to deny the common power of transformation. By removing the elements from the market, the Bayān collapses the economic basis on which racial hierarchy is built. If land cannot be owned, it cannot be stolen. If labor is not commodified, bodies cannot be priced. If life is not exchangeable, populations cannot be rendered disposable. Hence why the Bayān functions as a weapon against both base and superstructure. Economically, it forecloses accumulation. Ideologically, it exposes liberal pluralism as a management strategy for commodified difference. Thus, the Bayān does not ask to be included in the liberal order; it declares that order void at the level of being.

Seen through this lens, Malcolm X's charge is not racial essentialism but ontological accusation. The "white man" names a system that universalized itself while denying

universality to others; that preached freedom while commodifying life; that spoke of democracy while organizing extraction. The Bayān does not answer this charge with counter-rhetoric. It answers it with law: *you may not buy or sell the world*. Where liberalism responds to the nightmare with dreams of better inclusion, the Bayān responds with rupture. It refuses the marketization of the elements that made the nightmare possible in the first place. And in doing so, it reveals the deepest truth beneath Malcolm X's fury: that peace, harmony, and democracy cannot exist where the conditions of life are for sale. That is not hatred. It is judgment. It is Truth.

Attempted Liberal Capture of the Bayān: Epistemic Domestication, White {Mis}Innocence, and the Denial of Power[6]

The modern white liberal epistemic order prides itself on openness, pluralism, and tolerance. It claims an unrivalled capacity to include difference without coercion and to adjudicate conflicts through reason rather than force. Yet again and again, when this order encounters traditions that are not merely culturally different but juridically and ontologically non-assimilable, its professed openness collapses into a patterned response: denunciation, reinterpretation, and attempted capture. Such responses are not accidental, nor are they reducible to individual bad faith or misunderstanding. They are structural reactions of liberal modernity when confronted with traditions that refuse its foundational premises. The Bayān—understood not as a cultural artifact or symbolic theology but as a law-constituting, world-negating, ontological rupture—functions as a particularly acute stress test for liberalism. It exposes the limits of liberal pluralism, the racialized nature of its epistemic authority, and the mechanisms by which it neutralizes what it cannot absorb.

Now, liberalism presents itself as anti-sovereign. It claims to have displaced metaphysical absolutes with procedures, hierarchies with neutrality, and authority with consensus. But as Carl Schmitt, Max Weber, and later Michel Foucault each demonstrated in different registers, liberalism does not abolish sovereignty—*it relocates it*. In the liberal order, sovereignty resides not in either a monarch, *the people*, or a sacred law, but in procedural legitimacy, expert discourse, institutional reasonableness, and *epistemic gatekeeping*. The liberal subject is permitted to believe almost anything so long as those

beliefs do not claim jurisdiction over reality itself. What liberalism cannot tolerate is not belief, but law—especially law that does not derive from the state, the social contract, or consensual reason. Thus, the Bayān is intolerable precisely because it does not seek validation from liberal reason. It does not argue its case within the liberal forum. It does not present itself as one worldview among others. It announces a break—a reconstitution of reality, normativity, and obligation that does not wait for permission. This is the point at which liberal tolerance ends.

The first response of the liberal epistemic order to such a tradition as the Bayān is always denunciation. This denunciation rarely takes the form of outright theological refutation. Instead, it is framed in terms of extremism, irrationality, psychological disturbance, dangerous absolutism, or latent violence. Crucially, the denunciation is presented as *protective*—protective of pluralism, safety, democracy, or vulnerable populations. The tradition is not attacked because it is false, but because it is said to be *unsafe*. Here, Frantz Fanon's analysis of colonial psychiatry is instructive.[7] The colonized subject is not refuted; *he is diagnosed*. His claims are not engaged; they are rendered symptomatic. In this phase, the Bayān is framed as something that must be opposed, contained, or warned against—not because of what it says, but because of what it allegedly does to those who encounter it. Denunciation alone, however, is insufficient. Liberalism does not merely exclude; it *domesticates*.

The second move is reinterpretation. At this stage, the tradition is aestheticized, historicized, psychologized, or symbolically defanged. The Bayān here is re-described as a metaphorical spiritual protest, a historical curiosity, a poetic idiom of resistance, or an early attempt at ethical universalism. Its juridical force is denied. Its ontological claims are translated into therapeutic or cultural language. What was law becomes narrative; what was rupture becomes metaphor. This is not misunderstanding. It is both *epistemic violence* and the logic of market capitalism—the forced translation of a tradition into categories that neutralize its threat. The third and most insidious move is attempted capture. Here, liberalism no longer positions itself as an external critic. Instead, it installs intermediaries—often progressive, inclusive, UU-adjacent actors—who claim to speak *from within* or *alongside* the tradition while quietly reengineering it. Unitarian Universalism is particularly instructive here. Structurally, UU functions as a *universal solvent*: every tradition is

welcomed on the condition that it abandon exclusivity, juridical force, and metaphysical finality. What remains is a curated spirituality compatible with liberal consensus. Through this mechanism, the Bayān is invited in only if it agrees to renounce its legislative claims, soften its eschatology, and subordinate itself to Western liberal ethical norms. This is capture, not dialogue.

Throughout all three phases—denunciation, reinterpretation, capture—there is a persistent denial that race or power are operative at all. This denial is central. As Charles Mills argues in *The Racial Contract* (1999), white liberalism is defined not by explicit racism, but by an *epistemology of ignorance*—a structured inability to perceive itself as positioned, racialized, or dominant. The authority to decide what counts as "religion," "extremism," "acceptable belief," or "dangerous absolutism" is exercised overwhelmingly by white liberal actors who nonetheless experience themselves as neutral arbiters. The fact that these attacks and infiltrations disproportionately come from *white liberal men* is not incidental. It reflects a deeper structure in which *hermeneutic sovereignty*—the power to interpret, classify, and domesticate—is racially coded as universal reason. By refusing to recognize itself as a racialized and historically situated order, white liberalism converts its particularity into universality and its dominance into common sense. What appears as reasoned moderation is in fact the enforcement of an unmarked norm, one that renders non-liberal juridical traditions intelligible only insofar as they can be reframed within liberal horizons of meaning. Any remainder—any claim that resists translation—is not debated but managed, sidelined, or pathologized. In this way, liberalism's self-presentation as post-racial and post-colonial becomes the very mechanism through which racial hierarchy and colonial authority persist, now disguised as epistemic hygiene rather than overt rule.

The Bayān, by refusing this conversion, exposes the fragility of liberal innocence. It does not ask to be recognized as one worldview among others, nor does it submit its claims to liberal arbitration. Instead, it names a different ground of normativity altogether, one that does not derive legitimacy from consensus, procedure, or inclusion. This refusal is what provokes such disproportionate anxiety and hostility, for it threatens to unmask the liberal order's concealed sovereign function: the power to decide, unilaterally and without acknowledgment, which forms of life may appear as reasonable, which may be tolerated as

cultural residue, and which must be neutralized in the name of peace. In confronting the Bayān, liberalism does not encounter extremism; it encounters the limits of its own authority—and responds, predictably, by denying that any authority is being exercised at all. The Bayān further exposes liberalism not because it is reactionary, but because it is *non-assimilable*. It refuses translation into liberal categories. It refuses domestication. It refuses to surrender its claim to legislate reality. The liberal epistemic order responds as it always does when faced with such refusal: by declaring itself neutral, denying power, and *attempting capture through inclusion*. What is revealed in this encounter is not any extremism falsely attributed to the Bayān, but the limits of liberal pluralism itself. Liberalism cannot tolerate difference unless it come with a white mask. It cannot tolerate sovereignty unless it is a *sovereignty it controls*. And it cannot admit that its epistemic intolerance is structured by race, power, and colonial inheritance—because to do so would require it to abandon the fiction of its own innocence, of which it is not.

A Fanonian Indictment of White Settler Epistemology in recent framings[8]

Now, what has presented itself as "independent investigation" in some recent framings is, in fact, a ritualized tribunal. The form is familiar: the declarative opening, the confident posture of neutrality, the immediate naming of a defendant, and the swift movement from description to judgment. Frantz Fanon taught us to read such scenes not for what they claim to be, but for what they *do*. They do not investigate; they authorize. They do not inquire; they classify. The episode under consideration stages authority as a given and difference as a problem. It installs a frame in which a racialized, non-Western intellectual is rendered legible only as pathology, danger, or fraud. The episode's hosts—three white men situated within US and Canadian settler formations—never name their own location. Their authority is presumed, unmarked, universal. Fanon's work insists that this presumption is itself the signature of colonial power: the colonizer does not speak *from* somewhere; he speaks *as* the norm. The colonized subject, by contrast, is made hyper-local, hyper-biographical, and hyper-suspect. We read such episodes through Fanon's analytic of colonial reason, treating them not as a series of opinions but as a coherent discursive apparatus—one that reproduces racial hierarchy, settler innocence, and the moralization of coercion.

Fanon described the colonial gaze as a one-way mirror.[9] The colonizer sees and judges; he is not, in turn, seen. In the episode, the speakers adopt precisely this position. Their biographical authority, institutional affiliations, and historical inheritances remain unexamined, while the target is rendered exhaustively visible: named, labeled, diagnosed, and narrated. The gaze operates through naming. To name is to fix. Labels such as "cult leader," "authoritarian," or "dangerous" are not arguments; they are acts of enclosure. Fanon warned that colonial discourse prefers labels to explanations because *labels foreclose politics.* Once the subject is named as pathology, his claims no longer require refutation; they require management. The asymmetry is decisive. The hosts' own societies—built on Indigenous dispossession, racial capitalism, and imperial war—are absent from the frame. Their location disappears into universality. This is not an oversight; it is a technique. Colonial power functions by rendering itself invisible while rendering the other hyper-visible.

A recurring motif in the episode is the civilizational timeline: Europe as present, the Muslim world as past; the West as mature, the non-West as belated. Fanon identified this move as "colonial time,"[10] a temporal hierarchy that converts historical contingency into racial destiny. Such claims do not merely misread history; they perform domination. By asserting that entire regions or traditions are "behind," the speaker grants himself the right to instruct, correct, and judge. The language of inevitability—"they will eventually secularize," "they must pass through enlightenment"—naturalizes intervention and contempt alike. What is striking is the absence of reflexivity. The speakers do not apply the same temporal scrutiny to their own societies: mass incarceration, racialized policing, settler violence, and imperial warfare do not trouble the narrative of Western maturity. Fanon insisted that this selective temporality is the hallmark of colonial ideology: progress is a mirror that reflects only outward.[11]

Fanon's clinical training led him to a crucial insight: colonial power medicalizes dissent. When political opposition cannot be answered on its merits, it is reframed as illness. The episode's repeated invocations of *narcissism*, *sociopathy*, and *psychological instability* enact this very move. These are not diagnoses grounded in evidence; they are moral technologies. They translate disagreement into disorder and justify exclusion as care. Once the subject is pathologized, coercion becomes treatment, silencing becomes

protection, and erasure becomes hygiene. The danger of this move lies in its plausibility. Psychological language carries the aura of science. Fanon warned that, under colonial conditions, such language is routinely conscripted to serve domination. The episode demonstrates this conscription with unsettling clarity.

Another of the key manoeuvres is the conflation of anti-Zionism with antisemitism. Fanon would recognize this as a disciplinary strategy: transform a political critique into a moral transgression. By recoding opposition to a settler state as racial hatred, the speaker forecloses debate and authorizes sanction. This move is particularly revealing given the speakers' own settler locations. Speaking from states founded on Indigenous dispossession, they position themselves as arbiters of acceptable critique while leaving the settler structure itself unexamined. Antisemitism here functions not as an ethical concern but as a *speech-policing device*—one that immunizes a colonial project from structural analysis. Fanon insisted that colonial power thrives on such inversions. The colonizer portrays himself as the victim of the colonized subject's speech, even as he wields institutional power to discipline that speech.

Now, beside the fact the Chris Bennett's false allegations were decisively refuted one by one in *Against the Postmodern Germ* (2025), another recurring pattern is in that episode is epistemic dismissal. Knowledge is deemed *legitimate only* when it appears within Western circuits of validation. When a claim cannot be located by the speaker within his familiar archives, it is treated as suspect or fraudulent. Fanon named this dynamic *epistemic racism*: the refusal to recognize non-Western modes of knowledge production as authoritative. Oral transmission, non-English sources, and non-institutional archives are rendered invisible. The colonizer's ignorance becomes the measure of reality. This is not merely an intellectual failure; it is *a political act*. It reasserts Western monopoly over truth and casts the colonized subject as perpetually on trial before an unreachable standard. But what it does do is further prove my contention regarding Bennett's unmitigated racism.

Throughout the episode, the speakers perform moral concern: protecting victims, preventing harm, exposing danger. Fanon cautioned that colonial violence often dresses itself in the language of benevolence. The claim to protect is the pretext to dominate. Crucially, unless they these three perpetrators consider themselves as victims, no concrete victims are identified, no specific harms substantiated. The rhetoric operates at the level of

atmosphere and insinuation. This vagueness is not accidental; it allows fear to circulate without accountability. Settler innocence is preserved through this performance. The speaker becomes the guardian of order, never the agent of coercion. Fanon argued that such innocence is the ideological linchpin of colonial rule.

The episode then culminates in a declaration of exposure: the promise to reveal, unmask, and end a supposed threat. Fanon recognized this ritual as a precursor to silencing. Exposure here does not mean illumination; it means neutralization. The language of ending—"*this ends now*"—is especially telling. It signals a desire not to debate but to terminate. The target is no longer a speaker but *a problem to be resolved*. This is the moment where discourse shades into coercion. At no point do the speakers interrogate their own racial positioning. Whiteness operates as the *silent guarantor* of reason. Fanon emphasized that whiteness under colonialism functions precisely through this silence. It is the background against which all others are judged. By refusing to name their own inheritance, the speakers *reproduce the very hierarchy they deny*. Their critique masquerades as universal while remaining profoundly situated.

Fanon warned that colonial societies are haunted by the violence they deny.[12] When confronted with voices that expose structural injustice, they respond with projection, pathologization, and moral panic. The episode exemplifies this dynamic with almost textbook clarity. The intensity of the denunciation far exceeds the evidence offered. This excess is itself *a symptom*. It betrays a*nxiety*—not about the target's danger, but about the fragility of the order being defended. Read through a Fanonian lens, the episode is not an aberration but a condensation of colonial reason. It mobilizes temporal hierarchy, psychological pathologization, epistemic exclusion, and moralized threat to discipline a racialized other. Fanon did not write merely to diagnose such formations; he wrote to insist on their contestation. To name this discourse as colonial is not to indulge rhetoric; it is to clarify the stakes. What is at issue is not a disagreement of opinions but the reproduction of a world in which some speak as judges and others as defendants. The task, Fanon insisted, is not to seek inclusion within such a world, but to remake it. That work begins by refusing the tribunal—and by exposing the colonial grammar that sustains it.

Nightmare, Judgment, and the Refusal of Innocence

What emerges from this constellation—Malcolm X's indictment, Fanon's analytics of colonial reason, Polanyi's diagnosis of fictitious commodities, and the Bayān's juridical rupture—is not a plea for recognition but a refusal of innocence. The nightmare Malcolm X names is not a failure of liberal ideals to be realized; it is the realization of those ideals within a world whose economic ontology requires dispossession, racialization, and the commodification of life itself. Liberalism dreams of equality while standing on a foundation that cannot sustain it. The nightmare is not hypocrisy alone, but structural necessity. A system that treats land, labor, and life as alienable must generate hierarchies of value; it must decide who may be protected and who may be extracted; it must racialize in order to function. Malcolm's fury is therefore not excess. It is *precision*. He names a world whose violence is not episodic but systemic, not accidental but constitutive.

Fanon teaches us why this violence is so often denied. Colonial domination survives not merely through force, but through epistemology—through the production of a reality in which the colonizer experiences himself as neutral, benevolent, and universal. Liberal reason becomes the grammar through which domination speaks without confessing itself. The tribunal replaces the battlefield; diagnosis replaces refutation; care replaces coercion. In this world, the colonized subject is never simply wrong—he is unwell, dangerous, opaque, or unreasonable. What Fanon unmasks is not merely racism as prejudice, but *whiteness as an unmarked position of hermeneutic sovereignty*: the power to decide what counts as reason, safety, extremism, or truth while denying that any such power is being exercised. This denial is the ideological core of settler innocence. Polanyi, for his part, allows us to see why this innocence is materially impossible. The liberal order rests on a foundational fiction: that land, labor, and money can be treated as commodities without tearing society apart. Liberal pluralism then appears as the ethical supplement to this fiction. It promises tolerance and diversity after the material world has already been abstracted, priced, and owned. Difference is welcomed only once the conditions of existence have been rendered alienable. In this sense, pluralism is not the opposite of domination but one of its refinements. It tolerates identities, cultures, and beliefs so long as they do not assert limits on exchange, ownership, or accumulation. What it cannot tolerate is inalienability. What it cannot tolerate is law that refuses the market.

This is precisely where the Bayān intervenes—not as metaphor, not as spirituality, not as cultural expression, but as *ontological sabotage*. Its prohibition on the buying and selling of the Four Elements strikes at the heart of capitalist modernity. It abolishes fictitious commodities at their root. It declares that the world itself—earth, water, air, fire—is not for sale. In doing so, it renders impossible the economic logic that produces racial hierarchy while denying race. You cannot commodify land without dispossessing those bound to it. You cannot commodify labor without ranking bodies. You cannot commodify life without deciding whose lives matter. The Bayān collapses these calculations by refusing their premise. It does not seek reform or inclusion. It declares the economic ontology of liberal capitalism void. This is why the Bayān provokes such disproportionate anxiety within liberal epistemic orders. It cannot be pluralized, because it cannot be priced. It cannot be translated, because it refuses the categories that would neutralize it. Liberalism responds as it always does when confronted with non-assimilable law: denunciation, reinterpretation, capture. The tradition is first declared dangerous, then aestheticized, then domesticated through intermediaries who promise inclusion at the cost of juridical force. Throughout, race and power are denied. The authority to judge remains unmarked. Whiteness continues to speak as universality. Fanon warned us that this is how colonial power reproduces itself in postcolonial form—not through overt domination, but through epistemic hygiene.

Read in this light, Malcolm X's "*I Have a Nightmare*" and the Bayān's law converge on the same truth from different registers. Malcolm names the nightmare at the level of lived political economy: democracy without sovereignty, inclusion without restitution, rights without land. The Bayān names the judgment at the level of Being: you may not buy or sell the conditions of life. Where liberalism responds to the nightmare with dreams—dreams of better representation, better inclusion, better management—the Bayān responds with rupture. It refuses the marketization that made the nightmare inevitable. This refusal is not hatred. It is not fanaticism. It is judgment. It names a limit beyond which tolerance becomes complicity and pluralism becomes an alibi for extraction. What is finally at stake here is not a disagreement of opinions, nor a clash of cultures, nor a dispute about tone. It is a confrontation between two ontologies. On one side stands a liberal-capitalist order that universalizes itself while denying its racialized foundations, that commodifies the world

while speaking the language of care, that governs through tribunals while insisting it governs no one. On the other stands a law that refuses alienability, that insists on inalienability as a condition of justice, and that exposes the fiction of liberal innocence by naming what liberalism cannot acknowledge: that peace, harmony, and democracy cannot exist where the world itself is for sale. Malcolm's nightmare is thus not answered by liberal dreams. It is answered only by judgment—by the refusal of a world organized around commodification, extraction, and racial hierarchy. The Bayān does not ask permission to make this refusal intelligible. It does not seek recognition from the tribunal. It simply legislates otherwise. And it is precisely this—this refusal to translate itself into the grammar of liberal reason—that reveals the limits of liberal pluralism, the persistence of colonial epistemology, and the truth Fanon never tired of repeating: that liberation begins not with inclusion, but with the dismantling of the world that made exclusion necessary in the first place—and that means the complete ontological dismantling of white liberalism itself.

Notes

[1] The following essay is an augmentation of a blogpost by the same title from December 2025, online, https://wahidazal303.blogspot.com/2025/12/a-bayani-commentary-on-malcolm-xs-i.html (retrieved 14 January 2026).

[2] In Cedric D. Burrows *Rhetorical Crossover: The Black Presence in White Culture* (2020): 90-1.

[3] Fanon's critique of colonialism emphasizes that colonial power is not only exercised through overt violence or legal structures but is also internalized in how identities and social reality are constituted. In ***Black Skin, White Masks*** (1952), Fanon examines how the colonized subject is caught within a psychological and epistemic framework imposed by the colonial order, producing a lived reality in which the colonizer's categories define the conditions of existence and recognition.

[4] ***Black Skin, White Masks*** (1952), *passim*.

[5] See the ***Wretched of the Earth*** (1961), *passim*.

[6] The following essay is an augmentation of a blogpost by the same title from December 2025, online, https://wahidazal303.blogspot.com/2025/12/attempted-liberal-capture-of-bayan.html (retrieved 14 January 2026).

[7] In ***Black Skin, White Masks*** (1952), *passim*.

[8] Adapted from this substack https://wahidazal66.substack.com/p/a-fanonian-indictment-of-white-settler (retrieved 19 January 2026).

[9] ***Black Skin, White Masks*** (1952), *passim*.

[10] See Onni Ahvonen "*'I am not a prisoner of history': Frantz Fanon, temporal defiance, and the critique of colonial time," Review of African Political Economy* (2025): 1-12.

[11] Ibid.

[12] "*...colonialism is not a thinking machine, nor a body endowed with reasoning faculties. It is violence in its natural state, and it will only yield when confronted with greater violence...*", ***The Wretched of the Earth*** (1961): 61.

4

A Note on Rousseau and the Bayān

A Dialogue on Property, Law, and the Origin of Inequality[1]

Jean-Jacques Rousseau (d. 1778) begins the *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality* (1755) with a scene that still unsettles modern political thought. He opens with this famous scene:

> *The first man who, having enclosed a piece of ground, bethought himself of saying "This is mine," and found people simple enough to believe him, was the true founder of civil society.*[2]

With that gesture, Rousseau tells us, society is born—and with it inequality, domination, and moral corruption spanning the entire human experience. This is not an incidental remark. It is the conceptual fulcrum of the entire work. Rousseau knows that the juridical recognition of property, especially land, is the decisive rupture that transforms natural difference into structural inequality. Yet Rousseau never quite follows this insight to its conclusion. He exposes the crime, but he cannot abolish the law that ratifies it. His critique stops at moral denunciation and historical diagnosis. The Bayān does not stop there. It legislates where Rousseau hesitates. Imagine, then, a dialogue not between two men, but between two logics: Rousseau's liberal-republican critique of inequality and the Bayān's juridical-ontological prohibition on the buying and selling of the Four Elements.

Rousseau would immediately recognize the Bayān as answering the question he posed but could not resolve. When the Bayān declares that Air, Fire, Water, and earth may not be bought or sold, it strikes directly at the moment Rousseau identifies as the origin of corruption. It prevents enclosure from ever acquiring legal force. It renders the founding lie—"*this is mine*"—juridically void before it can become socially binding. Where Rousseau imagines a warning cry that history never heard, the Bayān makes the warning into law. But this is precisely where Rousseau would recoil. For Rousseau, legitimate law must arise from the general will. Even when he condemns property as the source of inequality, he still assumes that law is ultimately a product of human convention and collective consent. The Bayān violates this assumption. It does not ask whether the people agree to the inalienability of the elements. It does not negotiate with appetite, habit, or interest. It establishes a limit on contract itself. Certain things are placed beyond exchange not because society has chosen so, but because exchange itself is declared illegitimate at that level of being.

Rousseau would object that such a law risks tyranny. How can freedom survive if limits are imposed prior to consent? How can legitimacy exist without deliberation? These are sincere questions within Rousseau's framework. But they also reveal the boundary he cannot cross. Rousseau remains committed to a political ontology in which everything, including the earth, is ultimately negotiable through the social contract. The Bayān rejects that ontology outright. It asserts that there are domains where consent cannot authorize alienation without destroying the very conditions of human life and equality. This is the decisive philosophical divergence. Rousseau believes inequality arises because humans *mistakenly* consented to property. The Bayān understands inequality as arising because property was ever permitted to become a juridical possibility in the first place. Rousseau hopes for a virtuous republic that restrains excess after the fact. The Bayān precludes the excess by foreclosing its legal ground.

From this perspective, the Bayān resolves the conundrum that haunts Rousseau's opening pages. Rousseau knows that once land is enclosed, no amount of moral exhortation can undo the damage. Civil society is born already corrupted. The Bayān refuses to allow that birth to occur. It does not attempt to repair inequality downstream; it damns its source. So if Rousseau were forced to confront this resolution honestly, he would have to admit

that his critique remains incomplete. He diagnoses inequality with unparalleled clarity, yet remains bound to a liberal horizon in which property must be reformed rather than abolished at the ontological level. The Bayān completes his insight by abandoning that horizon altogether. It does not seek a better social contract; it declares certain contracts null and void at the outset. This is why the Bayān remains unintelligible, even threatening, to modern liberal thought. Liberalism—of which Rousseau is a foundational critic and contributor—cannot accept inalienability without consent. Capitalism, as liberalism's highest stage, cannot tolerate limits on exchange that are not justified in market or procedural terms. The Bayān's ordinance against buying and selling the Four Elements therefore appears not merely radical, but irrational, authoritarian, or dangerous. Yet from Rousseau's own starting point, it is the only coherent answer. If inequality begins when the earth becomes property, then equality can only exist where the earth is not for sale. Rousseau sees the wound; the Bayān closes it. Rousseau remains the great diagnostician of modern domination. The Bayān is its surgeon. The tragedy of modernity is not that Rousseau was wrong, but that his insight was never allowed to become law. The Bayān shows what such a law would look like—and why the world built on enclosure recoils from it with such violence and so why the "liberal white man" (let alone his conservative or libertarian brothers) is its greatest enemy.

Bahāʾuʾllāh's About Face

The contrast between the Bayān's prohibition on the buying and selling of the Four Elements and Bahāʾuʾllāh's affirmation of private property in the *Kitāb-i-Aqdas* marks not a minor juridical divergence but a *civilizational rupture*. Where the Bayān locates injustice at the level of ontology—treating the commodification of earth, water, air, and fire as the primordial crime—Bahāʾuʾllāh's legal framework accepts private property as a legitimate and morally regulable institution. This acceptance immediately situates the *Aqdas* within a world already shaped by market relations, rather than against them. In the *Aqdas*, private property is not merely tolerated but sanctified through regulation: inheritance laws, penalties for theft, and protections for ownership presume the legitimacy of alienable goods, land, and wealth. Inequality is addressed ethically—through exhortations to justice, charity, moderation, and obedience—rather than structurally. The problem is no longer

that the world has been rendered sellable, but that individuals might misuse what they own. In this sense, the *Aqdas* mirrors a familiar pattern in post-Enlightenment moral economy: property is naturalized, while virtue is tasked with mitigating its excesses. Capital is not questioned at its root; it is moralized.

From a Bayānī perspective, this is not a neutral shift but a *negation*. The Bayān does not view inequality as a consequence of moral failure within an otherwise legitimate property regime; it understands inequality as the *inevitable product* of allowing the elements themselves to enter circulation. Once land can be owned, water priced, air enclosed, and fire industrialized, no amount of ethical instruction can prevent domination from reasserting itself. The Bayān therefore refuses the entire framework within which "ethical capitalism" becomes thinkable. It does not seek kinder proprietors; it abolishes proprietorship at the elemental level. This difference has far-reaching implications. Bahāʾuʾllāh's affirmation of private property makes possible a theology that can coexist comfortably with capitalist modernity, colonial administration, and liberal legal orders. It allows the faith to be translated into a universalist ethic compatible with market society, state sovereignty, and gradual reform. The Bayān, by contrast, cannot be so translated. Its law is not reformist but preclusive. It renders illegitimate the very mechanisms—enclosure, extraction, accumulation—upon which capitalist civilization depends. For this reason, the Bayān appears ungovernable, excessive, and dangerous to later systems seeking accommodation with global power.

Seen in this light, the divergence between the Bayān and the *Aqdas* is not simply theological succession but ***counter-revolution***. Where the Bayān articulates a juridical ontology hostile to exchange as such, the *Aqdas* reconciles revelation with a world already organized by property and capital. The former announces a break with the logic of civilization as it has come to be; the latter institutes a religion that can survive—and even flourish—within it. That this reconciliation requires the abandonment of the Bayānī prohibition on elemental commodification is not accidental. It is the price of admission into the modern world. This is why, from a Bayānī standpoint, Bahāʾuʾllāh's property regime cannot be read as a development or clarification, but only as a reversal. It restores precisely what the Bayān sought to make impossible: a world in which the earth may again be owned, traded, inherited, and exploited—albeit under the supposed sign of divine law. The Bayān

names that world as already fallen. The *Aqdas* accepts it as the field of action. In doing so, it shifts Revelation from an act of rupture into an act of accommodation, transforming law from a weapon against domination into a framework for managing it. What the Bayān forecloses as ontologically illicit, the *Aqdas* re-legitimates as morally governable. This is not continuity but *inversion:* a movement from prohibition to permission, from inalienability to regulation, and from a cosmology of refusal to a theology of survival within the existing order.

And this is, among other reasons, why Bahāʾism once appealed so strongly to elite and middle-class white Anglo-European audiences while the Bayān did not—because it mirrors their own self-conception within the modern world. Bahā'ism offers a universalist ethic that sanctifies property, moralizes accumulation, and frames global dominance as benevolent stewardship rather than structural extraction. It allows those already positioned advantageously within the capitalist world-system to see themselves as agents of unity, peace, and progress without interrogating the material conditions that make such self-images possible. The Bayān, by contrast, refuses this recognition. By naming the commodification of the elements as ontologically illicit, it exposes the violence beneath civilizational order and denies the moral alibi through which domination is reimagined as humanitarianism. It does not flatter the modern subject; it indicts the world that produced him. To these white privileged Anglo-European elites and bourgeoisie, Bahāʾism reflected back to them a purified image of their own historical role—universal, rational, managerial—while evacuating the question of extraction and enclosure that made that role possible. The Bayān offers no such mirror. It strips modern power of its moral cosmetics and names the global order not as incomplete unity, but as organized dispossession.

Conclusion

Taken together, the comparison with Rousseau and the contrast with the *kitāb-i-aqdas* clarify what is truly at issue in the Bayān's ordinance against the buying and selling of the Four Elements. This ordinance is not an ethical recommendation, a symbolic gesture, or a critique of excess. It is a juridical and ontological refusal of the world that modernity has built. Where Rousseau exposes the moment of enclosure as the origin of inequality but lacks

the conceptual means to prevent its repetition, the Bayān intervenes decisively by removing enclosure itself from the domain of lawful possibility. It does not lament the rise of property; it forecloses its elemental foundation. In doing so, it resolves the very paradox Rousseau inaugurates: how inequality becomes structurally inevitable once the earth enters circulation. The contrast with Bahāʾuʾllāh's affirmation of private property in the *Aqdas* further sharpens this point. The *Aqdas* accepts the world as already constituted by ownership, exchange, and accumulation, and seeks to regulate these forces through moral discipline, legal order, and exhortations to justice. In this framework, inequality is treated as an ethical problem arising from misuse, not as an ontological consequence of commodification itself. The Bayān rejects this premise outright. From a Bayānī standpoint, no amount of moral refinement can redeem a system that permits land, water, air, and fire to be owned, traded, and inherited. To sanctify private property is therefore not a neutral accommodation but a negation of the Bayān's foundational insight.

What emerges from these two sections is a stark choice between incompatible civilizational logics. Rousseau's critique remains trapped within liberalism's horizon, unable to legislate the limits it knows are necessary. The *Aqdas* reconciles Revelation with a capitalist world by accepting property as a given and seeking justice within it. The Bayān alone refuses the grammar shared by both: that the world is fundamentally alienable. Its ordinance against the commodification of the Four Elements is not ancillary to its vision but constitutive of it. It names the point at which liberalism, capitalism, and moralized religion all converge—and draws a line they cannot cross. This is why the Bayān remains irreducible, unassimilable, and persistently unsettling. It does not offer a better version of modern society, nor a more compassionate capitalism. It announces that the foundational act of that society—the conversion of the world into property—is itself illegitimate. In doing so, it exposes the limits of reformist critique and ethical accommodation alike. Rousseau diagnoses the wound; the *Aqdas* dresses it; the Bayān cauterizes it. And for a world built on exchange, that act can only appear as an affront.

Notes

[1] The following essay is an augmentation of a blogpost by the same title from December 2025, online, https://wahidazal303.blogspot.com/2025/12/a-note-on-rousseau-and-bayan-dialogue.html (retrieved 14 January 2026).

[2] Translated by G. D. H. Cole (2005): 33.

5

The Four Elements and the End of Political Economy

The Bayān versus Marxism[1]

Do not buy or sell the Four Elements ~ 11th Gate of the Ninth Unity.

لَا تَبِيعُونَ عَنَاصِرَ الرُّبَاعِ وَلَا تَشْتَرُونَهَا

The quintessence of this Gate is this, that God, the Knower—exalted be Its Name—from the infinite grace of Its endless Being, created the fourfold elements (ʿanāṣir-i rubāʿ) for the sake of Its creation, and rendered them lawful; yet in the Bayān He forbade (nahy farmūda) their buying and selling...

*As for earth (khāk), which is the lowest rank of the elements and pure annihilation beneath your feet, He forbade its buying and selling. Likewise, He caused water (āb) to flow for the sake of the elevation and inviolability of your selves, and as the cause of manifest life in your bodies; and every thing in the world is nurtured into existence within the domain of being by means of it. He therefore sought that it be administered by you without price (min dūn-i bahā), and that it not enter into buying and selling. For how grievous it is that the substance of the life of creation should be outwardly sold for **dinar**s, and that a base creature should derive enjoyment from it.*

Likewise fire (ātash), and the other element, air (hawāʾ)…Yet since the other three elements have entered into buying and selling, the element of air too is reckoned among their indivisible part (juzʾ-i lā-yatajazzā). And outwardly, the beholding of the breath (dīdan-i nafas) and that which causes the blowing of the wind—indeed, some people exchange the seeing of their own breaths for a wage. He therefore sought that people expend their breaths in the path of God. And whenever they go to the bedside of the sick to recite and to breathe, they should not assign a wage for themselves.

And whenever it is said outwardly that these elements—among them earth and water—are made available without price, yet that they are not carried without recompense, or that one takes payment for water and earth: in such a case, a wage is assigned for the bringer and the remover, so that it be without price—that is, not that the earth is sold for that sum, nor the water; rather, for the sake of the labor of the water-carrier and the bringer of earth, a wage is assigned to them. Likewise fire: whenever there is need of it on ships, some do not give it freely without price…

How many souls have taken large sums as the wage for a single breath, and have set the wage for recitation and breathing as outward dinars; and have sold water, in certain times and places, for what prices—while God, exalted be It, has placed these seas of water, rivers, valleys, streams, springs, and mountains for the sake of Its creation, so that they might partake of Its infinite mercy and be sustained by limitless effusions…

…Whenever they behold the course of the Will within the Temple of the Volition, and the five attachments related thereunto in the very soul of the Decree/Book; and when they consider that the elements are not sold outwardly and that the rank of air is not visible, it is forbidden that souls—who are the totality of the elements—enter absolutely into buying and selling.

The people of the Bayān must absolutely refrain from this act: they must not buy or sell the human soul. This is the true prohibition in the matter of the elements…[2]

The Bayān's prohibition on the buying and selling of the Four Elements—Air, Fire, Water, and Earth—must be understood as a juridical act that precedes political economy altogether. Unlike Marxism, which intervenes at the level of production, labor, and exchange, this ordinance intervenes at the level of Being. It does not critique exploitation as unjust; it renders commodification itself ontologically void. What Marx exposes as alienation, the Bayān identifies as metaphysical imposture. This point of view holds capitalism not merely immoral or unequal. Instead, it holds it to be founded on a false claim about what may be owned. Where Marxism interrogates the distribution of value, the Bayān revokes the right to posit value in the first place with respect to the elemental conditions of existence.

This is because Marxism remains bound to a materialist grammar in which nature appears as raw substrate—external to the worker, appropriable through labor, and historically mediated through class struggle. Even its most ecological variants preserve this assumption, imagining a rational or equitable administration of nature rather than questioning the premise of administration itself.[3] The Bayān does something categorically different. It declares the elements to be *pre-legal ontic trusts*: unownable, unexchangeable, and anterior to every regime of value. Their sale is not exploitation; it is a metaphysical falsehood, a claim upon being that cannot, in truth, exist. This is why the prohibition is absolute rather than reformist. It does not regulate extraction; it annuls the ontology that makes extraction intelligible. This distinction exposes the limits of classical Marxist revolutionary subjectivity. Marxism produces a historical subject—*the proletariat*—defined by its relation to production and oriented toward a future liberation deferred through revolutionary time.[4] The Bayān produces no such subject. The subject formed by its ordinance is already positioned outside the grammar of exchange. Liberation is not postponed until after the seizure of the means of production; it is instituted immediately through ontological withdrawal. One does not wait to be free. One stands where freedom has already been declared as law, because the conditions that would bind one—air, water, land, fire—have been removed from the market altogether. Law itself thus undergoes a fundamental transformation. In Marxist analysis, law is superstructure, an ideological reflection of material relations, destined either to be abolished or temporarily repurposed after revolution. In the Bayān, law is not superstructural but ontic. It names what cannot

be. The buying and selling of the elements is not prohibited because it is socially harmful, but because it is *unreal*—an ontological contradiction masquerading as legality. This is why the ordinance does not seek recognition from existing institutions. It does not argue with them. It renders them conceptually obsolete by exposing the metaphysical lie on which they stand.

This ontological intervention also explains why the Bayān does not theoretically require revolutionary violence in the Marxist sense. Marxism must seize the means of production because it accepts the terrain on which production is organized. The Bayān erases that terrain altogether. It does not fight capitalism on its own terms; it withdraws the metaphysical legitimacy that allows those terms to exist. Capitalism is not simply overthrown here; it is invalidated. Its violence is revealed not as historical necessity but as *metaphysical usurpation*. What remains is not a battlefield, but an exposed void, even if the means of production are to be physically seized at some time.

The racial dimension of this move is decisive. Marxism treats race as historically contingent, instrumental to capital, and ultimately secondary to class—an approach that even Fanon had to rupture from within. The Bayān requires no such supplementation. By prohibiting the commodification of the elements, it directly disables the material infrastructure of racial capitalism: enclosure, plantation logic, extractive colonialism, atmospheric control, water privatization, and land theft. These are not accidental features of capitalism; they are its racialized technologies of world-making. The Bayān does not analyze racism; it prevents its conditions of possibility from forming. Racial capitalism thus becomes not merely unjust, but *ontologically illegal*. At this point, the contrast with Polanyi, degrowth theory, and eco-socialism becomes unavoidable.[5] Polanyi famously argued that land, labor, and money are "fictitious commodities,"[6] and that society periodically attempts to re-embed markets through protective counter-movements. Yet Polanyi never exits the frame of market society itself. He laments commodification while presupposing its conceptual legitimacy, seeking balance rather than abolition. Degrowth theory, similarly, critiques endless accumulation and advocates reduced consumption, localized economies, and ecological restraint—but it leaves untouched the fundamental premise that nature is a resource to be managed more gently. Eco-socialism improves the ethics of administration without challenging the ontology of administration itself.

The Bayān surpasses all of these by refusing the category of commodity outright. It does not seek to re-embed markets, slow growth, or socialize extraction. It abolishes the very idea that the elemental conditions of life can enter exchange at all. There is no "green" version of selling air, no just form of water markets, no equitable privatization of land. These practices are not excessive; they are false. Where Polanyi hopes society will correct itself, and eco-socialism hopes humanity will mature, the Bayān issues an immediate metaphysical judgement: *this shall not exist*. This is precisely what the corporate state cannot recognize—let alone the Bayānic subject—as legitimate. Administrative consciousness is structurally incapable of encountering an ontology that does not seek reform, recognition, or inclusion. The corporate state operates through risk assessment, procedural legitimacy, and managed dissent. It can negotiate demands. It can absorb critique. It can even tolerate radical rhetoric, provided it remains within the grammar of policy, rights, and future reform. What it cannot process is an ontological refusal that invalidates its foundational assumptions. This is because Bayānic subject does not request rights to air, water, land, or life. He or she denies the state's authority to distribute them as *metaphysical axiom*. He or she does not argue that privatization is harmful; he or she declares it *metaphysically impossible*. From the perspective of administrative systems, such a subject appears unintelligible, excessive, or dangerous—not because he or she is violent, but because he or she stands outside the coordinates through which legitimacy is calculated. The system cannot classify him or her as stakeholder, complainant, or reformer. He or she does not fit any workflow. He or she represents a category error. In this sense, the Bayān does what neither Marxism nor its ecological descendants can do. Marxism dreams of a redeemed future. Degrowth imagines a gentler present. The Bayān judges now. It does not await historical maturation, cultural enlightenment, or institutional reform. It names, in law, what accords with being and what does not. Capitalism, racial domination, and administrative sovereignty are not defeated through struggle here; they are declared void at the level where they never had the right to arise. What remains, then, is not a program but a verdict. Not a movement but a rupture. Not a critique of the world, but a *re-naming* of what may exist within it. And this is why the Bayān is not simply post-Marxist, eco-socialist, or degrowth-adjacent. It is something beyond.

The Ontological Contrast

Now, the partial translation of the passage we cited above from Ṣubḥ-i-Azal's ***Continuation of the Persian Bayān*** opens by establishing an ontological asymmetry that Marxism never reaches: the Four Elements are created *for the sake of creation*, rendered lawful in their use, yet forbidden in their commodification. This distinction is decisive. The Bayān does not oppose use, administration, or mediation; it opposes *exchange-value itself* at the elemental level. Marx critiques exploitation within exchange; the Bayān *revokes exchange as a category* where the conditions of existence are concerned. The elements are lawful because life requires them, but their sale is forbidden because sale presupposes *alienability*—and alienability, here, is metaphysically false. The prohibition is therefore not moralistic but ontological: what sustains being cannot itself be made an object of *being-for-sale*.

Earth is named first precisely because it is "*the lowest rank of the elements and pure annihilation beneath your feet*." This is not a denigration of matter, but a metaphysical placement. Earth is the site of extinction, dissolution, and return; to sell it is to claim ownership over annihilation itself. Marxism treats land as a factor of production whose enclosure produces class relations.[7] The Bayān goes further: land-sale is not merely the origin of exploitation, but a *false assertion of mastery over finitude*. To sell earth is to pretend that death, decay, and return can be priced. This is why the prohibition is absolute, not historical. No future society may legitimately sell earth, because no society owns annihilation. Water then appears not as "natural resource" but as *the substance of manifest life*, the medium through which everything "*is nurtured into existence within the domain of being*." Marx recognizes water only indirectly, as part of material conditions.[8] The Bayān names water as *ontologically prior* to all production. It therefore demands that water be administered "without price." Administration is permitted; commodification is forbidden. This distinction annihilates the capitalist fiction that infrastructure, logistics, or scarcity can convert life itself into a commodity. The horror expressed—"*how grievous it is that the substance of the life of creation should be outwardly sold for dinars*"—is not sentimental. It is metaphysical outrage: life is being treated as a surface phenomenon, while its ontological depth is ignored. Fire and air extend this logic into subtler domains that Marxism cannot reach at all. Fire is energy, transformation, heat—the basis of industry and motion. Air is breath, invisibility, circulation, life itself. The Bayān's brilliance is to notice that once the

other elements are commodified, air too is drawn into the market, even though it cannot be seen. This is an early diagnosis of what we would now call atmospheric capitalism: the monetization of circulation, respiration, attention, vitality. Marx could analyze the sale of labor-power; the Bayān identifies something deeper and more terrifying—the sale of *breath itself*. When "*some people exchange the seeing of their own breaths for a wage*," the critique is no longer economic but ontological: being has been converted into *performance-for-pay*.

The instruction that people should "*expend their breaths in the path of God*" rather than for wages is not pietistic. It is an anti-commodification axiom. Breath is the sign of life's immediacy; to monetize it is to collapse the distinction between existence and exchange. This is why even acts of healing—recitation, breathing over the sick—are forbidden from becoming wage-labor. Marxism accepts that care work can be remunerated under different relations. The Bayān refuses this entirely at the elemental level: once breath enters the market, the soul is already being priced. The passage then makes a crucial clarification that shows the Bayān is not naïve about labor. Payment may be given for *labor*—for carrying water, transporting earth, tending fire—but *never for the element itself*. This distinction annihilates the Marxist confusion between value and labor at the deepest level. Marx locates value in socially necessary labor time.[9] The Bayān says: labor may be compensated, but *value may not be posited in what sustains existence itself*. The wage belongs to the worker, not to the element. This preserves human dignity while preventing ontological theft. Capitalism collapses this distinction deliberately; Marx critiques the collapse but retains the framework. The Bayān *abolishes the framework*.

The repeated lament over souls who "have taken large sums as the wage for a single breath" pushes the analysis into explicitly spiritual–ontological territory. This is no longer about water markets or land rents. It is about the conversion of soul-functions into exchangeable services. When recitation, breath, and life-energy are sold as commodities, the soul itself has entered the market. Marxism has no conceptual tools here. It can speak of alienation, but not of *ontological prostitution*, where the very principle of life is priced. The Bayān sees this clearly and names it without euphemism. The cosmological framing—seas, rivers, valleys, streams, mountains placed for creation to partake of divine mercy—further dislocates classical Marxism. Nature is not "free gift to capital" nor "object of stewardship," but *theophanic generosity*. To sell it is not only unjust; it is a blasphemous misrecognition of

what it is. Political economy is irrelevant at this level. One is dealing with the structure of manifestation itself.

The climactic turn comes when the text links the invisibility of air and the non-sale of the elements to the prohibition on buying and selling souls. This is the decisive move Marxism cannot make. Souls are declared to be "the totality of the elements." If the elements cannot be sold, then neither can the soul. Slavery, wage-slavery, human trafficking, and the commodification of life are not social evils to be corrected by history; they are *ontological impossibilities* that no system may legitimate. This is why the passage concludes with absolute language: "*The people of the Bayān must absolutely refrain from this act*." Here the Bayān finally exposes classical Marxism's limit. Marx critiques the sale of labor-power but still accepts its legal form as historically conditioned.[10] The Bayān declares the sale of the soul—of which labor is only one outward function—*forbidden in principle*. There is no future society in which this becomes acceptable. There is no dialectical justification. This is not ethics; it is ontology legislated as law. Seen in this light, the Bayān does not merely go beyond Marxism; it renders classical Marxism partial, provisional, and metaphysically incomplete—nay, in some cases even obsolete. Marx diagnoses the sickness of capitalism correctly and precisely. The Bayān, however, revokes the possibility of the sickness altogether by forbidding the ontological error on which it depends: the conversion of the conditions of being—and ultimately of being itself—into commodities.

Bahā'ism's Counter-Revolution

Now, where the Bayān issues an ontological prohibition, Bahāʾism performs a decisive translation of metaphysical law into moral–administrative ethics. The elemental interdiction in the Bayān is not preserved as an ontic limit that annuls commodification at its root, but is quietly reabsorbed into a framework of ethical stewardship, social harmony, and progressive civilization. The Four Elements cease to function as inalienable conditions of being and are instead subsumed into a developmental narrative in which resources may be administered, priced, regulated, and redistributed so long as this occurs within a universalist moral order.[11] What is lost in this translation is precisely the Bayān's refusal of exchange itself at the elemental level. This shift corresponds to a deeper metaphysical

reorientation. In the Bayān, law speaks *prior* to history and judges it; in Bahā'ism, law is increasingly framed as *instrumental to historical progress*. The Bayānic ordinance interrupts political economy by declaring certain relations ontologically impossible. Bahāʾism, by contrast, seeks to humanize political economy through ethical norms—moderation, consultation, justice, trusteeship—without revoking its foundational grammar. Capitalism is not rendered void; it is rendered reformable. The market remains intact, now moralized rather than annulled.

The distinction becomes most visible in the question of the soul. In the Bayān, the prohibition on selling the elements culminates in an absolute interdiction on buying and selling the human soul, because the soul is the totality of the elements. This is not metaphorical language; it is an ontological identity. Bahāʾism decisively breaks this identity. The soul is elevated, spiritualized, and abstracted from material relations, while economic life proceeds according to modern administrative norms. As a result, the sale of labor-power, attention, vitality, and even life itself through bureaucratic and economic mechanisms can persist without appearing as a violation of sacred law, because the soul has been displaced into an interior, post-economic register. This displacement allows Bahāʾism to align comfortably with modern institutional forms: the nation-state, global governance, development economics, technocratic administration. Where the Bayān renders administrative sovereignty ontologically illegitimate by denying the alienability of the elements, Bahāʾism legitimates administration by sacralizing order, unity, and procedural harmony. The elemental world becomes something to be managed wisely rather than something that places absolute limits on management itself. In this sense, Bahāʾism does not confront administrative consciousness; it perfects it.

The result is a religion structurally compatible with the corporate state. Bahāʾism can critique excess, inequality, and injustice, but it cannot name commodification itself as ontological falsehood. Air may be regulated, water priced, land developed, labor exchanged, and souls mobilized for "service," all without violating the system's metaphysical assumptions. What the Bayān forbids absolutely, Bahāʾism renders conditional, ethical, and developmental. The rupture becomes a gradient. In short, where the Bayān abolishes political economy at its root by forbidding the sale of being's conditions, Bahāʾism re-enters political economy with a sanctified conscience. It replaces

ontological judgement with moral exhortation, metaphysical prohibition with administrative ethics, and immediate rupture with historical gradualism. This is not a difference of emphasis or tone; it is a difference of *metaphysical jurisdiction*. The Bayān speaks from the level where capitalism has no language. Bahāʾism speaks fluently within the world capitalism has already made. In doing so, Bahāʾism becomes legible to institutions whose power depends on managing life rather than questioning the right to do so. What it offers is not a limit to sovereignty, but a spiritual grammar through which sovereignty can recognize itself as benevolent while remaining intact.

Seen as a whole, the Bayān's prohibition on the buying and selling of the Four Elements marks a limit-point beyond which political economy cannot pass. It does not offer an alternative economic system in the structural sense, while it does imagine a purified or ethically regulated market with other ordinances. Yet it abolishes the very intelligibility of markets at the level where existence itself is at stake. Air, fire, water, and earth are not inputs, resources, or commons to be better governed; they are the preconditions of manifestation. To treat them as commodities is not just to mismanage nature, but to misunderstand being. This is why the Bayān's intervention cannot be assimilated to Marxism, eco-socialism, degrowth, or any reformist ecological paradigm. Instead, they must align with it because those traditions remain trapped within a grammar that presumes administration, mediation, and exchange as unavoidable horizons. The Bayān revokes that presumption altogether. Marxism requires history to complete what ontology cannot: justice must arrive later, after struggle, seizure, and transformation. The Bayān requires no such deferral in theory. By legislating the unexchangeability of the elements, it institutes freedom immediately, not as an outcome but as a condition. The subject formed here is not mobilized toward a future emancipation; it is already standing outside the relations that would bind it. In its initial step, freedom is not achieved by reorganizing production, but by withdrawing from the metaphysical lie that production owns its conditions. What Marxism understands as alienation, the Bayān identifies as category error.

The consequences of this move are not merely philosophical but civilizational. By invalidating the commodification of the elements, the Bayān disables the infrastructural logic of racial capitalism at its root. Enclosure, extraction, plantation economies,

atmospheric control, water markets, and land privatization are revealed not as historical contingencies or policy failures, but as ontologically illicit acts. They are not unjust distributions of value; they are false claims upon what no power may possess. In this sense, the Bayān does not oppose the corporate state as a political enemy. It exposes it as metaphysically incoherent. Administrative sovereignty cannot recognize this exposure because it presupposes the very ontology being denied. This essay therefore closes not with a call to action but with a judgment. The Bayān does not ask to be implemented, negotiated, or recognized. It does not seek inclusion within existing regimes of legality or legitimacy. It declares, in advance of all systems, what may and may not exist as law. Capitalism, racial domination, and administrative governance are not overturned here through struggle; they are rendered void at the level where they first claimed reality. What remains is not a blueprint for another world, but a rupture in the one we inhabit—a naming of the ontological limits that no economy, however rational or humane, may cross. In this sense, the Bayān is not post-Marxist or anti-Marxist. It stands elsewhere entirely, legislating being itself where critique, history, and reform can only follow.

Bayānī Political Economy as Critique of Marxian LTV (The Labor Theory of Value)[12]

If the Bayān institutes a juridico-ontological prohibition on the buying and selling of the Four Elements—Air, Fire, Water, and Earth—then it does not merely modify or radicalize Marxism; it exposes a foundational limit internal to Marx's own critique of political economy. Marx's labor theory of value, as expounded in *Capital* Volume I,[13] is a formidable dismantling of bourgeois mystification. By locating value not in divine order, natural scarcity, or subjective preference but in socially necessary abstract labor, Marx decisively secularizes political economy. Yet this very achievement reveals its own boundary: Marx's critique remains historical and social rather than ontological. He unmasks exploitation within a world whose most basic ontic permissions—what may be owned, alienated, and abstracted—are never themselves placed on trial. The Bayān does precisely that very thing.

Marx insists that labor alone creates value, while nature merely supplies use-values as a "free gift" to capital. This formulation is analytically powerful, but it silently presupposes the very metaphysical availability of nature that makes capitalism possible.

Air, water, land, and energy appear as neutral substrates, awaiting labor's impress. The Bayān shatters this neutrality. By rendering the elements inalienable, it declares them neither commodities, nor inputs, nor raw material, but sacred ontic commons. This is not an ecological ethic appended to political economy; it is a pre-economic veto that invalidates the conditions under which abstract labor can arise at all. Where Marx shows how surplus value is stolen from labor, the Bayān exposes a deeper expropriation that Marx leaves largely intact: the capture of the elements as legitimately ownable and therefore economically "free." Once this prohibition is taken seriously, the **labor theory of value** reveals its dependence on a prior ontological theft. Abstract labor presupposes land that can be enclosed, water that can be privatized, energy that can be monopolized, and air that can be treated as costless until it becomes a dumping ground. Marx brilliantly historicizes enclosure and primitive accumulation, but he does not fully theorize the ontological illegitimacy of these acts. The Bayān does. It denies, at the level of sacred law, the right of any regime to convert the conditions of manifestation into commodities. Labor does not found value; it participates in a prior order of being. Ontic rank precedes labor-time. The elements are not "worked upon" into value; they are the very horizons within which work appears. From this perspective, the commodity form itself becomes illicit. For Marx, the commodity is historically specific but internally coherent; it can be abolished only through a transformation of social relations. For the Bayān, the commodity form collapses at inception. If the elements cannot be bought or sold, then there can be no land market, no water market, no energy market, and no atmospheric sink. Without these, labor cannot become abstract, value cannot generalize, and capital cannot self-valorize. The world presupposed by *Capital* is rendered juridically impossible before exploitation even begins. Marx asks who appropriates surplus labor; the Bayān asks who authorized the appropriation of the elements in the first place.

This is where Karl Polanyi becomes an instructive bridge. In *The Great Transformation* (1944), Polanyi identifies land, labor, and money as "fictitious commodities"—things that are treated as commodities despite not being produced for sale. Polanyi's insight edges toward Bayānī ground, but stops short of ontological prohibition. He diagnoses the social devastation caused by commodifying land and labor, yet frames the problem in terms of social disembedding rather than metaphysical illegitimacy. The Bayān goes further: it does

not merely warn that treating the elements as commodities is destructive; it declares that such treatment is unlawful in principle. Where Polanyi sees a tragic error of modern society, the Bayān names a categorical violation of the order of being. Marx himself, especially in his late work, gestures toward this limit through the concept of the "metabolic rift."[14] He recognizes that capitalism ruptures the metabolism between humanity and nature, exhausting soils, poisoning water, and destabilizing ecological cycles. Yet even here, the problem is framed as a contradiction within capitalism rather than as a transgression against an ontological boundary. Nature remains something whose metabolism can, in principle, be rationally managed under socialism. The Bayān refuses this managerial horizon altogether. It does not propose a better administration of nature; it withdraws nature from administration as such. The elements are not resources to be rationally planned, but sacrosanct conditions that no political economy may rightfully enclose.

This reveals what may be Marx's most tragic limitation: labor becomes the final idol. Having abolished the theological foundations of value, Marx installs labor as its secular substance, history as its providence, and communism as its eschaton. The Bayān refuses all such substitutions. It does not replace God with labor, nor salvation with history. It insists that no created thing—neither labor, nor land, nor time—may serve as an absolute measure. Value itself is dethroned. What emerges instead is not a higher form of value, but a political economy *without value as such*: a regime of use, stewardship, and ontic humility grounded in the inalienability of the elements. In this sense, Bayānī political economy does not complete Marxism; it passes beneath it. Marx remains indispensable for understanding exploitation within a commodified world. The Bayān explains why that world is already illegitimate. Marx unmasks the theft of surplus labor. The Bayān unmasks the prior seizure of the conditions of existence. Where Marx aims at emancipation through the reorganization of production, the Bayān institutes liberation by amputating the very possibility of commodifying the ground of being. This is why Bayānī law is not a reform, not a socialism in the ordinary sense, nor an ecological Marxism with metaphysical embellishments, but a rival nomos altogether—one that renders racial capitalism, extractivism, and administrative domination not merely unjust, but ontologically illegal.

A Bayānī Critique of the LTV (the Labor Theory of Value)

Marx's **Labor Theory of Value** (LTV) in *Capital I* rests on a decisive but limited move: Value is socially necessary abstract labor congealed in commodities.[15] This is already a powerful demystification of political economy. Marx strips value of its theological aura and shows it to be a *historical form* arising under specific social relations—namely, generalized commodity production. However, Marx brackets the question of nature at precisely the wrong depth. For him, nature appears as **i.** *use-value substrate*, **ii.** *raw material*, and **iii.** *free gift* to capital. Here labor alone is the *substance* of value. This is where the Bayān strikes from below.

Now, the silent presupposition of Marx's LTV is *alienable nature*. Marx explicitly insists that **(1)** *only labor creates value* and **(2)** nature contributes *use-value but not* ***value***. This makes sense *within* capitalist accounting—but it smuggles in a presupposition: That nature is legitimately available as a non-valuing input to labor**.** In other words, Marx criticizes the exploitation of labor while tacitly accepting the metaphysical availability of the elements themselves. The Bayān refuses this at the root. By declaring Air, Fire, Water, and earth inalienable, the Bayān unequivocally states:

- These are **not inputs**
- They are **not substrates**
- They are **not neutral conditions**
- They are **sacred ontic commons**

Thus, this is not just environmentalism. It is a *pre-economic ontological veto*.

That said, the labor theory of value depends on a prior ontological theft. Once one sees this, the weakness becomes sharp because where Marx exposes surplus value as stolen labor time, the Bayān reveals that labor itself already stands upon a *deeper expropriation*: the capture of the elements as "free". Capital can only abstract labor because **(a)** land is enclosed, **(b)** water is privatized, **(c)** air is treated as costless until polluted, **(c)** fire/energy

is rendered proprietary. Marx historicizes **(a)** brilliantly but he *under-theorizes* **(b–c)** at the level of ontological right. In contrast, the Bayān forbids the very condition that makes abstract labor measurable in the first place. So where in *Capital I* abstract labor is produced by the leveling of concrete labors and their reduction to homogeneous time, the Bayānī political economy introduces something Marx cannot accommodate: Ontic rank precedes labor-time. Air, water, fire, earth are not "worked upon" into value. They are *conditions of manifestation*, not commodities. Thus labor does not *found* value, labor ***participates*** in a pre-given ontological order. So where Marx abolishes bourgeois natural theology, the Bayān abolishes *economic naturalization* itself altogether.

For Marx, the commodity form is historically specific but internally coherent. For the Bayān **i.** the commodity form is juridically broken at the root and so **ii.** one cannot even *begin* commodity production if the elements are non-alienable. This means no land market, no energy market, no water market, and no atmospheric sink. Without these labor cannot become abstract, value cannot become general, and capital cannot self-valorize. The **LTV** thus presupposes a world that Bayānī law renders *impossible*. Much of is this is due to the fact that Marx believed he had eliminated metaphysics from political economy altogether. But from a Bayānī perspective this tantamounts to **(a)** labor being elevated as the ***last sacred substance*** (thus made into a quasi-theological idol), **(b)** value becoming its secularized sacrament, and **(c)** material history substituting eschatology. The Bayān refuses *all* such substitutions. It does not replace "God" with "Labor," "Providence" with "History" and "Salvation" with "Communism." Instead, it says: No created thing—not *labor*, not *land*, not *time*—has the right to become an absolute measure. So the weakness in Marx's labor theory of value, exposed by the Bayān, is not a technical flaw but a *foundational omission*: Marx critiques exploitation *within* an ontologically compromised world while the Bayān renders that world unlawful *before* exploitation even begins. Marx asks: "Who steals the surplus?" The Bayān asks instead: "Who gave you the elements to steal with?" That is the deeper rupture.

Contra Eco-Marxism *As It Is*: Why the Bayān Exceeds Mere Ecological Critique

Now, contemporary eco-Marxism often presents itself as the point where Marx's unfinished critique finally reaches nature. By foregrounding climate collapse, extractivism, and the metabolic rift, eco-Marxists argue that capitalism's contradiction is no longer merely social but planetary. Yet despite its urgency, eco-Marxism remains trapped within the same ontological horizon as classical Marxism. It seeks to *repair* the rift, not to *invalidate the regime* that produced it. Nature, even here, remains an object of rational administration—something to be better planned, democratically managed, or sustainably optimized. The question eco-Marxism asks is not whether nature may be commodified, but how that commodification might be regulated or overcome through a different mode of production. The Bayān renders this entire framework insufficient. It does not diagnose an ecological crisis within capitalism; it declares the commodification of the elements unlawful *in principle*. Eco-Marxism still presumes that land, water, energy, and atmosphere can be conceptually gathered under the sign of "resources," even if they are to be held in common rather than privately owned. The Bayān refuses the category itself. Air is not a commons to be managed; it is a condition of manifestation. Water is not a public utility; it is a sacred medium of life. Earth is not land; it is ontic ground. Fire is not energy; it is transformative power. These are not political goods but *metaphysical givens*, and any political economy that treats them as administrable inputs—no matter how egalitarian—remains complicit in the original transgression. In other words, for the Bayān such are the *original* "theoretical" *sins* that invert *metaphysical givens* into political goods.

This is why Bayānī political economy cannot be reduced to ecological ethics, green socialism, or degrowth theory alone. All such projects presuppose the legitimacy of economic reason as such, merely redirecting it toward sustainability. The Bayān withdraws legitimacy from economic reason at the level of the elements themselves. It does not ask how humanity might live *better* with nature; it declares that humanity never possessed the right to subsume nature under value in the first place. Where eco-Marxism radicalizes Marx by extending exploitation to ecosystems, the Bayān radicalizes the problem by denying the ontological permission that makes exploitation intelligible at all.

Toward a Bayānī *Theory of Use Without Value* and Beyond Marx, Beneath Capital

The question may be asked, if value is dethroned, what takes its place? This is the question Marxists often pose to any critique that moves beyond value theory. The assumption is that without value, there can be no coordination, no production, no social order. The Bayān answers by dissolving the question itself. It does not replace value with another metric; it *abolishes metricization* at the ontological level. What emerges is not a new theory of value, but a regime of use governed by ontic rank and theo-juridical ontological prohibition.

In a Bayānī economy, use is not derivative of exchange. It is primary, situational, and bounded by sacred limits. One does not ask what something is "worth," but whether its use violates the inalienability of the elements. Production becomes secondary to stewardship. Labor is no longer abstracted into homogeneous time, but remains concrete, local, and non-generalizable. There is no universal equivalent, because there is no permission to universalize. The prohibition on buying and selling the elements blocks the conversion of qualitative difference into quantitative equivalence—the very operation that makes value possible. Crucially, this does not entail primitivism or stagnation. The Bayān does not forbid making, building, cultivating, or transforming. It forbids *ownership of conditions*. One may use water, but not own it; inhabit land, but not alienate it; employ fire, but not monopolize it; breathe air, but not commodify it. Economic activity persists, but it is ontologically de-centered. It no longer expands through accumulation, but circulates within limits that cannot be crossed without venturing into *metaphysical sacrilege*. Growth gives way to sufficiency; accumulation gives way to maintenance; progress gives way to balance.

Here the Bayān introduces something neither Marx nor Polanyi fully conceptualized: *juridical asymmetry* between what may circulate and what must remain fixed. Capitalism dissolves all fixities; socialism merely redistributes them. The Bayān sanctifies certain fixities absolutely. This is why Bayānī political economy cannot be captured by the language of redistribution. Nothing is being redistributed when the elements are removed from circulation altogether. What is instituted instead is a law of non-appropriation that precedes all questions of class, ownership, and production. In this sense, Bayānī ***use without value*** is neither utopian nor managerial. It does not rely on the moral enlightenment of subjects, nor on technocratic oversight. It relies on prohibition—

clear, categorical, and non-negotiable. The modern world recoils from such limits because it has made limitlessness its theology and supreme idol—its *ṭāghūt*. The Bayān reintroduces limit as sacred form. By doing so, it achieves something Marxism never could: it blocks the recurrence of exploitation at the level where exploitation is born, rather than endlessly chasing its social manifestations from one to the next. In other words, it breaks the wheel itself. And because the wheel is broken rather than merely slowed, domination can no longer reconstitute itself under new names. There is no return here in the guise of planning, welfare, sustainability, or "ethical" management, because the metaphysical permission that would allow such substitutions has already been revoked. What remains is not an improved economy, but a reordered field of existence in which power is denied its most basic manoeuvre: the conversion of what *is* into what may be owned. In that sense, the Bayān does not promise liberation as an outcome—it institutes it as a condition, by foreclosing in advance the very grammar through which unfreedom reproduces itself.

What thus finally distinguishes the Bayān from Marxism—classical or ecological—is not that it is more radical in its critique of capitalism, but that it is radical in a different dimension altogether. Marx exposes the injustice of surplus extraction; eco-Marxists expose the devastation of planetary metabolism. The Bayān renders the entire civilizational schema that makes both possible ontologically void. It does not promise a future reconciliation between humanity and nature through history. It institutes a present prohibition that amputates the legitimacy of value itself. In doing so, the Bayān offers not a politics of emancipation, but *a law of impossibility*. Certain things simply may not be done. Certain relations may not be instituted. Certain conversions—of air into rent, water into asset, land into commodity, fire into monopoly—are forbidden not because they are inefficient or unjust, but because they *violate the order of being*. This is why Bayānī political economy is not post-Marxist, but extra-Marxist: it operates on a plane Marx could glimpse but never enter. Capital asks how value grows. Marx asks who pays the cost. The Bayān asks why value was ever allowed to rule in the first place.

The Wretched of the Corporate State: Bayānī Prohibition and the Racialised Subject

The figure that finally emerges from a Bayānī political economy without value is not the emancipated worker of Marxist eschatology, but the *wretched subject of the corporate state*—the one whose existence itself becomes illegible once value is dethroned. The corporate state is not merely capitalism administered by bureaucracy; it is capitalism metabolized into law, procedure, risk management, and reputational governance. It is the regime that no longer needs overt exploitation because it governs by pre-emptive classification, anticipatory containment, and administrative suspicion. Its primary antagonists are not only workers but those whose being cannot be rendered legible in value-terms at all. This is where the Bayān intersects decisively with Fanon, but also moves beyond him. Fanon diagnosed colonialism as a system that epidermalizes value, inscribing hierarchy directly onto the body of the racialised subject. The corporate state perfects this logic by abstracting it: race, belief, dissent, and nonconformity are no longer marked explicitly, but encoded through "risk," "concern," "safeguarding," "extremism," or "wellbeing." What is targeted is not labor-power but *ontological surplus*—that excess of being which cannot be reconciled with administrative norms. The *wretched of the corporate stat*e are not merely exploited; they are *ontologically misfitting*.

Bayānī prohibition clarifies why this misfitting provokes such violent response. A subject who implicitly denies the legitimacy of value—by refusing commodification of belief, speech, land, body, or lineage—poses a threat more profound than economic dissent. Such a subject calls into question the silent metaphysics of the corporate state: that everything, including human interiority, may ultimately be administered, priced, managed, optimized, or classified. The corporate state does not persecute belief as belief; it persecutes *non-alienability* wherever it appears. This also explains one of the reasons for the recent public attacks against us.

In this scheme, the prohibition on the buying and selling of the Four Elements reveals its political force. Air, fire, water, and earth are not merely physical referents; they are metaphors of governance. Air is speech, circulation, reputation. Water is life, care, kinship. Earth is dwelling, belonging, place. Fire is power, transformation, intensity. The corporate state seeks to regulate each of these through valuation: speech through platform metrics and reputational scores, care through institutional workflows, land through

property regimes, power through licensure and monopoly. The Bayān's refusal of elemental commodification therefore names the corporate state itself as ontologically illegitimate and so the enemy of Being. Thus, the wretched of the corporate state are those who encounter this illegitimacy directly, not as theory but as lived condition. They are the ones whose speech is flagged, whose care is bureaucratically seized, whose dwelling is rendered precarious, whose power is reframed as threat and pathologized. Unlike the proletariat of classical Marxism, they cannot be integrated through redistribution or recognition, because what they resist is not exclusion from value but *subsumption by value*. They do not demand inclusion; they stand as living evidence that inclusion itself ***is*** the problem.

This is why Marxism, even in its most radical forms, cannot fully account for the violence directed at such subjects. Marxist critique presumes that exploitation remains the central contradiction. But the corporate state increasingly operates beyond exploitation, through pre-emptive governance of existence itself. The Bayān reveals that this shift is not accidental: once value becomes total, it must eliminate anything that cannot be rendered commensurable. The subject who embodies non-alienability—of conscience, of kinship, of metaphysical orientation—becomes intolerable. Conversely, a Bayānī political economy reframes Fanon's insight for the present epoch. The struggle is no longer primarily between labor and capital, but between ***ontological illegibility*** and ***administrative totality***.

The *wretched of the corporate state* are not simply the poor, the unemployed, or the marginalized; they are those whose very mode of being exposes the metaphysical fraud of a system that claims universal legitimacy while depending on the commodification of everything it touches. In this sense, the Bayān does not offer redemption through revolution, nor reconciliation through policy. It offers something far more dangerous: a ***law of refusal*** that precedes politics. By sanctifying the inalienability of the elements, it sanctifies the inalienability of the subject who lives in fidelity *to* and *with* them. Such a subject cannot be governed without contradiction. The corporate state senses this instinctively, and responds with suspicion, surveillance, (mis)classification and procedural violence. The ***wretched of the corporate*** state thus stand where Marx's proletariat never fully stood: not at the point of production, but at the ***fault line of being***. Their struggle is not for a fairer distribution of value, but for the right to exist outside value's jurisdiction altogether.

And it is precisely here—beneath capital, beyond Marx—that the Bayān speaks with absolute clarity: not everything may be owned, not everything may be measured, not everything may be governed, and no material substance may occupy a monocausal pedestal even theoretically.

How the Bayān Abolishes the Marxian Category of "Class"

Now, if a society is organized around the categorical prohibition on the buying and selling of the Four Elements—Air, Foire, water, and earth—the result is not merely a moral economy or an ethical correction of capitalism, but a structural dissolution of class as Marx himself defines it. For Marx, class is not synonymous with labor, nor with inequality, nor even with hierarchy; it is defined with precision as a relation to the means of production, and more fundamentally, to the ownership and control of the conditions that make production—and thus life—possible. Labor exists in every society; class exists only where labor is compelled to sell itself because it is dispossessed of access to the material conditions of existence. Once this dispossession is removed, the concept of class loses its analytical footing, even if work, effort, and differentiated social roles persist (which the Bayān clearly anticipates).

The Bayān's prohibition targets not the surface mechanisms of exploitation, but their ontological root. Earth, water, air, and fire are not symbolic categories; they correspond to land, water systems, circulation and atmosphere, and energy—the irreducible substrates upon which all production depends. In modern capitalism, these substrates are precisely what are enclosed, commodified, financialized, and transformed into rent-extracting monopolies. Marx analyzes how capital exploits labor through ownership of the means of production, but he largely presupposes the neutrality of nature as raw material. The Bayān goes further: it denies the legitimacy of private ownership over the very conditions of existence. By doing so, it abolishes not merely capitalist relations, but the deeper possibility of extracting surplus from another's dependence on life itself. Under such a Bayānī political economy, labor does not disappear. People still cultivate, build, teach, heal, and exchange skills. What disappears is the structural coercion that forces labor to sell itself in order to gain access to land, water, energy, or dwelling. When

no one owns the earth beneath another's feet, the water they drink, the air they breathe, or the fire by which they live, labor is no longer alienated from life. Work becomes contribution rather than survival-compulsion. In Marxist terms, exploitation collapses not because effort ceases, but because surplus extraction through ownership becomes impossible. There can be no bourgeoisie without monopolized conditions of life, and no proletariat where access to existence is not mediated by sale.

This does not entail absolute sameness or the elimination of difference. The Bayān does not posit a flat, homogenized society, and in fact clearly anticipates various ranks and grades of a given Bayānī society. Differences of knowledge, function, responsibility, and honor may persist. But Marx himself is explicit that class is not difference; it is domination rooted in property. A society may have artisans, scholars, cultivators, and administrators without having landlords, rentiers, or capitalists. Inequality of role does not equal class. Class arises only where one group systematically extracts value from another's dependence on owned conditions of existence. Remove that dependence, and class—as a structural category—vanishes. In this sense, the Bayān accomplishes something Marx aims at but does not fully theorize. Marx abolishes private ownership of the means of production; the Bayān abolishes private ownership of the ontological substrate of production. Marx's horizon remains historical and material; emancipation is deferred to a future stage of development. The Bayān's horizon is ontological and immediate: certain things must never enter exchange, regardless of historical stage, because their commodification constitutes injustice at the level of being. Where Marx critiques capitalism as historically contingent, the Bayān declares it ontologically illegal once it touches the elements.

This is why the Bayān must be brought into dialogue with Marx rather than measured against him. Marx diagnoses exploitation with extraordinary precision, but he leaves intact the assumption that nature itself can be treated as economically neutral. The Bayān shatters that assumption. It insists that justice cannot emerge from reorganizing ownership alone if the elemental conditions of life remain commodifiable. By removing those conditions from exchange altogether, it precludes not only capitalism but any future regime that would attempt to resurrect class domination under a different name. The consequence is a society that is post-class but not post-labor, post-capitalist but not post-work, post-exploitative without being post-productive. Labor continues, history continues,

difference continues—but class, as Marx rigorously defines it, does not. This is not a utopian fantasy but a coherent political ontology, one that explains why the Bayān's economic prohibitions are so absolute, and why they strike modern sensibilities as extreme. They are extreme only if one assumes that justice can coexist with the commodification of life itself. Seen this way, the Bayān is not merely a religious or ethical system but a radical intervention into political economy at the deepest possible level. It does not ask how to humanize exploitation or regulate markets more fairly; it asks which things must be removed from the market altogether if justice is to exist. In an age where capitalism has expanded to encompass land, water, atmosphere, energy, and even data and attention, the Bayān reads less like a relic of the nineteenth century and more like a diagnosis written for the twenty-first. It exposes, with unsettling clarity, that class is not abolished by redistributing wealth alone, but only by severing the link between survival and ownership.

Notes

[1] The following essay is an augmentation of a blogpost by the same title from December 2025, online, https://wahidazal303.blogspot.com/2025/12/the-four-elements-and-end-of-political.html (retrieved 14 January 2026).

[2] Ṣubḥ-i-Azal *mutammim'ul-bayān* (online: see bibliography for hyperlink).

[3] See John Bellamy Foster *Marx's Ecology: Materialism and Nature* (2000).

[4] See *The Communist Manifesto* (1848).

[5] For the current degrowth perspective, see Kohei Saito *Slow Down: The Degrowth Manifesto* (2024).

[6] *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Insights of Our Time* (1944), *passim*.

[7] See *Capital,* volume I (1867).

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid., esp. chapter 6.

[11] See *kitāb-i-aqdas*.

[12] The following section is an augmentation of a blogpost by the same title from December 2025, online, https://wahidazal303.blogspot.com/2025/12/bayani-political-economy-as-critique-of.html (retrieved 14 January 2026).

[13] *Capital,* volume I, ibid.

[14] See Kohei Saito *Capital, Nature, and the Unfinished Critique of Political Economy: Karl Marx's Eco-Socialism* (2017).

[15] *Capital,* volume I, ibid.

6

The Collapse of Natural Justice

A Bayānī Perspective

The collapse of natural justice in the digital age is not an accidental by-product of new technologies, but the visible symptom of a deeper civilizational breakdown. Justice, classically understood, requires *logos* rather than noise, judgment rather than reaction, proportion rather than excess, and finality rather than endless recurrence. Yet the global digital "village" has inverted each of these requirements. Accusation precedes hearing; repetition substitutes for proof; platforms replace courts; and disputes never conclude. The result is a post-juridical space in which the appearance of justice survives while its substance has dissolved. What we are witnessing is not merely injustice, but the erosion of the very grammar by which justice can be spoken.

Aristotle diagnosed this degeneration long before the internet, in his account of the polis and its corruptions. A true *polis*, he insists in *The Politics* (especially **Books III–V**), is not a mere aggregation of persons but a community unified by shared judgment about the just and the good. Law (*nomos*) governs not because it is imposed, but because it is intelligible to those who live under it. When *logos* gives way to *pathos*, when law is displaced by collective impulse, *politeia* decays into *ochlocracy*—the rule of the crowd. The digital village globalizes this pathology. It abolishes the spatial, temporal, and embodied limits that once constrained mob judgment, producing an *ochlocracy* without borders, a crowd that never

disperses, judges without office, and punishment without authority. In such a space, justice cannot survive, because the conditions for judgment no longer exist. In the *Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951), Hannah Arendt (d. 1975) sharpens this diagnosis by showing that domination does not begin with terror, but with the destruction of the conditions of judgment itself. Total domination, for Arendt, arises when common reality collapses, when institutions lose authority, and when the continuity of time—memory, forgiveness, finality—is broken. The internet produces precisely this "worldlessness." People are hyper-connected yet share no stable world; decisions are made by bureaucratic systems optimized for risk rather than truth; and nothing is ever finished, forgiven, or laid to rest. Accusations persist indefinitely, while retractions and clarifications evaporate. Justice, which requires both judgment and an end, becomes impossible in a space where everything is permanent except responsibility. In *The Wretched of the Earth* (1961), Frantz Fanon reveals the violence embedded in this condition. Colonial domination, he argues, is not merely political but epistemic: it forces the colonized subject into a permanent posture of explanation, suspicion, and self-defense. The digital village universalizes this colonial logic. Anyone may become the accused native, endlessly visible, perpetually suspect, judged emotionally rather than juridically. Silence is taken as guilt; defense as aggression; proportionality as evasion. Violence becomes asymmetrical: accusers bear no risk, while the accused is punished for responding at all. Natural justice presupposes reciprocity; the internet abolishes it. What remains is colonial psychology without geography, domination without empire.

Suhrawardī provides the metaphysical diagnosis underlying all of this. For him, implicitly justice depends on illumination (*nūr*): clarity, presence, proportion, and ontological ranking.[1] Injustice arises not merely from falsehood but from darkness (*ẓulma*), the confusion of levels, the flattening of distinction, the proliferation of discourse without light. The digital polis is a machine of such darkness. Rumor equals testimony, allegation equals proof, repetition equals truth, outrage equals justice. Ontological rank collapses; minor errors become existential crimes; punishment loses all proportion. This is not merely moral failure but metaphysical obscuration. A civilization cannot long endure in a condition of sustained darkness. Seen from this angle, the digital global village is not a polis at all, but a counterfeit one: proximity without responsibility, speech without embodiment,

memory without mercy, judgment without law. Civilizational collapse here does not mean immediate material ruin; it means the hollowing out of legitimacy. Institutions persist, but belief in fairness drains away. Rules are obeyed, but justice is no longer trusted. Collapse is ethical before it is economic or political. The internet accelerates this collapse by rewarding cruelty, punishing restraint, and making justice appear weak or obstructive.

Although we have abrogated the relevant ordinances in our **Completion of the Bayān**, it is within this civilizational context that the earlier political theology of the Bayān becomes intelligible. Modern readers recoil from the Bayān's earlier conception of a Bayānī state that excludes non-Bayānīs, reading it through liberal assumptions about universal inclusion. But this is a category error. The Persian Bayān, at least, is not proposing an empire, a pluralist nation-state, or a universal order. It is attempting to constitute a just order under conditions of civilizational breakdown. Like Aristotle's *polis*, the Bayān presupposes shared *nomos*, shared criteria of judgment, and a common metaphysical grammar. Citizenship is not ethnic or racial; it is ontological. To live under Bayānī law requires inhabiting Bayānī Reality. Inclusion of those who do not share that reality would not produce justice; it would dissolve it. Competing authorities of truth, rival grammars of law, and incompatible modes of judgment would reintroduce stasis at the heart of the polity. Illumination cannot govern where darkness claims equal standing. The Bayān's exclusion is therefore not sectarian prejudice but civilizational defense: a recognition that justice requires bounded space, that law cannot survive plural foundations of legitimacy, and that a just order must first exist before hospitality can even be meaningful.

Fanon's logic converges here as well. For the colonized subject to recover dignity, there must be a protected space not governed by the colonizer's gaze, a law not answerable to hostile epistemic regimes. Universal inclusion under unjust conditions is not liberation but perpetual exposure. The Bayān understands that a new order cannot be built inside the ruins of an old one that denies its premises. First comes coherence; only then can openness cease to be suicidal. Arendt, too, would recognize this necessity. Plurality requires a shared world. Without it, difference degenerates into noise. The Bayān does not reject plurality as such; it refuses worldlessness. It insists that politics is impossible without shared reality, shared authority, and final judgment. Where these are absent, what remains is administration or violence.

The tragic irony of the present age is that the digital village proclaims universal inclusion while producing *perpetual accusation*, endless conflict, and no justice under the reign of white liberalism's totalizing terror. The Bayān proposes bounded inclusion in the service of clarity, proportion, and finality. In an era where natural justice has collapsed, this no longer appears as medieval intolerance but as radical sobriety. The Bayān is saying what modernity cannot bear to hear: that justice is fragile, that it requires limits, and that inclusion without shared law destroys it faster than exclusion ever could. The Bayān thus reads not as a relic of a pre-modern past, but as a response to a post-modern collapse. It confronts the uncomfortable truth that a just order must first be constituted before it can afford openness, and that illumination cannot arise in a space that has surrendered itself to discursive darkness. In a world where the global polis has become an ochlocratic, post-juridical village, this insight is not merely historical—it is urgently contemporary.

For example, the **4th Gate of the Sixth Unity** of the Persian Bayān establishes a principle that is at once cosmological, anthropological, and political: God has permitted habitation (*suknā*) only upon the five divisions (or provinces) (*aqṭāʿ al-khams*)[2] that are delimited by the letters of the Bayān, and no others, no matter how long time may pass. This restriction is not arbitrary legislation but the consequence of how divine illumination (*ishrāq*) enters the world. Just as God extracts the *jawhar* (substance/quintessence) from every thing, so in the Manifestation of the letter ***hāʾ*** (ه), It extracts the essential substances of the earth and placed them within its bounds. Illumination does not descend evenly across all places; in the Bayān's earlier conception, it appeared most proximally upon these five divisions, then propagated from one division to another, exactly as souls dwelling in these lands became means of guidance for other souls. What is being described is not geography in the ordinary sense, but graded receptivity to divine light: a *geosophy* where space itself becomes differentiated by proximity to the Source of Revelation. Within this fivefold division unfolds a vertical ascent of *tawḥīd* (divine unity) through five ontic stations, each corresponding to a letter and a mode of divine unity as it appears in the inner hearts/blaze-fluxes (*afʾida*) of different human types.

In ***fāʾ*** (ف) (Fars province), the formula *lā ilāha illā huwa* (no other god but It)[3] shines in the mirrors of the inner hearts/blaze-fluxes of those who glorify (*tasbīh*); in ***ʿayn*** (ع) (Irāq), *lā ilāha illā anā* (there is no other god but I)[4] appears in the inner hearts/blaze-fluxes of those

who sanctify (*taqdīs*); in ***alif*** (ا) (Azerbaijān), *lā ilāha illā allāh* (there is no god but God)[5] manifests in the hearts of the true unitarians who confess to the divine unity (*tahlīl*); in ***khā'*** (خ) (Khurāsān), *lā ilāha illā anta* (*there is no other god but Thee*)[6] dawns in the hearts of those who magnify (*takbīr*); and in ***mīm*** (م) (Māzandarān), the hearts of the exalted are illumined by *lā ilāha illā alladhī* (*there is no other god Who/That*).[7] These are not competing doctrines but graded unveilings of the same *tawḥīd*, each requiring a specific ontological *preparedness*. Although all these degrees exist potentially in every land and even in every atom, the *ḥukm* (effective ruling) belongs to manifestation and to the transmission of aid (*imdād*) from the Source, so that the people of a given land may ascend toward the total substance (*jawhar al-kullī*) and be translated, in the human form, into the five paradises of the five Names[8] within the bounds of ***hā'*** (ه). Whoever truly looks, the Bayān says, will see the lines of ***hā'*** (ه) inscribed across the whole earth, yet only these five divisions are loci of stable manifestation.

This order remains fixed until the Manifestation of *He whom God shall make Manifest* (*man yuẓhiruhu'llāh*). At that point, the source of illumination itself shifts, just as in the Manifestation of the Qurʾān Mecca became the origin of radiance, and in the Manifestation of the Bayān the land of ***fā'*** (*fars* = Shīrāz) became the locus from which the Sun of Reality rose. The question is never *whether* the Sun will rise, but *from which horizon*. Hence the command that within these divisions there should not remain even an atom of what God does not love; were perception capable of such total vigilance, the Bayān says, the earth would be raised from beneath the waters to exalted heights of diamond, so that no science of the self could be surrounded by anything but the Beloved. Because such total purification exceeds the capacity of this creation unless God wills otherwise, the reward of a single soul dwelling rightly in these five divisions is declared greater than twelve thousand years of worship—provided that soul is firmly established in true faith. Space here is moralized and ontologized: dwelling becomes an act of alignment with illumination (*ishrāq*). Crucially, the Bayān insists that this elevated division itself would not have been created had it not accepted prostration before the division of *He whom God shall make Manifest*. Its very existence is contingent upon recognition of the future Manifestation. Just as individual souls would not have been created had they not freely accepted the possibility of faith, so this land's distinction rests upon acceptance of the axis of Revelation. Superiority here is

not ethnic, historical, or coercive; it is conditional upon ontological recognition. The text then grounds this entire structure in a theory of knowledge (*ʿilm*) as the decisive separator between belief and unbelief. God has created nothing more exalted than knowledge conjoined with action (= *praxis*), and no knowledge except knowledge of the source of the Command and comprehension of all that unfolds from it until the return of all things to *He whom God shall make Manifest*. The difference between the believer and the non-believer is not appearance, lineage, or even outward action, but *knowledge itself*. On the historical Day of ʿĀshūrāʾ, for example, two men stood in identical human form: one gave His life in Truth, the other committed injustice against Truth. The distinction lies purely in knowledge. The Bayān gives the governing metaphor: Truth is like the Sun; the believer is like a mirror that reflects it when placed before it; the non-believer is like a stone upon which the Sun shines without reflection. God is capable of making the stone into crystal, but the stone has accepted its opacity. The very cause that enables belief in one becomes the cause of veiling in another.

This logic is then projected forward to the Manifestation of *He whom God shall make Manifest*. Every existent thing, whether already formed or yet to come, subsists through Him as the Primal Will. Even before His outward manifestation, even before speech, even in the cradle, all aid already flows from Him. He is one in Essence even if He rises innumerably, one in Self even if He sets, a single Sun whose Light sustains all realms from the world of blaze-fluxes (= existence) to the furthest limit of matter. Tawḥīd thus permeates the whole cosmos, but its effective governance requires receptivity. What finally emerges is the decisive Bayānī conclusion: justice, illumination, and divine governance cannot operate in a space that refuses their ontological grammar. Habitation is therefore restricted not as punishment but as *preservation of meaning*. A polity founded on the Bayān therefore cannot include those who deny the epistemic and ontological conditions of Bayānī law without dissolving that law itself. Inclusion without shared knowledge would collapse illumination back into opacity, judgment into confusion, and guidance into contradiction—as the Bahā'īs proved, not only in their own case, but in the case of the unfolding of history throughout the region and beyond. The Bayān's exclusion is thus not sectarianism but metaphysical coherence: a recognition that Light can govern only where mirrors exist, that *tawḥīd* can rule only where its grammar is shared, and that a just order

must first be *possible* before it can be universal. Seen in this light, the Bayān anticipates with uncanny precision the failure of the modern "global village." Where modernity insists on universal inclusion while erasing the conditions of judgment, the Bayān insists on bounded space in order to preserve justice itself. The distinction is not moral arrogance but civilizational sobriety. The Bayān does not deny God's power to illumine all; it denies the fantasy that illumination can govern where receptivity is refused. In an age of ontological flattening, discursive darkness, and post-juridical outrage, the Bayān reads not as exclusionary theology but as a rigorous diagnosis of what justice requires in order to exist at all.

The **16th Gate of the Seventh Unity**, makes explicit what earlier Bayānī passages establish implicitly: that political authority, justice, and ontological order are inseparable, and that a polity founded on the Bayān cannot survive internal epistemic contradiction. God, the text states, has *obligated every sovereign who arises within the religion of the Bayān* not to permit on his or her land anyone who does not adhere to that religion—and analogously, at the Manifestation *He whom God shall make Manifest*, anyone who does not believe in Him. This is not framed as coercion for its own sake, but as a consequence of how *truth manifests in space*. The fruit (*thamara*) of this command is said to be eschatological clarity so that on the Day of Resurrection, the Tree of Reality will not be seen manifesting in a land except among those who believe in it, just as in the land of Paradise no fiery soul can subsist. To extract the people of the Bayān from the bounds of Paradise is declared contrary to the will of God—meaning that removal of the faithful from the space of illumination is itself injustice. What is decisive here is that exclusion is not justified by fear of difference, but by the impossibility of ontological coexistence between contradictory grammars of truth. The text insists repeatedly that the concern is not outward human form—all remain human in appearance—but inward epistemic and ontic alignment. The warning that rulers must be vigilant lest, at the Manifestation of *He whom God shall make Manifest*, believers in Him be treated as the Letters of the Living were treated in the Bāb's own Manifestation is crucial: the original Letters of the Living were rejected not because they lacked signs, but because others claimed to possess *knowledge* independently of love and recognition. Here the Bayān makes one of its sharpest interventions: knowledge divorced from recognition of the Source of Revelation becomes a principle of veiling, not illumination. This is why many are

gathered veiled, while the Letters are gathered seeing. The text then moves from political command to existential warning. It exhorts the reader to ensure that no soul is subjected to such treatment, because nothing comparable has been more severely prohibited. Salvation on the Day of Resurrection is linked not to moral sentiment but to fidelity to this juridical–ontological command. To cause grief to the "Letters of Unity"—those upon whom one's own religion was founded—is to act against signs whose truth one does not yet recognize, but whose veracity is already evident through unmistakable marks. Here again the Bayān undermines liberal epistemology *avant la lettre*: ignorance does not excuse injustice when the signs of truth are present but refused.

A crucial qualification follows, often overlooked or deliberately ignored: exception is made only for those whose presence is justified by *tijārat-i kullīya*—a "total" or universally beneficial commerce, exemplified by the Letters of the Gospel (i.e. Christians). This is not economic liberalism. It is a tightly circumscribed allowance for those whose activity yields indisputable benefit to the people without importing rival authority, rival judgment, or rival law. Even then, permission is conditional, rare, and revocable. Otherwise, the presence of even a single non-believing soul in a land of faith is described as a proportionate presence in the infernal fire —not as a moral condemnation of the person, but as an ontological mismatch between *space* and *being*. The warning becomes even sharper when the text says that especially if such a person bears a *non-honoured* status, no permission is given at all. The Bayān is explicit: justice is not maintained by tolerance of contradiction, but by guarding the integrity of the field in which truth governs. The final injunction concerning companionship (*tajālūs*) makes the logic unmistakable. Sitting together is forbidden where faith is absent, because the ruling of non-faith applies; the condition of lawful association is *ṭahārat-i dīn*—purity of religion—and nothing less. This is not social cruelty; it is the insistence that judgment, intimacy, and deliberation presuppose shared ontological ground. Without that ground, association becomes a vector of confusion, not community.

Placed into dialogue with Marx, Fanon, and Arendt, the force of this specific gate of the Persian Bayān becomes unmistakably contemporary. Marx shows how capitalism dissolves all qualitative distinctions into exchange; the Bayān responds by drawing an absolute line around what may *never* be commingled—truth and its negation. Fanon shows that colonial domination survives by forcing the colonized to live perpetually under an

alien epistemic court; the Bayān refuses that court altogether by constructing a space where legitimacy does not have to be argued for. Arendt shows that politics collapses when a common world disappears; the Bayān's severity is precisely an attempt to *prevent worldlessness* by refusing plural foundations of judgment within a single polity. In other words, the Bayān by definition rejects all of the underlying assumptions of Western postmodernism, and this gate and unity of the Bayān makes explicit how the Bayān's political theology is anti-nihilistic at its core. It denies that contradiction can be harmonized by procedure, that rival truths can peacefully co-govern, or that justice can survive epistemic relativism. Where the modern digital "global village" proclaims universal inclusion and produces permanent accusation, endless conflict, and post-juridical violence, the Bayān asserts bounded inclusion as the precondition for illumination, finality, and justice. What appears intolerant to a Western liberal imaginary is, in fact, a rigorously worked-out response to an implicit anticipation of civilizational collapse that we are now experiencing. Read this way, the Bayān is not retreating from universality; it is postponing universality until justice is ontologically possible. It insists that a just order must first be constituted in clarity, purity, and shared law before hospitality can cease to be destructive. That is why (contrary to the approach of the Bahā'īs) this text is not an embarrassment to be explained away, but one of the Bayān's sharpest theoretical instruments—and why bringing it into dialogue with Marx, Fanon, Arendt and others is not only legitimate, but urgently necessary.

The earlier **5th Gate of the Fifth Unity** then addresses what is perhaps the most disturbing—and therefore most revealing—dimension of the Bayān's political ontology: the status of property (*amwāl*), possession, and economic legitimacy under conditions of Revelation. Its opening premise is sweeping and uncompromising: in every Manifestation (*ẓuhūr*), everything that exists upon the earth ought, in principle, to fall under the sovereignty of the subsequent Manifestation. The failure of this to occur historically is never attributed to a lack of worthiness in the revealed religion, but to weakness, hesitation, or disobedience on the part of its adherents. The Bayān thus rejects the modern tendency to naturalize historical contingency as moral neutrality; what did not occur is not therefore just, but merely unrealized. The text grounds this claim through an analogy with early Islam. On the day of the Manifestation of the Prophet, no human life—or anything

deriving from it—was licit to its possessor except through entry into faith. Once belief was affirmed, what God had already bestowed upon that person through Its bounty became licit again. Property, life, and benefit are thus not treated as pre-political natural rights, but as *conditionally legitimate trusts*, whose lawfulness depends on ontological alignment with the Source of command. The same logic is extended explicitly to the Manifestation of *He whom God shall make Manifest*: no soul is licit to its possessor, and nothing that attaches to that soul is licit, except through faith in Him. Everything may be taken—*in principle*—unless and until it is revalidated through entry into the revealed order. This is framed not as cruelty, but as *faḍl* (grace), because it restores creation to its proper alignment with truth. The Bayān then confronts the most common objection head-on: forced conversion. It asserts, without equivocation, that when cities were conquered in the early Islamic period by force, those who entered Islam under compulsion nevertheless attained the fruits of faith, while those who did not remained in the infernal fire—not as an injustice inflicted upon them, but as the consequence of remaining outside the salvific order. Mercy, here, is not sentimental tolerance; it is *inclusion within truth*, even if that inclusion is effected through power. This is a decisive rejection of modern moral psychology, which assumes that voluntariness is the supreme ethical criterion. For the Bayān, ontological rescue outweighs procedural purity.

At the same time, the text introduces a critical limitation that modern readers often ignore. This ruling is binding only upon *sovereigns possessing authority within the religion*, not upon all individuals indiscriminately. Moreover, in lands where the application of this command would result in harm, humiliation, or sorrow—particularly for believers living as merchants among non-Bayānī powers—God has explicitly not permitted its execution. Here the Bayān shows itself to be neither anarchic nor reckless: it distinguishes between *principle* and *capacity*, between ontological right and situational wisdom. Until God grants decisive power, believers are commanded to act with extreme care, lest abasement befall them. What is withheld is not truth, but its premature enforcement. Yet this restraint is explicitly temporary. The Bayān rejects quietism just as decisively as it rejects passivity. It states plainly that one must not wait for a command to descend from heaven that will miraculously cause all the earth to enter the religion; just as Islam spread through concrete acts of authority in obedience to the Prophet's command, so too in every Manifestation must what is ordained by God appear through human action. Failure is not attributed to

Revelation but to those entrusted with power who do not act upon it. Divine aid (*nuṣra*) is promised, but it operates through obedience, not in place of it. This is a theology of *activated sovereignty*, not messianic procrastination.

The culmination of the chapter is eschatological and totalizing. The purpose of this entire juridical economy is that, at the Manifestation of *He whom God shall make Manifest*, all souls raised under the discipline of the Bayān will already be prepared, so that none of the believers fall away from faith in Him. Should any do so, their ruling becomes the ruling of one who has not believed in God at all. The text then makes one of its most radical claims: by the sanctity of God's Essence, if all were to unite in His support at that moment, not a single soul would remain upon the earth outside of Paradise; indeed, every thing would watch over its own soul, because the entire religion would consist solely in supporting Him, not in the subsidiary ordinances of the Bayān, which are valid only prior to His appearance. Law here is openly declared *provisional*, oriented entirely toward the recognition of the next Manifestation. What emerges is a political theology in which property, coercion, mercy, and salvation are unified under a single ontological principle: nothing truly belongs to anyone except by alignment with truth. Ownership is not abolished; it is *conditionalized*. Power is not denied; it is subordinated to Revelation. Violence is not glorified; it is instrumentalized within a teleology of universal rescue. This is not liberal justice, but neither is it nihilistic domination. It is a form of what might be called *soteriological realism*: the conviction that *truth is so real*, and *salvation so decisive*, that allowing people to remain indefinitely outside it is the greater cruelty.

Placed in dialogue with Marx, the resonance is unmistakable. Marx exposes how capitalism naturalizes property relations that are in fact historical and violent. The Bayān goes further: it denies the ontological legitimacy of property altogether unless it is grounded in truth. Where Marx abolishes private ownership in the name of material equality, the Bayān abolishes unconditional ownership in the name of ontological justice. Certain things—life, land, wealth—are not merely socially misallocated; they are illicit when detached from the source of being itself. With Fanon, the convergence is equally sharp. Fanon shows that colonial domination persists by preserving the colonizer's right to define legitimacy, property, and law. The Bayān rejects that epistemic court outright. It does not ask permission from an unjust order to reclaim sovereignty; it treats that order's

claims as null. Liberation here is not negotiated recognition but enforced realignment. Fanon's insistence that decolonization is necessarily violent finds its metaphysical analogue in the Bayān's insistence that truth cannot coexist indefinitely with its negation. Arendt, finally, clarifies the political stakes. She warns that politics collapses when law loses authority and reality fragments. The Bayān responds by refusing fragmentation altogether. It insists on a single source of judgment, a single horizon of legitimacy, and a finality that modernity no longer dares to claim. What appears tyrannical to a pluralist imaginary is, from this perspective, an attempt to rescue politics from *worldlessness* by re-grounding it in Revelation.

Read in the context of civilizational collapse and the digital global village—where property is abstracted, coercion is hidden, and justice is endlessly deferred—this chapter of the Bayān appears not as barbaric excess, but as a brutally lucid diagnosis. It denies the fantasy that justice can emerge from neutral procedure, voluntary consensus, or perpetual tolerance. It asserts instead that justice requires decision, alignment, and the courage to subordinate economics, power, and law to truth itself. This is why the Bayān remains dangerous. Not because it is archaic, but because it refuses the modern settlement between nihilism and management. It does not ask how to govern injustice more gently; it asks how to abolish it ontologically. And that question—once asked—cannot be safely ignored.

Conclusion: From Post-Juridical Noise to Bayānī Decision

If the digital age has produced anything like a universal anthropology, it is this: everyone is now exposed, everyone is now judgeable, and no one is any longer judged by a rule that binds judge and judged alike. The collapse of natural justice described is therefore not simply a crisis of moderation or manners, nor merely a drift from institutional norms. It is a *metaphysical and political disintegration of reciprocity*—the replacement of law with ambience, hearing with reaction, and decision with perpetual re-litigation. What emerges is a world that retains the *gestures* of justice—procedural language, platform "standards," bureaucratic review, community "accountability"—while evacuating justice's substance: intelligible criteria, proportionate response, and finality. The signature of this collapse is that the accused are required to be perfectly legible while accusers and institutions remain

structurally unaccountable. In other words, the digital village does not merely permit injustice: it institutionalizes asymmetry as normality.

Aristotle's diagnosis, Arendt's warning, Fanon's exposure, and Suhrawardī's metaphysics all converge here as a single composite truth: *justice is not merely an outcome but an environment*—a bounded field of shared criteria in which judgment is possible at all. When that field dissolves, what remains is not pluralism, but *ochlocracy*; not public reason, but viral pathos; not politics, but administrative risk management; not moral clarity, but ontological flattening. Under such conditions, even accurate accusations corrode justice, because they circulate without the forms that permit adjudication. This is the distinctive perversity of the present: truth itself becomes a weapon of injustice once it is severed from judgment and finality. The internet does not simply spread falsehood; it spreads *indefinite accusability*, and indefinite accusability is the negation of justice. This is why the Bayān's political theology, read without liberal reflexes, ceases to look like an antiquarian embarrassment and begins to read like a severe but coherent response to a world of collapsing judgment. The modern conscience recoils at the Bayān's exclusionary ordinances because it presumes that inclusion is the highest political good. Yet here we have demonstrated that inclusion without shared law is not a good at all; it is a solvent. It dissolves the very conditions under which justice can exist, replacing adjudication with noise. The Bayān's claim is not that outsiders are subhuman or unworthy. Its claim is structurally prior: *a polity is not a "space" until it has a common world*, and a common world is not a world until it has a shared grammar of legitimacy. Where legitimacy is pluralized at the foundation, *justice becomes impossible*—not because diversity is evil, but because judgment cannot be simultaneously sovereign and relativized without collapsing into contradiction. The Bayān therefore treats coherence not as a luxury but as a prerequisite: first a field of illumination, then hospitality; first a shared *nomos*, then plurality; first judgment, then openness. To reverse this order, as liberal modernity has done, is to produce precisely what we now inhabit: worldlessness with connectivity, accusation without hearing, procedure without truth.

The Bayān's geosophic logic (the five divisions, the graded unveilings of *tawḥīd*, the mirror/stone metaphor) clarifies something deeper than "theocracy." It clarifies the Bayān's central political insight: *law is not a floating instrument that can be applied anywhere*.

Law is the outward face of an ontology. Where the ontology is refused, law becomes either coercion or theater. This is why the Bayān does not imagine justice as a neutral mechanism available to any and all; it imagines justice as the governance of light over a prepared field—mirrors placed before the Sun. Modernity, by contrast, has attempted to govern without metaphysics and then pretended that its governance is therefore neutral. But we have shown throughout that this neutrality is fictive. The digital village has not abolished metaphysics; it has installed a metaphysics of flattening, where all claims are equal except those punished by the crowd or suppressed by platforms. Darkness becomes procedural. Illumination becomes "extremism." The Bayān's severity is thus not mere intolerance; it is a refusal to let darkness masquerade as equality.

The later passages analyzed push the argument into its most uncomfortable clarity: property, sovereignty, coercion, mercy—each is treated not as an autonomous moral domain but as an extension of ontological alignment. Modern liberalism turns these into separate compartments so it can manage contradictions: property is "economic," belief is "private," coercion is "illegal," truth is "subjective." The Bayān collapses these partitions. It insists that ownership is not morally self-justifying, that power is not automatically illegitimate, that procedure is not sacred, and that mercy is not synonymous with tolerance. This is the scandal: the Bayān treats *procedural voluntariness* as subordinate to *ontological rescue*. That claim is shocking to modern sensibility precisely because modern sensibility has already been trained by administrative power to regard procedure as the final court. Yet in the digital age, procedure is precisely what has become the *alibi of injustice*: it preserves the appearance of fairness while enabling asymmetrical harms without decision. This is where dialogue with Marx, Fanon, and Arendt becomes most urgent.

Marx teaches that property regimes pretend to be natural when they are historical. The Bayān goes further: it denies that "the natural" has any standing when severed from truth. Fanon teaches that domination persists by forcing the colonized into perpetual explanation before an alien court. The digital village universalizes that structure: everyone can be made the native, forever on trial, always required to translate themselves into hostile categories. The Bayān's boundedness, in this light, is not merely a politics; it is an *anti-colonial refusal of the gaze*—a protected space in which legitimacy is not begged for,

argued for, or "moderated," but simply governed. Arendt teaches that politics requires a shared world; when the world disintegrates, what remains is bureaucracy and violence. The Bayān reads as a radical attempt to prevent that disintegration by refusing plural foundations of judgment within one polity. In short: Marx diagnoses the theft, Fanon diagnoses the tribunal, Arendt diagnoses the worldlessness—and the Bayān answers all three with the same hard claim: *justice is impossible without a sovereign criterion of truth*.

The essay's final implication, then, is not that one should nostalgically reenact the Bayān's earlier ordinances as a program, nor that modernity must be met with a simple reactionary closure. It is that our age has reached a point where the liberal promise—universal inclusion through procedural neutrality—has become structurally incapable of producing justice. The internet has not merely exposed injustice; it has made injustice the default operating system of public life by destroying the conditions of judgment. Against this, the Bayān does not offer a dream of better moderation. It offers a theory of *decision*: bounded space, shared criteria, metaphysical coherence, proportion, and finality. It is a reminder that justice is not "more speech," not "more process," not "more inclusion," but the restoration of a field in which truth can govern, hearing can precede verdict, and disputes can end. This is why the Bayānī perspective is not merely interpretive; it is *diagnostic*. It identifies the core wound of our time: a civilization that has made everything public *except responsibility*, everything permanent except accountability, and everything legible except truth. In such a world, natural justice cannot be "reformed" back into existence by policy tweaks or platform guidelines. It must be *reconstituted ontologically*—by rebuilding the grammar of judgment, the conditions of finality, and the legitimacy of decision. If the digital village is the globalization of ochlocracy and worldlessness, some of the Bayān's former severity was due to the insistence that a world must first exist—illuminated, bounded, coherent—before justice can ever be more than theater as it has become in this age.

[1] See *The Philosophy of Illumination* (1999).

[2] These being 1. Fars, 3. Iraq, 3. Azerbaijan, 4. Khurasan and 5. Mazandaran

[3] In the Bayānic Theophany of Persons this formula corresponds to Muḥammad.

[4] In the Bayānic Theophany of Persons this formula corresponds to ʿAlī.

[5] In the Bayānic Theophany of Persons this formula corresponds to Fāṭima.

[6] In the Bayānic Theophany of Persons this formula corresponds to Ḥasan.

[7] In the Bayānic Theophany of Persons this formula corresponds to Ḥusayn.

[8] 1. Muḥammad = *Ḥayy*/Living; 2. ʿAlī = *Qayyūm*/Peerless Self-Subsistent; 3. *Fāṭima* = *Ḥakam*/Judge; 4. Ḥasan = ʿ*Adl*/Just; and 5. Ḥusayn = *Quddūs*/Holy.

7

A Fanonian Reading of the *19 Commandments* and Epilogue

The **19 Commandments** to ***Black Skin, White Masks*** and ***The Wretched of the Earth*** are not offered merely as a commentary on Fanon, nor as an extension of postcolonial theory, but as a response to the ontological impasse his work exposes with devastating clarity. Fanon shows that within the liberal-colonial symbolic order, recognition is structurally impossible: the colonized subject is produced as an object prior to encounter, speech, or action. What remains unresolved in *Black Skin, White Masks* especially, for instance, is not diagnosis but ground—what ontology could sustain as liberation once recognition, reform, and inclusion have been exhausted. **The 19 Commandments** proceed from the conviction that liberation cannot arise from rearranging the terms of a world whose first principles are already inverted. They therefore do not appeal to rights, identity, or historical vindication, but to manifestation, obligation, and ontological accountability. In this sense, they are not ethical injunctions but axiomatic interruptions: propositions intended to reconstitute what counts as selfhood, truth, justice, and reality itself. Read alongside Fanon, they mark the passage from critique to rupture—from the exposure of colonial ontology to its refusal. This is because when read together Fanon and the **19 Commandments** disclose the full arc of a single problem and its resolution. Fanon exposes the catastrophic psychic and ontological consequences of a world in which being is mediated by a racialized liberal

order that confers recognition selectively and retrospectively. The **19 Commandments** respond not by contesting recognition within that order, but by refusing its ontological authority altogether. What Fanon diagnoses as alienation, the Bayān names as negation (*nafy*); what Fanon experiences as suffocation, the Bayān answers with rupture.

Bayānī political ontology thus begins where Fanon is forced to end: at the point where liberation can no longer be secured by critique alone, but requires a decisive reconstitution of what counts as reality, responsibility, and truth. Seven theses drawn from these **19 Commandments** hold that:

1. Recognition is not liberation; manifestation is. The colonized subject cannot be freed by being recognized within an order that ontologically precedes and negates them. Liberation begins only when the self is affirmed as a locus of manifestation prior to institutional acknowledgment.

2. Rights without obligation reproduce domination. Liberal humanism's language of rights masks an asymmetry in which some are ontologically entitled while others are perpetually answerable. The Commandments ground existence instead in *taklīf*—responsibility prior to claim.

3. Truth is not verified by success or survival. Historical endurance and institutional consolidation are not criteria of truth but effects of power. Revelation, rupture, and defeat may disclose more truth than victory ever could.

4. Colonial violence is ontological before it is political. Racism, capitalism, and ecological devastation arise from the same inversion: the commodification of the conditions of manifestation themselves. Political domination is a downstream expression of metaphysical negation (*nafy*).

5. Administration replaces judgment in modern power. The liberal-bureaucratic order governs by deferral, procedure, and dispersed responsibility, rendering accountability indeterminate. The Commandments reassert judgment as an ontological event, not a managerial function.

6. The sacred cannot be institutionalized without betrayal. Creeds, states, and theocracies are mechanisms by which revelation is captured and neutralized. The refusal to found new religious or political monopolies is integral, not incidental, to liberation.

7. Justice precedes peace; peace without justice is appeasement. Fanon's insight that colonial order is maintained by false peace is given ontological depth: peace that does not arise from justice is itself a technology of domination.

Taken together, these theses do not supplement Fanon so much as radicalize his unfinished horizon by shifting the terrain of struggle from recognition, reform, and counter-narrative to the level of manifestation itself. Where Fanon exposes the psychic and material devastation wrought by an order that confuses force with truth, the Bayān names the deeper mechanism by which such an order sustains itself: the prior foreclosure of reality, in which what may appear, count, obligate, or judge has already been decided in advance by power. **The 19 Commandments** therefore do not offer a program in the usual sense, a state form, or a rival ideology; they enact a *withdrawal of ontological consent*. They refuse the metrics by which domination measures itself—success, stability, legitimacy, peace—and reanchor truth in responsibility, judgment, and disclosure rather than endurance. In this sense, Bayānī political ontology is neither postcolonial critique nor revolutionary humanism, but an insurrection at the level of Being itself: a demand that the world be rendered answerable again, not to power's narratives, but to the conditions of manifestation it has long denied.

That said, divine revelation is invoked here neither as a confessional appeal nor as a claim to unchallengeable authority, but as an ontological category naming interruption. It designates the irruption of Truth that does not arise from consensus, procedure, or historical validation, and therefore cannot be judged by them. In this sense, Revelation functions analogously to what Fanon calls a "leap" beyond the colonial symbolic order, though articulated here with metaphysical precision rather than existential desperation. To treat Revelation ontologically is to insist that truth may appear without permission from power, institutions, or prevailing grammars of legitimacy. This methodological decision is essential: without it, critique remains trapped within the very order it seeks to overcome; with it, political ontology becomes capable of naming not only domination, but the

conditions under which domination loses its claim to reality. What the **19 Commandments** thus accomplish—especially when read against Fanon—is a reversal of Fanon's diagnostic movement into an ontological corrective. Fanon anatomizes the colonized psyche as a site where ontology has been externally imposed: the Black and Brown subject is rendered an object in a racialized symbolic economy whose categories precede experience and foreclose self-recognition. The **19 Commandments** begin precisely where Fanon is forced to stop: at the point where diagnosis alone cannot generate liberation without an ontological counter-claim. Four structural features are decisive:

1. **From recognition to manifestation**

   Fanon exposes the impossibility of recognition within a white liberal symbolic order. The commandments refuse recognition as the horizon altogether and instead assert *manifestation* as primary. The self is not something to be acknowledged by institutions, states, or others, but something that *already stands* as a locus of theophany (**commandments 1–4**). This displaces the entire liberal grammar Fanon critiques but cannot escape.

2. **From rights to obligation (*taklīf*)**

   Fanon identifies the asymmetry of rights in colonial modernity but remains trapped in the political language of claim and redress. The commandments cut deeper by grounding existence in obligation rather than entitlement: truth, justice, courage, care, and responsibility precede any claim to recognition or protection (esp. **3, 7, 11, 17, 19**). This directly answers the psychic damage Fanon describes by reconstituting subjectivity as answerable rather than petitionary.

3. **From racial ontology to cosmological ontology**

   Fanon's analysis remains anthropocentric by necessity. The commandments widen the field radically: colonial violence is shown to be one expression of a deeper metaphysical crime—the commodification of the conditions of manifestation themselves (**commandments 15 and 18**). Capitalism, racism, ecological devastation,

and administrative domination appear here as different modalities of the same ontological inversion.

4. **From secular rupture to revelatory interruption**

   Fanon's tragic insight is that secular modernity offers no adequate language for genuine rupture; revolt risks reproducing the very symbolic order it opposes. The commandments resolve this by refusing secular neutrality altogether. Revelation is not appealed to as authority but asserted as *event*: interruption that judges history rather than being judged by it. This is why the text consistently refuses institutionalization, state capture, and clerical consolidation (**commandments 14–15**).

Now, in early January 2026 Salman Sheikh (who bears the Bayānī name *Burhānu'Llāh*, meaning the *Evidence*, *Testimony* or *Proof of God*) made a brief **YouTube** video comparing each of our **19 Commandments** (the **Fourteenth Unity of the Bayān**) to principles articulated in Fanon's work.[1] Here we revisit Salman's brief commentary, paired with our own Fanonian hermeneutical expansion on each commandment. Each section proceeds in sequence: first the commandment itself, then Salman Sheikh's short commentary, and finally our critical exegesis.

1

Know thyself and awaken! Whosoever knows their Self—their Celestial Guide or the Imām-of-their-being, the exclusive divine Name of which they are a manifestation, their Para-Atman, the Holy Guardian christic angelic twin (*angelos christos*, *syzygy*) *of their being—knows their Lord! For know, ye all are —all of thee!—the manifestations of My light and the fruits of My Being, so look within and ye shall find Me standing within manifest, luminous, mighty, splendorous, powerful and resplendent. Therefore*

the only true point of adoration (***qibla***) *is in the conjunction of the Sun and the Moon of the being of thine own heart—which is Me—not elsewhere, so turn to It!*

Fanonian Commentary on Commandment 1

Salman Sheikh: This commandment emphasizes inner awakening and self-knowledge as the foundation of liberation. Fanon's work mirrors this by insisting that Black liberation must begin with confronting internalized racism and false self-images. Fanon's call to descend into the 'zone of nonbeing' reflects this awakening: an inward reckoning that strips away imposed identities so authentic selfhood and dignity can emerge.

~

Critical exegesis: Fanon begins *Black Skin, White Masks* from the wound opened when the self is denied the possibility of knowing itself except through the gaze of another. The Black or Brown subject encounters themselves not as an interiority, but as an object—overdetermined from without, fractured by language, image, and expectation. In this sense, Fanon's insistence that liberation must pass through the "zone of nonbeing" already anticipates the demand issued here: *know thyself and awaken*. What Fanon exposes is that colonial domination is not merely political or economic but ontological—it interrupts self-relation at the root.

Yet Fanon can only describe the collapse of selfhood; he cannot fully ground its restoration. **Commandment 1** supplies precisely that missing ground. Where Fanon strips away imposed identities in order to reach a bare, perilous freedom, this commandment affirms that the self is not empty after deconstruction but luminous—already a site of manifestation. The "Celestial Guide" or *Imām-of-ones-being* answers Fanon's unanswered question: *what remains once the white mask is torn away?* Not negation, but *presence*. Crucially, this self-knowledge is not narcissistic interiority, which Fanon rightly rejects as bourgeois illusion. It is ontological recognition: the self as a locus of divine light prior to racial inscription. Fanon insists that the Black and Brown subject must refuse to be fixed by the white gaze; this commandment radicalizes that refusal by relocating the axis of meaning altogether. The *qibla* is no longer external—no longer Europe, no longer whiteness, no

longer the Other's recognition—but the heart itself as the conjunction of inner forces. This directly counters the colonial demand that value and truth come from elsewhere. Thus, where Fanon warns that recognition within the colonial symbolic order is impossible, this commandment abolishes the need for such recognition entirely. To "know thy Lord" through knowing the Self is to render colonial ontology irrelevant, not merely unjust. Fanon diagnoses alienation with unmatched clarity; **Commandment 1** names the ontological reversal that makes alienation no longer authoritative. Awakening here is not psychological insight alone—it is the reconstitution of being beyond the world that made the wound.

2

> *Verily I proclaim unto thee the* ***Great Resurrection*** *(****qīyāmat al-kubrā****), the age of inner truth and verification, so rend the veils, unfetter the bonds and smash the external idols of empty form and cleave forevermore to the pearls of inward meaning and reach out thereby to the loftiest heights of truth and realization in the world of Eternity, by whatsoever means or vehicles providence has provided for thee, and not by the means of those outward husks of vain, stultifying and narrow minded formulas or those empty ritualisms without meaning nor those malevolent fundamentalist religious exotericisms which drag down and imprison in their cages of opaque darkness of limited and limiting materiality!*

Fanonian Commentary on Commandment 2

Salman Sheikh: This commandment urges rejection of hollow rituals and external idols. Fanon similarly critiques colonial myths, scientific racism, and superficial liberalism that claim universality while sustaining domination. By exposing these false forms, Fanon teaches that liberation requires dismantling ideological structures that masquerade as progress while preserving inequality.

~

Critical exegesis: Fanon's entire project is animated by the intuition that colonial domination survives not primarily through brute force, but through *forms*—ritualized languages, sanctioned symbols, institutional performances, and moral vocabularies that present themselves as neutral while enforcing submission. What he calls the "myth of the Negro," the civilizing mission, and liberal humanism are precisely such *external idols of empty form*: structures that claim universality while hollowing out lived truth. In this sense, **Commandment 2**'s proclamation of the *Great Resurrection* names what Fanon experiences but cannot formally declare—an epochal demand for verification beyond inherited frameworks.

Fanon repeatedly insists that liberation requires tearing away veils: the veil of language that rewards proximity to whiteness, the veil of culture that masks domination as progress, the veil of psychology that individualizes what is structural. Yet Fanon remains caught in the tragic tension that once these veils are torn, the subject risks falling into nihilism or violence without metaphysical anchoring. **Commandment 2** resolves this tension by reframing unveiling not as destruction alone but as resurrection—*qīyāmat al-kubrā* (the Great Resurrection)—a passage into an order where truth is inwardly verified rather than externally authorized. The attack here on ritualism, formula, and narrow exotericism also cuts deeper than a critique of religion. Fanon's sharpest insights are aimed not at theology but at secular dogmas that function theologically: *republican universalism*, *scientific racism*, *developmentalism*, and *bureaucratic reason*. These are the "vain formulas" of modernity—systems that imprison by claiming to liberate. **Commandment 2** exposes their shared logic: all substitute external conformity for inner realization, obedience for truth, and repetition for transformation. Where Fanon demands a new humanism born from rupture, this commandment declares that rupture as already inaugurated. The *Great Resurrection* is not deferred to political victory or institutional reform; it names a present ontological threshold. To cleave to "pearls of inward meaning" is to refuse the colonial demand that truth be certified by institutions, traditions, or even revolutionary orthodoxies. Thus **Commandment 2** radicalizes Fanon's refusal of false universals by insisting that no liberation is possible without abandoning the entire economy of external validation—whether colonial, liberal, or fundamentalist.

In Fanonian terms, this is the moment when critique ceases to be reactive and becomes constitutive. The veils are not merely lifted to expose oppression; they are shattered to make another mode of being possible. What Fanon calls the leap into a new humanity, the Bayān names *Resurrection* (*qīyāma*).

3

> *Always on the Path of the Great Work of life to death to palingenetic resurrection rely upon what thine own inner light and what the truth within tells thee and not what thy neighbor, preacher, rabbi, priest, minister, mullah, shaykh, guru, clairvoyant, astrologer, institution, corporation, superior, bureaucrat, politician or popular consensus insists or demands that ye think and do. Therefore the only obedience due on the Path of the Great Work of life to death to palingenetic resurrection is obedience to that voice of Truth emanating forth when truly unveiled from within the essential light of thine own inner being or to that living, veridical embodification of the Proof of that Truth in the outer world, and nothing else. So listen most intently to that Mighty Voice of Truth!*

Fanonian Commentary on Commandment 3

Salman Sheikh: This teaching centers obedience to inner truth rather than imposed authority. Fanon exemplifies this by rejecting colonial institutions even when they offer prestige or acceptance. His resignation from colonial psychiatry in Algeria demonstrates allegiance to ethical truth over professional security, aligning inner conviction with action.

~

Critical exegesis: Commandment 3 articulates with remarkable precision what Fanon struggles to secure against every form of colonial mediation: the right—and necessity—of obedience to truth *prior* to authority. In *Black Skin, White Masks*, Fanon shows how colonial domination operates by colonizing judgment itself. The colonized subject is trained to mistrust their own perception, affect, and reason, and to defer instead to an external chorus

of validation—teachers, experts, institutions, sciences, bureaucracies, and moral authorities that claim neutrality while reproducing domination. What appears as "popular consensus" or "objective reason" is in fact an apparatus of command. Fanon's refusal of this apparatus is unmistakable. He rejects the psychiatrist who pathologizes Black or Brown consciousness, the liberal who demands patience, the revolutionary who substitutes doctrine for lived truth. His resignation from colonial psychiatry is the paradigmatic Fanonian act: obedience to inner ethical truth over institutional legitimacy. Yet Fanon can describe this refusal only negatively—as disobedience, rupture, or exile—without being able to name a positive principle of obedience that does not relapse into authority.

Commandment 3 supplies that principle. It draws a decisive distinction between obedience to power and obedience to truth. The former demands conformity, repetition, and submission to roles assigned from without; the latter requires unveiling, risk, and existential exposure. Fanon insists that liberation cannot come from mimicking colonial reason or submitting to its institutions; this Commandment clarifies why: because such obedience is always misplaced. Authority that does not arise from truth is ontologically illegitimate, no matter how widely it is endorsed. Crucially, this Commandment also avoids the liberal trap of reducing freedom to individual preference or opinion. The "inner light" invoked here is not arbitrary subjectivity but a site of verification (*taḥqīq*)—a demand that truth be lived, embodied, and, where necessary, externally manifested in a *Proof* (*ḥujja*). This answers Fanon's anxiety that unmediated freedom might collapse into solipsism or violence. Obedience to truth is neither anarchic nor submissive; it is a discipline that binds the self more rigorously than any institution ever could. Where Fanon exposes the psychological devastation caused by obedience to false authorities, **Commandment 3** reconstitutes obedience itself as a revolutionary category. It declares that the only obedience compatible with liberation is obedience to that which unmasks domination at its root. To "listen most intently to that Mighty Voice of Truth" is, in Fanonian terms, to refuse every demand that one justify their being to a world that has already decided against it. This is not rebellion for its own sake, but the restoration of judgment to its rightful place: within the being of the subject, prior to command, consensus, or coercion.

4

> *Always above all to thine own Self be true and as the day follows the night thou canst not be false to any person, for when thou art authentically true to thyself never will the demons of fanaticism, narrow mindedness, ignorance, selfishness, skewed vision, fundamentalism, hypocrisy and deceit visit thee!*

Fanonian Commentary on Commandment 4

Salman Sheikh: Authenticity is central to both Fanon and this commandment. Fanon condemns assimilation that demands self-denial in exchange for conditional acceptance. He argues that true freedom arises only when one refuses to live as a mask for someone else's expectations.

~

Critical exegesis: **Commandment 4** strikes at the very heart of the psychic catastrophe Fanon diagnoses: the enforced division of the self. In *Black Skin, White Masks*, Fanon shows how colonial domination compels the Black subject to live in bad faith—to speak, act, and even desire in ways that contradict their lived reality in order to survive within a world structured against them. This produces what he describes as a "splitting" of consciousness, where authenticity becomes dangerous and self-betrayal appears prudent. Fanon's rage is directed precisely at this condition, in which falsity is rewarded and truth is punished. To "be true to thyself" is therefore not a moral platitude but an *ontological act of resistance*. Fanon insists that assimilation is always a lie, because it requires the subject to negate their own experience in exchange for conditional acceptance. Such falsity is not merely personal; it metastasizes into collective pathologies—fanaticism, ressentiment, mimicry, and ideological rigidity. **Commandment 4** names this dynamic with clarity: when one is false to oneself, the ground is prepared for demons that Fanon relentlessly exposes—narrow-mindedness masquerading as reason, hypocrisy dressed up as civility, and fundamentalism born of wounded identity.

Fanon is acutely aware that falsehood does not liberate but corrodes. The assimilated subject becomes neither fully accepted nor fully present to themselves, trapped in what Fanon calls "*the hell of the present*." **Commandment 4** advances this insight by asserting that authenticity is not merely therapeutic but prophylactic: truthfulness to the self is what prevents the descent into ideological possession. Where Fanon observes the psychological consequences of self-betrayal, this commandment states the ontological law behind them. Most importantly, this Commandment refuses the liberal inversion that treats authenticity as selfishness and conformity as virtue. Fanon exposes how colonial societies accuse the oppressed of *extremism* the moment they refuse masks. **Commandment 4** answers that accusation in advance: it is precisely the refusal of self-truth that gives rise to fanaticism, not fidelity to one's being. Authenticity here is not isolation but ethical clarity; it is the condition under which one can no longer deceive others because one is no longer deceiving oneself.

In Fanonian terms, **Commandment 4** names the passage from alienation to presence. It insists that liberation cannot be achieved by strategic falsity, gradual accommodation, or polite compromise with untruth. The demons Fanon names—fear, mimicry, hatred, ideological rigidity—do not descend upon those who speak from their being, but upon those forced to deny it. To be true to the Self is thus not a retreat from struggle; it is the only ground from which struggle does not become its own betrayal.

5

> *Do not fear anything. Fear and fear alone is the root of all evil, the very seed of hatred and the negation of love, truth, freedom, justice and all good besides. Therefore bedeck thy selves with the attribute of the gem of the highest courage and fortitude possible in all circumstances!*

Fanonian Commentary on Commandment 5

Salman Sheikh: Fear sustains oppression. Fanon shows how colonial systems rely on fear to discipline bodies and minds. Liberation, for Fanon, requires courage to confront both external violence and internalized self-contempt.

~

Critical exegesis: Fear occupies a central, if often unspoken, place in Fanon's analysis of colonial domination. Colonial order is sustained not only by violence already enacted, but by violence anticipated—by the constant internalization of threat that disciplines thought, movement, speech, and desire. In *Black Skin, White Masks*, fear is what keeps the colonized subject cautious, conciliatory, grateful for crumbs of recognition, and hesitant to risk rupture. It is the affective infrastructure of domination. **Commandment 5** names this with uncompromising clarity: fear is not merely a symptom of oppression; it is its generative principle. Fanon shows how fear mutates into hatred—first inward, as self-contempt, then outward, as displaced aggression or pathological mimicry. The colonized subject learns to fear exclusion, ridicule, poverty, isolation, and violence, and this fear corrodes the possibility of love, truth, and justice before any explicit ideology is even invoked. In this sense, fear is prior to racism as doctrine; it is racism as lived affect.

Fanon is acutely aware that appeals to courage are often weaponized by power—used to shame the oppressed into reckless sacrifice. But **Commandment 5** avoids this trap by grounding courage not in bravado or martyrdom, but in fortitude: the sustained capacity to remain present to truth without flinching. Fanon's own life exemplifies this form of courage: the willingness to speak what could not be safely spoken, to resign from institutions that promised security at the cost of complicity, and to endure isolation rather than falsity. What Fanon cannot quite say—but what this commandment dares to declare—is that fear is ontologically incompatible with liberation. A subject governed by fear cannot perceive truth clearly, because perception itself is bent toward survival within an unjust order. Courage, then, is not an ethical accessory but a precondition of knowledge. To "do not fear anything" is not to deny danger, but to refuse fear's authority to decide what is real, possible, or speakable. In Fanonian terms, this commandment strikes at the deepest hold of colonial power: its ability to govern the future by terrorizing the present. To clothe oneself in courage and fortitude is to reclaim temporal agency—to act not according to

what power threatens, but according to what truth demands. Fear negates love because it narrows the world; courage restores love because it reopens it. This is why, for Fanon as for the Bayān, liberation begins not with strategy but with the audacity to live without fear before a world that depends upon it.

6

> *Love thy self first unselfishly and truly then can ye unselfishly love thy neighbor, for loving thyself unselfishly is the first step towards truly loving others unselfishly, whilst in a divided heart which hates itself—which is really the selfishness of the base ego—never can the seed of love for others bloom into anything but thorns, weeds and thistles, as the mirror of the inner life is also the mirror of the outer life!*

Fanonian Commentary on Commandment 6

Salmon Sheikh: This commandment reframes self-love as ethical responsibility. Fanon insists that self-hatred, produced by racism, prevents genuine solidarity. Healing the fractured self is therefore a prerequisite for collective liberation.

~

Critical exegesis: As we said, Fanon's most devastating insight in *Black Skin, White Masks* is that colonial racism produces not merely social exclusion but *self-hatred*. The Black or Brown subject is induced to experience their own being as a deficit, something to be corrected, disguised, or transcended through approximation to *whiteness*. What passes for "self-interest" in such a condition is in fact a desperate strategy of survival within a hostile symbolic order. **Commandment 6** directly names this condition and refuses its false remedies. For Fanon, self-hatred is not an individual moral failing but a structural imposition: the colonized subject is taught to despise their own body, language, culture, and affect. This hatred then metastasizes outward. Fanon shows how demands for "love," "tolerance," or "universal brotherhood" issued within a racist order ring hollow, because they presuppose a self that has already been denied the right to love itself. **Commandment**

6 exposes this contradiction with precision: a divided heart cannot generate genuine love. What masquerades as altruism under such conditions often conceals resentment, dependency, or mimicry. Crucially, the commandment insists on *unselfish* self-love, not narcissistic affirmation. Fanon repeatedly rejects bourgeois self-esteem discourse, which merely repackages ego under the language of empowerment. The "base ego" named here corresponds to what Fanon diagnoses as the assimilated self: a self obsessed with approval, terrified of rejection, and therefore incapable of solidarity. Such a self does not love others; it competes with them for recognition within a rigged order.

By contrast, unselfish self-love is ontological reconciliation. It is the healing of the split Fanon describes between the lived body and the imposed image. Once the self is no longer at war with itself, it no longer needs the Other as mirror, rival, or threat. Only then does love cease to be a compensatory gesture and become an outward extension of inner wholeness. The mirror logic Fanon traces—where the Black or Brown subject sees themselves only through hostile eyes—is here reversed: the inner life becomes the ground of the outer relation. In Fanonian terms, **Commandment 6** articulates the condition for genuine solidarity. Liberation cannot be built on self-contempt, however politicized, nor on ressentiment masquerading as justice. Love of the neighbor becomes possible only when the self has been reclaimed from negation. What Fanon diagnoses as the psychic wreckage of colonialism, this commandment answers as ontological repair: the restoration of a heart no longer divided against itself, and therefore no longer compelled to reproduce domination in the name of love.

7

> *Strive to be fair and just in all circumstances and always maintain the highest standard of integrity, equity and forthrightness in all thy dealings both with thyself and with others!*

Fanonian Commentary on Commandment 7

Salman Sheikh: Fanon relentlessly exposes injustice in colonial law, medicine, and culture. His insistence on integrity demands confronting uncomfortable truths rather than maintaining polite illusions of harmony.

~

Critical exegesis: **Commandment 7** confronts directly one of Fanon's most unsettling conclusions: that colonial society renders justice structurally impossible while continuing to speak its language. In *Black Skin, White Masks*, Fanon exposes how law, medicine, education, and liberal morality present themselves as neutral and fair even as they operate through racialized asymmetry. Justice becomes a vocabulary without substance, invoked to stabilize domination rather than to challenge it. What Fanon unmasks is not merely hypocrisy, but a systemic divorce between proclaimed values and lived reality.

To "strive to be fair and just in all circumstances" therefore cannot mean conformity to existing standards, for Fanon demonstrates that those standards are already corrupted. **Commandment 7** implicitly rejects procedural justice detached from truth. Integrity and equity here are not institutional attributes but existential disciplines. Fanon repeatedly insists that one must not seek shelter in systems that demand moral compromise as the price of participation. His own refusal to practice psychiatry within a colonial apparatus that pathologized the colonized is an exemplary act of the integrity named here, because Fanon was acutely aware that oppression pressures the oppressed into ethical distortion—into strategic lying, selective truth-telling, or moral shortcuts justified by survival. While he understands the conditions that produce such distortions, he never romanticizes them. **Commandment 7** addresses this tension without moralism: justice must be maintained *both* with oneself and with others. This insistence refuses the false choice between personal integrity and political struggle. Fanon's deepest fear is that liberation might reproduce the very structures of domination it opposes; this commandment places ethical coherence at the center of resistance itself.

Equity, as invoked here, directly counters the colonial logic Fanon critiques, wherein universality is proclaimed but particularity governs. True equity does not mean treating unequal conditions as equal; it means refusing to let advantage masquerade as merit or power masquerade as right. Forthrightness, likewise, rejects the culture of

euphemism and polite concealment that Fanon identifies as a hallmark of liberal racism. Speaking plainly becomes a form of justice when obfuscation serves domination. In Fanonian terms, **Commandment 7** asserts that liberation without integrity is a contradiction. Justice cannot be postponed until after victory, nor sacrificed for strategic gain, because injustice enacted in the name of justice only entrenches the logic of the oppressor. Fanon's work is haunted by this danger; the Bayān names it and forbids it. To live justly in an unjust world is not naïveté—it is the refusal to allow oppression to dictate the terms of one's being.

8

> *Think good thoughts, utter good words and commit good things, for thoughts, words and actions are as angels and demons, and it is in thy intentions whereby the good or the bad become manifest, and in the end ye reap what ye sow, because such is My eternal law of cause and effect (**karma**), so speak and do whatever establishes thy inner peace but always search thine intentions first before thinking, outwardly saying and doing!*

Fanonian Commentary on Commandment 8

Salman Sheikh: Fanon demonstrates how racist myths begin as thoughts, are reinforced through language, and enacted through violence. Transformation therefore requires ethical discipline at every level of consciousness and action.

~

Critical exegesis: Fanon is acutely sensitive to the fact that colonial domination operates not only through laws and institutions, but through *psychic economies*—through the circulation of images, myths, words, and habitual thoughts that sediment into reality. In *Black Skin, White Masks*, racist fantasies begin as thoughts, harden into language, and are finally enacted upon bodies as violence. Fanon's analysis thus already presupposes the chain named here: thought *to* word *to* act. **Commandment 8** makes explicit what Fanon

demonstrates implicitly—that consciousness is not epiphenomenal but generative. The distinction drawn between *angels* and *demons* maps precisely onto Fanon's insight that psychic life under colonialism is saturated with hostile presences. The colonized subject internalizes voices not their own: stereotypes, judgments, expectations that speak *through* them even when no colonizer is present. Fanon shows how language itself becomes demonized—how certain words wound before any physical blow is struck. **Commandment 8** responds by relocating ethical struggle to the level of intention, where domination first gains entry.

Now, Fanon is careful not to reduce oppression to individual psychology; he knows that structures precede intention. Yet he is equally clear that liberation requires vigilance at the level of inner life, lest the oppressed unconsciously reproduce the logic of domination. **Commandment 8** sharpens this vigilance into a discipline: intentions must be searched before *speech* and *action*, because unexamined intentions are where colonial poison most easily disguises itself as common sense, resentment, or righteousness. Importantly, the appeal to "inner peace" here does not signal withdrawal or quietism. Fanon fiercely criticizes any peace that is purchased at the cost of truth. Rather, inner peace names coherence—the alignment of thought, word, and deed that Fanon seeks when he rejects both assimilation and reactive hatred. Violence, Fanon insists, is sometimes historically unavoidable, but psychic incoherence is never liberatory. Actions born of hatred reproduce the world that produced hatred. In Fanonian terms, **Commandment 8** articulates the ethical infrastructure of decolonization. Liberation cannot be achieved solely by changing external conditions while leaving the inner economy colonized. To reap differently, one must sow differently—not in obedience to moral law imposed from without, but in fidelity to truth discovered within. Fanon exposes the catastrophic effects of colonized consciousness; this commandment names the practice by which consciousness ceases to be colonized at all.

9

Be detached from the world and content with what ye already possess and take thine eyes askance from coveting thy neighbor's possessions whether in the inner world or in

the outer world. But with what ye already possesses ye should always strive for the betterment of thyself and those around thee in all things and circumstances!

Fanonian Commentary on Commandment 9

Salman Sheikh: Colonial society equates worth with proximity to white material culture. Fanon critiques this fixation. He argues that true liberation cannot be purchased through symbols of colonial success.

~

Critical exegesis: Fanon repeatedly exposes how colonial domination binds the colonized subject to a world structured by lack. Desire is trained to flow toward what the colonizer possesses—language, commodities, status, modes of life—so that worth itself becomes indexed to proximity to whiteness. In *Black Skin, White Masks*, this produces a permanent economy of envy and imitation, where the Black or Brown subject is encouraged to covet not merely objects but being itself as embodied by the Other. **Commandment 9** strikes directly at this mechanism. Detachment here is not withdrawal from struggle but refusal of the *colonial calculus of value*. Fanon shows how possession under colonial conditions is never neutral: to desire what the colonizer has is already to accept the colonizer's ontology, in which worth is measurable, exchangeable, and scarce. Coveting becomes a form of self-alienation, because it presupposes that fulfillment lies elsewhere—in another body, another culture, another life. **Commandment 9** breaks this circuit by *severing desire from comparison*.

At the same time, Fanon is no ascetic moralist. He is painfully aware that material deprivation is real, violent, and politically produced. **Commandment 9** therefore does not sanctify poverty or counsel resignation. The call to be "content" is paired with an imperative to strive for betterment—for oneself and for others—using what one already has. This mirrors Fanon's insistence that liberation must be creative rather than mimetic: new forms of life must be invented rather than borrowed from a hostile world. The warning against coveting the neighbor's *inner* possessions is especially Fanonian. Fanon shows how colonial subjects are taught to envy not only material goods but psychic states—confidence, ease, entitlement—mistaking these effects of power for personal virtues. Such envy

deepens alienation, because it frames domination as aspiration. **Commandment 9** refuses this inversion by grounding dignity in sufficiency rather than accumulation.

In Fanonian terms, this Commandment dismantles the libidinal economy of colonialism. It denies power its most reliable ally: the *desire of the dominated to become like the dominator*. Detachment restores freedom by freeing desire from humiliation, and contentment restores agency by relocating value within lived reality rather than imposed hierarchy. Only from such a position can the betterment of self and others avoid reproducing the very order it seeks to overcome.

10

> *Do not descend into superficiality and shape thy life exclusively by the passing and ephemeral standards, fashions, contingencies, vanities and trends of popular culture, but be modest and follow a balance; hence, thou shalt not follow thy neighbor in their trends and habits, for if truly they had something other than of eternal value to offer thee, indeed they would follow thee, not ye them!*

Fanonian Commentary on Commandment 10

Salman Sheikh: Fanon criticizes the shallow optimism of colonial humanism that ignores lived suffering. Depth, not surface reconciliation, is required for genuine human transformation.

~

Critical exegesis: Fanon is relentlessly critical of the ways colonial modernity substitutes surface for depth. In *Black Skin, White Masks*, he shows how popular culture, fashion, language, and taste function as technologies of assimilation, teaching the colonized subject to model their life on ephemeral standards set elsewhere. These standards promise visibility, acceptance, and modernity, but deliver only further alienation. To live by them is to mistake adaptation for liberation. **Commandment 10** names this mechanism precisely.

Superficiality here is not aesthetic shallowness but ontological distraction—the reduction of life to trends whose very ephemerality ensures dependence. Fanon demonstrates how colonial culture constantly shifts its markers of legitimacy, forcing the colonized subject into perpetual imitation. One is always behind, always catching up, always adjusting oneself to habits that were never meant to be shared equally. What appears as "popular culture" is in fact a moving target that *stabilizes hierarchy*.

Fanon's critique of mimicry is especially relevant. He shows that the colonized subject who follows the habits of the colonizer becomes neither fully accepted nor fully present to themselves. **Commandment 10** radicalizes this insight by exposing the false asymmetry at work: if the dominant culture truly possessed something of eternal value, it would not require imitation; it would attract freely. The fact that imitation is demanded rather than invited reveals the emptiness of what is being offered. The call to modesty and balance is thus not conservative restraint but *strategic clarity*. Fanon does not advocate rejection of modernity as such; he advocates the invention of a new human. **Commandment 10** aligns with this by refusing to let life be shaped by what merely circulates rather than what endures. Depth becomes an act of resistance when surface is the medium of domination. In Fanonian terms, this commandment protects liberation from being absorbed by spectacle. A struggle that allows itself to be defined by trends, visibility, or cultural fashion risks becoming another performance for the dominant gaze. By refusing to follow the neighbor's habits, the subject withdraws from the colonial economy of imitation altogether. What Fanon demands as a break with imposed norms, the Bayān articulates as a refusal of superficial life in favor of balance rooted in what cannot be commodified or replaced.

11

> *Do not be sheep amongst society but rather be leaders the light of whose mind and spirit always shines resplendent like a torch in the darkness. Therefore let that light shine forth resplendent in the world, gird up thy loins and fight the good fight for truth, equity, justice and righteousness wherever the nonexistent darkness of negation hath cast its shadow and imprisoned the Good in the opaque transparency of its lies!*

Fanonian Commentary on Commandment 11

Salman Sheikh: Fanon exemplifies moral leadership by challenging dominant narratives. He encourages oppressed peoples to think critically rather than internalize imposed explanations.

~

Critical exegesis: Fanon is unsparing in his critique of mass conformity under colonial conditions. In *Black Skin, White Masks*, he shows how domination depends not only on repression but on habituation—on the production of subjects who internalize norms, repeat sanctioned narratives, and police themselves and one another. The "sheep" here are not morally deficient individuals but subjects trained to mistake safety for truth and adaptation for maturity. Fanon's deepest concern is that colonial order reproduces itself precisely by discouraging the emergence of independent judgment. **Commandment 11** responds to this danger by redefining leadership not as authority over others, but as luminosity of being. To be a leader is not to command or dominate, but to *shine*—to make truth visible in a world organized to obscure it. This resonates directly with Fanon's insistence that the task of the oppressed intellectual is not to echo the colonizer's categories, nor to flatter the masses, but to risk clarity where obscurity is rewarded. Fanon repeatedly warns against the temptation to hide behind collective slogans or ideological safety; this commandment names that temptation as a refusal of light.

The image of "nonexistent darkness" is especially Fanonian. Fanon shows that colonial myths—of racial hierarchy, cultural inferiority, liberal benevolence—have no ontological substance, yet they exert real force because they are believed and repeated. Darkness here is not an independent power but the absence produced by negation. **Commandment 11** insists that such darkness persists only insofar as truth is withheld. To fight the "good fight" is therefore not merely to oppose injustice externally, but to refuse the lies that imprison the Good within false transparency—systems that appear clear, rational, and neutral while concealing domination. Fanon is acutely aware that such clarity invites punishment. To step out of the herd is to expose oneself to ridicule, isolation, and violence. Yet Fanon insists that liberation cannot proceed without figures willing to bear

this cost. **Commandment 11** sanctifies that risk, not as martyrdom but as responsibility. Leadership here is inseparable from courage, integrity, and refusal of illusion. In Fanonian terms, this Commandment names the ethical vocation Fanon assigns to those who have glimpsed the truth of colonial domination: not to manage darkness, but to dispel it; not to negotiate with negation, but to expose its unreality. The torch does not overpower darkness—it reveals that darkness was never a substance to begin with. To let one's light shine is thus to reclaim the authority to name reality against a world invested in its distortion.

12

> *Strive always to speak the truth even if it be the acme of blasphemous heresy, for honesty is the attribute of the highest gem that the temple of humanity can bedeck itself with, whilst deceit, dishonesty, hypocrisy, conceit and obfuscation, the lowest, the meanest and most vile, which, as it were, kills the world as well as its perpetrator!*

Fanonian Commentary on Commandment 12

Salman Sheikh: Fanon's work was often labeled dangerous or extremist. Yet his refusal to soften truth for comfort embodies this commandment.

~

Critical exegesis: Truth-telling is the ethical nerve of Fanon's entire project. *Black Skin, White Masks* is written under the conviction that colonial domination survives because truth is rendered unspeakable—because honesty is recoded as excess, extremism, bad manners, or danger. Fanon repeatedly notes that the moment one names racism plainly, one is accused of hatred; the moment one describes domination accurately, one is charged with pathology. In this sense, "heresy" is not an accidental risk of truth-speaking—it is its predictable consequence within an order built on lies. **Commandment 12** names this dynamic without compromise. To speak truth even when it appears blasphemous is to refuse the moral blackmail Fanon exposes, whereby civility is weaponized to silence clarity. Colonial society

sanctifies deception—polite euphemism, liberal gradualism, scientific neutrality—while treating honesty as a threat to social order. Fanon shows that this inversion is not incidental: lies are necessary to sustain domination, because domination cannot survive prolonged exposure to truth. Fanon himself embodies the cost of such honesty. His work was dismissed as exaggerated, unbalanced, incendiary—precisely because it refused obfuscation. Yet he understood that deceit does not merely misrepresent the world; it *deforms* it. **Commandment 12** radicalizes this insight by asserting that dishonesty "kills the world": it corrodes trust, fragments perception, and renders justice impossible by severing words from reality. A world organized around concealment cannot sustain life, only management.

Importantly, this **Commandment** does not equate truth with provocation for its own sake. Fanon rejects theatrical rebellion just as firmly as he rejects polite falsity. The demand here is for honesty as an ontological discipline: speech aligned with reality rather than calibrated for approval. Conceit and hypocrisy are condemned not because they are impolite, but because they preserve systems that depend on silence and confusion. In Fanonian terms, **Commandment 12** restores truth to its rightful status as a force of liberation rather than a negotiable opinion. To speak truth under conditions of domination is always to risk being labeled heretical, irrational, or dangerous. But Fanon insists—and the Bayān affirms—that without such speech, oppression becomes naturalized and injustice normalized. Truth does not kill society; lies do. To speak honestly is therefore not merely an ethical choice but a refusal to participate in the slow annihilation of the world itself.

13

> *My eternal covenant with thee is My Love and My Love alone, and from Love follows Justice; from Justice follows Truth; from Truth follows Freedom, and only then can there be true unity in diversity, as every atom of My creation are so many manifestations of the various Names and Attributes of My Self mirroring Me to thee, my various Faces turned towards thee in every circumstance, for whichsoever place ye turn there is the Light of My Face, so love truly that ye may truly be free!*

Fanonian Commentary on Commandment 13

Salman Sheikh: Fanon's humanism is rooted in a radical love that demands justice. This love refuses sentimental unity and insists on structural change.

~

Critical exegesis: Fanon is often misread as a thinker of rage alone, but *Black Skin, White Masks* is animated by a far more demanding claim: that liberation without love collapses either into nihilism or into the replication of domination. Fanon rejects sentimental humanism, yet he insists on a radical reconstitution of the human—one grounded in a love that refuses hierarchy, pity, and abstraction. **Commandment 13** names this precisely, but reverses the modern order of derivation. Where liberal thought attempts to derive love from tolerance, rights, or coexistence, this commandment insists on the *primacy of love* (*aṣālat al-ḥubb*), and everything else follows. The sequence matters. Fanon shows that appeals to truth without justice become instruments of domination, and appeals to justice without love become indistinguishable from vengeance. **Commandment 13** resolves this impasse by grounding justice in love—not as emotion, but as ontological recognition of the other as irreducible. Justice that does not arise from love becomes procedural *cruelty*; truth that does not arise from justice becomes *ideology*; freedom that does not arise from truth becomes *license for the powerful*. Fanon circles this structure but cannot formalize it metaphysically; the Bayān declares it as law.

Fanon's insistence on a "new humanism" is haunted by the question of unity without erasure. Colonial universalism claims unity by suppressing difference; racialism claims difference by denying unity. **Commandment 13** refuses both by locating unity at the level of manifestation rather than identity. Every being is a distinct face, a particular expression, not a deviation from a norm. This directly answers Fanon's agony over being reduced to a category: the problem is not difference itself, but an ontology that cannot see difference without hierarchy. Verbatim echoing **Qur'ān 2:115**, the declaration that "*for whichsoever place ye turn there is the Light of My Face*" also dismantles the colonial logic Fanon

exposes, wherein value is spatially coded—center and periphery, metropolis and colony, whiteness and its margins. Fanon shows how geography becomes destiny under colonialism. **Commandment 13** abolishes that mapping altogether: no place is ontologically empty, no body is metaphysically peripheral. The gaze that renders some lives invisible is exposed as blindness, not vision. In Fanonian terms, this commandment articulates the only love capable of sustaining liberation: a love that does not demand assimilation, gratitude, or likeness. It is not peace before justice, nor unity before truth, but love that gives rise to justice, justice that clarifies truth, truth that makes freedom real. Fanon demands a world in which the Black and Brown subject no longer needs to justify their humanity; the Bayān grounds that demand in an ontology where humanity is already excessive, plural, and radiant. To love truly, then, is not to reconcile with domination, but to withdraw recognition from every order that denies the full Light of Being.

14

> *Thou shalt not found any more creeds, sects and religious organizations that greedily claim exclusivity over my Name, My truths or My eternal verities. For blessed is the spot, and the house, and the place, and the city, and the heart, and the mountain, and the refuge, and the cave, and the valley, and the land, and the sea, and the ocean, and the island, and the meadow, and the forest and the jungle, and the garden, and the country, and the church, and the mosque, and the synagogue, and the temple, and the cloister, and the caravan, and the reservation, and the hospice, and the ashram, and the khānanqāh, and the celebrating feast, and the workshop, everywhere and anywhere where My mention hath been made, by whatsoever Name or indication, where My praise is glorified; for I have inspired My wise ones many a time before to teach thee that I have many Names and am indicated by many indications and even in the worship of images, the stones and the idols am I to be found, that is, whensoever such worship has occurred with unimpeachable sincerity whereby the multiplicity of blind materiality has then erupted into the transparency of the Light of Divine Unicity* (***tawḥīd***). *My only religion to thee is realization in the Light of True Celestial Love and*

its realization by whatsoever means or vehicles alone which is none other than the realization of that Path (***ṣirāt***) *of the way of the payment of the existential life debt* (***dīn***) *to the All-High that is realized by means of the* ***First Commandment*** *whose outward Path of consummation in this day until My Return in* **303** *is represented by the ecclesia of My* ***N.U.R.****, the* ***Fāṭimīya****!*

Fanonian Commentary on Commandment 14

Salman Sheikh: Fanon rejects racial essentialism and closed identities. He envisions a humanity beyond rigid categories imposed by colonial thinking.

~

Critical exegesis: Fanon is relentlessly critical of every system that claims universality while functioning as exclusion. In *Black Skin, White Masks*, he shows how Western Christianity, secular humanism, and scientific rationalism all operate as *creeds* in precisely this sense: they present themselves as neutral or salvific while demanding assimilation and erasing difference. **Commandment 14** names this structure at its root. It does not merely critique particular religions or institutions; it exposes *exclusivity itself* as an ontological violence. For Fanon, the tragedy of colonial religion is not belief as such, but monopolization of meaning. Christianity arrives in the colony not as love but as classification—dividing saved from damned, civilized from primitive, truth from superstition. Fanon observes how even secular ideologies reproduce this logic, establishing new orthodoxies that pathologize deviation. **Commandment 14** refuses this entire economy of capture. To forbid the founding of new creeds is to forbid the conversion of revelation into administration.

The expansive litany of blessed places directly answers the spatial hierarchies Fanon dismantles. Colonial order assigns value geographically: Europe as center and metropole, colony as periphery and backwater; church as sacred, forest as pagan; institution as legitimate, body as suspect. Fanon shows how such mappings render the colonized world profane by default. **Commandment 14** abolishes this cartography altogether. No place is ontologically empty, no practice inherently void, no people outside manifestation. What Fanon experiences as suffocation under imposed universals, the Bayān

resolves by pluralizing the very sites of the sacred. The affirmation that truth may appear even in images, stones, and idols is especially Fanonian in its refusal of civilizational arrogance. Fanon exposes how colonial power ridicules indigenous forms of meaning while absolutizing its own symbols. **Commandment 14** dismantles this hierarchy by insisting that sincerity, not form, is the criterion of disclosure. What matters is not conformity to authorized vehicles but the eruption of unicity through multiplicity. Fanon intuits this when he rejects European claims to exclusive rationality; the Bayān states it as metaphysical law.

Thus, the refusal to found new religious monopolies is inseparable from Fanon's warning against replacing colonial domination with new orthodoxies. Fanon fears that liberation movements may calcify into dogma, reproducing hierarchy under a different name. **Commandment 14** forecloses this danger by defining religion not as institution but as realization—*dīn* as existential debt, not clerical possession. The path is lived, not owned. In Fanonian terms, this commandment liberates meaning itself from captivity. It declares that no group, race, institution, or civilization may claim final authority over truth. Fanon sought a world in which humanity could breathe without masks imposed by history. **Commandment 14** ensures that even liberation itself cannot harden into a new mask. Where Fanon dismantles false universals, the Bayān renders universality impossible to monopolize—by grounding it in love rather than power, realization rather than rule.

15

> *Thou shalt not found any more governments and states in My Name oppressing in My name for political purposes of worldly and material gain, for what need have I, or have I ever had, for your ephemeral governments and statecraft which always eventually pass into dust?* ***I Am that I Am*** *and no government or political agenda can ever encompass My vastness, nor is there any need to, for I am existent in all things, present in all forms of belief, including even within the blindness of atheism. Split a piece of wood and I Am there; lift up the rock and ye shall finding Me Standing, and I do whatever I Will to do regardless of what those with theocratic or authoritarian pretensions illegitimately seek to do in My Name. Therefore, know, that any group or*

persons wishing to establish a theocracy or any form of authoritarian polity are seeking one after their own selfish and base desires to control and oppress others by the vain delusions borne of their own fear, their own personal psychological and spiritual contamination, and so by their limited and false imaginings. Seek ye, however, to found instead an eco-socialist universal theophanocracy of light (the rule of the theophanies of My Being which ye all already-always are) within existing frameworks of secular social-democratic societies whose animating inner working spirit ye shall then alchemically and theurgically sacralize, for such is the best and most worthy form of government for ye all, guaranteeing thy rights, freedoms, welfare and protections, and one truly reflective of the protective freedom of the Spirit itself!

Fanonian Commentary on Commandment 15

Salman Sheikh: Fanon warns against replacing colonial domination with new forms of tyranny. Liberation must transform structures, not merely change rulers.

~

Critical exegesis: **Commandment 15** enters directly into the political impasse Fanon leaves deliberately unresolved. Fanon is ruthless in his critique of colonial states and the liberal myth that the state can function as a neutral instrument of justice. In *Black Skin, White Masks*, and even more forcefully in *The Wretched of the Earth*, he shows how the colonial state is not a misused apparatus but a machine designed to classify, dominate, and extract. Yet Fanon remains haunted by a danger he cannot fully escape: that anti-colonial struggle might simply replace one ruling elite with another, leaving the structure of domination intact. This commandment names that danger with ontological clarity. It refuses the very premise that divine truth—or by extension, ultimate meaning—can be embodied in the form of a state. Fanon warns repeatedly against the sacralization of power, whether religious or secular, because once power claims transcendence it becomes immune to judgment. **Commandment 15** radicalizes this warning by declaring all theocratic and authoritarian projects not merely politically dangerous but metaphysically illegitimate. They arise, it

insists, from fear and psychic contamination—the same fear Fanon identifies as the emotional infrastructure of domination.

The insistence that God "*has no need*" of governments echoes Fanon's rejection of every ideology that demands submission in the name of History, Reason, Nation, or Destiny. Fanon exposes how such abstractions function as masks for control. **Commandment 15** extends this insight beyond colonialism into postcolonial authoritarianism, foreclosing in advance the justification of tyranny by appeal to sacred mission or revolutionary necessity. What Fanon feared as betrayal, the Bayān forbids as illusion. Crucially, the commandment does not collapse into anarchism or quietism. Fanon is deeply concerned with material conditions—hunger, housing, healthcare, dignity—and he knows that withdrawal from politics is itself a luxury of the privileged. **Commandment 15** answers this concern by distinguishing sharply between *sacralized power* and *sacralized life*. The call for an "eco-socialist universal theophanocracy of light" is not a blueprint for clerical rule but a reorientation of political legitimacy: power is justified only insofar as it protects life, freedom, and dignity without claiming metaphysical finality. This aligns with Fanon's insistence that the postcolonial future must invent new forms rather than inherit colonial statecraft. The difference is that Fanon can only gesture toward such invention, while the Bayān grounds it ontologically. Theophanocracy here does not mean rule by God or clergy, but the refusal of any regime that claims exclusive access to truth. It affirms that sovereignty belongs to manifestation itself—to living beings already bearing dignity—rather than to institutions pretending to speak in their name.

In Fanonian terms, **Commandment 15** resolves the tension between liberation and authority. It declares that no state may demand obedience beyond justice, no ideology may sanctify domination, and no power may claim immunity by invoking transcendence. Where Fanon exposes the catastrophic consequences of replacing colonial masters with native administrators, the Bayān names the only politics that does not betray liberation: one that sacralizes life without deifying power, and governs without claiming to own truth.

16

> *Seek to be a true friend to all nations, colors, creeds, beliefs, persuasions, preferences, for they are all various hues and loci of My manifestation, and the various fruits of the* ***Tree of Existence****. For just as there is no inner difference between woman and man, also there is no difference between thy colors, creeds, beliefs, persuasions and preferences other than in your own perspectives!*

Fanonian Commentary on Commandment 16

Salman Sheikh: Fanon insists on solidarity across racial and national lines. His vision of humanity affirms dignity in all cultures.

~

Critical exegesis: Fanon's work is driven by an acute awareness that colonial domination fractures humanity by converting difference into hierarchy. In *Black Skin, White Masks*, race, culture, language, gender, and belief are not simply descriptive categories; they are weaponized to assign value unevenly and to justify exclusion. What Fanon suffers most acutely is not difference itself, but the way difference is made to signify inferiority. **Commandment 16** confronts this mechanism at its root by refusing the conversion of plurality into rank. Fanon is explicit that colonialism does not merely oppress; it *ontologizes* division. The Black and Brown subject is forced to experience their body, culture, and history as obstacles to humanity rather than expressions of it. **Commandment 16** answers this violence by re-situating difference within manifestation itself. Nations, colors, creeds, and preferences are not deviations from a norm but distinct loci of appearance—"hues and fruits" rather than errors to be corrected. This directly dismantles the colonial presumption that unity requires *sameness*. Importantly, Fanon also rejects false universalism—the kind that claims *colorblindness* while preserving *white normativity*. **Commandment 16** avoids this trap by affirming difference without erasing it. Unity here does not arise from abstraction or homogenization, but from ontological parity: difference persists, hierarchy dissolves. Fanon yearns for such a world when he declares that he wants

to be recognized "as a man among men," not as an exception or a problem. This commandment supplies the metaphysical ground for that demand.

The assertion that there is "no inner difference between woman and man" also resonates deeply with Fanon's critique of gendered and sexualized racial fantasy. Fanon shows how colonial racism eroticizes, feminizes, or hyper-masculinizes the colonized body in order to render it controllable. **Commandment 16** strips these projections of their ontological authority. Difference in form does not entail difference in being; the hierarchies built upon such distinctions are revealed as perspectival distortions rather than truths. In Fanonian terms, this commandment articulates a solidarity that is neither sentimental nor strategic, but ontological. To be a "true friend" to all is not to ignore conflict or injustice, but to refuse the metaphysical lie that some lives are closer to truth than others. Fanon's struggle is against a world that forces the oppressed to choose between erasure and antagonism. **Commandment 16** opens a third path: a world in which plurality is not a problem to be managed, but the very condition of manifestation.

17

> *Seek always to take care of the children, the infirm, the sick, the lame, the ailing, the homeless, the injured, the destitute, the wronged, the oppressed, the downtrodden, the wretched of the earth, the dispossessed and the elderly even if thou must sacrifice much from thyself in so doing, for those in need are in all circumstances My Face mirroring Me to thee and a test for thine own advancement, betterment and realization, would ye but know it!*

Fanonian Commentary on Commandment 17

Salman Sheikh: Fanon sides unequivocally with the oppressed against systemic violence. He views neutrality in the face of injustice as complicity.

~

Critical exegesis: **Commandment 17** stands in direct and unmistakable continuity with Fanon's moral universe. *The Wretched of the Earth* names with brutal clarity those whom history renders surplus: the poor, the sick, the displaced, the colonized, the forgotten. Fanon insists that colonial order is defined precisely by its abandonment of these lives—by its capacity to produce entire populations whose suffering is normalized, managed, or rendered invisible. To care for them is therefore never neutral; it is a direct challenge to the structure of the world as it is. Fanon is explicit that oppression is not an abstraction but a lived condition inscribed on bodies. Hunger, illness, homelessness, psychic breakdown, and premature aging are not accidental byproducts of colonialism but its daily operations. **Commandment 17** confronts this reality without euphemism. It refuses the liberal fantasy that justice can be achieved without cost, and it names sacrifice as unavoidable. Fanon rejects charity as spectacle or moral self-congratulation; what he demands is commitment that risks comfort, status, and security.

The decisive move in this commandment is ontological rather than humanitarian. Fanon argues that colonial society teaches its subjects to avert their gaze from suffering, to rationalize abandonment as necessity, efficiency, or realism. **Commandment 17** reverses this training by declaring that those cast aside by power are not marginal to truth but *central to it*. To encounter the oppressed is to encounter reality *unmasked*. Fanon repeatedly insists that the truth of a society is revealed at its margins, not in its institutions; this commandment affirms that insight as metaphysical law.

The claim that the oppressed are "My Face" directly answers Fanon's critique of dehumanization. Colonialism denies facehood—it reduces persons to functions, threats, or statistics. Fanon's rage is fueled by this annihilation of presence. **Commandment 17** restores facehood absolutely and without condition. Dignity is not conferred by productivity, citizenship, health, or utility; it is disclosed most intensely where power has attempted to erase it. In Fanonian terms, this commandment renders neutrality impossible. Fanon is unequivocal: to stand aside in the face of injustice is to side with domination. Care here is not sentiment but alignment. To tend to the wretched is to refuse the ontology that made them wretched in the first place. Sacrifice is not moral heroism but the price of truth in a world organized against it. Liberation, Fanon insists, is measured not by proclamations or

reforms, but by whether the most abandoned can live. **Commandment 17** makes that measure non-negotiable.

18

> *Take care of My angel the earth (gaia). Jealously protect the life pulsating within her, throughout her, around her, above her, and vigilantly safeguard all the creatures under her care in all circumstances and contingencies if, that is, thou art to remain true to thy essential calling as My vicegerent upon the earth! Therefore always be in balance with the earth, for in this age the buying and the selling, the trade and commerce in the Four Elements* (i.e. **Air**, **Fire**, **Water** and **Earth**) *have verily been prohibited and made illicit* (***ḥarām***) *by the heaven of My Command! So do not allow the earth to be ravaged any more by the ravenous beasts of industry, corporation, selfish profit mongering and, above all, by those demons of waste and those demons of the machine, for Nature and the earth are My most sacred trust to thee, containing therein the portals to the most wondrous loci of My manifestation, as I am above all the Mother, both in thy world and throughout all the realms of existence!*

Fanonian Commentary on Commandment 18

Salman Sheikh: Fanon transforms personal and collective suffering into political insight. Pain becomes a source of clarity rather than resignation.

~

Critical exegesis: Although Fanon rarely thematizes ecology explicitly, his analysis of colonial domination already contains the seeds of an ecological critique. Colonialism, for Fanon, is not only the exploitation of people but the violent transformation of land into property, resource, and instrument. The earth under colonial rule ceases to be a living ground and becomes an object of extraction—mapped, divided, commodified, and exhausted. **Commandment 18** brings to full visibility what Fanon intuits: the devastation of

the colonized subject and the devastation of the earth arise from the same ontological violence. Fanon shows how colonial capitalism converts both human bodies and landscapes into raw material for accumulation. Plantations, mines, factories, and urban slums are not merely economic sites; they are psychic and ecological wounds. The "ravenous beasts of industry" named here correspond precisely to what Fanon identifies as the colonial economy's appetite for endless growth, enforced by coercion and rationalized as progress. What is destroyed is not only soil and water, but the possibility of dwelling—of being at home in the world.

The prohibition on buying and selling the Four Elements radicalizes Fanon's critique by naming commodification itself as the crime. Fanon exposes how colonial order teaches the oppressed to understand land as something owned by others, fought over, or envied. **Commandment 18** dissolves this logic entirely: air, fire, water, and earth are not exchangeable goods but conditions of manifestation. To traffic in them is to negate life at its source. This reframes ecological devastation not as mismanagement, but as metaphysical negation (*nafy*).

That stated, Fanon's vision of liberation is inseparable from reclaiming the land—not merely as territory, but as the basis of collective life. Yet he remains bound to the historical horizon of decolonization struggles over ownership and control**. Commandment 18** goes further by refusing ownership altogether. The earth is not to be possessed, nationalized, or redistributed as property; it is a trust. Vicegerency here names responsibility without dominion, care without mastery. This answers Fanon's unresolved concern that postcolonial elites might reproduce extractive violence under new banners.

Finally here, the maternal imagery of earth as "Mother" resonates deeply with Fanon's awareness that colonial violence is also a violence against origins. Fanon describes a world in which ancestry, land, and continuity are severed, producing profound existential dislocation. **Commandment 18** restores relationality at the deepest level: to care for the earth is to heal the rupture between being and ground. In Fanonian terms, this commandment expands liberation beyond the human without abandoning the human. It declares that a world which cannot protect its most vulnerable land and life cannot liberate its most vulnerable people. The struggle against domination must therefore be ecological or it will not be liberation at all.

19

> *Know that peace without justice is appeasement and encouragement of the tyrant in continuation of his tyranny. Strive ye always therefore in all thy endeavors to render all their just and equitous due, and they thine, for without justice true peace is not possible, and without true peace true unity is not possible, and in their absence neither is the realization of true love possible. This is the balance, this is the balance, this indeed is the balance!*

Fanonian Commentary on Commandment 19

Salman Sheikh: Fanon rejects final solutions or static identities. Freedom, like this commandment, is a continual ethical and psychological practice.

~

Critical exegesis: **Commandment 19** articulates, with stark precision, the moral axiom that governs Fanon's entire corpus: *peace without justice is not peace, but a technology of domination*. Fanon is unsparing in his critique of colonial "order," which presents itself as peace while resting on *systemic violence*. The calm of the colony, he shows, is the calm of the cemetery—maintained by fear, enforced silence, and the normalization of suffering. What liberal discourse celebrates as stability, Fanon exposes as the successful management of injustice. Fanon repeatedly rejects appeals to reconciliation that precede justice. In *Black Skin, White Masks*, he demonstrates how demands for patience, moderation, and civility function as moral weapons wielded by the powerful. Such appeals do not restrain tyranny; they protect it. **Commandment 19** names this dynamic without equivocation: peace that does not arise from justice is appeasement. It is not neutral restraint but active encouragement of continued domination. Fanon's fury is directed precisely at this moral inversion.

Furthermore, the insistence on rendering "all their just and equitous due" also answers Fanon's concern that liberation movements might settle for symbolic recognition while material injustice persists. Fanon is adamant that dignity without redistribution,

respect without repair, and inclusion without transformation are empty gestures. Justice here is not abstract fairness but concrete reckoning—economic, political, psychic, spiritual. Only such justice can interrupt the cycle by which oppression reproduces itself under new names. The sequential logic of the Commandment—justice *to* peace *to* unity *to* love—maps exactly onto Fanon's ethical horizon. Fanon rejects unity imposed from above, which merely conceals antagonism. He also rejects love that bypasses conflict, which he regards as sentimental complicity. Unity without justice is false; love without truth is impossible. **Commandment 19** formalizes this insight as balance: not compromise, but proportion—each term arising only when its condition has been met.

In Fanonian terms, this final Commandment closes the arc of liberation by restoring moral clarity to a world addicted to false harmonies. Balance is not moderation between injustice and resistance; it is alignment with reality against distortion. Fanon's work is animated by the refusal to call oppression peace or silence unity. **Commandment 19** seals that refusal as law. Where tyranny depends on the language of peace, the Bayān insists that only justice can quiet the world—and that without justice, there can be no unity, no love, and no liberation worthy of the name.

Epilogue

We reiterate again, as we did at the beginning of the prologomenon—*O God, show us the realities of things as they truly are*—because the invocation is not ornamental; it is the methodological key. What has been argued throughout is that political life cannot be understood from within politics alone, because politics is *never primary*. It is downstream from the field of being in which it becomes thinkable, actionable, and legitimate. A polity, an economy, a legal regime, a corporate order—these are not merely institutional arrangements but crystallizations of an antecedent metaphysics: an implicit decision about what is real, what counts, what may be owned, what may be exchanged, what may be

deferred, and what must be treated as inviolable. This is why **political ontology** precedes ideology, law, and economics. Ideologies narrate a world; laws stabilize it; economic systems instrumentalize it. Yet none of them generates the ontological grammar they presuppose. If the world appears as administrable population, then administration will seem natural; if it appears as a warehouse of resources, extraction will seem rational; if it appears as neutral procedural space, the deferral of judgment will seem prudent. The deepest power of a political order lies precisely here: in rendering itself indistinguishable from reality, so that domination is not merely enforced but inhabited. The problem, then, is not merely that power is exercised unjustly, but that the very conditions under which justice could appear are quietly configured in advance. That is what it means for power to function as a fact of being and not merely as coercion.

The Bayān enters this question not as a moral protest within a shared horizon, but as a rival disclosure of that horizon itself. In Bayānī terms, to speak of political ontology is to speak of the rank of being within which power either becomes legitimate or reveals itself as void. Everything in the Bayān begins with the *resituation of existence* as sign and trust: all things are *āyāt* (signs), and their reality is measured not by utility, exchange, or administrative convenience but by proximity to the Divine Command. This is why the Bayān can say, with Qur'ānic resonance, that It (i.e. God) has not commanded any one of the existential possibilities except through self-recognition and the unicity of the inmost Reality of Its Being—for all else is created by Its command, and to It belongs creation and command from before and from after.[2] The meaning is not merely devotional: it is juridical and political at the level of first principles. Creation is not property; it is *amāna* (trust). Authority does not originate in procedure; it originates in ontological truth. From this standpoint, the question is not "*who rules*?" but "*what mode of being has been assumed as real*?" If the assumed ontology is false—if it misnames the world as alienable matter rather than entrusted manifestation—then the regime that follows from it does not merely govern badly; it governs without right. Its legitimacy collapses not by moral critique but by ontological verdict.

This is why the Bayān's prohibition on buying and selling the Four Elements is the centrifugal axis around which the whole political ontology revolves. Earth, water, air, and

fire are not "resources" in the modern sense; they are the primordial conditions of manifestation through which bodies, lives, and worlds appear. To render them objects of exchange is to commit an ontological error: it treats the conditions of existence as alienable property rather than as divine trusts held in custodianship. A polity that commodifies the elements does not merely distribute injustice; it violates the order of Being itself. Hence the phrase "ontologically illegal" is not rhetorical flourish. It names the fact that the modern capitalist (dis)order is built upon metaphysical inversion—negation of first principles—such that what appears as normal economic activity is, from within the Bayān's horizon, a falsification of reality. The Bayān names this falsification as *nafy* (negation) and withdraws recognition from any regime founded upon it. Power rooted in ontological falsehood is not simply oppressive; it is void. It persists only by colonizing perception until the unthinkable becomes practical, the impermissible becomes routine, and the sale of the elemental conditions of life feels inevitable, rational, and "how the world works."

Once this is seen, the critique of the corporate-administrative order comes into focus with sharper resolution. The contemporary system rarely forbids; it governs by deferral, classification, jurisdictional partition, and the multiplication of neutral-seeming processes. Harm accrues without ever crystallizing into an event; violence becomes atmospheric; responsibility is redistributed until it dissolves. What appears as openness becomes containment precisely because speech is permitted only after it has been rendered inconsequential. This is why modern existentialism, historically indispensable as a vocabulary of decision, authenticity, and alienation, begins to lose traction here: it presupposes a subject confronting obstacles, whereas the corporate labyrinth configures the horizon of intelligibility in advance, training subjects to experience compliance as prudence and resistance as irresponsibility. The Islamic existential-metaphysical tradition we mobilize does not begin from the isolated subject but from manifestation itself: from graded disclosure, veiling as modality, and temporal deformation as substantial motion. Suhrawardī makes legible domination by dimming and refraction; Ibn ʿArabī makes legible veiling through forms and excessive articulation; Mullā Ṣadrā makes legible harm that arrives as drift, erosion, and internal transformation rather than as a discrete blow. The Bayān then adds ontological rupture: it not only diagnoses how truth is attenuated but

names the point at which deferral itself becomes illegitimate. Legitimacy is grounded in presence rather than procedure; law follows illumination rather than manufacturing it. This is why the Bayān cannot be integrated as one discourse among others: it does not offer critique within the existing grammar of legitimacy; it displaces that grammar. It confronts contemporary theory with a demand it is structurally trained to evade: the *demand to decide*.

From this standpoint, even apparently "technical" domains—housing law, property, contract, eviction—reveal their metaphysical commitments. Where the modern order converts debt and title into state-backed displacement, the Bayān's horizon renders the commanded expulsion of persons from dwelling and place a form of ontological violence, not merely a regrettable enforcement mechanism but as *illicit* (*ḥarām*) in the highest sense of the word. The point is not to moralize tenancy but to deny the legitimacy of making existence itself leverageable. The Bayān's treatment of inclusion and exclusion belongs to the same logic. Exclusion here is not a moral failure or sectarian pathology; it is a condition of intelligibility. A polity ordered by a shared ontological grammar cannot incorporate its negation without collapsing into incoherence. To say this is not to advocate repression; it is to insist that judgment requires a common field in which truth can appear as truth. Modern readers conflate ontological boundary-setting with political persecution because contemporary power disguises coercion as inclusion and moralizes neutrality as if it were a virtue rather than an assumption. Yet the Bayān's insistence is structurally different: it refuses the dispersion of decision into endless dialogue, rights-talk, and procedural time. It does not fear difference; it refuses *ontological incoherence*. And where historical ordinances—such as the exclusion of unbelievers from a Bayānī polity—are prudentially abrogated in our **Completion of the Bayān** due to changed conditions, the underlying reasoning remains intelligible and, in its own context, justifiable: a defensive ontology in a world of imperial encroachment, not an eternal mandate for repression. The principle that survives is not the mechanical repetition of nineteenth-century polity-building, but the recognition that a shared world is not built by neutralizing criteria of legitimacy; it is built by clarifying them.

This brings us to the stakes: what counts as "failure," what counts as "success," and who gets to decide. This is why we say that the label "failed messiah," when applied to the

Primal Point, the Bāb, is revealed as a civilizational reflex masquerading as neutral history. It smuggles in an unspoken criterion—that revelation must achieve immediate worldly consolidation in order to be valid—and then applies that criterion selectively. Apply it consistently and it invalidates Jesus and Karbalāʾ at once. Yet Christianity and Shīʿī Islam have already taught the world how incoherent that criterion is: the Cross and Karbalāʾ invert the grammar of success and failure by making apparent defeat into ontological disclosure. If execution refutes the Bāb, it refutes Jesus; if massacre refutes the Bāb, it refutes Ḥusayn. If the Cross and Karbalāʾ are exempted, then worldly success cannot be the measure of messianic truth. What remains is the uneven distribution of interpretive mercy across civilizations: familiarity shields one figure, sacral memory shields another, and the modern Iranian figure is denied both. Thus the persistence of the "failed messiah" label tells us less about the Bāb and the Bābīs than about the order of judgment within which he is being read—an order in which power decides meaning after the fact and calls it analysis.

The conclusion of the matter is therefore neither programmatic nor conciliatory. The Bayān does not invite the corporate-administrative order to improve itself; it renders it ontologically obsolete. It does not seek recognition from—let alone reconcialition *with*—institutions (or even individuals aligned with them) whose authority depends on postponing judgment. Instead, the Bayān exposes postponement itself as a mode of domination. It does not offer reform within procedural time; it interrupts procedural time by insisting that truth, once manifest, cannot be suspended without becoming false, and that justice, once known, cannot be deferred without being negated. The essays that were offered here proceeded from this axiomatic conviction. None asked how to optimize administration, correct capitalism, or perfect pluralism. They asked what kind of ontology makes such systems possible in the first place, and what kind of ontological rupture would render them untenable. In this sense, the Bayān is not invoked as an object of study, but as a measure—a *maḥak* (benchmark)—by which contemporary forms of power can be judged and found wanting not only morally but ontologically. The task is not to draft a blueprint for a future regime in advance; it is to restore the conditions under which truth can appear, judgment can be rendered, and responsibility can once again become determinate. Another

world does not begin with better management. It first begins with the recognition that the current one persists only by refusing to decide—and that such refusal is no longer tenable.

To put it more plainly: power, no matter how casually exercised, does not confer truth. Yet the vast majority of actors under the neoliberal capitalist corporate order act as if it does. What has collapsed is not merely trust in institutions, but the older distinction between power and truth. For most of human history—even in empires—power at least *pretended* to justify itself by appeal to truth: divine mandate, law, reason, justice, revelation, or evidence. Today, that pretense is thinning. Power increasingly operates on the assumption that repetition, visibility, and dominance are themselves truth-generating. If a claim is asserted loudly enough, often enough, by someone with reach or authority, it is treated as *true enough to act upon*, which is all that is required. This is why false administrative narratives and media framings have become so potent as well as pervasive. They do not need to be proven; they only need to circulate. Once circulated, they acquire a quasi-ontological status: not "true," but *operative*. They produce effects—reputational damage, exclusion, fear, procedural consequences—and those effects are then retroactively cited as confirmation. The logic is circular and self-sealing: power acts, effects follow, and the effects are taken as evidence that the action was justified.

In such a climate, many people no longer ask, *Is this true?* They ask, *Who is saying it? How often is it being said? And what happens if I dissent?* Truth becomes a social risk calculation rather than a correspondence with reality. Silence, acquiescence, and repetition replace judgment. This is why so many will accept an unsubstantiated claim of criminality, danger, or deviance if it comes from someone who appears institutionally embedded, narratively confident, or socially aligned with "the right side." What makes this especially dangerous is that it hollows out responsibility. If power confers truth, then no one needs to verify, hesitate, or reflect. Harm becomes an administrative byproduct rather than a moral event. Reputations can be destroyed, lives destabilized, wars normalized, and invasions aestheticized—all without anyone feeling personally accountable—because "*that's just how things are*," or worse, "*that's what the facts show*," where "facts" means whatever the dominant narrative has already decided to enforce.

To insist, then, that *power does not confer truth* is no longer a philosophical nicety; it is an act of *resistance*. It is to reassert that reality is not created by assertion, that harm does not become right because it is normalized, and that no amount of casual authority can transmute falsehood into fact. In an age where most people behave as if power and truth are interchangeable, holding them apart is not naïveté—it is fidelity to reality itself.

Thus, what Fanon grasped with devastating clarity is that under regimes of domination, truth is not merely suppressed; it is *re-engineered to serve power's psychic needs*. Colonial power does not primarily lie—it *produces a world* in which its lies are lived as reality and endlessly reproduced by it. The colonized subject is not first defeated militarily but epistemically: the categories through which reality is perceived are rearranged so that domination appears natural, necessary, and even benevolent. In such a world, truth is no longer something to be discovered; it is something administered. This is why, in Fanon's analysis, violence precedes discourse. Power does not persuade; it imposes a situation in which persuasion becomes redundant. Once the colonial order is installed, the colonizer's word acquires an automatic authority—not because it is more rational, but because it is backed by the latent threat of force. The colonized learns quickly that contesting the narrative carries costs, while internalizing it offers conditional safety. Over time, this asymmetry trains entire populations to behave *as if* power were truth, even when experience contradicts it. Fanon insists that this process is not abstract. It inscribes itself into bodies, affects, and reflexes. The dominated subject begins to anticipate accusation before it is spoken, to preemptively justify themselves, to doubt their own perception of reality. Meanwhile, the dominant subject grows increasingly casual, even bored, with the need for justification. This is the psychic economy we see today when allegations are floated without evidence, when narratives of danger or deviance are asserted as fact, and when the burden of proof silently migrates from the accuser to the accused. Power speaks; the other must explain.

Crucially, Fanon shows that domination requires not only coercion but misrecognition. The colonized must be seen—and eventually see themselves—not as political subjects, but as *problems*, *pathologies*, *threats*, or *raw material* for management. Once this shift occurs, truth itself becomes secondary to utility. Statements are no longer

evaluated by correspondence with reality, but by whether they stabilize the existing order. Does the claim justify control? Does it neutralize resistance? Does it reassure the dominant group of its moral innocence? If so, it circulates as truth, regardless of its falsity. This is why, in Fanon's framework, appeals to "objectivity" within an unjust order are so often futile. The system is not malfunctioning; it is functioning exactly as designed. To demand evidence in a regime where power already authorizes itself is to misunderstand the nature of the conflict. The issue is not a deficit of facts, but an *ontological hierarchy* that decides in advance whose speech counts as credible, whose suffering counts as real, and whose denial counts as evasive. Power does not argue; it diagnoses. It labels. It pathologizes. And once labeled, the subject's every action is reinterpreted through that imposed identity.

Fanon also warns that this dynamic produces a particular kind of moral numbness among those who benefit from it. Because power confers truth in practice, responsibility dissolves. Harm is experienced as collateral, reputational destruction as unfortunate necessity, and violence as regrettable but unavoidable. The dominant subject no longer experiences themselves as an agent of harm, but as a functionary of reality. "It's not personal," "that's just the facts," "that's how the system works"—these are the modern equivalents of *colonial rationalization*. To insist, against this entire apparatus, that power does not confer truth is therefore to strike at the heart of the colonial psyche. It is to refuse the role assigned to the dominated subject: the role of defendant in a trial whose verdict has already been written. It is to reclaim the right to name reality from experience rather than from authority. For Fanon, this insistence is inseparable from liberation, because without it there can be no genuine politics—only administration, surveillance, and managed obedience; or, to put it another way, liberal corporate-administrative totalitarianism.

In our present moment, the Fanonian diagnosis is uncannily precise. We inhabit systems where narrative dominance substitutes for evidence, where repetition substitutes for proof, and where institutional voice substitutes for truth. That most people now think and act as if power confers truth is not a moral failure of individuals; it is the predictable outcome of living too long inside structures that reward compliance and punish dissent. To say otherwise—to separate truth from power—is not idealism. It is the first step in

dismantling a world that survives by confusing the two. What this moment demands, then, is not better fact-checking within the existing order, nor more polite appeals to institutions that already confuse authority with reality. It demands a *refusal*. A refusal to accept that repetition makes a claim true, that dominance confers credibility, or that harm becomes legitimate once it is procedural. Fanon teaches that the deepest violence of domination lies precisely here: in training people to *experience power as truth* and to *experience resistance as pathology*. Once this training succeeds, injustice no longer needs to be defended; it merely needs to be enforced. To break this spell is to reassert an older, more dangerous principle: that truth is not generated by force, nor by office, nor by narrative saturation, but by fidelity to reality as lived and tested. This principle is dangerous because it reintroduces responsibility. It forces power to justify itself rather than simply circulate. It restores the distinction between accusation and proof, between authority and legitimacy, between administration and justice. In a world organized to erase these distinctions, insisting on them becomes an act of insubordination.

Fanon understood that liberation begins not with recognition from power, but with the recovery of one's own epistemic ground. To say *this is false*—and to mean it, even when the system rewards silence and punishes truth-telling—is already to step outside the colonial frame. It is to refuse the role of the accused, the managed, the explained-away. It is to reclaim the right to name reality against those who would monopolize its definition. That is why the assertion that power does not confer truth is not a slogan but a line of demarcation. On one side lies a world in which domination explains itself and suffering is normalized as outcome. On the other lies the fragile, difficult work of Truth—where claims must answer to evidence, where narratives must answer to lives, and where power, stripped of its disguises, must finally answer for what it does.

And on that note, we end this book until a future study by us will flesh out more broadly the contours of *Theophanocracy* as a *Liberation of Theosophy*. Here this book and the essays in it have been the preliminary scaffolding to that end. What has been offered is not yet a system, but a clearing: a deliberate loosening of the conceptual ground on which modern political theology, administrative reason, and emancipatory discourse alike have settled. The task ahead is to articulate, with greater precision, how manifestation may

govern without sovereignty, how judgment may occur without domination, and how truth may appear without becoming property. Such a project cannot proceed by accumulation alone, but must remain faithful to rupture, restraint, and responsibility. For now, it is enough to have marked the limits of the existing order and to have indicated—however provisionally—the possibility of another mode of *being-together*, one that does not found itself on power, but on the conditions of appearance themselves.

And the Light be upon those who follow the Illuminations of the Guidance unto the Truth!

339

Notes

[1] https://youtu.be/zgCeSv-4Vz4?si=ETda1aQBhlOgJtng (retrieved 14 January 2026).

[2] See again the prologomenon where we quoted the exordium of the Persian Bayān. Here we have paraphrased what we cited over there.

Select Bibliography

Adambakan, Soraya. *Qurrat al-'Ayn Eine Studie der religiösen und gesellschaftlichen Folgen ihres Wirkens* (Qurrat al-Ayn: A Study of the Religious and Social Consequences of Her Work). Klaus Schwarz Verlag, Berlin, 2008.

Afary, Janet. *The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906-1911: Grassroots Democracy, Social Democracy, and the Origins of Feminism*. Columbia University Press, New York, 1996.

Afnani, Moeen. *Unraveling the Mystery of The Hidden Treasure: The Origin and Development of a Hadith Qudsi and Its Application in Sufi Doctrine*, PhD dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 2011.

Agamben, Giorgio. *The Adventure*. MIT Press, Boston, 2018.
—— *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*. Translated by Daniel Heller-Roazen. Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1998.

Ahvonen, Onni. "*'I Am Not a Prisoner of History': Frantz Fanon, Temporal Defiance, and the Critique of Colonial Time.*" *Review of African Political Economy* (2025), online https://www.scienceopen.com/hosted-document?doi=10.62191/ROAPE-2025-0063 (retrieved 14 January 2026).

Amanat, Abbas. *Resurrection and Renewal: The Making of the Babi Movement in Iran, 1844-1850*. Cornell University Press, Cornell, 1989.

Arendt, Hannah. *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*. Viking Press, New York, 1963; reissued by Penguin Books, London, 2006.
—— *On Violence*. Harcourt. Brace & World, New York, 1970.
—— *The Human Condition*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1958.
—— *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. New Edition with Added Prefaces. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers, Orlando, 1973.

Aristotle. *The Politics*. Online, https://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.html (retrieved 14 January 2026).

Avicenna The Metaphysics of the Healing: A Parallel English-Arabic Text translated, introduced and annotated by Michael E. Marmura. Brigham Young University Press, Provo, 2005.

Ayātī, ʿAbd'ul Ḥusayn (Avārih). *Kashf'ul-ḥīl* (Uncovering Deception). Naqsh-i-jahān. Tehran, 1326 *solar*/1948 CE.

Azal, Wahid. *The Wretched of the Corporate State: A Fanonian Essay*. Library of the Greatest Name. Brisbane, Australia, 2025, online, https://catalogue.nla.gov.au/catalog/10197702 (retrieved 14 January 2026).

—— *Against the Postmodern Germ: Essays on Parapolitical Disinformation Architecture and the CESNUR-Bennett-Cannabis Culture Controversy*. Library of the Greatest Name. Brisbane, Australia, 2025, online, https://catalogue.nla.gov.au/catalog/10194858 (retrieved 14 January 2026).

—— *Further Reflections on the Alteration of the Divine Plans (al-badāʾ)* (2025), online, https://www.academia.edu/128386263/Further_Reflections_on_the_Alteration_of_the_Divine_Plans_al_bad%C4%81%CA%BE_ (retrieved 14 January 2026).

—— *Regarding the Alteration of the Divine Plans (al-badāʾ)* (2025), online, https://www.academia.edu/128302774/Regarding_the_Alteration_of_the_Divine_Plans_al_bad%C4%81%CA%BE_ (retrieved 14 January 2026).

—— *Rashaḥāt al-barīqa fī sharḥ al-ḥadīth al-ḥaqīqa: yā sharḥ-i-ḥadīth-i-kumayl* (*The Iridescent Spiritual Sprinklings concerning the Tradition of Ultimate Reality: Or the Commentary on the Ḥadīth Kumayl*). Library of the Greatest Name, Brisbane, Australia, 2023, online, https://catalogue.nla.gov.au/catalog/10004762 (retrieved 14 January 2026).

—— *The Completion of the Arabic Bayān and the Eight Paths*. Library of the Greatest Name, Brisbane, 2022. Online, https://catalogue.nla.gov.au/catalog/10004752 (retrieved 14 January 2026).

—— *An Early Correspondence of Mirza Yahya Nuri Subh-i-Azal with Siyyid Ali Muhammad Shirazi, the Bab (circa 1849) The Earth of the Divine Volition (arḍ al-irāda) petitions the Heaven of the Divine Will (samāʾ al-mashīʾa) from the Illumination of the Land of the Letter Ṭāʾ (ط) (Ṭehran) to the Chihrīqian Mount of Theophanic Intensity (jabal al-shadīd)* (2019), online, https://catalogue.nla.gov.au/catalog/10034619 (retrieved 14 January 2026).

—— *The Organizational Hierarchy of the Bābīs during the period of Ṣubḥ-i-Azal's residency in Baghdad (1852–1863)* (2018), online https://catalogue.nla.gov.au/catalog/10034588 (retrieved 29 December 2025).

—— *A Preliminary Survey of the Cyprus Bayānī Corpus, Part I: The Works of the Bāb*. 2016, online, https://catalogue.nla.gov.au/catalog/10034610 (retrieved 14 January 2026).
—— *Journey with Me unto the Divine Throne* in LUVAH: Journal of the Creative Imagination, 2013: 2-25, online, https://catalogue.nla.gov.au/catalog/10034706 (retrieved 14 January 2026).
—— *Invoking the Seven Worlds: An acrostic prayer by Mirza Yahya Nuri Subh-i-Azal*, LUVAH: Journal of the Creative Imagination, 2013, online (version 1) https://catalogue.nla.gov.au/catalog/10039948 (retrieved 14 January 2026), and (version 2), online, https://catalogue.nla.gov.au/catalog/10038450 (retrieved 14 January 2026).

Badakhchani, S.J (ed. & trans.) *Spiritual Resurrection in Shiʿi Islam: An Early Ismāʿīlī Treatise on the Doctrine of the Qīyāmat*. I.B. Tauris Publishers in association with the Institute of Ismaili Studies, London, 2017.

Bayat, Mangol. *Mysticism and Dissent: Socioreligious Thought in Qajar Iran*. Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, 1982.

Brown, Wendy. *Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism's Stealth Revolution*. New York, Zone Books, 2015).

Browne, Edward G. *Mīrzā Ḥusayn Hamādānī's Tārīkh-i-Jadīd or New History*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1893.

Burrows, Cedric D. *Rhetorical Crossover: The Black Presence in White Culture*. University of Pittsburch Press, Pittsburgh, 2020.

Chittick, William C. *The Sufi Path of Knowledge: Ibn al-'Arabi's Metaphysics of Imagination*. State University of New York Press, Albany, 1989.

Cole, Juan R.I. Cole. "*Race, Immorality and Money in the American Baha'i Community: Impeaching the Los Angeles Spiritual Assembly*," Religion 30, no. 2 (2000): 109-125, 141-147.
—— "*The Baha'i Faith in America as Panopticon, 1963-1997*," Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, vol. 37, no. 2 (June 1998): 234-248.

Critchley, Simon. *The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas*. Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1992).

Dabashi, Hamid. *Shiʿism: A Religion of Protest*. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 2011.

de Castro, Eduardo Viveiros. "*Cosmological Deixis and Amerindian Perspectivism*" in *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 4, no. 3 (1998): 469–488; and "*Cannibal Metaphysics: For a Post-structural Anthropology*. Edited and translated by Peter Skafish. Univocal series, 2014.

Derrida, Jacques. *Politics of Friendship*. Verso, London & New York, 2005.
—— *On Touching—Jean-Luc Nancy*. Stanford University Press, Standford, 2005.
—— *On Grammatology*. Translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. John Hopkins University, Press, Baltimore, 1997.

Descola, Philippe. *Beyond Nature and Culture*. Translated by Janet Lloyd and foreword by Marshall Sahlins. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2013.

Dunn, John. *Setting the People Free: The Story of Democracy*. Atlantic Books, London, 2005.

Esposito, Robert. *Communitas: The Origin and Destiny of Community*. Translated by Timothy Campbell. Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2009.

Fanon, Frantz. *The Wretched of the Earth.* Translated by Constance Farrington. Grove Press, New York, 1963; *The Wretched of the Earth.* Translated by Richard Philcox. Grove Press, New York, 2004.
—— *Black Skin, White Masks*. Translated by Charles Lam Markmann. Pluto Press, London, 2008; *Black Skin, White Masks*. Translated by Richard Philcox. Penguin Random House, London, 2021.

Foster, John Bellamy. *Marx's Ecology: materialism and nature*. Monthly Review Press, New York, 2000.

Foucault, Michel. *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–1978*. Ed. Michel Senellart, Translated by Graham Burchell, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
—— *The Order of Things: An Archeology of Human Sciences*. Vintage Books, London and New York, 2004.
—— *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–1977*. Edited by Colin Gordon. Pantheon Books, New York, 1980.

Graeber, David. *The Utopia of Rules: On Technology, Stupidity, and the Secret Joys of Bureaucracy*. Brooklyn, Melville House, 2015.

Goodin, Robert E. and Tilly Charles (ed.). *The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006.

Heidegger, Martin. *Being and Time: A Translation of Sein und Zeit*. Translated by Josh Stambaugh. SUNY, Albany, 1996.
—— *Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings: from Being and Time* (1927) *to The Task of Thinking* (1964). Revised and Expanded Edition. Edited by David Farrell Krell. Harper Collins Publishers, San Francisco, 1993.
—— *What Is Called Thinking?* Translated by J. Glenn Gray. Harper & Row, New York, 1968.
—— *Being and Time*. Translated by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson. Harper and Row Publishers, New York, 1962.

Ibn al-ʿArabī, Muḥyīddīn. *The Bezels of Wisdom*. Translation and Introduction by R.W.J. Austin. Paulist Press, Mahwah, New Jersey, 1980.

Jambet, Christian. *The Act of Being: The Philosophy of Revelation in Mullā Ṣadrā*. Zone Books, New York, 2006.

Kierkegaard, Søren. *The Concept of Anxiety*. Translated by Reidar Thomte. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1980.

Kirmānī, Mīrzā Aghā Khān and Rūḥī, Shaykh Aḥmad. *Hasht Bihisht* (Eight Heavens). Bayani Digital Publications, 2001, online, https://archive.org/details/8-behesht/ (retrieved 14 January 2026).

Latour, Bruno. *Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy*. Translayed by Catherine Porter. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2004.

Losurdo, Domenico. *Liberalism: A Counter-History*. Translated by Gregory Elliott. Verso, London, 2011.

MacEoin, Denis. *The Messiah of Shiraz*. E.J. Brill, Leiden, 2008.
—— *Sources for Early Bābī Doctrine and History*. E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1992.
—— "*From Babism to Baha'ism: Problems of Militancy, Quietism, and Conflation in the Construction of a Religion.*" *Religion* 13 (1983): 219–55.
—— "*Azalī Bābism*" (in *The Encyclopedia Iranica*). Online, https://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/azali-babism/ (retrieved 14 January 2026).

Massad, Joseph. *Islam in Liberalism*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2014.
—— *The Age of Independence: A Global History of Settler-Colonialism*. Princeton University Press, forthcoming.

Massignon, Louis. *The Passion of al-Ḥallāj: Mystic and Martyr of Islam*. Translated by Herbert Mason. 4 volumes. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1982.

Engles, Friedrich and Marx, Karl. *The Communist Manifesto*. Online, https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/ (retrieved 14 January 2025).
—— *Capital*, volume 1. Online, https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Capital-Volume-I.pdf (retrieved 14 January 2025).

Meiksins-Wood, Ellen. *Democracy Against Capitalism: Renewing Historical Materialism*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995.

Miller, William M. *The Baha'i Faith: It's History and Teachings*. William Carey Library, Pasadena, 1974.

Mills, Charles W. *The Racial Contract*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1999.

Mokhiber, Craig. "*Ushering in the age of impunity: Venezuela, Palestine, and the end of international law*." Mondoweiss (7 January 2026), online, https://mondoweiss.net/2026/01/ushering-in-the-age-of-impunity-venezuela-palestine-and-the-end-of-international-law/ (retrieved 14 January 2026).

Momen, Moojan and Smith, Peter. "*The Babi Movement: A Resource Mobilization Perspective*," in *Iran: Studies in Babi and Bahá'í History*, vol. 3, (ed.) Peter Smith (Kalimat Press: Los Angeles, 1986): 33-93.

Morris, James Winston. *The Wisdom of the Throne: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1981.

Nabavī-Razavī, Siyyid Miqdād. *Tarīkh-i-maktūm: nigāhī bi-talāsh-hā'ī sīyāsī-i-faʿʿālān azalī dar mukhālifat bā ḥukūmat-i-qajār va tadāruk-i-inqilāb-i-mashrūtih* (Concealed History: An Investigation into the Role of Azalī Activists in Opposition to the Qājār Regime and the Genesis of the Constitutional Revolution). (Pardis, Tehran, 2014.
—— *Asnādī darbāri-i-jāygāh-i-mīrzā yaḥyā-i-nūrī ṣubḥ-i-azal dar nigāh-i-sayyid ʿalī-i-muḥammad-i-bāb* (Documentary Material Regarding the Position of Mīrzā Yaḥyā Nūrī Subḥ-i-Azal from the Perspective of Siyyid ʿAlī Muḥammad, the Bāb). Unpublished thesis. Shahīd Bihishtī University, 2013.

Nūrī, Mīrzā Ḥusayn-ʿAlī (Bahāʾuʾllāh). *Kitab-i-Aqdas*. Online, https://www.bahai.org/library/authoritative-texts/bahaullah/kitab-i-aqdas/ (retrieved 14 January 2026).

Nūrī, Mīrzā Yaḥyā (Ṣubḥ-i-Azal). *Mutammim'ul-bayān* (The Continuation of the Bayān). Online, https://bayanic.com/lib/fwd/mutamim/Mutamim-FWD.html (retrieved 14 January 2026), and https://bayanic.com/lib/typed/sacred/Azal/PBayan.pdf (retrieved 14 January 2026).
—— *Kitāb-i-mustayqiz* (The Book of the Sleeper Awakened). Online, https://bayanic.com/lib/fwd/must/Must-FWD.html?id=must (retrieved 14 January 2026), and, https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b531647206.r=Arabe%206248?rk=21459;2 (retrieved 14 January 2026).

Oderberg, David. *Real Essentialism*. Routledge, London, 2007.

Polanyi, Karl. *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*. Farrar & Rinehart, New York, 1944.

Rawls, John. *The Law of Peoples: With the Idea of Public Reason Revisited*. Harvard University Press, 1999.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. *A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality and A Discourse on Political Economy*. Translated by G.D.H. Cole. Edition: Digireads.com, Stillwell, KS, 2005.

Sait, Siraj and Lim, Hilary. *Land, Law and Islam: Property and Human Rights in the Muslim World*. Zed Books, London & New York, 2006.

Saito, Kohei. *Slow Down: The Degrowth Manifesto*. Translated by Brian Bergstrom. Astra House, New York, 2024.
—— *Capital, Nature, and the Unfinished Critique of Political Economy: Karl Marx's Eco-Socialism* Monthly Review Press, New York, 2017.

Sartre, Jean-Paul. *Existentialism Is a Humanism*. Translated by Carol Macomber. Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 2007.
—— *Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology*. Translated by Hazel E. Barnes. Washington Square Press, New York, 1956.

Sharīʿatī, ʿAlī. *Red Shiʿism and Black Shiʿism*. Online, https://archive.org/details/AliShariatiRedAndBlackShiism (retrieved 14 January 2026).

Shīrāzī, Siyyid ʿAlī Muḥammad (the Bāb). *Kitāb-i-panj shaʾn* (The Book of the Five Grades). Lithograph edition. No date, no place, online, https://archive.org/details/panjshan101 (retrieved 14 January 2026).

—— *Bayān-i-fārsī* (The Persian Bayān). Lithograph edition. No date, no place, online, https://archive.org/details/20201208_20201208_1113 (retrieved 14 January 2026).
—— *Bayān-i-fārsī* (The Persian Bayān). Bayanic.com edition. 2013, online, https://bayanic.com/lib/typed/sacred/Point/Persian-Bayan/PersianBayan.pdf (retrieved 14 January 2026).
—— *Bayān-i-ʿarabī* (The Arabic Bayān). Lithograph edition. No date, no place, online, https://archive.org/details/ArabicBayan_201903 (retrieved 14 January 2026).
—— *Qayyūm al-Asmāʾ* (The Commentary on the Sūrah of Joseph). **MS**, online, https://bayanic.com/lib/fwd/qayum/Qayum-FWD.html (retrieved 14 January 2026).

Spiker, Hasan. *Things as They are: Nafs al-Amr and the Metaphysical Foundations of Objective Truth*. Tabah Foundation, Abu Dhabi, 2021.

Suhrawardī, Shihābuddīn Yaḥyā. *Prayers to the Orient of Light: A translation and text of Shihābuddīn Yaḥyā Suhrawardī's The Spiritual Influxes and Sanctifications (al-wāridāt wa'l-taqdīsāt)*. Translated by Wahid Azal with introduction, text and glosses. Library of the Greatest Name. Brisbane, 2025, online, https://catalogue.nla.gov.au/catalog/10174895 (retrieved 14 January 2026).
—— *Suhrawardi: The Philosophical Allegories and Mystical Treatises: A Parallel Persian-English Text Edited and Translated with an Introduction by Wheeler M. Thackston*. Mazda Publishers, Costa Mesa, California, 1999.
—— *Suhrawardi: The Philosophy of Illumination, A New Critical Edition of the Text of Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq with English Translation, Notes, Commentary and Introduction by John Walbridge & Hossein Ziai.* Brigham Young University Press, Provo, Utah, 1999.

Tilly, Charles. *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1992*. Blackwell, Oxford, 1992.

Weber, Max. The Sociology of Religion. Beacon Press, Boston, 1978.
—— *Economy and Society*. Ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1978.

Wilson, Peter Lamborn. *False Messiah: Crypto-Xtian Tracts & Fragments*. Autonomedia/Logosophia, Brooklyn, 2022.

Wolin, Sheldon S. *Democracy Incorporated: Managed Democracy and the Specter of Inverted Totalitarianism*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2008.

Zuboff, Shoshana. *The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight For A Human Future At The New Frontier Of Power*. Profile Books, London, 2019.

ص